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On October 6–7, 2011 an international conference took place in Debrecen enti-
tled “Small Nations in between Great Powers”. The conference was organized 
jointly by the Institute of History, University of Debrecen and the Department 
of History and Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä. Altogether twenty speakers 
participated in this two-day event, eleven from the University of Debrecen and 
nine from the University of Jyväskylä. All presentations concentrated on the 
main topic of the conference, the historical role of small nations vs. great pow-
ers, and the majority of them approached the theme from the perspective of 
Finnish and Hungarian history. The articles in the present volume are based on 
the presentations given in the conference. 
Both Finland’s and Hungary’s history provides examples of many interac-
tions between these two states or nations and their neighbouring great powers. 
Both countries have long been under the influence or under direct rule of 
neighbouring great powers and thus have had in many respects similar historical 
experiences.  
However, this volume also addresses histories of other nations and states be-
sides Finland and Hungary. The relationship between small nations and great 
powers is thus explored from a broader or even global perspective and in a wide 
chronological span, ranging from early medieval times to modern Europe. As 
for the perspective, the relationship between small and great powers can be 
discussed, on the one hand, on a concrete level when the states share a common 
frontier. On the other hand, several articles in this collection discuss interactions 
and cooperation in international arenas or transnational influences between 
states that do not border each other. The present volume has several sub-themes 
investigating empires and powers as well as small nations through medieval and 
early modern times, also discussing their relationship in colonial contexts. It 
aims to explore issues of the relations and international co-operation of small 
states and great powers during the twentieth century, too. 
It is impossible to find a common theoretical approach or method to all arti-
cles in this book, as the individual texts cover such a wide thematic, historical 
and geographical area. However, from the title of this volume, a number of key 
concepts can be distinguished. First of all, there is the highly controversial term 
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“nation”. In relation to this, what kind of nations can be counted as “small”? On 
the other hand, there is the concept of “great power”, which is not unambiguous 
either.  
There is an abundance of scholarly literature on nations and nationalism1, 
and it is not the intention of this volume to delve into that complicated question. 
However, some basic definitions are in order. One of the main debates relating 
to the definitions of nations and nationalism is the question whether nations are 
products of the modern age or if they precede it. Can the forms of pre-modern 
national consciousness be linked with the modern forms of nationalism? There 
has been general consensus between the main scholars of the subject that na-
tionalism is a modern phenomenon, forming around 1800.2 This is interesting 
also from the viewpoint of the present volume, since many articles discuss the 
pre-modern period. 
The definition of nation has several dimensions. It is often emphasised that a 
nation has common national characteristics, above all common language, as 
well as common history, culture and ethnicity. Secondly, there is the political 
aspect of a nation, which leads to an implication that a nation equals an inde-
pendent state. In addition, there is the element of cultural construction, such as 
in Benedict Anderson’s view of “the imagined communities”.3 All these ele-
ments are manifest in a number of articles in our collection. 
Great powers can be understood as countries which can rely primarily on 
their own resources when defending their existence and interests.4 As Vesna 
Danilovic has noted, history of international relations has traditionally been 
presented as history of the great powers, or “major powers”, which according to 
her has come into more common use recently. However, the term great powers 
came into diplomatic and scholarly discourse only in the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, when the political system of Europe was reorganized after the 
fall of Napoleon.5 Danilovic distinguishes three criteria in defining a great 
power. The first is the size of a state’s power potential or capacities. The second 
relates to the spatial dimension, i.e. the geographical size. Thirdly, there is the 
issue of status: the state is recognised as a great power and it also sees itself as 
such and, moreover, is willing to act as one.6  
                                                 
1  See, for example, Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of 
Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism, Routledge, London, 1998, ix. 
2  Oliver Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, 1890–1940, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 4–5. 
3  For an overview of the subject, see Zimmer, Nationalism, 7–15. 
4  Paul W. Schroeder, ”Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?”, The 
American Historical Review 97: 3 (1992) 688. 
5  Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major 
Powers, University of Michigan Press, 2002, 26–28. 




As for the definition of small nations, the adjective “small” can be under-
stood here as referring to the relative size of a nation or a state. The main 
criterion is usually population, although the geographical area or the size of 
national economy are also used. Nowadays, small states sometimes refer to very 
small or micro-states. However, any exact figures or dividing lines are not very 
useful, especially in a historical context. 
Some authors have addressed the theme of how small nations or states fare 
when interacting with great powers. A useful analysis of the definition of a 
small nation in a historical context, albeit primarily referring to the situation 
during the twentieth century, has been made by Madelon de Keizer and Ismee 
Tames. They note that due to the lack of objective criteria, some scholars have 
argued that there is no definition of a small state. Like in the present volume, for 
Tames and de Keizer, a nation does not necessarily equal to a state. Tames and 
de Keizer argue, according to a definition made by Annette Baker Fox, that 
small states are local powers whose interests and demands extend to their own 
geographical area and to the immediate area. In contrast, great powers wield 
their influence over wider areas. Small states are limited in their policy choices 
and can often feel a threat to their existence. Therefore, survival strategies are 
essential.7 Baker Fox points out that the general assumption as to the relations 
of the great powers and small states is that “the great powers determine the 
course of world politics and that the small powers can do little but to acquiesce 
in their decisions”.8 Baker Fox, however, notes that the reality is not always that 
straightforward, and based on the case studies included in the present collection, 
we can surely agree with her.. 
At the beginning of the 21st century the issue of small nations and great 
powers has a peculiar relevance, since it can be observed that larger structures 
have been shaping beyond the traditional frames of nation-states, and the 
smaller states getting integrated into them are reluctant to abandon certain ele-
ments of their historical sovereignty and yield them over to supranational for-
mations. For instance, the dilemma of the relationship of the member states and 
the European Union is very much similar to the one smaller states – existing 
within imperial structures throughout their history – experienced in the past, 
when they had to give up certain elements of their national sovereignty. The 
historical experience gained in this way could raise interesting issues from 
which the 21st century readers can learn a lot. 
 
                                                 
7  Madelon de Keizer and Ismee Tames, ”Introduction”, in: Small Nations: Crisis and 
Confrontation in the 20th century, eds. Madelon de Keizer and Ismee Tames, Zutphen, 
2008, 7–24; Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States, University of Chicago Press, 
1959, 1–4. 
8  Baker Fox, The Power of Small States, 2. 
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Empires and powers in medieval context 
 
The duality of small nations and great powers already existed in the medieval 
world. During the Middle Ages Hungary was an independent and internation-
ally recognized state. Furthermore, in some periods of the country’s medieval 
history it appeared as a regional power on the political scene and was able to 
seize large territories from its neighbours or force its influence on them. There-
fore, Hungary had some of the necessary requirements to be considered a great 
power and was also – consciously – aware of its status as being one. This glori-
ous age ended at the beginning of the 16th century when the country found itself 
entrapped between two emerging powers, the Habsburg and the Ottoman Em-
pires. After Hungary suffered a devastating defeat from the Turks in 1526, the 
Habsburgs gained control over the north-western part of the country while the 
middle and southern territories were occupied by the Turks. Being incorporated 
into the Habsburg Empire meant for them almost the same as living within the 
Swedish Empire did for the Finns. This matter is discussed by Attila Bárány in 
the second chapter of the first section. 
However, it was not only Hungary that lived through the conflict of small 
nationhood and the experience of being – or being seen as – a grand power. It 
was also shared by Lithuania, which was able to rise as a considerable power in 
the Eastern European region. Reflecting from the beginning of the 21st century, 
one is inclined to view medieval states in the mirror of modern, 19th century 
nationalism. It is obvious that the medieval empires did not have any kind of 
modern national “consciousness”. Then what were the ideological elements that 
these empires were held up by? These questions are touched by Gábor Bradács 
in the context of medieval Germany. 
Attila Bárány and László Pósán both examine great powers in a regional 
and geopolitical sense, namely medieval Hungary and Lithuania. Bárány gives 
an overview of Hungary’s relationship to her neighbouring countries, from 
Croatia and the Holy Roman Empire in the west to Wallachia in the east. He 
discusses Hungarian expansions as well as examines the long-troubled relation-
ship with the Russian principalities and Bohemia, and the warm rapports with 
Poland. While Hungary aspired to be a great power it had always been fighting 
for its own survival between the superpowers of the Holy Roman Empire and 
Byzantium. Bárány has a dualistic scope, analyzing the “imperial” aspects of 
Hungarian expansion, whereas outlining those of the defence policies against 
German and Byzantine expansion at the same time. He underlines the major, 
symbolic motive in Hungarian historical mythology, the preservation of sover-
eignty in order that Hungary not be subordinated to any overlordship, and its 
kings be of equal status to any of the Christian monarchs. In the cross-fire of 




became a grand power in the reflections of her neighbours, and its kings’ self-
recognition was also twofold.  
Pósán assesses the circumstances of the birth of the “pagan great power” in 
the Baltic region, stressing that among the Baltic peoples only the Lithuanians 
were able to establish an independent state. Lithuanian statehood presented 
remarkable divergence compared with kingdoms that had come into existence 
around the millennium: statehood was not linked to the adoption of Christianity, 
but took place amidst the gentilitial structures of a pagan world. The existence 
of Grand Duchy was proof of the possibility of building a territorial power-
structure based on heathen fundaments which was capable of significant expan-
sion and of becoming a political factor in Eastern Europe. Pósán presents s the 
ever-present dilemma of converting to Christianity for the sake of national sur-
vival or fighting against the “conversion in arms” and in this way preserving 
national integrity. In a way, the tribal leaders were right since they could earn an 
independent statehood while expanding onto large areas of neighbouring Slavs 
as well as were able to halt the aggressive advances of the German knights, and 
moreover, were able to survive the aggression of the Tatars. Pósán highlights 
the religious pluralism based on political considerations. 
Gábor Bradács discusses imperial and national consciousness in the empire 
of the Ottonian and Salian emperors, which, from 919 to 1125 may be consid-
ered as the first realm of the medieval Europe, which has a continuity with a 
nation and a state that still exists today (Germany). He discusses whether it is 
possible to say that this Regnum Theutonicorum had a “German” consciousness 
in its modern sense. Bradács considers what contemporary sources may contain 
information of this “national” and “imperial” self-awareness. He also focuses on 
the policy of the early “German state” towards Central and Eastern Europe, 
especially the Christianization aspirations. He seeks answers to the question if 
this policy was determined and ideologized only by the church and its endeav-
ours to convert the heathen Slavonic, Hungarian or Danish people, or if it had a 
kind of “secular” ambition in this relation too. The article  comes to a conclu-
sion regarding whether the early German “state” had any sense or ambition of 
being a “world-power”, or not. 
 
 
Small nations and great powers in the early Modern period  
 
The early Modern period had a diverse affect on European small nations, for 
example, on Finland or the Low Countries. Four articles look at these issues. 
The Netherlands, in the territorial and demographic sense, was treated as a small 
country, at the same time, due to its geographical position and economic devel-
opment, it inevitably became a factor in the 17th–18th-century grand policy. That 
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is, it had the features of a small country yet had to face the threat of neighbour-
ing powers (in the first place, France) and was a great power having remarkable 
influence in the European political theatre. Moreover, the small Netherlands 
became an empire itself as it gained control of rich and significant overseas 
lands. Finland, which from a geographical point of view played a much more 
peripheral role, had a “multiple” role in the period in a different way. The terri-
tories populated by Finns entered the era as part of the Crown of Sweden which 
subsequently became a decisive factor and grand power itself. The Finnish peo-
ple in a way “suffered” and “made benefit of” an imperial structure, and along 
their eastern boundaries they were to see the emergence of another imperial 
frame, that of Russia, the final conflict of which was to take place during the 
Napoleonic wars. Finland, as a consequence, became part of the Russian em-
pire. With regard to Finland’s constitutional status this political shift had sig-
nificant consequences, since the country, which never had autonomy when it 
was part of Sweden, finally gained some sort of independence within the Rus-
sian Empire.  
Réka Bozzay discusses the birth of a “leading small nation” in Europe, the 
Netherlands, which rose to being one of the defining factors of the political map 
of the power system in certain periods during the 17th–19th centuries. Even be-
fore a new state was created in 1648 in the area of the Protestant Union of 
Utrecht, the Seven United Provinces had been waging a common and successful 
economic and foreign policy. The author discusses what contributed to the suc-
cess of this little Commonwealth. First, social and economic developments 
which led to the emergence of a (pre)-capitalist system are examined. Then, 
Bozzay emphasizes the role of trade companies and the successful trade wars, 
which insured the Seven United Provinces a great power position in Europe. 
Petri Karonen’s article gives an overview of the role and status of Finland 
and Finns during the early modern era. He argues that Finland and the Finns had 
a special rank and status in the Swedish realm. During that period, “Finland” 
was understood and defined in different ways in different contexts. The basis of 
the special status was that Finland was seen as a valuable resource and a 
“buffer” against possible attacks from the East. The war  and the relationship 
with Russia played a crucial role in the common history of Sweden and Finland, 
especially from the Finnish point of view. It is also important to note that al-
ready in the beginning of the 17th century the Swedish realm was a highly cen-
tralized and controlled state. Karonen also points out that during that period, the 
status of the Finnish language was not a major issue for the representatives of 
the three upper estates in Finland. 
Two articles discuss the time period in the early nineteenth century when 
Sweden had to cede Finland to Russia. Erzsébet Bodnár examines the Russian 




tion was a problem successfully managed by Russian diplomacy between 1801 
and 1815. At the beginning of his reign, Alexander I (1801–1825) and his dip-
lomatic administration did everything to avoid European conflicts, particularly a 
war with Sweden. But in 1807 Napoleon defeated Russia, and the Treaty of 
Tilsit gave Alexander the opportunity to advance Russian interests in the North 
against Sweden and in the South against the Ottoman Empire. In the Treaty of 
Fredrikshamn (Hamina) – which concluded the Finnish War (1808–1809) – 
Sweden ceded territories of Finland (the Grand Duchy of Finland) to the Rus-
sian Empire. The treaty indicated a change which finally led to an alteration of 
the Northern European political system and had an influence on European pol-
icy of Russia. 
The town of Vyborg is an interesting and special research subject as a result 
of its multicultural nature and status as a border town between the Russian Em-
pire and Finland. In her article which offers an entirely different perspective to 
that of Bodnár’s, Piia Einonen discusses how serfdom was manifested in Vy-
borg and how serfs were treated in the beginning of the 19th century. The main 
emphasis is on the cultural conflict of the Russian inhabitants’ attitudes towards 
serfs compared to those of other residents who saw the serfdom as an abhorrent 
feature of Russian culture. Keeping serfs was a way of manifesting power and 
emphasizing Russians’ status as representatives of conquering empire. On the 
other hand, Einonen argues that the reunion with the Grand Duchy re-enforced 
Vyborg’s status as a Finnish town, emphasized the return to western norms, and 
created a space for criticizing practices of serfdom, thus, cultural collisions.  
 
 
Small nations in colonial contexts 
 
Since the dichotomy of small nationhood and grand power existence was not 
only a European phenomenon, some articles discuss colonial empires and colo-
nial issues. In overseas territories it was mostly the European colonial powers 
that acted as great powers and the colonized peoples as small nations, but it is 
not that simple. There were cases when the colonizer settlers striving for greater 
independence turned against their parent state, which were aiming to extend its 
influence over them as well, seen here in articles dealing with the American 
Revolution (1763–1789) or the Boer Wars (1899–1902). An also interesting 
phenomenon is that smaller states were able to build up a colonial empire like 
Portugal, Belgium or the Netherlands, the latter of which is looked at in depth in 
an article below.  
A partly-colonial field is investigated by Csaba Lévai, who studies the com-
parisons of Hungary and the British colonies in North America in the 18th cen-
tury. Both territories enjoyed widespread political and economic autonomy 
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within their respective empires during the first half of the 18th century. How-
ever, for similar reasons, both imperial centres initiated a new policy towards 
the peripheries in the second half of the century, and some elements of this new 
policy were also similar, such as the mercantilist economic policy. The new 
policy of the imperial centres resulted in resistance on the part of local elites on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and the methods of this resistance against the imperial 
centres were also somewhat similar. This resistance movement led to an armed 
conflict in North America, but Hungary also arrived at the brink of open revolt 
by the end of the rule of Joseph II (1780–1790). In contrast to North America 
where this conflict led to the separation of the colonies from the mother country, 
the new ruler of the Habsburg Empire, Leopold II (1790–1792), could reach a 
compromise with the Hungarian estates.  
Gábor Pusztai gives an overview of the development of the Dutch colonial 
empire during the 19th–20th centuries, and examines the issue how a “small na-
tion” could retain such an extending and rich colonial system in the midst of 
warring superpowers. He stresses that from the perspective of world politics, 
and from the Asian one, the Netherlands  still remained a great power up to the 
mid-20th century at the East Asian theatre.  
Gábor Szabó-Zsoldos looks at Anglo-Boer relations in the 1870s, examin-
ing the British ambition to unite the colonies of South Africa under British flag, 
and the Boer responses. He argues that the situation had a significant impact on 
Anglo-Boer political relations and strengthened Afrikaner nationalism in Trans-
vaal. He also discusses the process of the integration of the Boer, as a small 
nation, and Transvaal to South African Confederation.  
Closely related to Szabó-Zsoldos’s article, Timo Särkkä discusses imperial 
connection of the British Empire to the Boer Republics of the late nineteenth 
century, in comparison with the attempted Russification of the Grand Duchy of 
Finland by the Russian Empire. The comparison of the case of Boers to the case 
of Finns is mostly made in the context of the Victorian periodical press in Brit-
ain. For the British Liberals of the late 1890s, imperialism referred particularly 
to South Africa, where the two Boer Republics, the Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State waged a war (1899–1902) against the British. At the turn of the twen-
tieth century, the dispute over the political rights of the Boers was widely com-
pared by liberal intellectuals in the London press to minority rights questions in 
various other imperial powers, including the Russian Empire. The attempted 
Russification of Finland, which occurred simultaneously, offered the liberal 
intellectuals an opportunity, not only to express their sympathy for the Finns, 
but also to point out the inconsistency of liberal principles with imperialism. 
Finland’s autonomous status was understood as a suitable example of the proper 





Relations and international cooperation between small states  
and great powers in the 20th century 
 
The Paris Peace Conference, which put end to the Great War in 1919–1920, 
entirely redrew the borders of Europe, changed the geopolitical structure of the 
continent and, besides it, radically changed the relationship between small and 
great nations. After the fall of the three great empires, the Russian, the Ottoman 
and the Austro-Hungarian, some nations successfully regained their once lost 
independence, for example the Estonians, the Finns, the Poles, the Latvians and 
the Lithuanians. Others, like the Romanians, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Serbs, 
and the Croatians found themselves in newly created states with vast territories 
populated by several ethnic groups. A third group consisted of Germans, Aus-
trians, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Turks, who were among the defeated nations 
and as a consequence had to give up their status as great or middle powers in 
order to fulfil their uncertain destiny as nation-states. Post-war conditions cre-
ated by the Paris Peace Treaties were far from idyllic; especially the members 
of the losing side were dissatisfied with them. 
When boundaries were changed and new states were created in the peace 
settlement after World War One, a number of minority treaties were concluded 
and subsequently placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. It was 
precisely the small states between Germany and the Soviet Union that had to 
assume obligations on minority protection after World War One. In her article, 
Satu Matikainen compares policies of two states, Finland, a small state, and 
Britain, a great power, relating to the League minority protection system in 
1929 when the question of altering the minority protection system came up and 
was thoroughly considered. Due to different positions of the two states, Britain 
had usually, but not always, a more central, influential and visible role than 
Finland which was usually content to follow the lead of the great powers. Both 
countries urged for moderation and were against more extreme opinions and 
demands of other Council members, both those willing to strengthen and widen 
minority protection and those willing to weaken it. 
Anssi Halmesvirta shows in his article how diplomacy and semi-official 
cultural and propaganda organisations of Finland and Hungary viewed each 
other and their interests during the Second World War, in their campaign on the 
side of the Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945. Halmes-
virta also analyses how the realities of the war and the prospect of defeat 
changed the situation. During the war, both Finns and Hungarians embarked on 
a campaign of expansion, although from different reasons. At first, war-time 
optimism was running high, which led to big visions on the part of kinship ac-
tivists and a strong feeling of identification between the nations, the peak year 
being 1942. The Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki was very active in controlling 
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and sorting out what information or propaganda material from Finland was to be 
disseminated in Hungary and vice versa to promote the common cause. How-
ever, in 1943 the mood turned more serious, and by autumn 1944 these kinds of 
kinship activities ceased. Both Finland and Hungary had ended up on the losing 
side. Kinship policies and the work of the pressure groups in kinship societies in 
both countries had contributed to the war-mongering, but as they were not in 
important decision-making positions, they can be regarded as playing auxiliary 
roles. 
The victory of the Allied Forces in the summer of 1945 was a major turning 
point in great power politics since for the first time in history the power to con-
trol the Old Continent and the rest of the world slipped through the fingers of 
Europe. The two new superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet 
Union, followed different models in their historical development than the Euro-
pean one. Pax Sovietica brought a new era for the nations of Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe. With the exception of Finns and Austrians, they were all obliged to 
adopt the Soviet model, which process was of course emphasized by the pres-
ence of the Red Army. This did not only mean the Sovietization of their domes-
tic relations, which was somewhat eased after Stalin died in 1953, but also de-
termined their foreign, military (Warsaw Pact) and economic (Comecon) rela-
tions. Although after 1945 Finland chose the Western style in the management 
of its economic, political and social affairs, the Finns were very careful that 
their neutrality would appear in a positive and friendly light from a Soviet per-
spective. This is especially true for the period between 1956 and 1983 when 
Urho Kekkonen was the president of the republic. These abilities were ac-
knowledged internationally when in 1975 Finland hosted the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, which resulted in the signing of the Hel-
sinki Final Act. Moreover the so-called “Finnlandization” concept, which was 
modelled on the special Finnish-Russian relationship, also had an effect on the 
foreign policy of the Kádár era. In terms of foreign policy the scope of action 
for Budapest was certainly much narrower than for the sovereign Finland along 
the northern border of the Soviet block. The small nations of the region could 
only follow the lead of Finland and Austria in introducing a western type of 
administration after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The peoples who live 
between the West and the East, which is also called “The Land Between”, hope 
that the adaptation of the western type of development model and their joining 
the close western integrations, such as the EU or the NATO, will secure their 
future both in the European and in the global field. 
In his study entitled British Ideas on the Post WWII Europe and Hungary, 
Róbert Barta illustrates the official and unofficial notions the British Empire 
had with respect to post-war Europe and Soviet-occupied Hungary and how it 




Churchill and also the diplomatic dispatches of A. F. Gascoigne, a British dip-
lomat serving in Hungary. According to the results of Barta’s research, it is 
important to emphasize that Churchill’s activity strengthened a Western Euro-
pean movement for unity and helped secure the Marshall Plan. He radically op-
posed a policy of appeasement if rooted in weakness, but he was also convinced 
that the West must negotiate with Moscow from a position of power. He accepted 
the division of Europe (and Germany) as a temporary condition, but he would 
render a Finland-type solution (independence, with friendship with the Soviet Un-
ion) for Eastern European Soviet satellite states. As he believed in Western democ-
ratic values, he considered that the kind of government the Soviet Union had was 
part of their domestic affairs. He may have been the first leader in the West to 
realize that rigid anticommunist propaganda and an unreasonably strong opposi-
tion against the Soviet Union would only solidify it as a police state. Since the 
Americans never formally accepted Europe’s division, Churchill could not get 
Stalin to repeat the percentage distributions of political influence as he had in Oc-
tober 1944. As a British diplomat in Hungary Gascoigne could represent a very 
weak and limited British influence in the region (because of the general weakness 
of the post WWII British Empire). Gascoigne tried to give an objective picture on 
Hungary though he was keen on the non-communist parties and the Hungarian 
Roman Catholic Church as well. But this old fashioned British gentleman could 
not represent the interests of a weak and disillusioned British Empire in a country 
where the Soviet Red Army had an upper hand. In spite of this limited British in-
volvement, Gascoigne’s subtle analyses give us a chance to clarify more delicate 
focus on the diplomatic history of that period. 
In his article, Simo Mikkonen shows how after Stalin’s death in 1953, the 
Soviet presence in the international arena became manifold. Mikkonen’s article 
focuses on describing the general framework for Soviet cultural diplomacy, 
mainly during the Khrushchev era, but also makes connections to Finland 
briefly. Mikkonen points out that Soviet foreign cultural operations have never 
been subjected to extensive scrutiny since Soviet foreign affairs have typically 
been examined in terms of international relations, mainly political or military. 
And yet, from 1953 onwards, cultural exchanges played a substantial role in 
Soviet international strategy. As the Soviet Union started to open up to the out-
side world, the ideological corrosion and alienation of the people from Soviet 
and Communist ideals slowly began. What this framework of cultural ex-
changes made possible was to open new worlds for individuals. For such a 
small country as Finland, cultural exchanges made it possible to receive top 
artists of international level in scale unimaginable without the Cold War. Thus, 
individuals and Finnish societies and organizations benefited from cultural ex-
changes with the Soviet Union. 
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The empire of the Ottonians and Salians –  





The empire of the Ottonian and Salian dynasties between 919 and 1125 may be 
considered as the first realm of the medieval Europe, which has a continuity 
with a nation and a state, that still exists today – the present-day Germany. But 
is it possible to say, that this Regnum Teutonicorum had a kind of “imperial” 
consciousness in its modern sense? In order to answer this question, we are re-
turning to those contemporary sources, historiographical and hagiographical re-
cords of the “Ottonian renaissance”, which may contain several information of 
this “imperial” self-awereness. We focus on the policy of the early “German 
state” towards Central and Eastern Europe, the neighbouring countries of the 
Ottonians across the Elbe and Oder river (Bohemia, Denmark, Hungary and Po-
land). The church policy, particularly the christianization of this Central and 
Northern Europe has a high importance in the examination of the relation be-
tween the early German kingdom (since 962 the Holy Roman Empire) and its 
eastern neighbours. Was this policy determined and ideologized only by the 
church and its endeavours to convert the heathen Slavonic, Hungarian or Danish 
people, or had it a kind of “secular” ambition in this relations too (the conquest 
of Eastern and Central Europe)? The output of this examination should be the 
answer for the question, whether the early German “state” had any sense or am-
bition of being a “world-power” in the context of the medieval historiography, 
as the expression of the contemporary “public opinion” of the age. In this paper 
we are focus on these narrative texts with a special emphasis on the terms like 
imperium, regnum etc. and their different meanings in the historiographical 
works. 
The idea of the early medieval Germany as a “major power” has a relatively 
long tradition in the modern German scholarship: according to Wilhelm von 
Giesebrecht, Emperor Otto the Great made his German kingdom and its “core”, 
the Saxon tribal area to the center of the “Roman Empire of the German na-
tion”.1 The notion of Giesebrecht was highly influenced by the contemporary 
political events, like the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), the unification of 
                                                 
1  Wilhelm von Giesebrecht, Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit. Vol. 2. Braunschweig, 
1875. 3. 
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Germany (1871) on the basis of a modern nation-state, in which the “primacy of 
the folk and the language” (Primat des Volkstums und der Sprache) played an 
important role.2 This imagined “empire of a nation” had a long lasting tradition 
in the first half of the twentieth century: Johannes Haller, for instance, wrote 
about a foundation of the empire as the political action of the “emotions and 
consciousness of the people”, the “idea of the national independence” driven by 
the “national uniqueness”.3 The research of the German scholarship, however, 
focused mostly on the emperors, the leadership and the Führertum of the rulers, 
the importance of the “military empire” (Heerkaisertum), particularly the 
“Rome free” empire (romfreies Kaisertum).4 After the World War II, the accent 
of the scholarship shifted towards the history of ideas; ideas, such as the “re-
newal”5 or the “translation” of the empire.6 The position of the East German 
historical research since the 1950s was the dialectic materialism of the Marx-
iscm with particular interest on the social and economic aspects of the history of 
                                                 
2  Eckhard Müller-Mertens, Regnum Teutonicum. Aufkommen und Verbreitung der deutschen 
Reichs- und Königsauffassung im früheren Mittelalter. Berlin, 1970. 8. 
3  Johannes Haller, Die Epochen der deutschen Geschichte. Stuttgart, 1940. 18. 
4  See for instance Edmund Ernst Stengel, “Kaisertitel und Souveränitätsidee. Studien zur 
Vorgeschichte des modernen Verfassungsbegriffs.” In: Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung 
des Mittelalters, 3 (1939), 1–56; ibid., Den Kaiser macht das Heer. Studien zur Ge-
schichte eines politischen Gedankens. Weimar, 1910; Albert Brackmann, Der „römische 
Erneuerungsgedanke” und seine Bedeutung für die Reichspolitik der deutschen Kaiser-
zeit. Berlin, 1932. 
5  Mathilde Uhlirz, “Das Werden des Gedankens der „Renovatio imperii Romanorum” bei 
Kaiser Otto III.” In: I problemi comuni dell'Europa post-carolingia. Ed. Giuseppe Ermini. 
Spoleto, 1955. 201–219; Percy Ernst Schramm, Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio. Studien zur 
Geschichte des römischen Erneuerungsgedankens vom Ende des karolingischen Reiches 
bis zum Investiturstreit. Darmstadt, 1962; Reinhart Staat, Theologie der Reichskrone. 
Ottonische "Renovatio Imperii" im Spiegel einer Insignie. Stuttgart, 1976; Gerd Tel-
lenbach, “Kaiser, Rom und renovatio: Ein Beitrag zu einem großen Thema,” In: Tradition 
als historische Kraft. Interdisziplinäre Forschungen zur Geschichte des früheren 
Mittelalters [Festschrift Karl Hauck]. Eds. Manfred Balzer, Norbert Kamp, and Joachim 
Wollasch. Berlin, 1982. 231–253; Jean-Marie Sansterre, “Le monastere des Saints-Bo-
niface-et-Alexis sur l'Aventin et l'expansion du christianisme dans le cadre de la „reno-
vatio imperii romanorum” d'Otton III. Une revision.” In: Revue bénédictine, 100 (1990) 
493–506. 
6  Werner Guldenfels, Translatio imperii in Germanos. Eine Untersuchung über Entstehung 
und Bedeutung der mittelalterlichen Translationstheorie. (PhD thesis) Freiburg im 
Breisgau, 1950; Werner Goez, Translatio imperii. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ge-
schichtsdenkens und der politischen Theorien im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit. 
Tübingen, 1954 (the substantial work of the concept of the “translation of the empire”); 
Piet van den Baar, Die kirchliche Lehre der Translatio Imperii Romani bis zur Mitte des 
13. Jahrhunderts. Rome, 1956. 
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the early medieval Empire, with the accent of an archaic “nation-state”.7 Eck-
hard Müller-Mertens analyzed the earliest concepts and the accounts of the his-
toriographical works of the tenth and twelfth century about the Holy Roman 
Empire on the basis of the “historical materialism”.8 The West German and the 
present-day German scholarship had and has many point of views concerning 
the idea of the empire, like the Ottonian empire in the medieval historiography, 




1. The Ottonian context  
 
Since his coronation in 936 King Otto I, the later emperor sought consciously 
for the elements and key features of the royal might of Charlemagne. The ac-
count of Widukind of Corvey (ca. 925-ca. 973) says clearly, that the sword as 
one of the regalia was regarded as a sign for the king as defensor ecclesiae, and 
his royal power shall be used also to the interest of the church as well.10  Ac-
cording to the researcher of the topic, Josef Fleckenstein, this is meant to be as 
the cooperation of the mission and the royal power,11 while Helmut Beumann 
wrote even the combination of the imperial expansion and the conversion to the 
                                                 
 7  Hans-Joachim Bartmuß, “Die Entstehung des ersten selbständigen Staates auf deutschem 
Boden.” In: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 10. Sonderheft (1962), 359–374; ibid., 
“Ursachen und Triebkräfte im Entstehungsprozess des ’frühfeudalen deutschen Staates’.” 
In: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 10 (1962), 1591–1625; Bernhard Gramsch, 
Germanen – Slawen – Deutsche. Forschungen zu ihrer Ethnogenese. Berlin, 1969; 
Eckhard Müller-Mertens, “Vom Regnum Teutonicum zum Heiligen Römischen Reich 
Deutscher Nation.” In: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 11 (1963), 319–346. 
 8  Müller-Mertens, Regnum Teutonicum, 43. 
 9  Gertrud Bäumer, Die Reichsidee bei den Ottonen: Heinrich I. und Otto der Große, Otto 
III. und Heinrich II. Nuremberg, 1946; Gian Andri Bezzola, Das ottonische Kaisertum in 
der französischen Geschichtsschreibung des 10. und beginnenden 11. Jahrhunderts. 
Cologne, 1956; Heinz Löwe, “Kaisertum und Abendland in ottonischer und frühsalischer 
Zeit.” In: Historische Zeitschrift, 196 (1963) 529–562; Hagen Keller, “Reichsstruktur und 
Herrschaftsauffassung in ottonisch-frühsalischer Zeit.” In: Frühmittelalterliche Studien, 
16 (1982) 74–128. 
10  Die Sachsengeschichte des Widukind von Korvei (Widukindi monachi Corbeiensis Rerum 
gestarum Saxonicarum libri III). Eds. Paul Hirsch and Hans-Eberhard Lohmann. Hanno-
ver 1935. 63–66 (II, 1). 
11  Josef Fleckenstein, “Zum Begriff der ottonisch-salischen Reichskirche,” In: Geschichte, 
Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Clemens Bauer. Ed. Erich Hassinger. Berlin 1974, 
61–71. 
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Christian faith.12 The imperial self-confidence of Otto I. was primarily deter-
mined by his role as the propagator Christianitatis. During his reign he also 
tried to meet this requirement unremitting: by the year of 948 five dioceses had 
been established by the will of the king: Schleswig, Ripe and Aarhus in Den-
mark, as well Havelberg and Brandenburg at the Elbe river.13 The following 
wave of foundation occurred after the year of 955, when Otto prevailed against 
the marauding army of the Hungarians at the Lech, and the foundation-stone of 
the episcopal see of Merseburg was laid, while the third wave of the establish-
ment of the episcopates occurred in 968 for behalf of Meissen and Zeitz, to-
gether with the upgrade of Magdeburg as the archbishopric center of the Elbe 
Slavic territories.14 Except of the Danish bishoprics, the organization of the dio-
ceses at the Elbe served for the conversion of the Elbe Slavic territories. The 
foundation of the episcopal seats in Oldenburg and Prague between 965 and 973 
belong also to this missionary process.15  
This expansive Ostpolitik combined with the mission policy was initiated al-
ready by King Henry I, known as Henry the Fowler, the father of king Otto I. 
About the late 920 he occupied the domains of the Havel and Dalamantian 
tribes living near the Elbe and expanded the German border of the East beyond 
the Elbe.16 In 934 Henry engaged into a military conflict with the Danish king 
                                                 
12  Helmut Beumann, “Imperator Romanorum, rex gentium: zu Widukind III 76,” In: Helmut 
Beumann, Ausgewählte Aufsätze. Aus den Jahren 1966–1986. Festgabe zu seinem 75. 
Geburtstag. Eds. Jürgen Petersohn and Roderich Schmidt. Sigmaringen 1987, 324–360. 
13  Die Konzilien Deutschlands und Reichsitaliens 916–1001. Teil 1: 916–961. Ed. Ernst-
Dieter Hehl. Hannover 1987 (MGH Conc. 6,1), 137–138, 158. 
14  Papsturkunden 896–1046. Vol. 1. Ed. Harald Zimmermann. Vienna 1984, 281, nr. 154; 
Rudolf Köpkem, Ernst Dümmler, Kaiser Otto der Große. Berlin 1876, 333; Walter 
Schlesinger, Kirchengeschichte Sachsens. Vol. 1. Cologne and Graz 1962, 126–127; 
Heinz Wolter, Die Synoden im Reichsgebiet und in Reichsitalien von 916 bis 1056. 
Paderborn et al. 1988, 69–70; Ernst-Dieter Hehl, “Merseburg – eine Bistumsgründung 
unter Vorbehalt. Gelübte, Kirchenrecht und politischer Spielraum im 10. Jahrhundert,” 
Frühmittelalterliche Studien  31 (1997), 96–119. 
15  Wilhelm Biereye, “Das Entstehungsjahr des Bistums Oldenburg,” Zeitschrift des Vereins 
für Hamburgische Geschichte 19 (1917) 37–50; Hans Sprangenberg, “Die Gründung des 
Bistums Prag,” Historisches Jahrbuch 21 (1900), 758–775; Jaroslaw Kadlec, “Auf dem 
Wege zum Prager Bistum (Zur Vorgeschichte seiner Gründung),” Geschichte der Ost- 
und Westkirche in ihren wechselseitigen Beziehungen: Acta congressus historiae Slavicae 
Salisburgensis in memoriam SS. Cyrilli et Methodii anno 1963 celebrati. Ed. Franz 
Zagiba. Wiesbaden 1967, 29–45. 
16  Lothar Dralle, “Zu Vorgeschichte und Hintergründen der Ostpolitik Heinrichs I.,” In: Eu-
ropa slavica – Europa orientalis. Festschrift für Herbert Ludat zum 70. Geburtstag. Eds. 
Klaus-Detlev Grothusen and Klaus Zernack. Berlin 1980, 99–126; Alfred Mirtschin, “Die 
Berechtigung der Rückeroberung des Meißner Erblandes durch Kaiser Heinrich im Jahre 
929,” Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte des Stadt Meißen 12 (1937), 7–36.  
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Gnupa, and defeated him; this success was followed by the forced conversion of 
Gnupa to the Christianity.17 The politics of the conversion and conquest were 
linked in the policy of Otto I. towards Denmark more explicitly. The historiog-
rapher Adam of Bremen (ca. 1050-ca. 1081/85) reports that the German king, 
after he defeated king Harald Bluetooth, forced also the Danish ruler to recog-
nize the German suzerainty and to convert with his people to the Christian faith. 
King Otto I. himself became the godfather of the son and heir apparent to the 
throne, Sven, the later king Sven Forkbeard.18 The fact of the baptism is con-
firmed by the account of Ruotger in his biography about the archbishop of Co-
logne and brother of Otto I, Bruno (925–965), as well by the rune-stone, which 
was erected by Harald at Jelling, calling himself as the apostle of Denmark.19 
However it cannot be said that the German influence was of purely religious na-
ture. The integration of the Danish bishoprics imperial church served not only 
for the objectives of the conversion, but these religious institutions were also 
important for Otto the Great, in order to wield his royal power directly over 
Denmark. In one of his charters issued in 965 Otto I. exempted the Danish bish-
oprics (in Danorum marca with Regni) from all the services performed for the 
ruler.20 The same logic inspired the historiographer Thietmar of Merseburg 
(975–1018) more than a half century later, when Harald Bluetooth made an at-
tempt to eliminate the German influence following the death of emperor Otto I. 
                                                 
17  Widukind, Rerum gestarum Saxonicarum, 59 (I, 40): Cum autem omnes in circuitu 
nationes subiecisset, Danos, qui navali latrocinio Fresones incursabant, cum exercitu 
adiit vicitque, et tributarios faciens, regem eorum nomine Chnubam baptismum percipere 
fecit. Perdomitis itaque cunctis circumquaque gentibus, postremo Romam proficisci 
statuit, sed infirmitate correptus iter intermisit. 
18  Adam von Bremen, Hamburgische Kirchengeschichte (Gesta Hammenburgensis ecclesiae 
pontificum). Ed. Bernhard Schmeidler. Hannover 1917, 56–58 (I, 57, 59): Deinde cum 
exercitu ingressus Daniam, Vurm regem primo impetu adeo perterruit, ut imperata se 
facere mandaret et pacem supplex deposceret... Postquam vero confessor Dei pervenit ad 
Danos, ubi tunc crudelissimum Worm diximus regnasse, illum quidem pro ingenita 
flectere nequivit saevitia; filium autem regis Haroldum sua dicitur praedicatione lucratus. 
Quem ita fidelem Christo perfecit, ut christianitatem, quam pater eius semper odio habuit, 
ipse haberi publice permitteret, quamvis nondum baptismi sacramentum percepit. 
Ordinatis itaque in regno Danorum per singulas ecclesias sacerdotibus sanctus Dei 
multitudinem credentium commendasse fertur Haroldo. Cuius etiam fultus adiutorio et 
legato omnes Danorum insulas penetravit, euangelizans verbum Dei gentilibus et fideles, 
quos invenit illuc captivatos, in Christo confortans.   
19  Ruotgers Lebensbeschreibung des Erzbischofs Bruno von Köln (Routgeri vita Brunonis). 
Ed. Irene Ott. Hannover 1951, 43 (c. 40): Siquidem eodem tempore et rex eorum Haraldus 
cum magna suę multitudine gentis regi regum Christo colla submittens vanitatem respuit 
idolorum. 
20  MGH DD O I 411, nr. 294. 
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the Great in 973.21 This same, a bit anachronistic concept of the “imperial logic” 
motivated also Adam of Bremen, as he presents the events of the uprising of the 
Elbe Slavs in 983 against the Holy Roman Empire, discussing about rebellious 
Slavs (Sclavi rebellantes), however, nearly about a hundred years later.22 The 
Annals of Hildesheim accounts also about riotous Slavs who destroyed the 
churches and killed the Christians alongside of the Elbe.23 Adam of Bremen and 
the major historiographer of the 12th century, Helmold of Bosau (ca. 1120-after 
1177) make clear, that the rebellion against the Empire means also the break 
with the Christian religion and the return to their ancient heathen religious para-
digms.24 Seeing the works of historians we may establish that according to these 
medieval historiographers the revolt against the Holy Roman Empire is the 
same as the turn against the new established Christian faith, and vica versa.  
 
 
2. The change of the idea about the role of the Empire  
    under the Salian rulers 
 
The view of Gábor Varga, a Hungarian historian, who examined the Hungarian-
German conflicts of the mid 11th century, achieved new and surprising results in 
this topic. In his study, published in 2007, Varga challenges the conventional 
views of the Hungarian history claiming, that the two campaigns of emperor 
Henry III of the Holy Roman Empire launched against Hungary may not be 
considered as en expanding, conquering foreign policy toward the young King-
dom of Hungary, but rather than a peace establishing act.25 Varga analyzed con-
temporary narrative sources, especially the Annals of Niederaltaich (written 
about the turn of the 11th and 12th century)26, as well various conciliar decisions, 
and concluded that the emperor's political stance was primarily determined by 
movements of the pax Dei and treuga Dei.27 This explains, inter alia, his conse-
                                                 
21  Die Chronik des Bischofs Thietmar von Merseburg und ihre Korveier Überarbeitung 
(Thietmari Chronicon). Ed. Robert Holtzmann. Berlin 1935, 442 (VII, 26). 
22  Adam, Gesta Hammenburgensis ecclesiae pontificum, 101–102 (II, 42)  
23  Annales Hildesheimenses ab initio mundi ad a. 1137. Ed. Georg Waitz. Hannover 1878, 
24: …et eodem anno Sclavi rebelles effecti sunt; Adam, Gesta Hammenburgensis 
ecclesiae pontificum, ibid.: Tunc vero et Sclavi a christianis iudicibus plus iusto 
compressi excusso tandem iugo servitutis libertatem suam armis defendere coacti sunt. 
24  Adam, Gesta Hammenburgensis ecclesiae pontificum, 105 (II, 44). 
25  Gábor Varga, “Heinricus III. rex pacificus (Az Árpádok és a Német-Római Birodalom 
uralkodóinak kapcsolatáról),” [Heinricus III. rex pacificus. Of the Relations between the 
Árpáds and the Holy Roman Rulers] Aetas 22 (2007), 35–58. 
26  Annales Altahenses maiores. Ed. Edmund von Oefele. Hannover 18912, 34–37. 
27  Varga, Heinricus III, 52–57. 
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quent policy against the feudal wars within the empire, his engagement to end 
the troubles of the papacy, which culminated in the council of Sutri in 1046, 
where the reigning popes, Sylvester III and Gregory VI were deprived of the 
papacy and sent into exile.28 In Hungary at the same year, a pagan uprising 
broke out, which included the reasons for the protest against the emerging feu-
dal ties and the radical changes caused by this social transformation, as well the 
discontent with the reign of King Peter of Orseolo (1038–1041/1044–1046).29 
Henry III had already helped Peter to restore the power of the expelled king, 
when the German ruler defeated king, Samuel Aba, who was supported by both 
the major part of the Hungarian aristocracy and the lower classes. In 1046 the 
emperor had no chance to intervene in the conflict, and Peter of Orseolo was 
killed soon in the pagan revolt. 1051 and 1052 there were two unsuccessful 
military campaigns launched by Henry III against Hungary.30 Both the tradi-
tional, bourgeois and the Marxist historical approach considered these actions as 
the expressions of the German imperialist ambition in order to conquest, or at 
least to force Hungary to pay homage to Henry III and recognize him as its liege 
lord.31 Varga made possible against these topoi, that Henry III regarded the new 
king of Hungary, Andrew I as an usurpator, and he treated him as a disloyal 
subject. That was the main reason to launch the attack against Hungary – to re-
store the peace and to regain the seigneury over the Hungarian kingdom. The 
annals as well the epistles of the abbot Berno of Reichenau, which deal with the 
military action against Aba are consisted of a number of hagiographical fea-
tures: for instance the Annales Altaihenses reports of the battle of Ménfő (1044), 
that king Henry was facing a large Hungarian army, but the Hungarians became 
blind suddenly by a heavy dust storm, as a divine miracle expressing the favour 
of God towards Henry, and God himself was the one, who has crushed the re-
                                                 
28  Engelbert Pius, “Heinrich III. und die Synoden von Sutri und Rom im Dezember 1046,” 
Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte 94 (1999), 
228–266; Hans Hubert Anton, “Die Synode von Sutri, ihr zeitgeschichtlicher Kontext und 
Nachklang. Neue Forschungen zu einer lange diskutierten Schrift,” Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 83 (1997), 576–584. 
29  Varga, Heinricus III, 35 
30  Ibid., 36; Henrik Marczali, Magyarország története az Árpádok korában (1038–1301) 
[History of Hungary in the age of the Árpádians]. Budapest, 1896, 7–59; Pál Engel, Beil-
leszkedés Európába a kezdetektől 1440-ig (Integration in Europe from the beginnings to 
1440). Budapest, 1990, 153–154; Ferenc Makk, Magyar külpolitika (896–1196) 
[Hungarian foreign policy 896–1196]. Szeged, 1993, 53–74. 
31  Gyula Pauler, A magyar nemzet története az Árpádházi királyok alatt, I [The history of the 
Hungarian nation in the age of the Árpádian kings]. Budapest, 18992, 78–104; Erik Mol-
nár, Magyarország története, I [History of Hungary, vol. 1].Budapest, 19672, 54–57. 
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bellious Hungarian forces without bloodshed.32 The views of Varga that III. 
Henry's policy towards Hungary increasingly conceived in the spirit of the pax 
Dei, can be conceived by an other case in which the prince of Bohemia Břeti-
slav I attacked Poland after the death of prince Mieszko II, but the Czechs were 
later forced by the German king to retreat.33 However, the case of Břetislav 
case, which cautions us that Henry’s policy in Central Europe, cannot be con-
sidered only as a deeply religious, idealistic political program. After his defeat 
suffered by the Germans, Břetislav had to swear allegiance to Henry III in Re-
gensburg, in the city, which has been for a long while as the center of German 
missions towards Bohemia.34 The fact that the German ruler stayed there in that 
time, and received the homage of the Czech prince, would be difficult to be re-
garded as coincidental. If we consider the fact that three years later, when the 
kingship of king Peter of Hungary was restored, in return for the homage of Pe-
ter, the ambition of Henry III becomes more unambiguous. Furthermore, the 
other fact that the father of emperor Henry III, Conrad II already initiated an un-
successful military campaign against Hungary, as well as all the rulers of the 
Salian dynasty, it arouse suspicion, that these military operations in Hungary 
were not only to restore peace in a country affected by anarchy and pagan re-
volts, but it has to be certainly a conscious decision of a major power in order to 
establish and extend the German political hegemony in Central Europe.35 The 
failure of Conrad II against Hungary, but his military successes in the area be-
tween the Elbe and Oder clearly shows that it appears the the Salian dynasty 
was not satisfied with a mere religious influence, but also demanded the hom-
age to the Emperor.36 He was able to achieve this goal in the whole region with 
exception of Hungary. It is not a coincidence either, that one of the major histo-
riographer of the Salian era, Wipo of Burgundy (ca. 995-ca. 1048) wrote about 
the Czechs as rebelles again.37 But it is also true that the interests of the Empire 
met not necessarily the interests of the Christian faith and the respublica Chris-
tiana. The hagiographical works of Bruno of Querfurt (the Lives of the Five 
                                                 
32  Varga, Heinricus III, 42–44; Annales Altahenses maiores. Ed. Edmund von Oefele. Han-
nover 1891, 29. 
33  Ibid.  
34  Winfried Baumann and Barbora Erbová, “Heinrich III. gegen Bretislav I.: der Kampf von 
1040 im Grenzwald und sein literarisches Echo,” Beiträge zur Geschichte im Landkreis 
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Friars38 and the Life of St. Adalbert 39) and his letter to the German king, Henry 
II,40 in which he crabed the lay ruler, if their reign seemed to be incompatible 
with the interests of the church. Otto II was especially judged in Bruno’s oeu-
vre: from the elimination of the episcopate of Merseburg, by which – according 
to the biography of St. Adalbert of Prague – he had provoked the wrath of St. 
Lawrence against himself, and on the other hand, his conquests in Italy and 
Burgundy, which did not serve to goals of the expansion of the Christian faith, 
but the territorial increase of the empire and the glory of the emperor, particu-
larly that he led several wars against Christians, and neglected the conversion of 
the heathen.41 In the Lives of the Five Friars Bruno condemned the young em-
peror, Otto III for that reason, because Otto had the aim to transform Rome, the 
city of St. Peter to the center of his renovated Roman Empire, although the em-
peror is a lay person, and the Constitutum Constantini does not allow him this.42 
Iniuria and superbia, injustice and arrogance – the reign of Otto III are marked 
by these sins.43 Bruno of Querfurt reflects on the kingship of Henry II as well. 
He accusated both Henry II and Otto II with the concept of the bellum injustum, 
the unjust war, as Henry made an alliance with the pagan tribe of the Liutici 
against the christian prince of Poland, Bołeslaw Chrobry, and in his letter of 
1008 complained Bruno of this unholy bound between the pagans and the em-
pire.44 Bruno asked Henry II that does he feel any sin that the empire had en-
gaged into a war against an other Christian people (the Poles), and entered into 
an alliance with the pagans (the Liutici), or not? Would it be not better, if coop-
erated with the pagans in order to expand the Christianity and to strengthen its 
power, than increasing his own might? Bruno considers the war led only by 
secular purposes unaccaptable; the peace and war do not exclude each other mu-
tually when the war is going in order to spread the words of the Gospels, if the 
                                                 
38  Bruno of Querfurt, Vita quinque fratrum. Ed. Jadwiga Karwasińska. Warszawa 1973 
(Monumenta Poloniae historica, nova series 4, 3), 1–41. 
39  Bruno of Querfurt, Vita sancti Adalberti. Ed. Jadwiga Karwasińska. Warszawa 1969 
(Monumenta Poloniae historica, nova series 4, 2). 
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41  Knut Görich, Otto III. Romanus Saxonicus et Italicus. Kaiserliche Rompolitik und 
sächsische Historiographie. Sigmaringen 1993, 33–34; Bruno of Querfurt, Vita sancti 
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war is going of the interests of the mission as it had been conducted by the 
predecessors of Henry II.45 Bruno of Querfurt formulated among his contempo-
raries the most important duties of the Christian rulers the best: compellere in-






We can say in a few words, that, the political “public opinion” of the 10–11th 
century Holy-Roman Empire had its own notion and consciousness about the 
empire, expressed by those words like regnum, or more occassionally imperium, 
with different emphasis. This empire was certainly not a structure in a modern 
sense, which is meant as an economic or political scheme, but the conversion of 
the heathen was regarded as its primary task, as a new, improved Roman Em-
pire. The peaceful, consensus-building foreign policy of the Ottonian had been 
replaced by a more combative politics of the Salian dynasty in the turn of the 
1020–30’s towards the newly established and converted countries of Central 
Europe. This politics, however, sought of the acquisition of these territories not 
inevitably, but of forcing or maintaining them in feudal dependence with the 
empire. Of course, we can not ignore the factor of the real-politik as well. Par-
ticularly the Ostpolitik of Henry the Fowler was determined by the expansion of 
his power towards the Elbe river and the Slavic tribes living eastern of the, 
without the Christian mission; the military expeditions into this territory had the 
goal to build up a buffer zone against the Hungarian raids. A century later, 
Henry II ignoring the Christian duty of the mission of the Liutici also by reason 
of the security interests of the empire, he had entered into an alliance with them 
against the Christian Poles. It shows clearly that the politics in the early Middle 
Ages was also not dispense with the rational decisions, that often did not met 
the expectations of the contemporaries.  
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Hungary's Relationship to her Neighbours  





The article is aiming to provide an outlook of Hungary’s relationship to her 
neighbouring countries. It will oversee the history of Hungarian expansions to-
wards Bosnia, Serbia and Cumania, as well as examine the long-troubled relation-
ship with the Russian principalities and Bohemia and the warm rapports with Po-
land and will also give an insight into the history of the Byzantine-Hungarian 
clashes in the Danubian region. 
Apparently the relationship of the House of Árpád with their neighbours is full 
of hostilities. It appears as if the warlike rulers had been indulging in laying dev-
astating assaults. The narrative sources report that they regularly overran foreign 
lands, led ravaging expeditions and laid waste to frontier territories by fire and 
sword.1 It may seem as if the kings had always been indignant and retaliated only 
for grievances.2 However, it will be observed that the foreign policy of the Árpáds 
was manifold and of more varied concerns.  
A major, symbolic motive in Hungarian historical mythology is the strive for 
independence, the preservation of sovereignty in order that the kingdom should 
not be subordinated to any overlordship, and its kings be of equal status in quality 
to any of the Christian monarchs and not subject their nations to any foreign suze-
rainty. In the crossfire of two empires, the Holy Roman and Byzantium Hungary 
is to survive and maintain its independence. Narrative tradition, based upon the 
12th-century Legenda S. Stephani Regis holds that St. Stephen (997/1000-1038) 
received a royal crown from Pope Sylvester II, which was to buttress the coun-
try’s claim to independence and equal status among the Christian monarchs. 
However, there is only one contemporary source that mentions the grant, yet he 
                                                 
1  Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV. In Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum tempore 
ducum regumque stirpis Arpadianae gestarum. Eds. Imre Szentpétery et al. 2 vols. Buda-
pest, 1937–1938. [hereinafter SRH] I. pp. 217–505. cap. 152. p. 433.; cap. 155. p. 439.; cap. 
153. p. 434.; cap. 101. p. 365.; Annales Hildesheimenses, Monumenta Germaniae His-
torica [a továbbiakban MGH] SS [Annales…aevi Carolini et Saxonici] Vol. 3. Ed. G. H. 
Pertz, Hannover, 1838.; Annales Altahenses maiores. MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum 
in usum scholarum separatim editi. Vol. 4. Ed. E. L. B. von Oefele. Hannover, 1890. 29. 
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does not say anything but, obscurely, that “he received a crown and benediction 
by the grace and upon the encouragement” of the Emperor, though does not spell 
it out, whether it was the Emperor or the Pope who did actually send the insignia.3 
It might have been dispatched, and the monarchy thus acknowledged by a com-
mon decision of the Pope and the Emperor.4 Although it is a disputed issue, it 
seems likely that Hungary was recognized as sovereign by Otto III, as a contem-
porary relates that, although he received a lancea regis, he was not under Imperial 
overlordship, as Otto “allowed him a free hand to rule his country.5 It might have 
been a theoretical subordination, if any, which did not bring about any practical 
consequences. Hungary was only subjected to the Empire in 1045, when King  
Peter „surrendered the kingdom” with „a gilded lance” to „his lord” Emperor 
Henry III.6 
The corona Graeca – presently incorporated into the Holy Crown, as its lower 
part – was donated to Géza I (1074–77) by Emperor Michael Dukas.7 Facing Nor-
man, Seljuk and Patzinak threat, Byzantium was very much in need of an alliance. 
The grant did not mean a recognition of suzerainty in practice, only a formal ac-
knowledgement of Byzantium as the first power in the hierarchy of Christian 
states. The princes treated as Byzantium’s subordinated vassals did not receive 
crowns.8 The basileus acknowledged Géza as a legitimate ruler – not equal in 
rank, but not subjected to Byzantine overlordship – as signified by the inscription 
beside the portrait of Géza on the crown as “faithful king” (pistos kralés).9  
The foreign policy of the medieval kingdom of Hungary should be considered 
in this context. In the early 11th century the Hungarian kings were to make their 
                                                 
3  „imperatoris gratia et hortatu… coronam et benedictionem accepit”: Thietmari Mersebur-
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Libri III [Historia pontificum et comitum Engolmensium]. MGH SS [Annales...aevi Carolini 
et Saxonici] Ed. G. Waitz. Vol. 4. 129.  
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nales Altahenses, 40.; Ferenc Makk, Ungarische Aussenpolitik (896–1196). Herne, 1999.; 
Die Heiligen Könige. Eds. T. Bogyay, J. M. Bak, G. Silagi. Graz, 1976. 131.; Font, Span-
nungsfeld, 162–3. 
 7  Makk, Aussenpolitik, 66.; Gyula Moravcsik, Byzantium and the Magyars. Amsterdam, 1970. 
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rule unconditionally recognized.10 For the sake of a German compromise Stephen 
surrendered the territories between the Enns and the Fischa as the dowry of his 
German consort.11 This helped him in a war against Bolesław I of Poland since he 
occupied Hungarian territories, harboured a rival and instigated the Patzinaks to 
invade.12 Stephen opened towards Bulgaria, his sister married the Bulgarian heir-
to-the-throne.13 She was repudiated by her husband and gave birth to a son at the 
Hungarian court, who was then harboured as a political factor.14 However, since 
Stephen needed Greek support to consolidate his position facing the emerging 
Salian expansion, assisted Byzantine Emperor Basil II against the Bulgarians, us-
ing his trump, his nephew.15 The concord was cemented with the Byzantine mar-




The foreign policy of the House of Árpád has been labelled as “familiar”, refer-
ring to the motivations of safeguarding the rights of members of the dynasty and a 
wide circle of relatives, queen-consorts, nephews etc. belonging to their “political 
family”. This diplomacy focused on establishing matrimonial alliances but was 
also to maintain a level of political influence. The kings applied various tech-
niques to secure influence ranging from organizing a league, through harbouring 
claimants or taking dynasty-members as hostages up to direct military interven-
tions, preventive campaigns to sustain the positions of sponsored pretenders. 
Whenever they felt that a well-established alliance, cemented with a matrimonial 
bond was to be threatened, and a son-in-law etc. was about to lose power, they in-
tervened to avenge insults. It did not always mean a military campaign, some-
times political pressure was satisfactory. They were only to interfere on behalf of a 
relative when it seemed necessary. True, the Árpáds several times found excuses in 
                                                 
10  Font, Spannungsfeld, 179.  
11  Font, Spannungsfeld, 182. 
12  Attila Zsoldos, The legacy of Saint Stephen. Budapest, 2004. 126.; György Györffy, King 
Saint Stephen of Hungary. New York, 1994. 142.; Die Heiligen Könige, 128. 
13  Györffy, Saint Stephen, 143. 
14  Marie-Madeleine de Cevins, Saint Étienne de Hongrie. Paris, Fayard, 2004. 373., 383.; 
Makk, Aussenpolitik, 36.; Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsi historiarum. Ed. J. Thurn. Berlin, 1973. 
410.  
15  Moravcsik, Byzantium, 62.; Zsoldos, Legacy, 57.; 127–28.; Cevins, Saint Étienne, 370.; Fe-
renc Makk, “On the Foreign Policy of Saint Stephen”, In: Saint Stephen and his country. A 
newborn kingdom in Central Europe Hungary. Ed. A. Zsoldos. Budapest, 2001. 37–48. 
16  Legenda beatae Margaritae, SRH. II. cap. 12. p. 689. Makk, Aussenpolitik, 40.; Györffy, 
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“the urgent necessity” of the kingdom.17 Nevertheless, the interventions did not 
always involve large-scale expeditions and territorial devastation. First, they put 
forward political pressure, reprimanded their allies, and raised objections before 
having resort to force. The kings were mostly contented with the demonstration of 
force, deploying their armies along the borders. When it seemed inevitable, they 
moved in and occupied key points but sought to abstain from plunder. Stephen is 
seen in historical mythology as the peacemaker king, every Árpád ruler is taken 
as following his path as a rex pacificus, wishing to reinforce peace with foreign 
nations.18 St. Ladislaus (1077–95) is described as “laying campaigns only in order 
to restore peace”.19  
In fact only few Árpád monarchs lived in peace with their neighbours, but not 
all of them were bellicose and most laid emphasis on making peace.20 In 1116 
King Stephen II (1116–1131) came to the border to “confirm their peace and 
friendship” with the Prince of Bohemia,21 but somehow the parties burst out into 
hostilities.22 Béla III (1172–96), to express his desire for peace with Byzantium, 
returned the formerly grabbed relics of St. Ivan of Rila.23 Only if these methods 
did not bring about results were the kings to have resort to arms. They very rarely 
applied direct territorial rule or established military administration. This policy 
was to be justified by the kingdom’s need to face confrontations from two em-
pires. Problem is that historiography has been trying to find justification for the 
ambitions even when there was no foreign threat at all. The German expansions 
ceased to threaten Hungary’s integrity after the late 11th century the latest, and, 
likewise, Byzantine aggression was not a serious menace except for the attempts 
for supremacy by Manuel Comnenus.24 Nonetheless, after a long series of Ger-
man interventions, the kings were to build up a defensive policy to uphold a dip-
lomatic stability resting on a wide system of dynastic alliances.  
The familiar relationship probably worked most effectively with Poland. Sev-
eral pretenders, deposed and ousted rulers found refuge in Hungary, and vice 
                                                 
17  „urgente regni sui necessitate…in expeditionem…”: Legenda sancti Ladislai Regis. SRH. II. 
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Lisa Wolverton. Washington, 2009. 231. 
23  Makk, Aussenpolitik, 124. 
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versa, in Poland. The expelled claimants or rivals were “received amiably” either 
by the Árpáds, or the Piasts.25 St. Stephen’s banished nephews, sons of the 
blinded Vazul “sought refuge in Poland”, and his descendants, as well as marry-
ing with the Piasts, supplied or received military assistance to lead campaigns and 
assume the crown in their own countries.26 St. Ladislaus is described as being 
“raised from childhood in Poland” as an alum(p)nus of the king, and “had almost 
become a Pole in his ways and life.”27 Nevertheless, the familiar assistance was 
not unscrupulously compensated for. The would-be king, St. Ladislaus, although 
received great assistance from King Bolesław II who “drove Salomon out of the 
country” in 1063 and “placed him on the throne”, thus “called him his king…he 
installed in Hungary”, refused to support the Polish king when he fled to him.28 
Ladislaus did not wish to sacrifice his papal relations on the altar of promoting the 
cause of the murderer of St. Stanisław.29 The familiar support was not uncondi-
tional: Stephen II refused to help Yaroslav of Volhynia in 1118.30  
The kings justified their motives as being defensive. In the 1050s the adver-
sary of Emperor Henry III, Conrad, Duke of Bavaria was also received and 
helped with military force, which, under the shadow of imperial invasions served 
defensive concerns.31 In 1092 St. Ladislaus laid an assault against Vasilko of 
Terebovl who had urged an attack of the Cumans into Hungary.32 It was a recur-
rent accusation that the Russian principalities’ instigated their auxiliaries to rav-
age Hungary.33 The kings, however, did not indulge in revenge but as they sought 
to strengthen their positions in the east, where they found the defence unsatisfac-
tory, came to conclude alliances with Russian princes. Three Kievan matrimonial 
bonds were contracted in the following years. On several occasions, the Árpáds 
were called in to intervene.34 When in the 1090s St. Ladislaus was called in to 
give aid to his relative, Otto II, Duke of Moravia against the Prince of Bohemia, 
he did it in return for the “great number of strong knights” the Duke’s father, Otto 
                                                 
25  „amicabiliter recepti”: Simonis de Kéza, Gesta Hungarorum. SRH. I. cap. 52. p. 177. Eng-
lish trans. The Deeds of the Hungarians. Eds. F. Schaer, L. Veszprémy. Budapest, 1999.  
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30  Makk, Aussenpolitik, 61., 63.; 73. ; 106.; Kristó, Die Arpaden-Dynastie, 242. 
31  Makk, Aussenpolitik, 57–8.  
32  Makk, Aussenpolitik, 94–5. 
33  Chronici Hungarici compositio, cap. 145. p. 424.  
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I had provided for him in 1074 against the rival, Salamon.35 It was a typical famil-
iar tie (consanguinitas) in terms of which, the king intermediated, since Otto I 
married Ladislaus’ sister. This system of “nutrition of relatives” worked well, e.g. 
when St. Ladislaus received his cousin, Duke Břetislav of Bohemia favourably 
and granted him a living and provisions.36 The support of the Moravian dukes 
against the German-ally Bohemian princes was later resumed.37 There were cases 
however, when the system did not work well and the Moravian dukes joined the 
German invaders.38 
The insult of a blood-relative (iniuria nepotis) was treated as an offence and 
cause for intervention. In 1108 Coloman (1095–1116), “wishing to revenge the 
injuries done to him” by the Duke Svatopluk, i.e. his devastation, began to lay 
waste to Moravia.39 In 1099 Sviatopolk and Yaroslav asked their relative, King 
Coloman to provide a force against their rivals.40 In the early 1070s, as the Patzi-
naks broke into Hungary, allegedly incited by Byzantium,41 St. Ladislaus led pre-
ventive counter-attacks into Byzantine territory and, as a base against further as-
saults, captured Belgrade.42 It is probable that the Hungarians tried to exploit the 
Byzantine rivalries and extend their frontiers south of the Danube.43 Expansion 
was in this way justified by defence interests, though the pillaging up to Niš and 
the seizure of the relic of St. Prokop as well as the huge booty the Hungarians 
gained cannot be argued for. Likewise, when they raided all the territories of their 
neighbours cannot be accounted for the safety of the country.44 Similarly, St. 
Ladislaus’ 1093 intervention to the Polish rivalry and a three-month siege and the 
starvation of the defenders of Cracow cannot at all be justified.45 The interference 
and the support of the sedition of Romanus Diogenes in Byzantium against Em-
peror Constantine X Dukas in the late 1060s cannot be explained either.46 To say 
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the least, in some cases the interest of defence and expansion intertwined. How-
ever, this policy was much more a defensive-offensive one, applying also preven-
tive aggressive actions. St. Ladislaus provided a good example of that when in 
1091/1092 led a campaign against the Cumans – who were incited by the Byzan-
tines to break into Hungary – and wanted to combat them beyond the borders, in 
Byzantine territory, “rode in advance of them fearing a devastation of the coun-
try”.47 It is true that in the 11th and the 13th century Hungary had to fight against 
the “eastern aggression” to protect its existence and several times suffered large-
scale Patzinak, Oghuz and Cuman invasions.48 The threat was in several cases 
justifiable, and “the peril indescribably” catastrophic.49 In 1099 the Cumans were 
driving them “for two days” “hither and yon as a falcon drives magpies”, and “the 
slaughter was so huge” and “the Hungarians had rarely before suffered such a 
massacre” from the hand of the Cumans.50 It was also a shock that lots of people 
from Szerém/Srem and Transylvania were carried off to Byzantium in the 1150s–
60s.51 However, foreign invasion or the prevention of an aggression was also to 
have Hungarian actions accounted for. When in 1202 King Emericus (1196–
1204) led an invasion into Bulgaria, he was to find pretext in the former inroad of 
Bulgarian-subject Cumans and the capture of the Belgrade – although it was at 
that time Byzantine territory as Hungary surrendered them as the Árpád-princess, 
Empress Margaret’s (consort of Isaac Angelus) dowry.52 By that time, the Árpáds 
had already been waging war in the Balkans for years against the Bulgarian Tsar 
Kaloyan.  
The preventive action or active defence based upon a frontier-guarding in-
dago- or gyepű-system, a wide area of wastes and borderlands, consisting of gates 
and obstacles.53 From the late 1020s King St. Stephen raided and plundered the 
marches of Ostmark and Bavaria, in return Emperor Conrad II’s promotion of 
German settlement into the frontier region between the Fischa and Leutha.54 Con-
rad went on a campaign against the Hungarians but “could not penetrate the fron-
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tier of the country well-protected by rivers and forests”.55 The defensive technique 
involved the “scorched earth” method, when the enemy were let in “until they 
were in rough country” and “distress”.56 Because of a treaty, the region between 
the rivers Leutha and Fischa was taken under Hungarian control.57 Henry III reoc-
cupied the zone in the 1040s, but it seems they kings of Hungary never ceased to 
threaten the region and laid almost regularly preventive campaigns.58 It is also 
true that the Princes of Austria and Bohemia similarly devastated the frontier re-
gion from time to time.59 In defence of the realm special border guard troops were 
settled in frontier zones, in some cases pushed forward as advanced outposts, 
serving as buffers against foreign invasion (e.g. the northern territories of Bosnia, 
the wardenship of Szörény/Severin). Frontier forces, mostly Patzinaks were also 
to lead preventive campaigns into enemy territory.60 Abū Hāmid al-Garnātī writes 
of Muslims, possibly Khalyzians of Khwarazmian origin in 12th century Hungary, 
“with whom they launch raids to Byzantine territories.”61  
By the end of the 12th century Hungary became a leading political power of 
“international” prestige in the region. It was judged as a grand power in traditional 
historiography. Hungary was a decisive factor in the political map, an important 
actor in papal diplomacy on the frontier of Latinitas, playing a major role in con-
version, the spread of Western Christianity and crusading. It was able to protect 
its interests, and had them well represented at the most important decisions touch-
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61  Abū Hāmid al-Garnātī, Al-Mu’rib ’an ba’ḍ ’ayā’ib al-Magrib [Eulogy on the countries of 
the West]. Budapest, 1985. 58. Chalisioi in Kinnamos, 86. 
HUNGARY'S RELATIONSHIP TO HER NEIGHBOURS IN THE ÁRPÁD AGE 39 
ing the fate of the region (cf. Hungary’s envoys were present at the signing of the 
1179 Venice treaty between Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa and Pope Alexander 
III). The Árpáds maintained a large-scale dynastic policy, contracted marriages 
with determining powers, Byzantium, the Kievan Rus’, the Capetiens, the Princi-
pality of Antiochia, the Sicilian Normans. It was a prime concern that they were 
not to acknowledge any suzerainty. In the interpretation of the Hungarian kings, 
the preservation of independence could also legitimize, if necessary, an interven-
tion into its neighbours and the enforcement of vassalage. However, the territory 
where the kings had a permanent or long-term direct territorial rule was only 
Croatia proper. Nevertheless, in the political ideology of medieval Hungary it was 
held that if the kings had extended their rule over a territory, it was to belong now 
to the crown of Hungary once and for all. It was taken as if they had a legitimate 
right to possess it for ever now. Even though they lost control over some territory, 
the kings kept on using its royal titles, and assumed the dignities as rex Serviae or 
Bulgariae. It was helped by a special ideology: the territories and parts once be-
longing to the Kingdom of Hungary were taken as true members of the body of 
the Holy Crown of Hungary. The kings were always to make the members who 
had once accepted the Holy Crown but denounced it as infideles regni return un-
der its obedience. In 1202, King Imre interfered in the dynastic rivalry in Serbia, 
then, on the pretext of supporting a claimant, led an invasion and assumed the title 
rex Serviae, and although he was not able to consolidate his rule, his successors 
kept on ruling as kings of Serbia.  
The familiar diplomacy was rather flexible and pragmatic. The prime concern 
was to uphold the positions and the precious ties and alliances the kingdom had 
already seized. The rulers, when it seemed necessary, changed sides and chose to 
support new protégés. The pragmatism can be touched upon in 12th-century Rus-
sian campaigns. Although King Coloman was severely defeated in 1099 at the 
battle of Przemyśl, in 1123 his son, Stephen II embarked on a campaign support-
ing now the Árpáds’ former enemy, Vasilko of Przemyśl against Vladimir II 
Monomakh of Kiev, to whom he had previously allied.62 He was not to indulge in 
any kind of a personal vengeance, but was mainly concerned to keep the status 
quo, and back the party he found most beneficial for the interests of the kingdom. 
Stephen II also gave asylum to his former adversary, Duke Bořivoj II of Bohe-
mia.63 In 1018 St. Stephen assisted the Polish invasion against Kiev and turned 
against his former friend, Yaroslav I the Wise.64 It might as well be seen as dou-
ble-dealing, but it might perhaps be explained that Stephen wished to confirm his 
commitment to the 1018 treaty between Poland and the Empire when he joined an 
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aggression against Bolesław I’s Kievan opponent, and help the German-Polish-
backed Kievan claimant occupy the throne.65 The king might have hoped to ce-
ment his friendship to Poland and sacrificed his Kievan alliance, he found less 
valuable for the moment.66 Although at the end of the 12th century Hungary gave 
support to Emperor Isaac Angelus against the augmented Bulgarian power, as a 
new actor, the Latin Empire appeared on the scene, in the 1210s–20s King An-
drew II (1205–35) came to support Ivan Asen II, contracting a marriage alliance 
and providing military help. 
The Realpolitik was to prevent the formation of a great power in the Rus’, any 
ill-proportioned augmentation of any of the principalities that might become a po-
tential ally of Byzantium and lay a threat to Hungary. In a way, the Árpáds were 
interested in a certain level of fragmentization. Whenever the Árpáds were afraid 
a potential source of danger would be born, if any of the princes extended his ter-
ritorial rule, they decided on an intervention. They were against the increase of 
power under Vladimir Monomakh, but came to support the Monomakhs, as 
Vladimir’s successors lost the throne in Kiev, against their Chernigov relatives, 
also because Kiev was the greatest adversary of the Cumans.67 Hungary was 
ready to supply military help whenever some power – in the 1140s Chernigov – 
sought to unite the principalities (Volhynia with Kiev). As Byzantium became a 
greatest threat and Manuel contracted alliances at the back of the Árpáds with the 
Galician princes, they, as realists, sought to find partners in their hinterland and in 
the 1140s–50s reconciliated their connections with Kiev. Between 1148 and 1152 
King Géza II (1141–62) led six campaigns on behalf of the Monomakh-branch, 
and helped Izyaslav II assume and keep the throne as well as forged a matrimo-
nial alliance. The Árpáds did not want to get caught up in a pair of Byzantine-
Russian pincers. The safety of the northeastern border was of primary importance 
since Byzantium did consciously lay assaults against Hungary just at the time 
when the Hungarians were engaged on campaigns in the Rus’. There was even a 
greater threat, that of a three-front war as Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I pro-
posed an alliance to Manuel and offered to assist him against Hungary.68 The 
kings were very pragmatic and valued the balance of powers first. Although the 
Árpáds assisted the Monomakhs in their struggles against Vladimirko of Galicia, 
but, even as opposed to his Byzantine sympathies, disagreed to have him dispos-
sessed and were to keep the independence of Halych-Volhynia and rejected it to 
be the united with Kiev. In return, the grateful Halychian prince helped the Ár-
páds against the Byzantine assaults in 1164.69 Then, Volhynia was not annexed to 
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Kiev, but was to be ruled by a brother of the Grand Prince, and kept its integrity, 
also safeguarded by the Árpáds’ matrimonial bond. The new Volhynian prince 
married Géza’s niece, by which they wished to demonstrate it was now part of the 
dynastic block and for the concerns of the princess they were ready to intervene if 
the independence of Volhynia was to be threatened. In their Russian relations the 
Árpáds, until the late 12th century did not extend their rule or occupy territories, 
but were satisfied with political influence and did not go beyond dynastic assis-
tance.  
The kings also gave political asylum to foreign dynasty members or refugee 
princes but intervened if a foreign power granted asylum to a Hungarian throne-
pretender, judging it as an aggressive act. St. Stephen harboured his brother-in-
law, Bruno, bishop of Augsburg, who got into conflict with Emperor Henry II and 
intermediated to have the parties make peace.70 This policy of familiar “inter-
cession” was applied several times later on.71 St. Ladislaus looked after the son of 
King Bolesław II of Poland “and for his father’s sake treated him as he were his 
own son”.72 King Géza II (1141–61) sheltered his uncle, the Serbian ban Belos of 
the house of Uroš, who found refuge from Serbia.73  
However, the kings usually made preventive steps to have the rival ousted. In 
1127 the refugee Prince Álmos was received in Byzantium, the expulsion of 
whom was demanded and invasions were led by Stephen II. It was also a pretext 
for territorial expansion (Belgrade, Braničevo).74 King Béla III devastated Austria 
because the Duke harboured his rival, Géza (1176).75 Béla II (1131–41) was pri-
marily interested to prevent his neighbours from supporting the alleged and disin-
herited son of Coloman.76 Boris “obtained the aid of the Russians and Poles”, who 
“intervened in Hungary on behalf of him”.77 The framework of familiar coopera-
tion worked well and was mutual: the king received military help from Vladi-
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mirko, Prince of Zvenigorod-Halych, and, in return, in 1138 he gave help to 
Vladimirko against his Chernigov relatives, who laid an assault against Vladi-
mirko’s principality. It was also mostly mutual with Poland: King Coloman got 
asylum in Poland against his rival, Álmos. Then he made preventive measures 
and interfered in the Polish throne struggles to make Bolesław III not to back Ál-
mos. In return, Bolesław supported Coloman against German invasions, since he 
was alike threatened by Emperor Henry V, who supported Bolesław’s rival.78  
A most critical period was the mid-12th century when the Árpáds had to face 
the expansive ambitions of the Comneni: large-scale invasions of nearly the 
whole imperial army, almost annually. Yet it is not the task of this study to give 
an overview of the whole history of Byzantine-Hungarian conflicts. Before the 
aggressions of Manuel Comnenus who did in fact threaten Hungarian indepen-
dence, the kings of Hungary did lead preventive assaults into Byzantine territo-
ries.79 By the mid-1160s the kingdom lost large territories in the south and was to 
agree to Prince Béla be taken as a hostage to Byzantium. Although Béla was 
brought up for a few years as an heir-presumptive, it is disputed whether Manuel 
considered for a united Byzantino-Hungarian empire.80 The Árpáds had to fight 
against the Byzantine threat to save the kingdom from suzerainty. Although the 
Byzantine army laid smashing, two-pronged assaults, the Árpáds did manage to 
ward them off and prevent them from moving deeply into Hungarian territories. 
They lost several battles and thousands perished but although the areas south of 
the Sava, Srem, Croatia and Dalmatia were lost, the country was never under 
permanent foreign territorial rule. The kings allied with the Serbs, dispatched aux-
iliary forces against Byzantium, brought forth a marriage alliance with the Uroš, 
and pushed the defensive frontier forward.81 Kinnamos also relates that Géza II’s 
uncle, ban Belus “undertook to make Serbia a subject-ally” to the Árpáds.82  
Byzantium traditionally had a liking to welcome, receive, nurture and harbour 
foreign pretenders. In the 1150s–60s Byzantium granted asylum to Boris, and as-
sisted his military interventions,83 then enthroned two anti-kings in Hungary, hav-
ing them acknowledged Byzantine overlordship.84 However, Hungary was able to 
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overcome these difficult periods and oust the anti-kings, neither of whose rules 
lasted more than a few months and the reigning king, Stephen III and his follow-
ers, also with Western help were able to regain the throne. The anti-kings recog-
nized Byzantine suzerainty and took an oath of vassalage, but their rule did not 
mean in practice Byzantine conquest. Neither of the anti-kings brought in Byzan-
tine administration or had castles garrisoned with Greeks. The Árpáds did even 
fight Byzantium with its own arms and sought to embrace the cause and gain the 
support of a rival Comnenus prince, and under the promise of territorial grants 
made him to assist Hungary with his troops against his cousin, the Emperor 
(1154).85 Another defensive technique was “not to come close quarters”, to march 
along the Danube, defer open-field combat and have the engagement prolonged 
until the Greeks were “gripped by anguish and fear”. “They fled after a brief en-
gagement…during the flight they dispersed and all of a sudden got lost”. “When 
the Romans observed no one opposing them they thought of returning”.86 There 
was only one occasion that the Byzantine army were able to pass through the 
Hungarian defences, and crossed the Danube. However, they never moved further 
to the north then Bács/Bač, the Temesköz region and the southern territories of 
Transylvania.87 The Árpáds did lead preventive campaigns and broke into Byzan-
tine territories. In 1154 Géza II laid siege to Niš and Braničevo. However, it can 
be seen as a great result that at last Manuel accepted that he was not able to con-
quer Hungary. The wars were “laden with horror”, the Greeks “suffered great 
losses”, and at the battles “achieved nothing worth mentioning”.88 Byzantium was 
satisfied with the territories south of the Sava and the Danube, only Dalmatia and 
Bosnia were established as thema-districts. The Hungarians in a few years’ time 
were able to reoccupy the territories and survived the “Greek peril”. Byzantium 
had only a restricted, temporary political influence and had no direct rule in prac-
tice.89 
In the political vacuum following the conquest of Constantinople in 1204, 
Hungary aspired to the role of a political arbitrator and a central diplomatic factor 
in the Central and Eastern European theatre, also aiming to fill the positions the 
fall of Byzantine Empire had left empty. Béla III (1172–96) made use of the wan-
ing of Byzantine power in 1183 when he led an invasion up to Niš and Sofia and 
recaptured most of the territories formerly lost to Manuel. This new power con-
ception is symbolically signified by the fact that Béla adopted the double cross, 
the majestic insignium of the basileus and had in incorporated to his seal and 
coat-of-arms. However, the kings also sought to keep the balance of powers. 
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When in 1185 Byzantium suffered a major Norman assault, Béla, though being 
still at war with Byzantium, came to make peace with Isaac II Angelus, cemented 
with a matrimonial alliance, and was to supply military aid. He also backed 
Byzantium in 1190 against German crusaders.90 With his backing, Byzantium 
was able to remain on the political map. Hungary was also concerned that the 
German-ally Normans not seize positions in the Balkans. To uphold the balance, 
Hungary also gave support to Isaac against the augmented Bulgarian power. 
The personal union of Hungary and Croatia is not to be seen here in depth, 
since it is out of the scope of this present study. Croatia does not closely belong to 
the field of foreign policy, being attached to the Kingdom in a personal union 
from 1091 on. To put it briefly, in 1091 St. Ladislaus intervened on behalf his sis-
ter, widow of King Zvonimir and occupied the kingdom, and bestowed it on his 
nephew. The union was also to be cemented with the foundation of the bishopric 
of Zagreb in 1093/94, a symbol of Ladislaus’ authority. It is also emphasized even 
in Croatian narrative tradition that Ladislaus was called in by a league of nobles, 
who “urged to seize the kingdom and subjugate it to his lordship” because Croatia 
“remained without a king to guard and protect it”.91 In 1097 Coloman resumed 
the conquest, then was crowned as King of Croatia. In 1105 he conquered the 
coastal areas of Croatia and Dalmatia.92 He assumed the title as King of Dalmatia 
at Zara/Zadar (1105/08). Hungarian sources treated Dalmatia as a regnum, though 
it was not a contiguous kingdom, but a number of cities.93 The cities, as opposed 
to Venetian rule, welcomed and preferred Hungarian domination, and rather felt 
as being governed in a mutual understanding. 94 
 
Relations with Galicia/Halych(yna)-Volhynia (Halycz-Vladimir) 
 
One of the areas where the Árpáds’ rule meant for certain periods direct Hun-
garian rule was the regnum Galiciae et Lodomeriae, taken as a true member of 
the Holy Crown.95 For a few years, it was made into a separate vassal state under 
the rule of an Árpád, governed as a subjected realm with a pro-Hungarian admini-
stration. Hungary had its castles garrisoned, levied taxes and built Catholic 
churches. The conquest was short-lived and failed as being totally refused by the 
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locals. Four parties were warring for the throne: Cracow, Novgorod, Cherni-
gov/Chernihiv and Hungary. Hungary applied various techniques ranging from 
organizing a league within the boyars to annexation. In 1205 Andrew II invaded 
on the pretext of safeguarding the rights of the infant prince, Danylo Ro-
manovych, in the name of whom he established a protectorate. It is also a part of 
the truth that Andrew was called in by boyars to assist against Vsevolod IV of 
Kiev. However, Danylo and his patrons were exiled. The King came now to sup-
port a new pretender with arms and money: Roman II Igorevich, Prince of Zve-
nigorod. Hungary intervened to help him banish a new Rurikid pretender, Vladi-
mir Igorevich. Thirdly, Andrew deposed the former protégé, Roman II and organ-
ized the principality into a Hungarian governorship (1208). There was a huge 
wave of discontent which had the Hungarians ousted in 1209. However, King 
Andrew had a last trump in his hand as a claimant, Prince Danylo was still kept in 
Hungary and receiving a Catholic education, was brought up as a new chance for 
a would-be-king. In 1211 a group of the Hungarian-league boyars asked An-
drew’s aid, who chose now to send Danylo to occupy the throne.96 The rule was 
only to be upheld with Hungarian arms, and the boyars soon revolted against it, 
but were severely repressed and brutally put to the torture (1213). Then, lastly, 
coming to reconcile with Cracow, Andrew put forward a new claimant, his son, 
Coloman, who was to marry a Polish princess and with Polish consent crowned as 
king of Halych (1214–19). The king of Hungary also intended to form Galicia 
into a Catholic vassal state, as he gained a papal authorization and a crown. The 
Polish and Hungarian allies, almost in the style of modern-age colonization, di-
vided their territorial conquests. However, there was much discontent arising 
against the Hungarian rule and Coloman was expelled by Mstislav of Novgorod 
(1219). Hungary did not give it up, and sought again to put the principality under 
its suzerainty, upheld by military force and subsequent interventions, which ex-
hausted much of the country’s energy. The Árpáds seem to have been driven by 
an overwhelming ambition to conquer Halych at all costs. In 1227 the King em-
barked again to enthrone his younger son, Andrew. Then, after his short-lived and 
much disliked rule, he attempted to put forward Hungarian rule with arms, but 
was defeated.97 Nevertheless, it is to be mentioned that this last attempt did serve 
defence interests, since after the defeat of the Russian princes at the battle of the 
river Kalka (1223),98 by the Mongols re-valued the importance of the region and 
the Árpáds might have also been aiming to build up a defensive buffer. All the 
Hungarian expansive efforts came to nothing. The rivalry between the Rurikid 
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princes, Poland and Hungary at the eve of the Mongol Invasion contributed to the 




The kings of Hungary were also led by religious fervour and assumed the role of 
defensor Christianitatis. A special political ideology was also conceptualized in the 
Legenda Sancti Stephani regis.99 Stephen was also named by the Pope as rex 
apostolicus and received an apostolic cross since “upon his merits he is Christ’s 
apostle since Christ converted many peoples by him”.100 All the kings of Hun-
gary, as apostolic kings aspired to the role of a missionary, having a divine role 
assigned to convert the surrounding pagans.101 A major direction of mission in the 
13th century was the region Cumania east of the Carpathians.102 As masses of the 
the Cumans asked to embrace Christianity, the Árpáds had Dominican friars set-
tled and a missionary bishopric founded in 1226–29, centred in Milkó/Mil-
cov(ia).103 Although the kings of Hungary assumed the title rex Cumaniae in 
1233, they had only a formal suzerainty over the region, since in 1241 the Mon-
gols swept their influence away. Then, the Árpáds chose to establish a wardenship 
(banatus) in a smaller region between the Southern Carpathians, the Danube and 
the river Olt, centred in Szörényvár/Severin.104 They had now only a formal po-
litical influence, but organized the district into a military frontier zone to ward off 
the Mongol invasions from the south-east.  
A missionary bishopric was to pave the way for Hungarian influence in Bos-
nia. King Béla II (1131–41) occupied the core of the region around the river 
Rama and assumed the address rex Ramae. Although the territory was addressed 
as a princely duchy and donated to a younger son, it was not organized into an 
apanage but a vassal ban was appointed. Beyond that we do not know of any 
Hungarian influence in the midst of the Byzantine wars of the mid-12th century. 
However, the assumedly Patarene heresy, Bogumilism provided justification both 
for action and the spread of the Roman Catholic faith, the kings of Hungary, hand 
in hand with the Papacy intervened and led crusades from 1200 onwards. The 
backing of Innocent III provided an opportunity for the Árpáds to intervene in 
Serbia and Bulgaria and extending the conversion campaigns on to Orthodox 
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schismatici. From the 1190s on the Hungarians captured Serbian and Bulgarian 
territories, but were not able to extend their control beyond the Danube. They 
tried to enthrone their own claimants, and had them crowned as vassals, but got 
into conflict with Innocent, who wished to have them taken under the sole suze-
rainty of the Holy See instead and make them accept crowns St. Peter dispatched. 
In Bosnia, it was not until 1237, when a crusade was preached that Hungarian su-
zerainty got consolidated and a vassal was installed. The conversion was led by 
Dominican missionaries, also aided by the Papacy so as to establish a Catholic 
bishopric. The conversion of the Slav schismatici in the Balkans was to be fur-
thered by the foundation of the bishopric of Szerém/Srem in 1229, under the au-




Throughout the Middle Ages Hungary sought to run a leading role in the region, 
which also involved aggression. The Árpáds occupied Croatia, and reigned over 
its monarchy in a partial personal union, in certain periods ruled some parts of 
Dalmatia and Bosnia, annexed territories in Styria, Moravia, Silesia, Bulgaria and 
Halych-Volhynia. Hungary, as seen in foreign sources, “continually harassed its 
neighbours”, yet it did not manifest itself in territorial gains or military admini-
stration. The reasons are to be understood in the conceptual framework of the 
regnum Hungariae, which, seen from inside, served defensive concerns, but from 
the outside, was nothing but strive for grandeur. The Holy Crown was to be 
treated as having several members. The occupied areas, as the regnum of Halych 
or Serbia were in perpetuity held as membrum Sacrae Coronae. In the political 
mythology of the Holy Crown it was seen whenever the kings laid an invasion 
against their neighbours it was because the princes subjected to the Holy Crown 
revolted against their lawful majesty. The kings restored the unfaithfuls to obedi-
ence. Using demonstrations of power, they were to protect the members of the 
crown, which came to be a guarantee of political stability. Yet the monarchical ti-
tles do not reflect that all territories were ruled by Hungary in fact. In most of the 
cases they did find justification for the hegemonic expeditions. The kings are 
mostly depicted as laying invasions “because of the deeds with which [their 
neighbours] had afflicted them”.105 It is also true that they had friendly terms with 
some of their counterparts (e.g. the Habsburgs in the late 13th century). Although 
it appears in the sources, they did not “force” neighbouring peoples “to pay trib-
ute”.106 Beyond Croatia, and in certain years in Galicia and Northern Bulgaria 
from the people of which they “exacted obedience”, they did not have direct terri-
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torial rule.107 Their reasons could have been explained by the concerns of defence 
and the protection of Christendom, but in several cases these were only pretexts.  
In medieval Hungarian political ideology, it was a prime concern to sustain the 
country’s sovereignty and independence as well as to be a rightful member of 
Christian monarchies, being able to direct its own fate. The king considered him-
self as equal of other Christian sovereigns, who does not subordinate himself to 
any supreme power.108 It was also underlined by the regnum Marianum concept, 
first conceptualized in the Legenda Sancti Stephani regis. It was proposed that St. 
Stephen asked the help of Virgin Mary to save the country from a German aggres-
sion, and offered it under her tutelage. She was to be the nation’s “perpetual pro-
tector”, which was now only subjected to the Virgin herself.109 
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Major Power or Not?  
Lithuania in the Middle Ages 
 
 
It is not easy to decide which state could be considered a “great power” in the 
middle ages because the criteria and viewpoints of later ages are not applicable 
to that age. For, everywhere – with the possible exeption of Italian city-states – 
political power and rule over a given territory in medieval times was based on 
personal relationships (on different forms of allegiance) rather than on some 
permanent system of institutions. Therefore, an oath of allegiance, matrimonial 
union, or the extinction of a princely family could alter overnight the existing 
arrangement of power. Undeniably, medieval political thinking commonly held 
the view that the extent of a prince’s power was closely related to the size of the 
teritory he/she ruled. Thus, the question under what political constellation one 
exercised sovereign power, or what resources were available to this person ap-
peared well-nigh immaterial from this point of view. 
The present study makes an attempt at delineating the issue whether the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had by the early 15th century expanded its 
sovereignity over very large territories could be considered a major power in 
contemporary Europe or not. Was it within its means to project its influence be-
yond its political boundaries, and be capable of shaping developments in 
Europe? How lasting and stable was that political power, that is, if it had influ-
ence over wider areas, was it incidental or was it a capability sustained over a 
longer time-frame? 
Out of the Baltic peoples only the Lithuanians were able to found an inde-
pendant state in the Middle Ages.1 However, the Lithuanian statehood presented 
remarkable divergence compared with kingdoms that came into existence 
around the millenium or in the early centuries of the Middle Ages: statehood 
was not linked to the adoption of Christianity and forming church organization, 
but it took place amidst the gentilitial structures of a pagan world. The existence 
of the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania was proof of the possibility of build-
ing a territorial power-structure based on heathen fundaments which was capa-
ble of significant expansion and of becoming a momentous political factor in 
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Eastern Europe. As a result of Lithuanian conquests in the Eastern Slav territo-
ries an empire extending over some 900,000 sq km area came into being by the 
end of the 14th century the upper stratum of which consisted of Lithuanians  and 
Slavs in fealty to them while the bulk of the population was made up of Slavs. 
The actual Lithuanian territories on the ethnographical sense represented 70–
80,000 sq. Km. area, that is they constituted only cca. 5–7% of the territory of 
the empire. (The territory of present-day Lithuania is 65,300 sq. Km.).2 
Whereas, the adoption of Western Christianity (which took place simultane-
ously with the Polish-Lithuanian Union of 1386)3 was concommitant with the 
gradual decline and loss of Lithuanian souvereignty and led eventually to incor-
poration in Poland (1569).4 
The first reports about Lithuanians and their land of residence date from 1009. 
It occurs in the written form of Lituae in the Annales Quedlinburgenses.5 Accord-
ing to Chronica Latopis Nestora Yaroslav, Grand Duke of Kiev waged war 
against the residents of Litua in 1040 and forced them to pay taxes.6 In the last 
third of the 12th century the Lithuanian tribes already formed two major territorial 
alliances which they called „low-landers” (žemaitis) and the „highlanders” 
(aukštaitis). This disctinction was probably derived from the lower, middle, and 
upper courses of River Neumas (Nyeman, Memel) and between the two areas, the 
valley of river Nevežis marked out the border.7 The „highland” parts may have 
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been the ancient residential areas whence smaller or larger groups migrated west 
and south-west as far as the estuary of river Neumas or the sea-coast, because 
Aukštaitia (Latin: Auxtote) was identified with Lithuania and Žemaitia (Latin: 
Samogitia) were recurrently mentioned separately. „Lithuani et Samogiti” can be 
read, for example, in a document dated around 1247, and Riga was attacked by 
„Lithuani et Samogiti” in 1286.8 The unification of forces, the alliance of tribes, 
the foundation of broader power structures over gentilitial structures had begun in 
order to fend off external threat much earlier in the Lithuanian highlands border-
ing on the Polish Piast principalities and the succession states of the Kievan Rus 
than in the “lowlands”. The medieval Lithuanian state came into being in 
Aukštaitia in the course of almost a century of internal strike. As early as 1219, 
the prince of Halych (Galicia)-Volhynia concluded peace with a Lithuanian tribal 
confederation headed by a prince named Živinbudas anonymously referred to by 
the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle (Livländische Reimchronik) and the annals of 
Halych (Galicia)9. The Lithuanian tribal confederation were to be reckoned with 
as a momentous political factor in the succession states of the former Rus and the 
Baltic region alike. “Their might goes far” („ir macht ist breit”) reported the 
Livonian Rhymed Chronicle10. It was mostly the “lowland” Lithuanians that got 
within the scope of conquering Germans – owing to geographical proximity. In 
the Livonian Chronicle of Heinrich mention is made, for example, of a certain 
leader named Žvelgaitis, who attacked the land of the Estonians with a 2000-
strong army and of a notable, named Daugerutas, who led a marauding campaign 
against Novgorod in 1213 (his daughter was, in turn, married by a Slav prince, 
Wszewolod of Gerzike) and a leader by the name of Stekšys whose troops were 
repelled by the Knights of the Order of the Sword Brothers to the further bank of 
the River Dvina (1213).11 This, however, did not mean that the tidings of political 
changes in the Lithuanian “highlands” were not payed attention to. Živinbudas 
died around 1219/20 and Ringaudas became the most powerful prince who was 
no longer content with the alliance of individual tribes and princes and their po-
litical cooperation, but endeavoured to put an increasing expanse of land under his 
                                                            
 8  Regesta Lithuaniae ab origine usque ad Magni Ducatus cum regno Poloniae unionem. 
Tom. I: Tempora usque ad annum 1315 complectens. Ed. H. Paszkiewicz. Warszawa, 
1930. Nr. 220, 659. 
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direct control.12 The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle unequivocally calls him “great 
king” („was ein konic grôz”).13 He extended his authority over a large part of 
Aukštaitia and even to the Estern Slav Polock as well.14 Subsequent to his death 
his male issue, Daugsprungas, succeeded him on the princely throne of Aukštai-
tia.15 He married the younger sister of Vykintas, the most powerful prince of Že-
maitia, in order to secure the northwestern borders by means of family ties. He 
gave one daughter in marriage to Alexander, prince of Novgorod the other daugh-
ter to Daniil prince of Halych (Galicia) thus wrapping up an alliance with the cru-
cially important western and southern Russian principalities.16 In the direction of 
the Eastern Slav territories, he launched a series of well-planned attacks while, be-
tween 1201 and 1226, Lithuanian incursions, marauding campaigns were equally 
directed against the Baltic regions and Russian territories, it was the Russian prin-
cipalities that were primarily targeted by Lithuanian military activity from 1226 
up until Daugsprungas’ death in 1238. The fight against conquering Germans in 
Livonia essentially fell on the residents of Žemaitia, while the Ringaudas-dynasty, 
which had initiated the unification of Lithuanians wished to strengthen its position 
by feats of arms conducting expansionist military campaigns against Russian ter-
ritories.17 Daugsprungas was succeeded on the throne by his younger brother, 
Mindaugas, in 1238, but his nephews (Tautvila and Edvytas) posed as serious ri-
vals who were also supported by their uncle on the mother’s side, Vykintas, 
prince of Žemaitia. Tautvila also wanted to strengthen his power by conquering 
Russian lands and extended his control over the upper course of Rivers Dvina and 
Dnepr (Polock, Vitebsk, Drutsk).18 Exploiting the huge Mongolian offensive 
mounted against the Russian princedoms in 1237,19 Mindaugas expanded his rule 
towards  both Red- and Black Russia and placed his son, Vaišvilkas at the head of 
the conquered Slav lands.20 By the mid-1240’s Mindaugas’ authority over the 
bulk of the territory of of Žemaitia had been recognized.21 In all likelihood the 
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fact that the Teutonic Order was at about this time engaged in the final phase of 
the conquest of Kurland22 played an important role in this, and it had come to be 
directly bordered on Žemaitia, whose inhabitants felt threatened by it and ex-
pected help from the prince of Aukštaitia. His nephews, therefore, could not count 
on the support of the “lowlands” in spite of the help of their uncle on the mother’s 
side, thus Mindaugas easily drove them out of Lithuania, but were allowed to re-
tain their Russian gains. Tautvila sought alliance with the Livonian Germans and 
even converted to Christianity to facilitate this end (1248).23 Mindaugas feared 
that the Livonian Germans (the bishop of Riga and the Teutonic Order), Vykintas, 
prince of Žemaitia, Tautvila (and his younger brother) and the Russian principali-
ties threatened by Lithuanian expansion might form some kind of coalition 
against him, therefore, he decided to modify his political line he had been follow-
ing up to that time. He declared his willingness to make peace with the Germans 
and to adopt Christianity thus breaking out of political and military isolation.24 
(At the same time, this move also meant that the Grand Duke of Lithuania relin-
quished the role of a being a defender of the tribes in Žemaitia and the Teutonic 
Order ceased to support Tautvila.) In 1251, Mindaugas and his sizeable armed 
retinue got baptized,25 pope Innocent IV, in turn, made the Bishop of Riga conse-
crate a priest of the Teutonic Order as bishop of Lithuania.26 
In the course of 1250/51, Mindaugas defeated his internal contenders and even 
his most formidable rival prince Vykintas, fell in combat. Because of the peace 
concluded with the Germans, the tribes of the “lowlands” turned against the 
Grand Duke of Lithuania and subsequent to Vykintas’ death they sided with a 
new leader, Treiniota. Like Tautvila, Treiniota also belonged to the Lithuanian 
princely family: he was the son of Lengvenis, a notable in Žemaitia and the 
younger sister of Mindaugas.27 Not unlike his brother, Mindaugas also settled his 
relations with the prince of Halych-Volhynia through matrimonial ties: one of his 
daughters married Daniil’s son, Svarn.28 The conversion of his son, Vaišvilkas to 
orthodoxy (1254) served the consolidation of Lithuanian rule over the conquered 
Slav territories. The bishop of Kulm enthroned Mindaugas as king of Lithuania 
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with the approval of the Pope in 1253.29 He and his country was granted the spe-
cial protection of the Holy See30 by Pope Innocent IV. In return, for the support of 
the Teutonic Order in consolidating his rule in Lithuania he donated Žemaitia to 
the Order of Knights, therewith shifting to the Knights the responsibility for the 
problems of mutinous locals.31 In 1255 the Mongolians extended their rule over 
Halych-Volhynia and thus became neighbours to Lithuania, therefore Mindaugas’ 
attention was directed to the Tartars in the second half of the 1250’s (that is also 
why he gave up on the Lithuanian “lowlands”) who did, in fact, go at Lithuania in 
1258.32 Victory over the Mongolians33 made Mindaugas’ rule over Lithuania even 
further cemented, but Treiniota, the leader in Žemaitia, rising up against him also 
boasted remarkable feats of arms enhancing his political authority. On July 13, 
1260, he inflicted a crushing defeat at Durben on the Teutonic Order.34 However, 
the king of Lithuania did not turn against the Livonian Germans even after that, 
because he thought that a war in Žemaitia would rather strengthen Treiniota than 
himself. Midaugas went on pushing towards the Russian territories and waged 
war against Brjansk. The Lithuanian notable displeased with his policies assassi-
nated him on August 5, 1263.35 Upon his death, savage internecine struggle got 
started for supremacy. In this struggle Treiniota defeated Tautvila (1263) then, in 
turn, he was overpowered by Vaišvilkas, Mindaugas’ son of the orthodox faith 
(1265) who was also supported by his brother-in-law, Svarn, the prince of Ha-
lych-Volhynia, who recognized the Tartars’ overlordship. In 1267 Vaišvilkas re-
tired in a monastery and turned the princely throne of Lithuania over to his 
brother-in-law, thus creating a personal union of Lithuania and Halych-Volhynia 
(soon after this, some followers of his former adversaries assassinated Vaišvil-
kas.) Two years later, Svarn died, too, and therewith ended the Christian Lithua-
nian power, which had been a Roman Catholic kingdom at the time of Mindau-
gas, while under Vaišvilkas and Svarn it had been an orthodox duchy.36 In 1270, 
Traidenis, a prince from Aukštaitia, got hold of the grand duke’s throne. His posi-
tion was cemented by means of a matrimonial alliance with a Roman Catholic 
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princely dynasty: he married Ludmilla, the daughter of Boleslaw, the Mazovian 
prince.37 He intended to establish his authority by means of conquest and led a 
campaign against Halych whose prince, Lev Daniilovich, turned to the Tartars for 
help. The troops of the Golden Horde attacked Lithuania in 1277 and 1279, but 
Traidenis – like Mindaugas before him – repelled both attacks and consolidated 
his position on the throne of the Grand Duchy.38 Subsequent to his death (1282)39 
they embarked on more than a decade-long power struggle in which Pukoveros, 
son of Skolomand, a notable in Aukštaitia kept on getting a grip on larger and lar-
ger territories. In the Chronicle of Peter von Dusburg unequivocally called 
Pukoveros “king” of Lithuania („Pucuwenus rex Lethowie”).40 His son, Vytenis 
relying on the power structure he had built up managed to quickly obtain the dig-
nity of Grand Duke.41 He endavoured to harness the military might of Lithuanian 
notables and klans into campaigns abroad, the success of which would, in turn, 
strengthen his ducal power. He managed to exploit the serious political and mili-
tary conflicts between the bishop of Riga and the Order of Knights, and he inter-
fered in Livonian domestic affairs, too.42 He lent the Bishop of Riga aid against 
the Knights.43 While Tautvila or Mindaugas had to adopt Christianity in order to 
find German allies, Vytenis did not need to give up heathen believes which, how-
ever, confirmed his legitimation among Lithuanian society. 
His brother, Gediminas, succeeded him on the throne. He successfully ex-
ploied the internal tensions of the Golden Horde44 and extended Lithuanian su-
premacy over larger Eastern Slav territories than ever before. He conquered the 
region of Minsk in the 1320’s then moved forward in the direction of Vitebsk and 
Smolensk. He took control of Kiev, placing his younger brother Feodor of the or-
thodox faith at the helm (1331). His other brother Voin was trusted with the gov-
ernance of Polock. These military achievements rendered his authority and power 
inside Lithuania indispensable. His dynastic policy also aimed at consolidating 
the Lithuanian power conditions. One of his daughters was, in 1321, given in 
marriage to the Prince of Płock in Mazovia. He concluded an alliance with 
Vladislav (Łokietek), king of Poland, while his daughter, Aldona (named Anna 
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when baptized) married Kazimir, heir to the Polish throne. The Polish-Lithuanian 
alliance was directed against the Teutonic Order, which both parties were at war 
with. In 1331, duke of Halych-Volhynia, Yurii Boleslaw II also married one of 
Gediminas’ daughters, Eufemia. The Polish-Lithuanian alliance did, however, not 
prove to be long-lived and with the death of Queen Aldona/Anna (1339) it came 
to an end. Its main reason was that subsequent to the murder of the Grand Duke 
of Halych-Volhynia, the Lithuanian Grand Duke and the king of Poland became 
claimants to the throne of Halych-Volhynia. King Kazimir III made a peace 
agreement with the Teutonic Order, then the Lithuanians had to reckon with both 
Polish and German aggression. The struggles for Ruthenian territories resulted in 
the dissolution of the duchy: Halych got under Polish rule, while Volhynia fell 
into the hands of Lithuanians.45 It was Gediminas’ followers who governed Nov-
gorod, Pskov (Pleskau) thus Lithuanian influence prevailed there. While Kernave 
and Trakai used to be the center of the power of the Grand Duke, Gediminas 
made Vilnius the most important ancient heathen place of cult his seat of gov-
ernment where the Lithuanians’ high priest was also resident. So, in this way, 
unlike former dukes, a remarkable degree of legitimation was attached to his rule 
in Lithuanian society.46 At the same time, the bulk of the population of the 
Lithuanian Grand Duchy was made up of orthodox eastern Slavs at the time of his 
reign, therefore Gediminas created an orthodox bishopric in Novohorodok 
(Nowogródok, Naugardukas) in the heart of Black Russia in 1317, in order to 
withdraw his subjects belonging to eastern Christianity from under the influence 
of Metropolitan of “Kiev and all Rus” who also had his seat in Vladimir from 
1299 and moved  to Moscow for good in 1328. Gediminas permitted Franciscan 
Monks to settle in Vilnius. These monks were his scribes and interpreters in con-
ducting his diplomacy with the western world. The City of Riga, because of its 
commercial interests, and the conflict between the Bishop of Riga (who was also 
a Franciscan) and the Teutonic Order that had lasted for nearly two decades, took 
pains to shape good relations with the Lithuanian ruler. Riga concluded an alli-
ance of political and military nature with Gediminas, who contemporaneosusly 
wrote the letters expressing his willingness to convert to the Catholic faith, which 
never came to pass.47 The Lithuanian Grand Duke lost his life in battle against the 
                                                            
45  Jörg K. Hoensch, Geschichte Polens. Stuttgart, 1998. 48–55; St. Zajączkowski, „Przymierze 
polsko-litewskie 1325 r.” (= The Polish–Lithuanian Alliance of 1325), Kwartalnik His-
toryczny 40 (1926); G. Schwalbe, Geschichte Podlachiens, 189–195; Norman Housley, 
The Later Crusades 1274–1580. From Lyons to Alcazar. Oxford, 1992. 346. 
46  Tomas Venclova, Vilnius, a city in Europe. Budapest, 2009. 36–37. 
47  Liv-, Est- und Curländisches Urkundenbuch, Bde. I–XI. Hgg. F. G. Bunge, H. Hildebrand, 
P. Schwartz. Riga, 1852–1905. (a továbbiakban: LUB) itt: LUB II. Nr. 414, 415, 687, 688, 
689, 690; Kurt Forstreuter, „Die Bekehrung Gedimins und der Deutsche Orden”, Altpreu-
ßische Forschungen 5 (1928) 239–268; Codex diplomaticus Lithuaniae. Ed. E. Raczyński, 
Vratislaviae, 1845. Nr. 3. 
MAJOR POWER OR NOT? LITHUANIA IN THE MIDDLE AGES  57 
Tartars in winter 1341. He had 14 children out of his three marriages: 7 boys and 
7 girls. He had testamented well before his campaign against the Tartars how his 
sons should carve up the Grand Duchy among themselves and his eldest son Jau-
natus, born of his first marriage, was appointed his successor on the throne of the 
Grand Duchy. Every one of his other sons was to get a part of the empire, but in 
theory all of them were subject to Jaunatus’ overlordship. He, however, was not 
able to exercise his power over his brothers. The disintegration of Lithuania was a 
looming disaster. However, the crusader undertakings of the Teutonic Order and 
other western crusaders as well as because of the military threat posed by the Tar-
tars and Moscow rendered it imperative to hold on to and expand the conquered 
eastern and southern territories (where the tax revenue came from) and to retain 
the political and military unity of the empire. The shiftless Jaunatus was de-
throned by his two brothers Algirdas and Kestutis and ruled jointly (diarchy). The 
dignity of Grand Duke got vested in Algirdas’hands while Kestutis was allotted 
extra prerogatives and authority which exceeded those held by other brothers, but 
recognized his brother as his superior. In this way, one can actually not speak 
about diarchy, albeit there was a remarkable division of responsibilities between 
the two brothers.48 Algirdas was engaged in the Eastern Slav territories and fur-
ther conquests and had bonds to this world of orthodoxy through both of his mar-
riages while he, personally, remained heathen. He gained a remarkable victory 
over the Tartars by the “Blue water”, along one of the tributaries of the southern 
course of River Bug. The severe internal strife in the midst of the Golden Horde 
(between 1359–1380 more than 25 khans managed to get on the throne of the 
Horde) created favourable conditions for major Lithuanian conquests. Algirdas 
consolidated his rule over Kiev and got hold of Podolia, the broad expanse be-
tween the confluence of the Dniester and Bug rivers. He extended the borders of 
the Grand Duchy essentially as far as the Black Sea.49 Moscow was also bent for 
exploiting the weakening of Tartar power and tried increasing her influence play-
ing the role of the defender of the orthodox Eastern Slav lands.50 Her expansionist 
drive targeted the same Russian territories as that of the Lithuanians, so in the 
second half of the 14th century Algirdas launched three offensives against Mos-
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cow (1368, 1370, 1371).51 Just like his father, he also wanted the orthodox Rus-
sian territories under his rule to have a religious center of their own so that they 
should be independent of the Moscow Patriarch. However, the establishment of a 
bishopric of the Eastern Church under Lithuanian supervision did not prove suc-
cessful.52 His younger brother Kestutis governed the western parts of the Grand 
Duchy (with Trakai as the seat of government) and his main task was the defensive 
fight against the Teutonic Order and Crusaders regularly coming from Western 
Europe.53 During his 37 years of activity there were more than 140 military cam-
paigns between the two sides.54 At the time of Algirdas and Kestutis, the Lithua-
nian Grand Duchy succeeded in defending its western borders, while in the east 
and south it significantly enlarged its area of authority. By the last third of the 14th 
century, its Eastern border lay a mere 200 kms from Moscow. Thus, a Lithuanian-
Slav empire of 900,000 sq.km. had come into existence, which was about 150–
200,000 sq km in excess of the territory of the Holy Roman Empire then regarded 
as the great power in medieval Europe. Based on the geographical expanse of ter-
ritories under its authority, the Lithuanian Grand Duchy could be considered a 
great power. However, territorial expanse in the second half of the 14th century in 
itself is not enough to pronounce that a country can be considered to have been a 
major power. It is not the scale of expanse, but rather the size of the taxpaying 
population that mattered. Germany, for example, had a population of cca. 5–6 
million at the time of Heinrich III in the mid-11th century, which number had 
grown to 10–12 million by the end of the 13th century and to 14–15 million by the 
mid-14th century. (It is not by chance, that Germany was the greatest “exporter” of 
settlers in medieval colonization). As a result of late medieval visitations of the 
plague, the number of population fell back to cca. 10 million. Population started 
to grow again from the mid-15th century onwards and by the end of that century it 
had reached the 12 million level of 200 years before.55 Whereas the Lithuanian 
Grand Duchy was a thinly populated state: its population density did not exceed 
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4–5 people per sq.km., so its total population cannot have exceeded 4–4.5 million 
at the end of the Middle Ages.56 At the end of the 15th century the Grand Duchy 
of Moscow surpassed Lithuania in geographical expanse (cca. 1,380,000 sqkm), 
but its population was smaller than that of the latter (cca. 3–3.5 million).57 Ger-
many had, thus, a much smaller territory, but had three times as many people as 
Lithuania or the  Moscow Grand Duchy. By the end of the 14th century the terri-
tory of Poland had increased to 240,000–250,000 sq.km. while the size of her 
population roughly equaled that of the four times as large Lithuanian state.58 On 
the basis of these considerations, it is understandable why Jogaila, the son of Al-
girdas, after two decades of fighting a war with his cousin Vytauas (son of Kestu-
tis) for the throne of the Grand Duchy, did finally relinquish in 140159 the rule of 
Lithuania after having been recognized as overlord for the benefit of Vytautas 
himself giving preference to gaining the Polish royal crown. But the size of popu-
lation and the related military and economic capabilities and potential also explain 
the fact why the state of the Teutonic Order hardly covering an area of 100,000 
sq.km. and consisting of 900,000 inhabitants, was able not only to resist for more 
than a century the attacks of the Lithuanians, but also to launch repeated cam-
paigns – albeit with the help western crusaders. (According to Werner Para-
vicini’s calculations the Order of Knights started a total of 299 military actions 
against Lithuania between 1305–1409).60 
The military might of the Lithuanian Grand Dukes rested for a long time on 
the military service of free Lithuanian yeomen, the Dukes’ own armed retinue and 
the troops of the subdued Slav princes and their boyars’ retinues (druzina). Simi-
larly organized were the armed forces of the Golden Horde as well as the army of 
the state of Moscow. The Lithuanian military consisted largely of light cavalry 
not unlike the troops of the Tartars and Moscow. Therefore the Lithuanians, Tar-
tars and Russians might gain important victories or sustain grave losses, for their 
military potential, its organization, and equipment did not differ much. The Teu-
tonic Order along the western and southwestern borders of Lithuania, as well as 
Poland and Hungary disposed of a more developed military technology (espe-
cially in the field of building and defending fortified castles and also in siege 
technology), no wonder therefore that Lithuanian expansion was not directed 
against these parts. 
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Medieval Lithuania extended her political authority over the region sur-
rounded by the Teutonic Order, Poland, the Golden Horde, and Moscow. This 
geographical position also meant that it fell between great religious cultures, that 
is, between the Roman Catholic world, the orthodox Eastern Church and the Is-
lamic world. The overwhelming majority of its population followed the orthodox 
faith, but Muslims, Jews, Armenians and Catholics also dwelt in the duchy with a 
good part of the ethnically Lithuanian population retaining their ancient polytheis-
tic believes. Religious pluralism prevailed in Lithuania and the heathen Grand 
Dukes practiced religious tolerance.61 Since the Lithuanian princes strengthened 
their power by means of conquering Slav territories as early as the 13th century, 
they inevitably got into contact with Eastern Christianity, thus orthodoxy exerted 
remarkable influence on the upper strata of Lithuanians.62 Even Vaiśvilkas, son of 
Mindaugas assumed Eastern Christianity (1254) and Daumantas, head of the plot 
against Mindaugas, also adopted the orthodox faith, moreover got canonized in 
the Eastern Church after his death (1299) and is venerated as Saint Timothy.63 
Duke Traidenis had a Roman Catholic wife, and his daughter, Gaudamante also 
converted to the Catholic faith (1279) and was given the name Sophia, Duke Ge-
diminas’ second and third wives followed the orthodox religion while four of his 
sons, Narimantas, Jaunutis, Karijotas and Liubartas followed the Eastern Church  
and came to be called Gleb, Ivan, Michael and Dimitry in Christianity. Only three 
of his seven sons remained heathen, but the eldest of the three, Manvidas died 
soon after his father, Gediminas (1342). It was essentially Algirdas (who de-
throned Jaunutis) and Kestutis who remained pagan. Both wives of Algirdas’ 
were orthodox Russian princesses and the majority of their children were bap-
tized64. The Lithuanian Dukes chose their religious affiliation based on political 
considerations. They usually entrusted the governance of a conquered Russian 
principality to a family member who intended to alleviate religious differences 
and tensions between the conquerors and the subdued (between polytheism and 
monotheism) by their adoption of the orthodox faith. Nevertheless, religious di-
versity weakened the political unity of the Grand Duchy. Neither Gediminas nor 
Algirdas managed to establish an independent orthodox hierarchy under Lithua-
nian supervision, therefore it was Moscow that became the religious center of the 
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Eastern Slav territories. Since the Lithuanian Grand Dukes were either pagans or 
Roman Catholics (after 1385), while their subjects were mainly orthodox, this fu-
elled constant internal political tension. The Grand Dukes of Moscow, however, 
could rely on the cohesive force and influence of the Eastern Church against the 
Lithuanian state. How far the adoption of Christianity was determined by actual 
political needs is well illustrated by the case of Vytautas, the grand Duke of 
greater consequence. He was baptized five times in the last last decade of the 14th 
century joining once the Latin Church and again the Eastern Church or offered 
sacrifices to pagan deities.65  
The Lithuanians left conditions unchanged in the conquered Eastern Slav terri-
tories: they did not touch the taxes formerly levied by the Tartars, leaving them 
unchanged.66 The end of Tartar rule over the Russian lands did not mean a change 
for the better from the viewpoint of the Russian population, so these circum-
stances, apart from  the religious issues, were not suited to enhance in any signifi-
cant way the social support of Lithuanian power. Subsequent to Jogaila’s and Vy-
tautas’ conversion to the Catholic faith, the bulk of the upper stratum of the grand 
Duchy also converted to western Christianity and as a consequence the laws nega-
tively discriminated the followers of the Eastern Church while the Lithuanian 
population had to give up their heathen cults and practices. In keeping with the 
agreement concluded in Horodło (1413), the Catholic Lithuanian boyars and 
landowners were of the same status as the Polish nobels as regards their personal, 
political and property rights, that is, the same status as the so-called szlachta, who 
were exempt from all obligations and dues, except military service. They could 
have had a place on the Grand Duke’s Council (rada) and they held the more im-
portant offices of the Duchy.67 According to Jan Długosz, 15th century Polish 
chronicler, “many especially the Russians” were happy after the death of Vytautas 
(1430), because they hoped that the position of the followers of orthodoxy would 
change favourably.68 It was mainly due to their support that Švitrigaila (younger 
brother of Jogaila) became Grand Duke and the landowners of the Eastern Church 
got strengthened, which gave rise to resentment among Catholic circles. The 
bishop of Krakow wrote in January, 1432 that Švitrigaila would only listen to his 
orthodox followers and placed them in all positions at the head of castle-
administration, which69 could never have occurred at the time of Vytautas. The 
Catholic camp installed Sigismund Kejstutovič on the throne of the Grand Duchy, 
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thus the Lithuanian state had two Grand Dukes, splitting the empire into two 
parts, one Catholic (Lithuanian) and the other orthodox (Slav) and there ensued 
many years of armed struggle between them.70 The final disintegration of the 
Grand Duchy was only prevented by Grand Duke Sigismund. Recognition of 
Catholic and orthodox nobles as equals in several deeds of privilege.71 So, the up-
per stratum of the Slavs deserted Švitrigaila, who suffered a final defeat.72 
The internal unity and stability of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy were often put 
at risk by the power struggles inside the ruling dynasty. The Grand Dukes usually 
appointed one of their sons to be heir to the throne, but their other children and 
relatives were also given large parts of the empire, who, in turn, relying on those 
parts ruled by them, did not recognize the successor on the throne. This is what 
happened in the case of the sons of Gediminas (Jaunutas was dethroned by Algir-
das and Kestutis), or when Kestutis (and his son Vytanutas) did not recognize his 
younger brother Jogaila’s title of Grand Duke and two decades of internecine war 
broke out. As long as the policy of conquest proved successful in the orthodox 
territories, interest lying in maintaining the unity of military power always took 
priority over conflicts within the ruling dynasty. However, Vytautas was badly 
defeated by the Tartars by River Vorskla, which put an end to Lithuanian con-
quests and it became indispensable to keep up the Polish-Lithuanian union in or-
der to make it possible to remain master of the vast territories that had been 
gained.73 As long as the conquests drew together in one camp the different 
Lithuanian interest groups of the nobility, the cessation of conquests gave way to 
separatism in different parts of the empire.74 
The Lithuanian Grand Duchy attained in the course of the 14th century the 
status of a major power in Eastern Europe ranking with the Golden Horde, from 
the second third of the 15th century onwards, however, it gradually lost weight and 
influence and its role was taken over by the Duchy of Moscow on the rise in the 
Eastern Slav areas. From the 1480’s the princes and governors along the Eastern 
borders of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy began to take fealty to the Grand Duchy 
of Moscow and pledged to serve it.75 
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Eine „kleine” Großmacht  
im frühneuzeitlichen Europa  
– Die Niederlande zwischen 1579–1713 
 
 
1648 ist ein neuer Staat auf der Karte von Europa entstanden: die Sieben Verei-
nigten Provinzen der Niederlande. Schon vor der Anerkennung der Unabhängig-
keit des Landes spielte das Gebiet eine besonders wichtige politische und wirt-
schaftliche Rolle unter den europäischen Großmächten. Die Geburt des Landes ist 
mit der Idee verflochten, zwischen zwei Großmächten einen Pufferstaat zu kreie-
ren, der für das Machtgleichgewicht auf dem Kontinent sorgen und die territoriale 
Expansionslust der Großmächte einschränken kann. 
Niemand hat aber damit gerechnet, dass dieses Land im Laufe des siebzehnten 
Jahrhunderts trotz seines kleinen Territoriums eine Zeit lang eine Großmachtposi-
tion einnehmen würde. Im Folgenden versuche ich zu erklären, welche Bedin-
gungen die Republik der Sieben Vereinigten Niederlande erfüllen musste, um ei-
ne führende Rolle in der europäischen Politik spielen zu können. Für die Analyse 
versuchte ich auf Grund sekundärer Literatur über die frühneuzeitliche histo-
rische Entwicklung der nördlichen Niederlande bezüglich ihrer Großmachtpo-
sition einen Überblick zu geben. 
Sehen wir uns zuerst an, was die Charakteristika eines Kleinstaates und einer 
Großmacht sind. Es gibt unterschiedliche Definitionsmöglichkeiten dieser Begrif-
fe. Die Theoretiker sind sich aber in dem Punkt einig, dass einer der wichtigsten 
Bestandteile die Dimension der Macht ist. Um diese Aussage näher zu beleuch-
ten, möchte ich hier die drei fundamentalen Komponenten zur theoretischen De-
finition der Macht von Raymond Aron nennen: 
1.  Milieu: der von der politischen Einheit besetzte Raum; 
2.  Quellen: die Qualität und Quantität der zu erreichenden Materialien, ein-
begriffen die Techniken, mit denen sie zu Waffen umgestaltet werden kön-
nen; die Anzahl der Leute und die Möglichkeit, sie zu Soldaten zu machen, 
bzw. die Quantität und Qualität der Mittel und des Personalbestandes; 
3.  kollektive Aktion: die Kollektive Handlungsfähigkeit, die die Organisation 
der Armee, die Disziplin der Soldaten, die zivile und militärische Befehls-
führung im Frieden und im Krieg, deren Qualität und die Solidarität der 
Einwohner in der Krise umfasst.  
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Nach Aron erfüllen die Kleinstaaten die Bedingung des Begriffs Kleinstaat-
lichkeit wegen der begrenzten Mittel der aufgelisteten Relationen.1   
Arons Definition beschränkt sich auf die militärische Handlungsfähigkeit. Wir 
dürfen aber nicht vergessen, dass eine Machtposition auch durch die wirtschaftli-
che Handlungsfähigkeit erreicht werden kann, wobei die militärischen Aktionen 
in erster Linie zur Verteidigung des freien Handels und nicht unbedingt zur terri-
torialen Expansion dienen. Dies galt (größtenteils) auch für die Sieben Vereinig-
ten Provinzen im 17. Jahrhundert. In Ergänzung und Umformulierung von Arons 
Machtdefinition um den wirtschaftlichen Faktor möchte ich die Position der Sie-
ben Vereinigten Provinzen unter den Kleinstaaten und Großmächten vom Ende 
des 16. bis Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts im Folgenden definieren.  
Die Definition des Milieus kann ohne weiteres in der ursprünglichen Bedeu-
tung, also als von der politischen Einheit besetzter Raum, gebraucht werden. Die 
Quellen müssen mit der Qualität und Quantität der finanziellen und geistigen Mit-
tel ergänzt werden, die zum erfolgreichen Handel nötig sind. Hier darf man auch 
nicht die praktische Organisation des Handels vergessen. Der Begriff der kollektiven 




Zur Festlegung der Grenzen der politischen Einheit müssen wir zuerst mit einem 
historischen Rückblick beginnen. Die niederländischen Territorien wurden unter 
der Herrschaft der burgundischen Herzöge und der Habsburger vereinigt. Als ers-
ter wichtiger Schritt wäre hier die Ehe des burgundischen Herzogs Philipp des 
Kühnen mit Margaretha, Tochter des flandrischen Ludwig von Male, im Jahre 
1369 zu erwähnen. Hiermit gerieten neben Flandern das Artois, Nevers, Rethel 
sowie die Städte Antwerpen und Mecheln unter burgundische Herrschaft.2 Die 
aus dieser Ehe geborenen Kinder folgten der Heiratspolitik ihrer Eltern. Mit der 
burgundisch-wittelsbachschen Doppelhochzeit von Philipps Sohn Johann von 
Nevers (Johann ohne Furcht) mit Margaretha von Bayern und Philipps Tochter 
Margaretha mit Wilhelm von Oostervant legten die burgundischen Herzöge die 
Grundlage für die Erweiterung des burgundischen Anspruchs auf die von den 
Wittelsbachern regierten Grafschaften Holland, Seeland und Henegauen. Zur tat-
sächlichen Machtübernahme in diesen Grafschaften kam es erst 1433, als die Grä-
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fin Jacoba van Bayern, Frau des Neffen des Herzogs Johann ohne Furcht, von ih-
ren Titeln Abstand nahm. So konnte Philipp der Gute, der Sohn von Johann ohne 
Furcht, die Macht in Holland, Seeland und Henegauen übernehmen. Drei Jahre 
zuvor, 1430, wurde Philipp der Gute auch in Brabant und Limburg als Erbherr 
anerkannt und noch früher, 1421, kaufte Philipp der Gute die Grafschaft Namur, 
wodurch 1441 auch das Herzogtum Luxemburg unter burgundische Herrschaft 
geriet.3 Er konnte auch 1435 Pikardien erwerben.4 Karl dem Kühnen, dem Sohn 
Philipp des Guten, gelang es, sich kurzzeitig Geldern (1473) einzuverleiben. Sei-
ne Tochter Maria von Burgund heiratete Maximilian von Habsburg. Mit dieser 
Ehe machten die Habsburger ihren Eintritt in die niederländische Geschichte. Ma-
ria verlor die tatsächliche Macht über das Herzogtum Burgund sowie Pikardien, 
Artois, Geldern und Lotharingien.5 Ihr Enkelsohn, Kaiser Karl V., fügte seinem 
Reich 1521 das Bistum Doornik hinzu, erwarb 1528 die weltliche Herrschaft über 
das Stift Utrecht und gliederte 1543 das Herzogtum Geldern ein. Noch 1523 hatte 
Friesland ihm die Herrschaft übertragen, Groningen mit Drenthe unterwarf sich 
1536.6 „Die Absicht Karls V., aus der Landmasse ein Königreich zu formen, ist 
niemals konkretisiert worden, und die Territorien haben sich lediglich bereit ge-
funden, die Pragmatische Sanktion von 1549 anzunehmen, in der die einheitliche 
Erbfolge für alle Territorien geregelt und damit eine Trennung in Einzelherrschaf-
ten ausgeschlossen wurde.“7 Hiermit ist der burgundische Kreis entstanden, der 
bis zur Aufteilung des Gebietes aus konfessionellem Grund bestand.  
Als territorialer Ausgangspunkt der späteren Republik können die in der Uni-
on von Utrecht vereinigten aufständischen Gebiete betrachtet werden, auch wenn 
am 23. Januar 1579 zum Verband noch Gent, Antwerpen, Breda und Lier zählten 
und einige „Territorien der späteren Republik erst mit einiger Verzögerung der 
Union beitraten. (…) Die Partner der Union waren es dann, die dem spanischen 
König als Landesherren 1581 abschworen. (…) Zwar war die Republik damit 
noch nicht proklamiert, aber die Entscheidung über Staats- und Regierungsform 
war voll in die Hände der Städte gelegt.“8  Die Utrechter Union war nichts ande-
res als ein Zusammenschluss souveräner Territorien, ein Interessenverband, des-
sen Aufgabe der Kampf gegen Spanien war. Nach dem militärisch bedingten 
Ausscheiden Brabants und Flanderns (1585/86) erreichten die Generalstände erst 
1595 mit dem Beitritt von Stadt und Land Groningen die endgültige Zusammen-
                                                 
3  Ebd., 109–111. 
4  Maarten Prak, Hollandia aranykora [Das goldene Zeitalter der Niederlande], Budapest, 
2004., 13. 
5  Mulder, Doedens, Kortlever, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 114–116. 
6  Horst Lademacher, Geschichte der Niederlande, Darmstadt, 1983., 13. 
7  H. Lademacher, Geschichte der Niederlande, 31. 
8  Ebd., 75–76. 
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setzung der ’sieben vereinigten Provinzen’ (Holland, Seeland, Utrecht, Geldern, 
Friesland, Overijssel, Stadt und Land Groningen).9  
In der Staatsformung der Niederlande – und dadurch auch in ihrer Machtposi-
tion – müssen zwei wesentliche Wendepunkte erwähnt werden. Die Spanier er-
kannten 1609 die Unabhängigkeit der Republik für die Dauer des 12-jährigen 
Waffenstillstandes an, der Ostindien-Handel blieb frei und die Bekenntnisfreiheit 
für Katholiken wurde nur für die begrenzten Gebiete Brabants und Flanderns ver-
einbart. Bei den Waffenstillstandsgesprächen im Haag waren England, Frank-
reich, Dänemark, die Pfalz, Hessen und Brandenburg zugegen. Mit der Anwesen-
heit wichtiger europäischer Mächte erhob sich die Republik aus der Rebellion und 
präsentierte sich als international anerkannter Partner.10 
Zur tatsächlichen Unabhängigkeit kam es erst 1648, weil diese territoriale 
Einheit bis zum Westfälischen Frieden offiziell einen Teil des Deutschen Reiches 
ausmachte.11 „Die einzelnen Artikel des Friedens benannten die durch die Repu-
blik eroberten Gebiete, regelten die Schließung der Schelde, bestimmten, dass 
Spanien die Schiffahrt im Monopolbereich der Ost- und Westindischen Kompanie 
verboten war.“12 Hiermit ist der neue Staat offiziell geboren und wurde als poli-
tisch souveräne Einheit von den europäischen Mächten anerkannt. 
Weiterhin dürfen wir nicht vergessen, dass das Gesamtgebiet der nördlichen 
Provinzen mit dem Polderbau vergrößert wurde. Im Laufe des 17. Jahrhunderts 
wurde das Gebiet der Provinz Holland um ein Drittel größer. Die Einpolderung 
war wegen der Ausdehnung der Landbaugebiete unvermeidlich. Als die extensive 
Agrarwirtschaft in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts abnahm, wurde auch 
mit den weiteren Einpolderungsarbeiten aufgehört.13    
Im Vergleich zu den europäischen Großmächten der Zeit verfügte also die Re-
publik über eine verhältnismäßig kleine Fläche. Wenn man nur den durch die po-
litische Einheit besetzten Raum betrachtet, gehörte die Republik also eindeutig zu 




Um eine Machtposition unter den europäischen Großmächten einnehmen zu kön-
nen, brauchte man eine leistungsfähige Wirtschaft und eine erfolgreiche Außen-
politik. Um die wirtschaftliche Expansion verstehen zu können, sehen wir uns ei-
nige statistische Daten an. Die Einwohnerzahl nahm ab dem 16. Jahrhundert 
                                                 
 9  Ebd., 78. 
10  Ebd., 134–135. 
11  M. E. H. N. Mout, Het Duitse Rijk 1519–1648, In: Republiek tussen vorsten. Oranje, 
Opstand, Vrijheid, Geloof, Red. Frouke Wieringa, Zutphen, 1984., 95. 
12  H. Lademacher, Die Geschichte, 143. 
13  M. Prak, Hollandia aranykora, 93. 
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überall in Europa zu. Vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert stieg diese Zahl in Eng-
land und Wales von 3,75 Millionen auf 5,67, in Frankreich von 15 auf 21 Millio-
nen und in den Niederlanden von 0,9 auf 2 Millionen. Die Anzahl der Einwohner 
der Niederlande blieb also immer geringer als die der zwei wichtigen Großmächte 
der Zeit. Doch war die Bevölkerungsdichte in den Niederlanden, vor allem in der 
Provinz Holland, die höchste in Europa mit einer Bevölkerungsdichte von 37 Per-
sonen/km2.14 Die ab der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts zunehmende Bevöl-
kerungszahl ist größtenteils den protestantischen Flüchtlingen aus den südnieder-
ländischen Gebieten zu verdanken.15 Sie siedelten sich vor allem in Holland an 
und trugen in großem Maße zum wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung der Provinz bei.  
Der neugeborene Staat musste die politischen und finanziellen Verhältnisse 
unter den Provinzen regeln. Die für den 18. Januar 1651 einberufene große Ver-
sammlung (Grote Vergadering) bekräftigte die provinziale Selbstständigkeit und 
bestätigte praktisch auch die Hegemonie der Provinz Holland.16 Eine der wich-
tigsten Verabredungen war die Erhebung der Steuer, weil ein wesentlicher Teil 
des Geldes die militärischen Kosten deckte. Der Staat hatte bis 1805 kein einheit-
liches Steuersystem, die einzelnen Provinzen konnten selbst Steuern erheben. Je-
de Provinz musste jedes Jahr ihren Beitrag zu den Verteidigungskosten genehmi-
gen. Schon zu der Zeit von Karl V. wurde der Beitrag jeder Provinz im Verhältnis 
zu dem der anderen festgelegt. 58,3% aller Kosten trug die Provinz Holland allei-
ne, währenddessen sich die anderen sechs Provinzen die übrig gebliebenen Kos-
ten unter einander teilten.17 So ist es kein Wunder, dass Holland, das die größte 
wirtschaftliche Last trug, die führende Rolle in allerlei politischen Beschlüssen – 
auch die Wirtschaft und die Außenpolitik betreffend – spielen wollte.     
Auch in der Verteidigung galten die holländischen Interessen. In den Admira-
litäten, die während des 80-jährigen Krieges zur Leitung der Flotte gebildet wur-
den, besaßen die Holländer drei Büros von den 5. Die Matrosen der niederländi-
schen Flotte waren sehr gut ausgebildet, aber sie hatten auch Glück darin, dass sie 
bis 1648 keinem Gegner von Format begegneten. Die Flotte war ursprünglich 
nicht unterteilt in eine Kriegs- und Handelsmarine, auch Handelsschiffe hatten 
Kanonen an Bord. Erst nach dem Ersten Englisch–Niederländischen Handelskrieg 
wurden 64 Schlachtschiffe mit 40–60 Kanonen ausgerüstet und weitere 80–90 
Schiffe als Konvoi-Flotte gebaut.  
                                                 
14  Nyugat-európai gazdaság- és társadalomtörténet. [Westeuropäische Wirtschafts- und Ge-
sellschaftsgeschichte], Red. H. A. Diederiks et al., Budapest, 1995., 34–37. Hierzu hat 
beigetragen, dass die maritime und städtische Ökonomie der Provinz Holland ab den 1640 
Jahren eine immer zunehmende Arbeitskraft benötigte. Siehe: Jonathan I. Israel, The 
Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806, Oxford, 1998., 622. 
15  M. Prak, Hollandia, 102. 
16  Ebd., 47. 
17  Ebd., 74–76. und J. Israel, The Dutch Republic, 712. 
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Die Landmacht von 35.000 Soldaten wurde im Laufe des 17. Jahrhunderts 
verdreifacht. Die höchste Anzahl erreichte sie während des neunjährigen Krieges 
gegen Frankreich.18    
Wirtschaftlich gesehen lag eine der wichtigsten wirtschaftlichen Regionen im 
Mittelalter im östlichen Teil der Niederlande an der Ijssel entlang. Städte wie 
Kampen, Harderwijk, Zwolle, Zutphen, Deventer und Elburg gehörten zur Hanse. 
Dies hat zur Blüte des Handels und der städtischen Kultur beigetragen. Diese 
Städte verbanden zwei wichtige Handelsgebiete: die Hanse auf der einen und 
Holland-Flandern auf der anderen Seite.19 Erst im 13. Jahrhundert kann von einer 
Stadtentwicklung in der Grafschaft Holland gesprochen werden. Drei Faktoren 
haben diese Entwicklung gefördert: die Verbesserung des interlokalen Verkehrs, 
die Sundfahrt und die zunehmende Bedeutung des holländisch-seeländischen He-
ringsfangs. Die Städte der Grafschaft erwarben einen wachsenden Anteil am in-
ternationalen Handel, vor allem am hansischen Transitverkehr zwischen Flandern 
und Hamburg, Pommern und Livland. Im Süden der Grafschaft entwickelte sich 
Dordrecht zum wichtigsten Rheinhafen und Stapelmarkt. Durch die starke Erwei-
terung des Seehandels mit den baltischen Ländern konnte die Tuchindustrie der 
Grafschaft enorm expandieren.20  
Nach der Einwanderung der flämischen Flüchtlinge nach dem Ausbruch des 
80-jährigen Krieges übernahm Holland von Flandern die führende Rolle in der 
Textilindustrie. Die Flüchtlinge brachten sowohl ihre Initiativkraft als auch ihr 
„know-how“ ein.21 Die Händler aus Brabant, vor allem aus Antwerpen, trugen 
auch zum Aufschwung der Warenbörse bei. Die holländischen und brabantischen 
Händler konnten zusammen neue Märkte erobern. Dazu gehörte das Mittelländi-
sche Meer und Ostindien.22  
Im 15. Jahrhundert wurde aus Frankreich noch drei- bis viermal so viel Ge-
treide in die Niederlande gebracht wie aus dem Baltikum. 1636, als man in Ams-
terdam versuchte, die Einfuhr aus Europa zu schätzen, stellte man fest, dass von 
30 Millionen Umsatz 12,5 Millionen, also 40 Prozent des gesamten Umsatzes, 
aus dem baltischen Handel stammten. Zu dieser Zunahme trug die Entwicklung 
eines neuen Schifftyps, des sog. Flötenschiffes (fluit), bei. Der Rauminhalt eines 
solchen Schiffes hatte zugenommen, der gesamte Tonneninhalt belief sich auf 
40–50.000, zweimal so viel wie der eines venezianischen Schiffes. Die holländi-
                                                 
18  Ebd., 62–69. 
19  Koggen, kooplieden en kantoren. De Hanze, een praktische netwerk, Red. Hanno Brand 
und Egge Knol, Hilversum, 2010., 119. 
20  H. Lademacher, Die Geschichte, 4–5. 
21  Ebd., 127. 
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schen Schiffe brauchten aber nur 9–10 Personen als Mannschaft, während engli-
sche Schiffe derselben Größe 30 Leute benötigten.23 
Ab den 1590er Jahren ist der Handel in den Mittelmeerraum wieder frei ge-
worden, weil Spanien das Embargo gegen die niederländischen Rebellen aufhob. 
Die niederländischen Kaufleute nahmen Getreide und immer häufiger Textilien in 
die Region mit und transportierten von dort Gewürz, Seide und Luxusartikel in 
die baltischen Gebiete, wo sie einen reißenden Absatz fanden.24 
Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts entstand in den Nordniederlanden der Bedarf, un-
mittelbare Handelskontakte mit Asien herzustellen. Die asiatischen Produkte 
wurden bis dahin durch portugiesische Kaufleute in die Niederlande transportier-
te. Nach unterschiedlichen erfolglosen Versuchen, einen Seeweg über Nordruss-
land zu finden, sind vier Schiffe nach Asien gefahren. Obwohl auch diese Unter-
nehmung – zumindest wirtschaftlich – von wenig Erfolg begleitet wurde, bewies 
diese Reise, dass unmittelbare Handelskontakte mit Asien möglich sind. Nach der 
Einfuhr eines neuen spanischen Embargos wurden Handelskompanien gegründet, 
um den Handel mit Asien zu sichern.25 
Aus diesen unterschiedlichen „Vorkompanien“ ist 1602 auf Initiative des 
Ratspensionärs Johan van Oldenbarnevelt die Vereinigte Ostindische Kompanie 
entstanden, die sich dann im 17. Jahrhundert zu einer der wichtigsten Handelsge-
sellschaften der Welt entwickelte.26 Die Kompanie erhielt zum einen das Schiff-
fahrts- und Handelsmonopol für das Gebiet zwischen dem Kap der Guten Hoff-
nung und der Magellanstraße. Die VOC durfte im Namen der Generalstände im 
Haag Verträge mit den Fürsten Asiens schließen, Festungen anlegen, eine Armee 
rekrutieren und unterhalten sowie Gouverneure anstellen. Die Niederländer bau-
ten ein Handels- und Verkehrsnetz auf mit – seit 1619 – Batavia auf Java als 
Zentrum und beherrschten die Sundastraße, wozu später mit der Eroberung des 
portugiesischen Forts Malakka die Kontrolle der Durchfahrt vom Indischen zum 
Stillen Ozean kam. Die Erweiterung des asiatischen Handels und der Ausbau des 
innerasiatischen Handels erfolgten in den 1620er Jahren. Als Zeichen für die wirt-
schaftliche Blüte der VOC mag auch die günstige Entwicklung der Aktienkurse  
an der Amsterdamer Börse gelten. Der noch Anfang der 1630er Jahre auf 200 (in 
                                                 
23  Ebd., 95. 
24  Ebd., 97. 
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26  Kaufleute als Kolonialherren: Die Handelswelt der Niederländer vom Kap der Guten 
Hoffnung bis Nagasaki, Hg. Eberhard Schmitt, Thomas Schleich, Thomas Beck, Balberg, 
1988., 5. 
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Gulden) stehende Kurs stieg im Jahre 1643 auf 470 und beim Abschluss des 
Münsteraner Friedens gar auf 539.27  
Das handelsgesellschaftliche Pendant für die Neue Welt, für beide Amerikas 
und Westafrika, wurde die 1621 gegründete Westindische Kompanie. Das eigent-
liche Motiv zur Bildung dieser Kompanie war ein militärisches, darüber hinaus 
ging es auch darum, den afrikanischen Gold- und Sklavenhandel sowie die Er-
zeugung von und den Handel mit brasilianischem Zucker an sich zu reißen. We-
sentliches Ziel war die militärische und wirtschaftliche Schwächung der Spanier. 
Herausragendes Ereignis war 1628 die Aufbringung der spanischen Silberflotte 
durch die Niederländer unter Piet Heyn. Dieser Kompanie gelang es aber nie, 
wirtschaftlich, handels- und kolonialpolitisch den Rang der ostindischen Schwes-
ter zu erreichen.28 Die Niederländer eroberten Gebiete in Nordamerika, im karibi-
schen Gebiet und auch in Südamerika. Die auf brasilianischem Boden gegründete 
niederländische Kolonie war nur kurzlebig, hatte aber trotzdem eine wichtige 
Rolle in der niederländischen Kolonialgeschichte, weil ab 1635 hierher Sklaven – 
vor allem von der Goldenen Küste – angefahren wurden. Von diesem Zeitpunkt 
an nahmen die Niederländer am Sklavenhandel aktiv teil und sind einer der größ-
ten Sklavenhändler geworden.29   
Beide Kompanien entwickelten sich nach dem Staat zum größten Arbeitgeber 
und bereicherten den für den niederländischen Handel so wichtigen Stapelmarkt 
mit tropischen Erzeugnissen. Von besonderer Bedeutung war auch das internatio-
nale Prestige, das die Republik durch solche Unternehmungen gewann, die nicht 
nur finanziell attraktiv waren, sondern schlicht auch als Unternehmungen zur 
Entdeckung neuer Schifffahrtrouten den Namen der niederländischen Republik in 
alle Welt trugen.30  
Der Aufschwung des Handels inner- und außerhalb Europas vermehrte die 
Nachfrage nach Produkten der Textilindustrie und des Schiffbaus. Neue Indust-
riezweige entstanden, die auf Rohstoffen basierten, die bisher in der Republik un-
bekannt waren: z. B. die Zuckerraffinerie, Tabakindustrie, Seidenweberei und die 
Diamantschleiferei.31 
Zum Erfolg der niederländischen Kaufleute trugen zwei Institutionen wesent-
lich bei: die Wechselbank und die Börse. Die Amsterdamer Wechselbank entwi-
ckelte einen besonderen Grad der Vertraulichkeit und Präzision beim Feststellen 
des richtigen Wertes der Münzen aus aller Welt. Die wichtigste Funktion der Bör-
                                                 
27  H. Lademacher, Die Geschichte, 144–146. In der Periode 1621-1647 schienen die Nieder-
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The Dutch Republic, 941. 
28  Ebd., 146–147. 
29  P. C. Emmer, De Nederlandse slavenhandel 1500–1850, Amsterdam, 2007., 39–41. 
30  H. Lademacher, Die Geschichte, 145. 
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se war es, Leute zusammenzubringen: Hier wurden nicht nur Waren, sondern 
auch wichtige Informationen über innen- und außenpolitische Geschehnisse aus-
getauscht.32 
Die Blüte des Handels bedingte auch eine Blüte des gewerblichen Sektors. Ein 
Anwachsen der Betriebsgrößen sowie eine Diversifizierung und zugleich Spezia-
lisierung in der Güterproduktion sind zu bemerken. Die einzelnen Gewerbezwei-
ge konzentrierten sich vor allem in den Städten im Westen des Landes, in Holland 
und Seeland. Hier bot der Handel die Kapitalbasis und sorgte für den Aufbau von 
Unternehmen. Es entwickelten sich die sogenannten ‚trafieken’, eng an das Wa-
renangebot des Handels gebundene Gewerbezweige, zum Teil nichts anderes als 
Veredelungsbetriebe. Gerade diese waren investitionsfreudige, kapitalintensive 
Bereiche, die einigermaßen konkurrenzlos arbeiten konnten.  
Die Landwirtschaft erlebte einen ebensolchen Aufstieg wie die anderen Wirt-
schaftssektoren. Wichtige Voraussetzung der Anpassungs- und Leistungsfähigkeit 
war die traditionell ‚freie Struktur’ der Landwirtschaft, die aus den besonderen 
Siedlungsschwierigkeiten zu erklärende Freiheit der Bauernschaft mit Eigentum 
oder Pachtbesitz bei nur gering entwickelter Grundherrschaft. Vor allem Holland 
und Seeland sind hier zu nennen. Neue Anbautechniken und -methoden wurden 
eingeführt. Das Kapital stellten die Amsterdamer Kaufleute zur Verfügung. Die 
Kapitalinvestition für Produktionsmittel wie Windmühlen zur Verarbeitung der 
Agrarerzeugnisse war beträchtlich.33 
Wie kann die Blüte der Wirtschaft im 17. Jahrhundert erklärt werden? Auf 
Grund der neusten Forschungen machten die Niederlande den ersten Schritt in die 
kapitalistische Wirtschaft. Das Kapital wurde frei in Unternehmungen investiert, 
statt größtenteils in Grundherrschaft festgelegt zu sein. Dies bedeutet, dass der 
freie Markt viele Sachen bestimmte, wie z. B. die Anstellung und Entlassung der 
Arbeitskräfte. Regeln der Gilden, die noch im Mittelalter entstanden sind, lebten 
in der Republik noch lange fort, aber die Sektoren, wo sie nicht mehr gebraucht 
wurden, weiteten sich aus. In der Republik gab es keine absolute Monarchie und 
keinen Adel, der hohe Steuer erhob. Der Staat wurde durch Kaufleute-Regenten 
regiert, die den Handel in ihren (politischen) Entscheidungen eine wichtige Rolle 
spielen ließen. Die Kaufkraft der Einwohner des Landes war höher als in den 
Nachbarländern. Hieraus folgt, dass in Holland zwischen 1580 und 1690 ein sta-
biles wirtschaftliches Wachstum von ein oder anderthalb Prozent pro Jahr festge-
stellt werden konnte.34 
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Die niederländische Außenpolitik wurde im 17. Jahrhundert durch zwei Faktoren 
bestimmt. Die erste und wichtigste Zielsetzung war die Sicherstellung der Han-
delsbelange inner- und außerhalb Europas. Die zweite war die militärische Ver-
teidigung des Gebietes zuerst gegen die Spanier und in der zweiten Hälfte des 
Jahrhunderts gegen die Engländer und Franzosen bzw. ihre eventuellen Alliierten.   
Der Dreißigjährige Krieg hat die Position der österreichischen Habsburger 
dermaßen geschwächt, dass eine neue Machtkonstellation in Europa entstanden 
ist: England, Frankreich und die Republik gehörten zu den einflussreichsten 
Mächten des Kontinents. Der Entstehung dieses Machtgleichgewichts ging eine 
Reihe von Kriegen voraus. England und die Republik führten zwischen 1652 und 
1674 dreimal Krieg gegen einander. Ab 1672 standen die Republik und Frank-
reich fast ohne Unterbrechung im Kampf. England bedrohte den Handel der Re-
publik, Frankreich ihre territoriale Integrität. Die Republik, und vor allem Rats-
pensionär Johan de Witt, sah die wichtigste Aufgabe der niederländischen Au-
ßenpolitik darin, einen französisch–englischen Bund zu verhindern. 
Die Regierung von Cromwell verhielt sich ambivalent zur Republik. Einerseits 
sah sie einen natürlichen Alliierten in der Republik, der bei der Stabilisierung der 
jungen englischen Republik helfen könne. Andererseits wurde in England ge-
dacht, dass die Vereinigten Provinzen einem viele Handelsmöglichkeiten vor der 
Nase weggeschnappt hatten.35 Deswegen nahm das englische Parlament die Na-
vigationsakte an, die einfach darauf gerichtet war, die niederländische Handels-
schifffahrt vom Warentransport nach England auszuschließen.36 Die Navigations-
akte wurde in der Republik als Kriegserklärung verstanden. Der bewaffnete Streit 
begann 1652.37 Der Krieg endete 1654 mit dem Frieden von Westminster. Er 
schaffte die Navigationsakte nicht ab und beinhaltete eine Ausschlussakte (akte 
van seclusie), worin sich die Stände von Holland bereit erklärten, die Oranier aus 
der Statthalterschaft und der Position des Generalkapitäns auszuschließen. Mit 
dieser innenpolitischen Intervention probierte Cromwell die Restauration der eng-
lischen Monarchie zu vermeiden, da die Oranier mit dem englischen Königshaus 
verwandt waren.38   
Die Republik mischte sich auch in den Nordischen Krieg ein. Der Handel mit 
dem Baltikum war zu der Zeit für alle europäischen Großmächte von besonderer 
Bedeutung. Das schwedische Holz war notwendig für den Schiffbau, das balti-
sche Getreide ergänzte den eigenen Anbau in Süd- und Westeuropa. Diese Waren 
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mussten durch die schmale Sundstraße zwischen Dänemark und Schweden trans-
portiert werden. Die Republik hatte einen großen Anteil an der Anfuhr der Ost-
seeprodukte und war deswegen an einem Gleichgewicht zwischen Dänemark und 
Schweden interessiert. Sie unterstützte die schwächere Partei und zwang Schwe-
den zu Friedensbedingungen, die ihren Belangen entsprachen.39  
Die zweite Auseinandersetzung der Handelsrivalen, England und die Repu-
blik, konzentrierte sich vor allem auf die westindischen Gebiete. Die englische 
Company of Adventures und die niederländische Westindische Kompanie kämpf-
ten um den Zuckerhandel, und um die Monopolisierung des Sklavenhandels. Oh-
ne Sklaven hätten sie die Zuckerplantagen im karibischen Gebiet nicht mit Arbei-
tern versehen können. 1664 eroberten die englischen Truppen die niederländi-
schen Festungen an der westafrikanischen Küste – die die Niederländer größten-
teils zurückeroberten – und besetzten auch Neuamsterdam in Amerika.40  Im Frie-
den von Breda 1667 bekam die VOC die Alleinherrschaft in Ostindien, die nie-
derländische Kolonie in Nordamerika wurde gegen Suriname in Südamerika um-
getauscht, was damals ein guter Tausch zu sein schien.41 
Die Friedensbestimmungen von Breda gestaltete der Ratspensionär De Witt 
für England ausgesprochen mild. Er sah in England einen künftigen Koalitions-
partner gegen voraussehbare französische hegemoniale Ambitionen.42 
Die niederländisch–französischen Beziehungen waren in den 30er Jahren des 
17. Jahrhunderts freundschaftlich. Die Franzosen waren am Scheitern der Frie-
densverhandlungen mit den Spaniern interessiert, weshalb Kardinal Richelieu 
1630 den niederländischen Ständen Subsidien von einer halben Million Gulden 
jährlich versprach. 1634 kam es zu einem Abkommen mit Frankreich, in dem sich 
die Republik gegen finanzielle Unterstützung verpflichtete, bis 1635 nicht mit 
Spanien zu verhandeln. Diese Zeitspanne diente zur Vorbereitung einer militäri-
schen Zusammenarbeit zwischen Frankreich und der Republik. Weiterhin diente 
dieses Abkommen dazu, die Zukunft der spanischen Niederlande zu regeln: ent-
weder durch die Bildung eines unabhängigen, von Frankreich und der Republik 
garantierten Staates oder durch die Eroberung und Aufteilung des südniederländi-
schen Gebietes zwischen den beiden Mächten. Die militärische Zusammenarbeit 
wollte aber nicht gelingen und der Krieg ist für die Republik aus dem vertrauten 
Bereich der Aktionen gegen Spanien in seine echte internationale Phase getreten. 
In den 1640er Jahren veränderte sich die französische Außenpolitik und strebte 
nach besseren Kontakten mit Spanien durch die Besiegelung einer Ehe zwischen 
                                                 
39  Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden, Red. Blom, Lamberts, 158. 
40  M. Prak, Hollandia, 50–51. 
41  Mulder, Doedens, Kortlever, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 182. Siehe noch: P. J. van 
Winter, “De Acte van Navigatie en de Vrede van Breda”, Bijdragen voor de geschiedenis 
der Nederlanden, 4 (1949), 44, 53. 
42  H. Lademacher, Die Geschichte, 118. 
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dem französischen Dauphin und der spanischen Infantin. Die Franzosen sollten 
weiterhin das von ihnen besetzte Katalonien räumen und dafür die spanischen 
Niederlanden erhalten. Der Republik wurde der Tausch Maastrichts gegen Ant-
werpen angeboten. Dies stieß aber bei den niederländischen Ständen auf Wider-
stand. Es tauchten Stimmen auf, die den Oranier verdächtigten, mit dem Besitz 
von Antwerpen und der Unterstützung des französischen Königs auch nach der 
Herrschaft eines Souveräns greifen zu wollen. Dazu kamen noch die militärischen 
Erfolge der Franzosen, mit denen die französische Gefahr für die Republik kon-
krete Formen annahm. Während der Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen mit Spanien 
1646 in Münster war klar geworden, dass Großmächte in der Nachbarschaft der 
Republik nicht erwünscht waren. Dieser Gedanke bestimmte dann die niederlän-
dische Außenpolitik  in den nächsten Jahrzehnten, weshalb die Republik die Her-
stellung und Wahrung einer Barriere zwischen Frankreich und den Vereinigten 
Provinzen unterstützte.43  
Nach dem Pyrenäenfrieden (1659) betrat ein expansionsfreudiges Frankreich 
die europäische politische Bühne. Die Republik suchte nach Koalitionspartnern. 
Eine Allianz mit Frankreich, um gegen die See- und Handelsmacht England zu 
streiten, hätte eine Bedrohung der staatlichen Unabhängigkeit bedeutet, der 
Kampf gegen Ludwig XIV. mit England als Koalitionspartner hätte dagegen eine 
gewisse Preisgabe des maritimen Wettbewerbs und eine Änderung der eigenen 
Innenpolitik bedeutet. Ein distanziertes Einvernehmen gegenüber Frankreich 
schien die einzige Möglichkeit, zunächst einmal die spanischen Niederlande vor 
den Ambitionen Frankreichs zu retten. Ein 1662 geschlossener französisch–
niederländischer Allianz- und Freundschaftsvertrag klammerte das Schicksal der 
Südregion aus. Während des Zweiten Englisch–Niederländischen Krieges (1665–
1667) fielen die Franzosen zur ’Wahrnehmung’ des Devolutionsrechts in die spa-
nischen Niederlande ein. Dies führte rasch zum englisch–niederländischen Frie-
den von Breda (1667) und ein Jahr später zur englisch–niederländisch–schwedi-
schen Trippelallianz, die dem Schutz der spanischen Niederlande dienen sollte. 
Ein Jahr später musste Frankreich einen Großteil der eroberten südniederländi-
schen Gebiete wieder herausrücken. Eine Konsequenz des französischen Einfalls 
war ein spanisch–niederländischer Leihvertrag gewesen, nach dem den Nieder-
landen gegen einen bestimmten Geldbetrag eine Zahl fester Plätze in den spani-
schen Niederlanden als Truppen- und Festungsorte übereignet wurde. 
Frankreich probierte in dieser Situation, mit England Verhandlungen zu füh-
ren. Als Ergebnis dieser Verhandlungen galt der Vertrag von Dover (1670), in 
dem die Partner einen Angriff auf die Republik vereinbarten. Frankreich sollte die 
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Last des Landkrieges, England die des Seekrieges übernehmen. In einem zweiten 
Vertrag Ende des Jahres wurde die Eröffnung des Krieges für 1672 festgelegt.44  
Die neue niederländische Außenpolitik beruhte auf der Ansicht, dass die Exis-
tenz der Republik nur durch die Sicherung der Existenz der spanischen Nieder-
lande garantiert und die Erhaltung der Republik aber vor allem eine Garantie für 
die Wahrung des politischen Gleichgewichts in Europa sei – ein Schutz gegen he-
gemoniale Bestrebungen Frankreichs. Das Allianzsystem sollte nunmehr ein be-
ständiges sein. Schon 1673 konnte der Oranier beide habsburgischen Häuser in 
der großen Haager Allianz binden und die Neutralität Englands im Frieden von 
Westminster 1674 garantieren. Diese Allianz- und Sicherheitspolitik als Instru-
ment der Gleichgewichtspolitik musste durch militärische Maßnahmen, in concre-
to durch die Nutzung der südlichen Niederlande als Barriere, gestützt werden. Im 
Frieden von Nimwegen von 1679 gab Ludwig XIV. sechs Städte aus den von ihm 
eroberten südniederländischen Gebieten an Spanien zurück. Nach dem Krieg der 
vom Statthalter Wilhelm von Oranien zusammengebrachten zweiten Großen 
Haager Allianz gegen Frankreich (1689–1697) erstrebte der Oranier bei den Frie-
densverhandlungen von Rijswijk eine größere Zahl von festen Plätzen, die stark 
gegen die französische Nordgrenze verschoben lagen.  Er konnte zwar diese Ide-
allinie nicht erreichen, schloss aber im folgenden Jahr einen Vertrag mit dem 
Gouverneurgeneral in den spanischen Niederlanden, Max Emanuel von Bayern, 
ab, nach dem Truppen der Republik in acht südniederländischen Festungen stati-
oniert werden durften.45 
Man hätte denken können, dass die Besteigung des englischen Throns durch 
Wilhelm ein höheres Maß an Sekurität, an Sicherstellung der englischen Allianz 
bedeutete, gewiss ist aber auch, dass nur mit dem Ratspensionär Heinsius an der 
Spitze die Allianz auf dem Kontinent getragen werden konnte. Heinsius hinder-
te den Oranier vor 1697 separat mit Ludwig XIV. Frieden abzuschließen. Lud-
wig XIV. nahm im November 1700 das gesamte spanische Erbe für seinen En-
kel Philipp von Anjou an, besetzte die acht Barriereplätze und nahm die nieder-
ländischen Garnisonstruppen gefangen. Hierauf kam am 7. September 1701 die 
Dritte Große Allianz vom Haag zustande. Sie umfasste die Niederlande, Eng-
land und den Kaiser. Die Partner waren verpflichtet, die spanischen Niederlande 
als Barriere für die Republik zurückzugewinnen. Die englischen und die nieder-
ländischen Interessen schienen unterschiedlich zu sein. England wollte eine 
möglichst weitgehende Schwächung Frankreichs, währenddessen die Republik 
befürchtete, dass an die Stelle französischer Handelskonkurrenz in Amerika und 
der Levante England treten würde. 1706 forderte die Republik sechzehn Plätze 
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als Barrierefestungen, darunter Nieuwpoort, Gent und Ostende, Hafenstädte, die 
für den englischen Handel so wichtig waren. Die Forderung lief schließlich auf 
die Anerkennung der gesamten spanischen Niederlande als Barriere hinaus. 
England fürchtete jetzt die Vorherrschaft der Niederlande in diesem Raum bei 
gleichzeitigem eigenem Ausschluss. Die niederländische Barriere wurde letzt-
endlich 1709 anerkannt, erreichte aber nie wieder den ursprünglichen Umfang.  
Der Machtverlust der Republik ist für die Phase 1709–1713 besonders deut-
lich, denn im Utrechter Frieden blieben die Handelsvorteile aus, England wusste 
Nieuwpoort und Ostende aus der Barriere herauszulösen und es fehlten auch die 
gegen Frankreich vorgeschobenen Grenzfestungen. Diese hatte England zuvor 
den Franzosen zugesagt. Die Republik fand sich plötzlich allein, infolge eigener 
Koalitionstreue stand sie isoliert, nachdem zuvor Gelegenheit gewesen wäre, se-
parat mit Ludwig XIV. Frieden abzuschließen. 
Im Frieden von Utrecht 1713 wurden der Republik sieben Barriereplätze (Na-
mur, Doornik, Warneton, Ypern, Knokke, Veurne) und ein Besatzungsrecht in 
Dendermonde zugesagt. Weiterhin wurde die Stationierung und Unterhaltung eines 
permanenten österreichisch–niederländischen Truppenkorps von 35.000 Mann 
vereinbart. Dieses Abkommen hatte der Republik weitestgehend freien Warenzu-
gang zugesichert. 
Mochten die Niederlande zunächst auch noch in dem österreichischen Gebiet 
eine wirtschaftlich herrschende Stellung einnehmen, mit dem Utrechter Frieden 
endete auch die zentrale Rolle, die sie bis dahin im europäischen Mächteverband 
gespielt hatten. Das Land war offensichtlich zu klein, als dass es dauernd den Part 
einer starken Land- und Seemacht gleichermaßen hätte spielen können. Tatsäch-
lich hat der hohe Steuerdruck die wirtschaftlich-gewerbliche Entwicklung des 
Landes gestört. Außenpolitisch folgte den großen koalitionspolitischen Ereignis-




Wie sich in dieser Studie herausstellte, konnte die Republik der Sieben Vereinig-
ten Niederlande nur für eine beschränkte Zeitspanne die Rolle einer europäischen 
Großmacht spielen. Was war der Grund hierfür? Im Vergleich zu den europäi-
schen Großmächten der Zeit verfügte die Republik über eine verhältnismäßig 
kleine Fläche. Wenn man nur den durch die politische Einheit besetzten Raum be-
trachtet, gehörte die Republik eindeutig zu den Kleinstaaten. Im 17. Jahrhundert 
erlebte aber das Land wegen der zunehmenden Einwohnerzahl, der spezialisierten 
Flotte, der vorteilhaften Handelskontakte und der erfolgreichen Verteidigungspo-
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litik mindestens einige Jahrzehnte lang eine wirtschaftliche und politische Blüte-
zeit. Das kleine Gebiet konnte in der langen Strecke nicht genügend finanzielle 
Mittel aufbringen, um seine politischen Interessen in den Kriegen verteidigen zu 
können. Die Republik stand nach dem Frieden von Münster fast ununterbrochen 
im Krieg entweder mit England oder mit Frankreich oder mit beiden gleichzeitig. 
Diese Kriege erschöpften das Land auch wirtschaftlich, da die Unterhaltung der 
Armee viel Geld kostete. Der Frieden von Utrecht bekräftigte nur den Machtver-
lust der Republik. In den folgenden Jahrhunderten versuchte die Republik, sich 
aus den großen europäischen Konflikten herauszuhalten. Statt ein Mitspieler in 
der europäischen Politik sein zu wollen, beschränkte sie ihre Position ab dem ers-






Finland in the Swedish realm during  





This article gives an overview of the role and status of Finland and Finns during 
the early modern period (c. 1600–1800). I am going to argue that Finland and 
the Finns had a special rank and status in the Swedish realm. There are three 
things to be studied here. Firstly: What was considered to constitute “Finland” 
and how was it defined during the 17th and 18th centuries? Secondly: What was 
the basis of the special status given to Finland? Thirdly: What kind of problems 
did exist in the relationship between “Sweden” and “Finland” and how did the 
Finns express themselves in different situations and arenas?1  
In this paper, I am not going to assess questions relating to identity or ethnic-
ity. There was not much what can be called “early nationalism” in the eastern 
part of the Kingdom of Sweden during the 17th and 18th centuries. Finland as a 
concept was used first and foremost as a form of “pressure” towards the central 
government in order to get the demands of the Finns met. However, this does 
not mean, that the Finns did not have a shared solidarity with each other.  
 
                                                 
1  There is no room for a comprehensive review of the historiography concerning the Swed-
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of Finland, Cambridge, 2006; Petri Karonen, Jari Eilola, Marko Hakanen, Marko Lam-
berg, and Olli Matikainen (eds.), Hopes and Fears for the Future in Early Modern Swe-
den, 1500–1800, Studia Historica 79, Tampere, 2009. 
PETRI KARONEN 82
During the period under consideration, the Swedish realm was a conglomerate 
state which had a variety of parts and areas. The realm looked like a mosaic espe-
cially in the 17th century, when Sweden conquered large areas in the east and in 
Central Europe. In some of these areas, the inhabitants had “better” rights than 
Finns (and Swedes), while some groups of people had nothing but duties to carry 
out.2  
There were at least two crucial things which divided the “real”, or “the hard 
core”, Swedish realm from the later conquests. These two things are very impor-
tant when analyzing the role of Finland during the 17th and 18th century. Firstly, 
the inhabitants of Sweden and Finland were represented in the Diet. One of the 
main tasks of the Diet was to deal with the Crown in financial matters relating 
to the military and other burdens. Secondly, it was possible to form new mili-
tary units and maintain the existing troops only with manpower recruited from 
either Sweden or from Finland. These two areas were seen as loyal and safe in 
the 17th century, thus it was not considered as a big risk to arm these groups and 
train them to fight. The mercenaries were used on the battlefields in Central and 
Eastern Europe during the Thirty Years’ War, but they were very expensive and 
not always reliable in a state of emergency. Sweden was not a very wealthy 
state, thus it badly needed all the resources it could gain from the land.3  
The “war” was the key concept in this context. If we look at the history of 
Sweden and Finland during this time, it is easy to find landmarks which indicate 
the huge impact of war. Soon after the crisis of the 1590s a reform programme 
began, making the period of the Swedish great power possible. During this time 
much attention was paid on Finland. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), 
Queen Christina of Sweden was forced to give away large donations to war vet-
erans, the financers of the war and their heirs in Sweden and particularly in 
Finland. Moreover, the catastrophic wars of 1700–1721 (the Great Northern 
War), 1741–1743 (The War of the Hats) and Russo-Swedish War of 1808–1809 
                                                 
2  For Sweden as a conglomerate state, see especially Harald Gustafsson, “The conglomerate 
state. A perspective on state formation in early modern Europe”, Scandinavian Journal of 
History (1998); cf. also Torbjörn Eng, Det svenska väldet. Ett konglomerat av ut-
trycksformer och begrepp från Vasa till Bernadotte [Swedish forms of dominion: a con-
glomerate of expressions and concepts from Vasa to Bernadotte], Studia Historica Upsa-
liensia 201, Uppsala, 2001. 
3  Jan Lindegren, ”The Swedish ‘Military State’, 1560–1720”, Scandinavian Journal of His-
tory, 10:3 (1985); Sven A. Nilsson, De stora krigens tid. Om Sverige som militärstat och 
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(Finnish Suomen sota – the Finnish War) sealed the destiny of the period of a 
shared common history between Sweden and Finland.4  
 
 
What Was “Finland” and How Was it Defined During  
the 17th and 18th Centuries? 
 
It is usually claimed that the early modern Swedish rulers did not know much 
about the situation and the special problems of Finland. Even the contem-
poraries spoke at great length about this in their propaganda, especially during 
the middle of the 18th century, when feelings in the political arena were running 
high. But if we take a closer look at the documents, this impression seems to be 
a bit far-fetched. The central administration and the members of the political 
elite (i.e. council of the realm and the four estates’ in the Diet) certainly had 
knowledge of what happened in Finland; as a matter of fact, the central gov-
ernment was active in gathering information about the situation in Finland – as 
well as from other areas of the kingdom. Another thing is that although the gov-
ernment was not always able to do something about the problems, it was never-
theless neither ignorant nor uninformed.5  
The information on the situation in every part of the realm was collected and 
distributed by the central administration to Stockholm. The central adminis-
tration, i.e. collegiums (Swedish kollegier) also prepared various reports. In the 
Diet, which had increased importance after the fall of autocracy from 1718 on-
                                                 
4  On the problems of War-to-Peace transition during the Swedish Era, see for instance Petri 
Karonen & Antero Holmila, “War and Peace in the History of Finland: Social and Politi-
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and Fears; Petri Karonen, ”The Peace Treaty of Hamina and its Aftermath in Sweden and 
in Finland”, Sjuttonhundratal (2010).  
5 See for instance K. O. Alho, Läntinen tutkijakunta ja sen toiminta vuosina 1725–1727. 
Eräs Suomen jälleenrakennustyön vaihe isonvihan jälkeen [The Western Commission of 
Inquiry and its effectiveness from 1725 to 1727], Helsinki, 1940, 1; A. R. Cederberg, 
”Suomen asema Ruotsin valtakunnassa vapauden aikana. Muutamia yleisiä havaintoja” 
[Finland's position in the kingdom of Sweden during the Age of Freedom. Some general 
observations], In: Turun Historiallinen Arkisto IX, Turku, 1945; Einar W. Juva, Suomen 
tie Uudestakaupungista Haminaan 1721–1808. Historiallinen tutkielma [Finland's road 
from the Peace of Uusikaupunki to the Peace of Hamina, 1721–1808. A historical study], 
Helsinki, 1947, chapter VI; Toivo J. Paloposki, Suomen talouden kehittäminen 1750–
1760 -lukujen valtiopäiväpolitiikassa [Developing the Finnish economy in the Swedish 
Diet during the 1750’s and 1760’s], Forssa, 1976, 134–137.  
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wards, the estates often heard experts as well as interested parties and stake-
holders.6   
Finland had come into focus already in the beginning of the 17th century, when 
the Swedish central power was strengthening. In that situation Finland was on the 
one hand seen as a periphery, which, however, had a clear potential to improve its 
performance. On the other hand, Finland and its resources were desperately 
needed, because the realm was involved in a number of simultaneous wars. One 
important solution was to concentrate the whole Finland under one man: a number 
of general-governors were sent to Finland from the 1620s to the 1660s. The gen-
eral-governors practically had viceregal powers within their administrative areas. 
At the same time, Sweden developed a well-functioning provincial administration 
which both monitored the subjects more closely throughout the kingdom and pro-
vided information to the ruler in Stockholm.7 
Even so, a definition of what “Finland” was during the 17th and 18th centuries 
is not easy to find in manuscripts or other documents. The definition varied 
widely during the period under consideration, but even in the 17th century 
Finland was most likely to have been seen as an area consisting of several ad-
ministrative districts. More often than not, “Finland” consisted of districts of 
Finland Proper, Tavastia, Satakunta, Savonia and Karelia (without the province of 
Käkisalmi). In addition, the district of Ostrobothnia and the Åland islands were 
connected to Finland during the 17th century by the administrative, judicial and ec-
clesiastical systems. In the 18th century, Finland was understood as the eastern part 
of the realm even in official texts. At that time the formerly not uncommon con-
cept of “Finland and Ostrobothia” disappeared completely. From then on, it was 
usual to divide the kingdom into two parts in administrative texts: the first part was 
named as “the realm” (Swedish Rike), i.e. Sweden, and the second one was the 
“Grand Duchy” (Swedish Storfurstendömet), i. e. Finland.8  
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(1600–n. 1680) [The governmental unifying policy in Finland in the 17th century], Hel-
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great power and the disintegration of a Kingdom], Jyväskylä, 2009; Nils Erik Villstrand, 
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Finland in the Swedish Realm], Historisk Tidskrift för Finland (1919); Matti Klinge, 
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To illustrate the spatial dimensions of Finland it is useful to present some 
examples of contemporary maps from the 17th and 18th centuries. The first map 
was produced in the 1660s by a famous Dutch cartographer, Johan Blaue, who 
drew this map with the help of Swedish information. The map shows the Grand 
Duchy of Finland with its districts and their coat of arms.  
 
 
Map 1. Blaeu, Joan., Magnus Ducatus Finlandiae, [Amsterdam], [1662].  
Source: The electronic map collections at the University of Jyväskylä,  
Department of History and Ethnology 
                                                                                                                       
Bernadotten ja Leninin välissä. Tutkielmia kansallisista aiheista [Between Bernadotte and 
Lenin. Studies in national issues], Helsinki-Porvoo, 1975; Matti Klinge, Kaksi Suomea [Two 
Finlands], Helsinki, 1982; Harald Gustafsson, Political Interaction in the Old Regime. Central 
Power and Local Society in the Eighteenth-Century Nordic States, Det nordiska forskningspro-
jektet Centralmakt och lokalsamhälle – beslutsprocess på 1700-talet, Publikation 6, Lund, 
1994; Jonas Nordin, Ett fattigt men fritt folk. Nationell och politisk självbild i Sverige från sen 
stormaktstid till slutet av frihetstiden [A people of poverty and liberty: National and political 
self-image in Sweden from the late age of greatness to the end of the age of liberty], Eslöv, 
2000; Petri Karonen, ”De finska borgarna och begreppet ’Finland’. Om borgarståndet och dess 
krav på ständertidens riksdagar” [The Finnish bourgeoisie and the concept  of ”Finland”. The 
burghers on the Diet at the age of freedom], In: Maktens mosaik. Enhet, särart och självbild i 
det svenska riket, Eds. Max Engman & Nils Erik Villstrand, Helsingfors, Stockholm, 2008. 
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Ethnology.Samuel Gustaf Hermelin’s laudable map dating from the end of the 
18th century illustrates the situation at the point when the common history of 
Finland and Sweden was about to end. The different provinces are marked with 
different colours and it is possible to piece together the future Finland already in 
this picture. Moreover, the map shows the difficult defense position of Finland, 
because the eastern border was drawn to the Kymi-river after the disastrous War 




Map 2. Samuel Gustaf Hermelin,  
Charta öfwer Storfurstendömet Finland, Stockholm, 1799.  
Source: The electronic map collections at the University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of History and Ethnology 
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The special role of Finland can be noticed quite easily during the 17th century in 
the Riksdag, i.e. the Diet, where a strict distinction was made between the 
Crown resolutions directed at the subjects in the Finnish districts on the one 
hand and in districts in Sweden on the other hand. Contemporaries often re-
ferred to specific idiosyncrasies and manners of the people in the “particular 
half of the realm”, but this should not be interpreted too literally, as it is quite 
clear that the other parts of the Swedish realm had their own kinds of peculiari-
ties. But what is interesting in this context is that “Finland” was often seen as 
one area, although the differences between, for example, Finland Proper and 
Savonia were marked.9  
The Swedish Realm was judicially a united and undivided entity. Finland 
had no constitutional status within the kingdom; that is why the often used term 
“Sweden-Finland” is not correct – it is a rather anachronistic and unhistorical 
concept. The legislation as well as the secular and religious authorities and the ad-
ministration were usually the same on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. The sub-
jects in Sweden and in Finland had the same rights as well as the same duties. 
For the contemporary lawyers the concept “Kingdom” (Swedish rike) re-
ferred to the area where the Swedish law was in force and to the areas that were 
represented in the Diet. Such a definition differed in a significant way from both 
the practices of the administration and the views of many members of the Es-
tates for whom the basic categorization of the empire was the division of the 
kingdom and the grand duchy. We know many examples from the 18th century 
in which Finland is not counted as belonging to the kingdom. In these cases the 
concept “the kingdom” meant exclusively the Swedish part (Swedish Svealand, 
Götaland and Norrland) of the realm, while “the Grand Duchy of Finland” was 
intended to include the so-called Swedish Finland and Ostrobothnia. Thus the 





                                                 
 9  See for instance, Karonen, Pohjoinen suurvalta; cf. Eng, Det svenska väldet; Jan Samuel-
son, Eliter, riket och riksdelningen. Sociala nätverk och geografiska mobilitet mellan 
Sverige och Finland 1720–1820 [Elites, kingdom and the dividing of the Realm. Social 
networks and geographic mobility between Sweden and Finland, 1720–1820], Skrifter 
utgivna av svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland 705, Helsingfors, 2008. 
10  For instance, Erkki Lehtinen, ”Suomen asema Ruotsin suurvallassa” [Finland’s position in 
the Swedish Realm at the 17th century], In: Historian päivät 1985, Historiallinen Arkisto 
88, Helsinki, 1986; Sten Carlsson, ”Finland och det svenska riket” [Finland and the 
Swedish Realm], In: Finland i det svenska riket, Ed. Sulo Huovinen, Stockholm, 1986. 
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The Changes in the Role of Finland Over Time 
 
The importance of Finland in the Swedish realm varied over time during the pe-
riod under consideration. In the second part of the 16th century, Finland’s role as 
a guardian against Russia laid a heavy burden on the dwellers of the Finnish 
side of the realm, as most of the financial costs of warfare were collected from 
Finland during the 25 years long war against Russia, lasting from the 1570s to 
the mid-1590s. (Long Wrath, 1570–1595).  
The Club War in Finland (1596–1597) and the end of the “crisis of the 
1590s” in Sweden was a major turning point in the history of Sweden. The tur-
bulent era began right after the death of King John III in 1592. This period of 
political confrontations and civil war lasted up until the beginning of the 17th 
century and caused serious damage, especially to the Finnish peasantry and the 
high-commanding noble officers in Finland, who had had a very strong position 
in Finland during the 25-years war against Russia.11  
The usurper Duke Charles (b. 1550, d. 1611) – known later as King Charles 
IX (1604–1611) – used very harsh methods to “tame the Finnish noble-lords”. 
In Finnish historical research, this period has traditionally been described as a 
period in which there was a loss of the special status of Finland and the Finns. 
On the other hand, due to the fact that the Club War was a real catastrophe for 
the peasants, there has been some tendency to see the role of the Finnish peas-
antry as repressed and crushed.  
These perceptions are both partly true. But if we raise the whole question to 
the macro-level and if we are more interested in the situation of the Swedish 
realm as a state, it becomes quite easy to conclude that the aftermath of the cri-
                                                 
11  The Club War has not been adequately examined as part of the general crisis which af-
fected the whole of Sweden in the 1590s and which had contemporary parallels elsewhere 
in Europe. On the debate, see esp. Eric Anthoni, Konflikten mellan hertig Carl och Fin-
land. Konfliktens uppkomst och hertigens seger [The conflict between Duke Charles and 
Finland. Conflict's origins and the Duke’s victory], Helsinki, 1935; Eric Anthoni, Kon-
flikten mellan hertig Carl och Finland. Avvecklingen och försoningen [The conflict 
between Duke Charles and Finland. The closure and reconciliation], Helsingfors, 1937; 
Pentti Renvall, Kuninkaanmiehiä ja kapinoitsijoita Vaasakauden Suomessa [King’s men 
and the mutineers in 16th century Finland], Turku, 1949; Pentti Renvall, ”Ruotsin vallan 
aika” [The period of the Swedish rule], In: Suomen kansanedustuslaitoksen historia 1, 
Helsinki, 1962; Heikki Ylikangas, Nuijasota [The Club War], 3rd edition, Keuruu, 1996; 
Kimmo Katajala (ed.), Northern Revolts. Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the 
Nordic Countries, Helsinki, 2004; Mirkka Lappalainen, Susimessu. 1590-luvun sisällissota 
Ruotsissa ja Suomessa [Civil War in Sweden and in Finland at the 1590s], Helsinki, 2009; 
[the old text continues from here: “in general…”] in general see also Geoffrey Parker and 
Lesley M. Smith (eds.), The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, 2nd edition, Lon-
don, 1997. 
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sis of the 1590s was a victory for the king and for the state governed by a strong 
central administration. Whereas it may have been possible for the members of 
the nobility to act in ways which had no legal basis or which were not justified 
at all in wartime during the war between Sweden and Russia, in the new situa-
tion this was very carefully rooted out from the realm.  
It was clear that from the beginning of the 17th century all of the peripheries 
or even very well-to-do-regions and their inhabitants had much more difficulties 
in continuing to act the way they used to. At the same time, the poor and not 
very urbanized kingdom was embroiled in many long and very expensive wars 
which demanded even more resources from all the regions from the geographi-
cally large country. This is why the subjects of the King of Sweden, even on the 
eastern side of the Gulf of Bothnia, were closely subjugated under the new and 
efficient administrative system of the Swedish Crown. The “new order” was led 
from one centre, i. e. Stockholm. This meant an end to the local diversity or 
semi-independent areas. As a matter of fact, this was a general phenomenon that 
stretched across the whole of the Kingdom of Sweden. 
The central government in Stockholm paid serious attention to Finland in the 
Age of Greatness (from ca 1620 to 1720), especially during the first half of the 
17th century. It was during this time that the central government sent Finland 
several general-governors with the task to fulfill the government plans. The 
government desperately needed the resources which could be collected from the 
eastern parts of the realm. The system of general-governors was subsequently 
introduced to other parts of the realm too.  
The Great Northern War (1700–1721) in which Sweden was overrun by the 
Russians was, in particular, a significant turning point in the status of Finland. 
The horrors of the Great Wrath in Finland and the loss of large territories from the 
eastern borders of the realm – especially the areas of the Karelian Isthmus – on the 
one hand weakened the possibilities to defend the eastern parts of the kingdom, but 
on the other hand strengthened the Finns’ demands from the crown. The dwellers 
of the Grand Duchy of Finland discovered that it was important to make collective 
pleas if they wanted to gain some results. Right after the peace treaty of Uusikau-
punki (1721), the Finns succeeded in gaining many tax-free years for their ruined 
domiciles and, moreover, their demands did not stop there.12  
The central government did not pay much attention to the defence of the 
eastern parts of the realm during the 1720s and 1730s. The main reason for this 
was the illusion that Sweden could retake the areas it had lost in the Great 
Northern War. After the losses of the War of the Hats in the 1740s, this attitude 
changed and the defence of Finland became a priority in the defence plans of 
                                                 
12  Kustaa H. J. Vilkuna, Viha. Perikato, katkeruus ja kertomus isostavihasta [The Great Wrath]. 
Historiallisia tutkimuksia 229, Helsinki, 2005; Karonen, Coping; Karonen, The Council. 
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the kingdom. Two strong fortresses were built on the eastern border. The con-
struction of Sveaborg (i.e. Castle of Sweden) and Svartholma fortifications 
eased the anxiety of the Finns who felt that they had been left alone with the en-
emy already two times during the first half of the 18th century.13  
Critical voices rose every once in a while during the 18th century, but most of 
the Finns were loyal to the Swedish Crown and the king of Sweden. It is possi-
ble that “Finns” did not care much about the “Swedes”, but the monarch was the 
rallying point which connected these two parts together. The most remarkable 
exception to this rule were those few members of the nobility who during the 
second part of the 18th century, and especially during the 1780s, were active in 
making plans for forming some kind of “Finnish separatist movement”. But these 
actions were not realistic. Thus, on the threshold of Finnish autonomy there 
were not many individuals who wanted to change the ruler from the Swedish 
king to the czar of Russia. The strongest opponents to the Russian rule came, 
not surprisingly, from the peasantry. The burghers were also very suspicious 
towards the new rule, as they were not sure about the nature of the czarist gov-
ernment. They were especially afraid of losing their rights and privileges 
granted by the Swedish crown. The new situation was not so problematic for the 
clergy and the nobility, because they could lean on their special skills and 
status, even under Russian rule.14  
 
 
“Swedes” and “Finns” in the Early Modern Period 
 
For the representatives of three upper estates in Finland – i.e. the nobility, the 
clergy and the burghers – the status of the Finnish language was not a big prob-
lem, because all the members of these groups had a good knowledge of Swedish 
and they had also access to the tacit knowledge of the manners and general be-
haviour of the ruling classes. The language was not a a point of contention in 
                                                 
13  Michael Roberts, The Age of Liberty. Sweden 1719–1772, Cambridge, 1986; Einar W. 
Juvelius, Suomen puolustuskysymys ison- ja pikkuvihan välisenä aikana [The question of 
defence of Finland between the Greater and Lesser Wrath, 1721–1741], Helsinki, 1919; 
Jean Häggman, Studier i frihetstidens försvarspolitik. Ett bidrag till Sveriges inre historia 
1721–1727 [Studies on the defence policy in the Age of Liberty. A contribution to Swe-
den's internal history], Stockholm, 1922.  
14  Martin Hårdstedt, Finska kriget [Russo-Swedish War], Stockholm, 2006; Max Engman, 
Pitkät jäähyväiset. Suomi Ruotsin ja Venäjän välissä vuoden 1809 jälkeen [The Long 
Goodbye. Finland Between Sweden and Russia after 1809], Juva, 2009; Karonen, The 
Peace; Petri Karonen, ”Introduction: Sweden, Russia and Finland 1808–1809”, In: Mo-
netary boundaries in Transition. A North European Economic History and the Finnish 
War 1808–1809, Eds. Cecilia von Heijne and Tuukka Talvio, The Museum of National 
Antiquities Stockholm, Studies 16, Huskvarna, 2010. 
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the 17th century at all; as a matter of fact, there are only a few remarks relating 
to the language before the 18th century in the sources. One of the most famous is 
the story about the hated and feared Finnish “iron-marshal” and a councillor of 
the realm Klaus Fleming who was one of the prime movers during the crisis of 
the 1590’s and a loyal supporter of King Sigismund of Sweden and Poland. 
Klaus Fleming was called a “sootnose” (Finnish nokinenä), because of his un-
sophisticated outward appearance. His Swedish language was also criticized for 
being very broken. Later, these kinds of remarks disappeared. The main reason 
for this was, of course, the improved language skills of the members of the three 
upper estates.15  
The problem of not understanding Swedish was the worst among the peas-
antry, because most of them spoke only Finnish. During the time when men 
were needed to fight in a war, and the duty had to be done, this was a serious 
matter for the Crown and its officials at the local level. The peasants made nu-
merous complaints about problems that resulted from the office-holders who 
lacked knowledge of Finnish. The Crown took these complaints seriously and 
tried to ease the friction. In many cases the peasants were satisfied with the re-
sults, which suggests that the language was not the main issue here. In these 
matters the Crown efficiently used the knowledge of the local priests to translate 
official declarations etc. The problems were, of course, much more difficult, if 
the priest did not have a sufficient knowledge of the language, as sometimes 
was the case when priests from Sweden were placed in completely Finnish 
speaking regions.16 The problems associated with using the Swedish language 
for the peasants were thus based on practical reasons and not reasons concern-
ing principles.  
However, in the 17th century, and even more so in the 18th century, the three 
upper estates frequently complained about the appointments for official posi-
tions in Finland. As already mentioned, the language was not an issue for these 
groups. The repeated complaints concerning the problems of the people of “the 
Finnish Nation” (Swedish den Finska Nationen) should therefore be interpreted 
as arguments relating to the practises of the society of privileges (which the 
Swedish society in the 17th to 18th century certainly was) and – in many cases 
this was the main reason – as attempts to secure a person’s own status and to 
gain benefits. Professor Sten Carlsson proved in 1962, that the “Finns” – that is 
mostly, “The Swedish speaking Finns” – had occupied, during the 18th century, 
almost every seat of the official posts in Finland. Nevertheless, they argued that 
                                                 
15  For instance Karonen, Pohjoinen suurvalta; Villstrand, Sveriges historia.  
16  Erkki Lehtinen, ”Vieras virkakieli ja suomalaiset talonpojat n. 1650–1735” [Foreign of-
ficial language and the Finnish peasants, c. 1650–1735], Historiallinen Arkisto 55, Hel-
sinki, 1955; Villstrand, Riksdelen. 
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the King’s subjects from the eastern part of the realm were not treated justly in 
the appointments.17  
Above all, the burghers from the Finnish towns were very active to separate 
“Finland” from “Sweden” in their petitions and complaints at the Diet in the 
18th century. They argued repeatedly that the town-dwellers on the eastern side 
of the realm had much inferior possibilities to conduct business than their coun-
terparts in Sweden. In particular they contrasted the situation between the capi-
tal Stockholm and Finland. This was a very effective argument, and the mer-
chants of the Finnish towns got all they dared to ask from the Crown. Perhaps 
this seems a little surprising, as in Finnish historical research there has been the 
impression that the Finns did not succeed in their demands at all. But the main 
reason for these, sometimes very aggressively expressed, arguments was mainly 
the economic benefits. Thus, it was not the question of separation or a “divorce” 





The first basic finding of this article is that Finland and the Finns had a special 
status in the Swedish realm during the early modern period. Secondly, “Fin-
land” was understood in different ways in different contexts. Thirdly, Finland 
was seen as a valuable resource and a “buffer” against possible attacks from the 
East. Fourthly, the status of the Finnish language was not a big problem for the 
representatives of three upper estates in Finland – i.e. the nobility, the clergy 
and the burghers. The situation was less good for the peasants and other inhabi-
tants in the countryside.  
The war, and especially the relationship with Russia, played a crucial role in 
the common history of Sweden and Finland and especially for the Finns already in 
the early modern period. The “war” was the key concept in this context, having a 
huge impact for the Swedish and Finnish society in the Early Modern period.  
 
                                                 
17  Sten Carlsson, Bonde – präst – ämbetsman. Svensk ståndscirkulation från 1680 till våra 
dagar [A Farmer – a priest – an official. Swedish social circulation from 1680 to the pre-
sent day], Stockholm, 1962; Karonen, De finska; cf. Samuelson, Eliter. 
18  Petri Karonen, Patruunat ja poliitikot. Yritysjohtajien taloudellinen ja yhteiskunnallinen 
toiminta Suomessa 1600–1920 [Masters and politicians: business managers as economic 
and political actors in Finland, 1600–1920], Historiallisia Tutkimuksia 217, Tampere, 
2004; Petri Karonen, “The Swedish Diet as a Forum for Gathering Commercial and Po-
litical Information”, In: Scandinavia in the Age of Revolutions. Nordic Political Cultures, 
1740–1820, Eds. Pasi Ihalainen, Michael Brensgbo, Karin Sennefelt, Patrik Winton, 
Cornwall, 2011. 
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Table 1.  
The main factors behind the special status of Finland, 
 ca 1600–1800. 
 
Factor Explanation 
WAR General importance is decreasing rela-
tively during the 18th century.  
RUSSIA Importance is relatively small during 
the 17th century, but increases greatly 
after that. 
ECONOMIC FACTORS  
        Taxes  Including tolls etc. 
        Products  Tar, timber, grain etc. 
        Resources  Manpower for the military; capable of-
ficials for the administration etc.; for-
ests; “free” soil which can be donated  
(donations only possible in the 17th 
century) 
OTHER FACTORS  
       Different institutions and symbols  Academy of Turku, Court of Appeals 
(Turku, Vasa), the King of Sweden as a 
Grand Duke of Finland 
       Problems of controlling the area Large administrative districts, the un-
certainty and “leaking” of the east bor-
der – Finland as an “abnormal” area as 
seen by the high-ranking officials in the 
capital of Sweden 
       Finnish language Not a primary question in the early 
modern period, but very important for 
the peasants 
 
It is also important to notice that already in the beginning of the 17th century the 
Swedish realm was a highly centralized and controlled state. This meant that the 
government and the administration had a pretty good understanding of what 
happened in different regions. In terms of its territory and its administration, 
Sweden was a great power, but not in terms of its material resources. Thus, the 
central administration in Stockholm usually did know a lot about the realities 
and practices in Finland. Most exceptions were the harsh war-time periods, es-
pecially in the beginning of the 18th century.  
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Table 1 pulls together the arguments presented above. In this table it is pos-
sible to see some of the main factors which might be considered important in re-
lation to the special status of Finland during the 17th and 18th centuries.  
Finland’s relative share of products and services in the Swedish realm was 
much higher than her population. On the other hand, taxes were the “weak 
point” of Finland from the point of view of the central government.19 However, 
the most important keywords here are “war” and “Russia”, and almost everything 
else was dependant on these two concepts: warfare needed vast resources and 




                                                 
19  Sven-Erik Åström, ”Finlands tribut till Sverige” [Finland's tribute to Sweden], In: Sym-
posium för historiker från Sverige och Finland, Helsingfors, 1980, 90–102; Sven-Erik 
Åström, “The role of Finland in the Swedish national and war economies during Sweden's 




The Russian Diplomacy  





Several works have analyzed the relationship between Russia and Sweden in depth, 
as well as have seen the diplomatic background and history of frequent Russian–
Swedish wars. However, the reconstruction of the changes in Russian–Swedish 
relationships, with the help of the diplomatic sources of the period, has not been 
so far duly reconstructed. The events in the North constitute only a small particle 
of the Napoleonic Wars, nevertheless they provide important details to have a 
more thorough examination of the diplomatic history of the period, as well as to 
grasp the right perspectives of Russian foreign policy in the Swedish Question.  
The present paper gives an overview of the changes in the Russian–Swedish 
relationship in 1801–1815, based on published diplomatic sources from the Rus-
sian Empire’s Archives for Foreign Affairs (Moscow). It investigates the circum-
stances that led the two states towards cooperation during the Napoleonic Wars, 
and the principles of Russian foreign affairs. It explores the causes of the outbreak 
of the last Russian–Swedish war (1808–1809), and clarifies how the conse-
quences affected the relation between the states and the international affairs. 
The year 1801 brought forward essential changes in the history of the Russian 
State. Alexander I came into power by the Palace Revolution (‘dvortsovyi perevo-
rot’) in March 1801. The new Sovereign and his diplomacy did their best in order 
to keep away from the European conflicts, and maintain good relationships with 
the European powers. Alexander I inherited a number of agreements1 and obliga-
tions from his predecessor, Paul I (1796–1801).2 The main problem was the con-
                                                 
*  This paper is part of a research project in the framework of the Historical Russistics 
Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA–ELTE Történeti Ruszisz-
tikai Kutatócsport 2006TK 1194). 
1  Vneshniaia politika Rosszii 19 i nachala 20 veka, [hereinafter VPR], Dokumenti Rossiis-
kago Ministerstva Inostrannikh g’el, Ser. I. t. 1. Moskva, 1960. Prim., 662., 703. The Rus-
sian–Swedish agreement on friendship, trade and naval shipping was concluded on 1 
March 1801. 
2  Istorii vneshniei politiki Rossii. Pervaia polovina 19. veka. Ot voin Rossii prot’iv Na-
poleona do Parizhskogo mira 1856 g., Moskva, 1995. 27.; Janet M. Hartley, Alexander I, 
London, 1994. 61. 
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flict with England, and the proximity of the English fleet to the Russian capital, St 
Petersburg as well. During 1800 Paul I revived the League of Armed Neutrality 
with the participation of Denmark, Sweden and Prussia. The merchant ships were 
to be guarded by armed forces from that time on. However, England did not ac-
cept the situation and the British fleet appeared off Copenhagen in March 1801, 
and with their cannons set the capital of Denmark on fire.3 Alexander I was com-
mitted to the League of Neutrality because of his father’s politics, and he prom-
ised his allies not to leave them alone, but at the same time emphasized that this 
policy needed to be modified and adjusted towards the interests of London.4 On 6 
April 1801 Alexander I ordered his ambassador, S. R. Vorontsov, to London to 
make the English Cabinet understand: „The restoration of the friendly terms be-
tween Russia and England depends on the ceasure of the state of war against 
Denmark and Sweden”.5 On 9 April 1801 the Tsar informed the Russian ambas-
sador in Stockholm, A. Ya. Budberg about the steps to make towards England.6 
The Russian Government invited Sweden and Denmark to St Petersburg to attend 
the English–Russian negotiations about entering into a sea convention, but the 
two powers did not take the opportunity.7 The new English–Russian Sea Conven-
tion was signed on 5 June 1801.8 
After having solved the conflict with England, the Sovereign informed his dip-
lomats of the essentials of the new Russian foreign policy. He announced that he 
would stay away from European affairs, emphasizing that such a huge country as 
Russia did not need any further territorial growth. He did not wish to take part in 
European conflicts and was to provide peace for his nation.9 In fact, he believed in 
the policy of non-alignment and peace, and was to intervene into European con-
flicts only if necessary. „If I happened to take up arms […] I would do it only to 
protect my nation, or if the peace of Europe would be threatened by the danger of 
                                                 
3  VPR, Ser. I. t. 1. Dok., 5. Aleksandr I generalu ot kavalerii P. A. Palenu, 8 (20) aprelia 
1801 g. 17.; Prim., 8., 698. 
4  VPR, Ser. I. t. 1. Moskva, 1960. Dok., 3. Aleksandr I poslu v Stokgolme A. Ya. Budbergu, 
9. (21) aprelia 1801 g., 18–19.; H. Ragsdale, „Prosvishchonnii absolutizm i vneshniaia po-
litika Rossii v 1762–1815 godakh”, Otechestvennaia istoriia 3 (2001) 15. 
5  VPR, Ser. I. t 1. Aleksandr I S. R. Vorontsovu, 6 (18) aprelia 1801 g., 16. 
6  VPR, Ser. I. t. 1. Dok., 6. Aleksandr I poslu Stokgolme A. Ya. Budbergu, 9 (21) aprelia 
1801 g., 22–23. 
7  VPR, Ser. I. t. 1. Prim. 19., 699. 
8 See the content of the convention in detail: VPR, Ser. I. t. 1. Dok., 9. Anglo–russkaia 
morskaia konvenciia, 5 (17) iiunia 1801 g., 28–39. 
9  VPR, Ser. I. t. 1. Dok., 12. Aleksandr I poslanniku v Berline A. I. Kriudeneru, 5 (17) iiulia 
1801 g., 49–50. The instructions containing the new principles and alternatives of Russian 
foreign policy were handed to A. I. Markov, Russian ambassador in Paris on 27 June 1801, 
and S. R. Vorontsov, Russian ambassador in London on 5 July 1801. See details in: VPR, 
Ser. I. t. 1. Prim., 20., 699. 
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the pursuit of ambition”10 – he wrote. Actually, with this foreign policy the Rus-
sian Cabinet wished to stabilize the presence of Russia on the Continent with a 
system of agreements, furthermore, to keep her position as a great power and 
have the European affairs influenced with her policy of isolation.11 With his first 
steps in foreign policy, the Russian Sovereign attempted to restore his diplomatic 
relationship with England (it had duly occurred on 5 June 1801), as well as to 
strengthen his alliance with Sweden, in order to establish  friendly terms with 
Austria and Prussia, and sign a peace with France. However, this latter was only 
to take place after long negotiations on 8 October 1801. 
Central Europe became the main axle of Russian foreign policy.12 Beside the 
German States the role of the Northern States, Denmark and Sweden was growing 
in Russian European Diplomacy. On the one hand, they neighboured Russia, 
which became more and more important considering the protection of the borders. 
On the other hand, this connection provided Russian Diplomacy with a much 
wider range of opportunities on the international battlefield. The most important 
task, which the Russian Government was aiming at, was to prevent French influ-
ence in the area. Alexander I considered it necessary to build a barrier from the 
German States that would be able to prevent French territorial expansion.13 In this 
effort, Sweden proved to be a partner, since the Swedish Cabinet was afraid 
France attack their North-German territories. 
Finally, on 18 March 1802, after long-lasting negotiations, Sweden also be-
came part of the English–Russian Sea Convention, which Denmark had already 
signed on 11 October the previous year. The Swedish Cabinet was not totally sat-
isfied with the results achieved by the Russians, they disapproved that the inter-
ests of the Neutral States had not been appropriately enforced. On 16 May 1802 
Alexander I, in his letter to the Russian ambassador in the Hague, G. O. Stackel-
berg, gave voice to a different opinion. „I am absolutely sure of the fact that nei-
ther Denmark, nor Sweden would have ever been given such concessions as they 
have obtained now, thanks to my mediation. Although, the accession of Sweden to 
the convention came into being, the case came to an end at last”.14 In his letter, 
Alexander highlighted that apart from Sweden and Russia being on friendly terms, 
he was afraid that Sweden, struggling with serious financial problems, would do 
anything to accept the French help to improve her economic situation. „It is 
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widely known that the Cabinet in Stockholm is making attempts to get closer to 
the French Cabinet. The King does not seem to like the French Government, but 
on the other hand, this Sovereign has hostile emotions towards England, which 
could remain, resulting in an approach to France, particularly if the First Consul 
shows that he is willing to help Sweden, which is in extreme financial situation”.15 
On 16 May 1802 he formed a similar opinion in his secret dispatch sent to his 
ambassador in Madrid, I. M. Murav’ov-Apostol, which was also dispatched later, 
on 26 July, to his ambassador in Berlin, M. M. Alopeus. He kept on emphasizing 
the fact that the relationship with Sweden was friendly, whereas he was afraid of 
the rapprochement between France and Sweden. „Beside being neighbours I am 
in a particularly close relationship with Gustav IV”16 – he wrote to Alopeus, hop-
ing that the family relations connecting him to the Swedish Sovereign would pro-
tect the friendly cooperation, and would also keep Sweden beside Russia. 
At the beginning of 1801, the aim of Russian foreign policy was to strengthen 
the friendship with Sweden, and they seem to have been successful. However, 
from the autumn of 1802 the Russian–Swedish connection appeared to have 
slackened, because of the Swedes’ French policies. This is also shown by the fact 
that Alexander I did not only ask information from his ambassadors in European 
courts, but also from Constantinople, Ambassador A.Ya. Italinsky. He entrusted 
him „to observe, preparing for any circumstances, the relationship between the 
Swedish Mission and the Turkish Ministries”.17 The Russian Government also re-
lied on the possibility that the French Government would refresh its old „Eastern 
Barrier System”, and would make Sweden and the Ottoman Empire stand by 
France and against Russia. The concern of the Russian Cabinet is manifest in the 
letter of A. R. Vorontsov, Foreign Minister, written on 6 October 1802, in which 
he asked a detailed report from D. M. Alopeus – on duty in Stockholm from Au-
gust 1801 –, about the financial situation and the condition of the Swedish army 
and fleet. Beyond that, he ordered him „to focus on the political relationship of 
Sweden with other states”.18 
However, from the end of 1803 onwards the European situation changed along 
with the Russian standpoint with regard to Sweden. It was again seen as a strong 
ally, which was related to the newly modified Russian foreign conception. The 
policy of isolation, announced at the beginning of 1801, failed, and it became 
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clear that Russia should take a harder line in European affairs against the expan-
sive policy of France. The Treaty of Amiens (25 March 1802) between England 
and France proved to be short-lived. After 12 May 1803 warfare was resumed be-
tween the two states, and the Russian Diplomacy made keen efforts to enter into a 
military alliance with Prussia, and later, in December 1803, with Austria. After 
Russia’s unsuccessful attempts to solve the conflicts between the two German 
States, and make a coalition with them against Napoleon – Russia concluded an 
agreement with Prussia in May 1804, and with Austria in November the same 
year –, the necessity of a Russian–Swedish alliance came to to forefront. 
Napoleon being elected emperor, the dramatic incidents in 1804 (the execution 
of the Duke of Enghien), and the French policy towards the German States filled 
the Swedish Government with fear. All these are clear from the minutes of the 
discussions of A. A. Czartoryski, the Russian Foreign Minister, and Karl Stedingk, 
the Swedish ambassador in St Petersburg. The ambassador reported that „the 
King of Sweden was afraid that Swedish Pomerania was in danger, since its loca-
tion makes it a stronghold, and there is the port of Stralsund as well, a good catch, 
which will surely arouse the interest of the First Consul”.19 For this reason, he 
enquired „whether his Sovereign could count on the help of Russia if the French 
start military operations in Pomerania”.20 The ambassador received a satisfying 
answer, since the Russian Government was ready to help Sweden at the smallest 
sign of danger. Furthermore, Alexander I offered his diplomatic services to obtain 
English financial support, which the Swedes accepted.21 On 8 January 1805 Rus-
sia made a convention with Sweden in order to protect Northern Germany.22 The 
document, consisting of ten Articles and five Secret Articles, was signed by A. A. 
Czartoryski and D. P. Tatishchev, Secret Counsellor from the Russian side, and 
Karl Stedingk, Swedish ambassador in St Petersburg, from Swedish side. In the 
preamble several reasons why the convention was made were listed. The alliance 
was explained as „French troops marched into Germany, without paying atten-
tion to the neutrality of this Empire, […] sacked Hannover and the Hansa-cities. 
The French Government went too far. These incidents called the attention of the 
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Swedish and Russian Sovereign from the beginning. […] The Swedish King 
should consider the situation of the threatened Swedish Pomerania, which is on 
the border of Northern Germany invaded by the French army”.23 
The First Article of the convention included that „in case of a further decline 
of the relations of France and Sweden, and if the Northern German territories of 
Sweden are under attack, the Russian Sovereign, in accordance with the Gatchina 
Agreement, will send troops of 40–50,000, and the Swedish King will have to arm 
a force of 20–25,000 troops”.24 Further Articles established the foundations of the 
cooperation of the Russian and Swedish Army and Navy. Secret Article No. 1 
underlined that „the alliance is open for those Powers that wish to take part in 
it”.25 Secret Article No. 4 made it clear that „since the alliance also serves the in-
terests of England, England will give financial help to Sweden in order that it is 
able to raise a force of 25,000”.26 Secret Article No. 5 claimed that „supposing 
France attacked either of the parties of the convention, the other one would im-
mediately offer help, and support it with necessary military force”.27 
Napoleon being crowned emperor (2 December 1804) accelerated the rap-
prochement between England and Russia as well. Alexander I sent N. N. No-
vosiltsev to London to negotiate with Prime Minister William Pitt about the or-
ganization of an anti-Napoleonic coalition. It is clear from Novosiltsev’s notes of 
13 December 1804, taken at his talks with Pitt that the Russians counted on Swe-
den. As Russia was unable to fight alone, the aim was to organize as great mili-
tary power as possible, and put it into action against Napoleon. The idea was that 
„Russia and England will bring Austria and Prussia into the coalition, to which 
the Ottoman Empire and Sweden are bound to join, possibly Denmark as well; 
the central aim of this coalition would be to put an end to the territorial expan-
sion of France, and the barbarous actions of Napoleon”.28 In the spring of 1805, 
the alliance was being negotiated in London, and an agreement was signed on 30 
March 1805.29 The English–Russian alliance, which was to make the foundation 
of the Third Coalition, and which Sweden officially joined, is regarded, in many 
respects as a milestone in Russian foreign policy in the period. It became obvious 
that Russia was unable to stay away from European events, the policy of isolation 
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would bring self-isolation, which was definitely not acceptable for such a great 
power with quite a significant military potential. Furthermore, it also became evi-
dent that simply with diplomatic methods the Russian Government is not able to 
stop the French expansion, interfering into Russian interests. Entering into the 
Third Coalition meant war for Russia. The Cabinet felt relieved when Sweden al-
lied with Russia in their fight against Napoleon.  
From 1804 to 1807, Russia was preoccupied with the struggle against Napo-
leon. After the defeats of the Third Coalition (1805), of which Sweden was a 
member, and later those of the Fourth Coalition (1806–1807), Russia was forced 
to accept the French alliance, along with its burdens, which meant joining the 
Continental System. After the Treaty of Tilsit (7–9 July 1807), Russia’s political 
sphere in the international battlefield was narrowing, and the situation even wors-
ened since the French alliance dissatisfied Russian nobles.30 The Treaty of Tilsit 
put an end to the period of Russian influence in Central Europe, but at the same 
time gave opportunity to Alexander I to protect the interests of Russia in the 
North against Sweden, and in the South against the Ottoman Empire. Russia also 
declared in the Treaty of Tilsit that she would turn Denmark and Sweden against 
England. Denmark was inclined towards it, whereas Sweden did not join the Con-
tinental Blockade introduced against England, and Alexander I used this to prove 
his attack. This step of his was not really in connection with the economic prob-
lems, but rather he felt strategically threatened in the Baltic if the Swedes would 
have allied with England.31 Apart from all these incidents, the Russian Govern-
ment did not wish to enter into war with the Swedish, and did not want to obtain 
Finland, which, in fact, could have been a necessary step for the protection of 
Russia in the Baltic. Russia, because of the pressure from France, declared war on 
England in November 1807. Napoleon hoped that Russia would enter into war 
with Sweden as well. However, the Russian Cabinet took every pretext to post-
pone the beginning of the war until February 1808. It created a hopeless situation 
for Sweden, since keeping its alliance with England foreshadowed the conflict 
with Russia, but if it had joined the French–Russian alliance, England would have 
proved a threat.32  
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Napoleon was satisfied while Russia paid a full attention to the North, partly 
because it was, though formally, to protect the Continental System. What is more, 
he offered military help, but the French were far too engaged in the war with 
Spain from the summer of 1808. This is why Napoleon did not want to interfere 
in the affairs of the North, which was a great relief for Alexander I. The Russian 
Army soon defeated the Swedish in Finland: a force numbering about 24,000 won 
over 20,000 badly equipped and poorly trained Swedes and Finns. Only the For-
tress of Sveabog, which was responsible for checking the naval route towards 
Helsinki, was able to hold out for a longer time, but it also capitulated in May. 
The way to Helsinki was open, Alexander I announced the incorporation of 
Finland into the Russian Empire.33 In the spring of 1809 Gustav Adolphe IV was 
deprived of his power. The Finnish Diet was convoked in Porvoo, and on the 
same day, 29 March 1809, when the Finnish swore allegiance to Tsar Alexander I, 
the common Sovereign of Sweden and Finland resigned. 34  The union made 
Finland a Grand Duchy, what is more, a „peculiar state”. „The Finnish nation 
lifted in the row of nationalities” became the subject of the Russian state, and at 
the same time received a right of political representation under their Sovereign: 
the estates could collectively represent the interest of the whole nation. For Alex-
ander I, in the unfavourable international situation, it was important to conciliate 
Finland soon, and to stabilize the Government with the cooperation of the leading 
Finnish figures and the estates. In Porvoo, in his sovereign oath, the Tsar prom-
ised that the Evangelical religion, the constitution and the privileges of the estates, 
originating from the Swedish reign, would remain acknowlegded.35 Finland, as a 
consequence of the Napoleonic Wars alliance policy, got out of the authority of 
Sweden, and with the Treaty of Fredrikshamn (5 September 1809) closing the 
Finnish war, became part of the Russian Empire.  
The Fredrikshamn Peace was preceded by negotiations lasting for about a 
month. The representatives were, from the Russian side N. P. Rumiantsev, For-
eign Minister and D. M. Alopeus, ambassador in Stockholm from 1803 to 1808, 
and from the Swedish side Baron Karl Stedingk, ambassador in St Petersburg 
from 1792 to the beginning of the Russian–Swedish war, as well as General 
André Frederich Skjöldebrand. The Swedish and Russian representatives met first 
on 2 August 1809, but official talks began only the following day. Alopeus made 
detailed memoranda and a protocol report on the sessions from 2 to 5 August 
1809, as a consequence, the parties’ points of view in the disputed issues are most 
clearly shown, and the changes in the content of the Articles of the Treaty could 
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also be easily followed.36  The negotiations were intensive and supervised by 
Alexander I himself. The Swedes at the very beginning agreed on passing Finland, 
as well as joining the Continental Blockade against England. From the side of 
Sweden an Article was to be amended in order that the import of a few staple 
goods would be allowed for their citizens. Two questions, however, were for rela-
tively long discussed: the state of the Aland Islands and a clear demarcation of 
Russian–Swedish (Finnish–Swedish) inland borders. In the first issue Stedingk 
argued that „those were never parts of Finland […] and if these islands are an-
nexed to Russia, the population of Stockholm will not even for a single night sleep 
peacefully, being afraid of a sudden assault, which could be easily laid. Moreover, 
the occupation of these islands will make it possible to check naval traffic in the 
Bay of Botten, which could break the contact of the capital with the Northern 
harbours”.37 Furthermore, Stedingk told Rumiantsev that he had not been given 
authority in Stockholm to negotiate about the passing of the Aland Islands. 
Alopeus noted that „Rumiantsev was astonished at this, because from the preced-
ing correspondence it should have been known in Stockholm that we will never 
renounce these isles, since we are aware how important this territory is regarding 
the protection of Finland”.38 In issue of the borders the Russian delegates pointed 
that „the Russian Sovereign finds it important to push the borders to the North, in 
order that his successors should not enter into new wars for the causes of a cor-
rect demarcation, […] and when they are discussing the borders, natural fron-
tiers will have to be found, with which a new war could have been avoided”.39 
The delegates were not able to discuss the cases of the Aland Islands and the 
northern borders, because the Russian request was not known in Stockholm, thus, 
Alopeus was to send a courier for further instructions.  
From 5 August 1809 onwards the talks were suspended until the return of the 
Swedish courier. The same day Rumiantsev sent a letter to Barclay de Tolly, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army stationed in Finland, in which he re-
ported on the results of the first conference with the Swedish in Fredrikshamn. 
The Russian Foreign Minister asked Barclay to be prepared in case the war 
should be continued, since the treaty was not signed.40 The negotiations started 
again on 12 August 1809, which was joined by the Danish as well. The Russians 
did not renounce the Aland Islands, or give up their territorial aims in the question 
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of the northern frontier of Russia and Sweden.41 In the meantime, the Russian 
Foreign Minister, Rumiantsev in his letter of 26 August, let the Tsar know that the 
peace would be signed soon. He also reported that he had explained his point of 
view to the Swedish delegate regarding the renewal of the alliance of the Northern 
States. „For Stedingk I revealed that my idea is that at the conclusion of peace 
with the cooperation of Sweden and Denmark we should create the Northern Al-
liance, and the basis of this alliance, with the help of revising and renewing of the 
former conditions, […] taking charge of the state of the Baltic, provided by the 
three monarchies. […] My views were proved to be satisfactory for Stedingk. […] 
I reassured him with reference to the opinion that Russia has interest in retaining 
Sweden, apart from the fact that they are at war at the present time, and that 
Sweden is in a difficult situation as a consequence of its home affairs”42 – he 
wrote. Rumiantsev informed the Sovereign that the Swedish would sign the peace 
if the Russian agreed on a smaller modification of the frontiers. „Sovereign, 
Baron Stedingk has repeated for me that he is ready to sign the treaty with the 
condition that I am willing to push the frontier as far as the river Torneo”.43 Ru-
miantsev asked for the permission of Alexander I, which was given on 27 August 
1809. The letter, which the Russian Sovereign sent in return, also proves that he 
followed the proceedings of the peace negotiations, and kept them under control. 
In connection with the peace he formed further instructions to Rumiantsev, 
among others he asked for the creation of an Article, in which Sweden would 
guarantee the territorial safety of Denmark, and that Russia must not be blamed 
for the consequences, coming from the choice of the Duke of Augustenbourg in 
the question of the accession of the Swedish throne.44 Finally, after negotiating 
about some minute details, the treaty was signed on 5 September 1809. 
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The Peace Treaty set essential relations not only in the history of Russia and 
Sweden, but also that of the region of Northern Europe. The First Article of the 
Treaty declared that „from this time there will be friendship and good relation-
ship between the Russian Sovereign and the Swedish King”45, and they would 
make efforts to keep it up among their states and subjects. In the Second Article it 
was formulated that the Swedish Sovereign would conclude peace with the allies 
of the Russian Tsar. In the Third Article, which is considered to be the most im-
portant one, Sweden agreed to join the Continental System. The Swedish King 
promised to close the harbours of the country in front of the British navy and 
merchant ships. However, Sweden, with the approval of Russia, was allowed to 
import some significant goods (salt and colonial goods) in order to meet the needs 
of the Swedish population, with this permission the total blockade did not come 
into operation. Russia promised to make France and Denmark accept this situa-
tion. Article No. 4 contained that Sweden renounce Finland. It is eye provoking, 
otherwise that Finland by its geographical name was not mentioned in the agree-
ment, instead the Provinces, incorporated in Russia, were listed. Article No. 5 
proves to be a significant part of the peace treaty, which demarcated the frontier 
between the two states down the rivers Torneo and Muonio, and gave a detailed 
list of the status of the islands by the rivers. It described to the engineers where to 
draw the borderline exactly. Article No. 6. reassured the promise made by the 
Russian Sovereign during the war that the population of the incorporated Finland 
was allowed to keep their evangelic religion, and the Swedish laws would remain 
in operation. A number of articles regulated the technical details of the incorpora-
tion of Finland into the Russian Empire.46 Alexander I made a complacent state-
ment in his letter of 6 September 1809, written to his sister, Grand Duchess Cath-
erine: „This peace is perfect and absolutely like what I had wanted. I can not suf-
ficiently thank the Almighty for this. The cession of all of Finland up to the Tor-
neo with the Aland islands, the adherence to the continental system and closure of 
its ports to England, and finally, peace with the allies of Russia; all this is con-
cluded without intermediaries”.47 
The Treaty of Fredrikshamn did not solve the problems arising with the incor-
poration of Finland into the Russian Empire. After the peace the Russian Cabinet 
considered it important to stabilize their relationship with Sweden, and confirm 
their newly drawn borders with a new agreement.  
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This aim was served by the Russian–Swedish Convention of 8 January 1810, 
in the preparation and conclusion of which P. K. Suchtelen, a Dutch diplomat of 
Alexander I, played an important role. In fact, Suchtelen was acting as an ambas-
sador in practice in Stockholm from December 1809 to September 1811, and af-
terwards from March 1812 to April 1813. On 28 October 1809 Alexander charged 
him with a special commission that in the Swedish capital he „furnish a basis for 
a close friendship, which I wish to form between my Empire and the Swedish 
Kingdom”.48 The Tsar, in his instructions dispatched to Suchtelen to reassure the 
Swedish Government, ordered that „after transferring Finland they do not have to 
be afraid of the Empire, since Russia does not want to benefit from the weakening 
of Sweden. […] It is in my own interest to wish the best for this Kingdom”.49 As 
far as the problems around the Swedish accession were concerned, Alexander ex-
plained that he had not intended to disturb the inner peace of the country. „Every 
nation is only able to decide on their own what is more preferable for them, and 
no statesman has a right to interfere in the public affairs of another nation”50– he 
expounded his attitude. Alexander I commissioned that Suchtelen be mainly re-
sponsible for the strengthening of the friendship between the two states. Further-
more, he was to reassure the Swedish Sovereign that the main purpose of the Tsar, 
that is Sweden would live in happiness, could only be provided by this peace. 
„Promise him that I will making efforts in order that this recently signed peace 
between Us should never break up”51 – as he pointed out.  
In the spring of 1810 the French Cabinet also gave a thought of an alliance 
with Sweden. It clearly appears in the memoranda Jean-Baptiste Champagny 
made for Napoleon on 16 March 1810. The French Foreign Minister laid down 
the aims of French foreign policy, and defined the essential elements of the atti-
tude in regard to Russia. Champagny stressed that based on its economic and po-
litical interests, England is a „natural ally” of Russia, and their approach would in 
no time be inevitable. For this reason, France should turn back to its former, anti-
Russian alliance policies, and revive the system of „Eastern Barrier”, that is, there 
is no other way than an alliance with Turkey, Sweden and Poland. The French 
Cabinet was to make efforts to obtain a positive reply from the Ottoman Empire. 
They were to do their best not to bring an end to the Russian–Turkish war, start-
ing in 1806, and but also act as a mediator in peace negotiations and prevent the 
Russians from enforcing their interests. „It is important to strengthen the alliance 
with Sweden temporarily, because they could be relied on against Russia, but we 
must act carefully, not to induce the approach between Russian and France when 
                                                 
48  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Dok., 134. Instrukciia Aleksandra I inzhener-generalu P. K. Sukhtelenu, 
28 oktiabria (9 noiabria) 1809 g., 279. 
49  Ibid. 281. 
50  Ibid. 282. 
51  Ibid. 
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French troops are occupied in the Iberian Peninsula”52 – he stressed. The French 
Government, due to the France’s ambassador in St Petersburg, Armand Caulain-
court, was aware of Russian foreign purposes in regard to the Swedish Question 
as well. On 10 June 1810 Caulaincourt reported to Champagny that the Russian 
Foreign Minister, N. P. Rumiantsev let him know on a number of occasions that 
Russia had not intended to interfere in Swedish home affairs, including that of the 
designation of the heir to the throne.53 In the meantime, the diplomatic personnel 
in Paris were busy exploring the French position regarding the Swedish succes-
sion. A. I. Chernishev, the Russian representative in Paris learnt that Napoleon 
supported the designation of Marshal Bernadotte as Crown Prince and Heir to the 
throne. After negotiations with Bernadotte in Paris, on 13 July 1810 he reported to 
Rumiantsev that „Bernadotte has a good relationship towards Russia, he believes 
the Swedish Sovereign must show a friendly behaviour to make sure that His 
northern frontiers are in safety”.54 This news was reassuring for the Russian Gov-
ernment, which immediately tried to get in touch with Bernadotte, the new Heir to 
the Throne. The Russian Foreign Minister, in his letter of 21 October 1810 com-
missioned Suchtelen to assure Carl Johan (Bernadotte) that „Russia would like to 
live in a perfect harmony and peace with Sweden, its King and the Crown 
Prince”.55 The answer of Suchtelen arrived from Stockholm to St Petersburg on 
12 November 1810. „I believe that the happiness of Sweden cannot be separated 
from the conclusion of peace with Russia”56 – the ambassador interpreted the po-
sition of the Swedish Heir to the throne in this way. On 20 November 1810 the 
Swedish ambassador, Stedingk informed Charles XIII that Rumiantsev tried to 
assure him that Russia had not raised any demands towards the Swedish Kingdom 
since it had obtained Finland. Furthermore, supposing the Swedish Government 
had made much closer contacts with the Russian Cabinet than with the French, 
they would have avoided the war with England, which caused hardships in the 
Russian trade.57 
On 12 December 1810 Alexander I, in a letter to Prince Carl Johan, Heir to the 
Throne expounded his expectations to strengthen the alliance with Sweden and 
                                                 
52  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Zapiska ministra inostrannikh g’el Francii Champani Napoleonu I, 16 
marta 1810 g., 392. 
53  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Francuzskii posol v St Peterburge Kolenkur ministru inostrannikh gel 
Francii Champani, 10 iiunia 1810 g., 456. 
54  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Polkovnik A. I. Chernisev ministru inostrannikh g’el N. P. Rumiancevu, 
Paris, 13 (25) iiulia 1810. 481. 
55  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Dok., 255. Ministr inostrannikh g’el N. P. Rumiancev inzhener-generalu 
P. K. Sukhtelenu, 21 oktiabria (2 noiabria) 1810 g., 569. 
56  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Dok., 264. Inzhener-general Sukhtelen ministru inostrannikh g’el N. P. 
Rumiancevu, Stokgolm, 12 (24) noiabria 1810 g., 595. 
57  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Feldmarsal Steding Karlu XIII, St Peterburg 20 noiabria (2 giekabria) 
1810 g., 604. 
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tighten their personal friendship. „You can always rely on Me, and never surren-
der to the fear that is being tried to be planted in You in relation to Russia”58 – he 
encouraged him. In spite of all these, a year-long effective work of the Russian 
Diplomacy was needed for the realization of the Swedish alliance. Both the wors-
ening of the French–Russian relationship and Napoleon’s more and more anti-
Russian policy affected the situation. 
On 3 January 1811 Chernishev reported to Alexander I from Paris that Napo-
leon’s statements regarding Russia had not been sincere, and that he was prepar-
ing for a war against the country. As a consequence, he advised the Sovereign to 
conclude an alliance with Sweden and Austria as soon as possible, occupy the 
Grand Duchy of Warsaw in a preventive war, and proclaim himself King of Po-
land.59  
In the autumn of 1811, the work of the diplomatic representation in Stockholm 
was becoming busy. P. A. Nicolai, the Russian delegate in Stockholm managed to 
be received by Crown Prince Carl Johan. In his letter of 19 October 1811 sent to 
Rumiantsev, he reported on his negotiations with the Prince. He emphasized that 
the Heir to the Throne had made it unambiguous for him what his position in rela-
tion to Russia was. The two states were to establish closer relations in the future 
and form a union in the North.60 The Swedish Government was not in an easy 
situation. It is understandable from the report of Suchtelen, written to Alexander I 
on 13 March 1812 that Carl Johan had resisted Napoleon’s pressure several times, 
and also refused his offer to enter the war against Russia, on the French side.61 
After Sweden had lost Swedish Pomerania and French troops marched into the 
territory in January 1812, the Swedish Cabinet, being in a difficult situation, was 
resolute to make a crucial decision. At the beginning of February 1812 Count 
Karl Löwenhielm, charged with an exceptional commission, was sent to St Pe-
tersburg in order to negotiate with the Russian Cabinet to establish a protective al-
liance, as well as to obtain Russian help in order to gain Norway. 
Due to Chernishev the Russian Government was informed of the „Norwegian 
plan” of the Swedish still in December 1811. Löwenhielm arrived in the Russian 
capital on 16 February 1812, Alexander I received him on 24, and was willing to 
conclude an alliance. Engeström, the Swedish Foreign Minister, with the media-
tion of Suchtelen, forwarded the Swedish alliance-plans to St Petersburg on 17 
March 1812. According to the project, Russia had to guarantee that Sweden 
would obtain Norway in a way that Denmark would be compensated for its terri-
                                                 
58  VPR, Ser. I. t. 5. Aleksandr I svedskomu nasledniku princu Karlu Juhanu (Bernadotu), 19 
(31) giekabra 1810 g., 645. 
59  VPR, Ser. I. t. 6. Moskva, 1962. A. I. Chernisev Aleksandru I, 3 (15) 1811 g., 9. 
60  VPR, Ser. I. t. 6. Dok. 83. Poverennii v g’elah v Stokgolme P. A. Nicolai ministru 
inostrannikh g’el N. P. Rumiancevu , 19 (31) oktiabria 1811 g., 214. 
61  VPR, Ser. I. t. 6. P. K. Sukhtelen Aleksandru I, 13 (30) marta 1812 g., 312. 
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torial losses, and the Government of Denmark would be offered to enter the 
Swedish–Russian alliance. The alliance envisaged military action in Northern 
Germany, and foreshadowed England joining the alliance as well. In addition, 
Sweden offered the Russian Cabinet to be a mediator during its peace talks with 
the Turkish Government, and advised to persuade the Ottoman Empire to be their 
ally. There were intensive negotiations in both capitals, first starting in Stockholm 
on 18 March. The participants did not agree on two points at the talks in St Pe-
tersburg. The Swedish insisted that obtaining Norway should not be an honour, 
but it should be given to Sweden for their military actions in Northern Germany. 
The Russian Government, on the other hand, thought that Denmark should be 
made to stand on their side well before they enter into war with them.  
The Russian–Swedish defensive and offensive coalition was made on 24 
March 1812. The agreement was made up of 20 Articles and 4 Secret Articles. In 
the preamble the participants of the coalition set the reasons and aims of their con-
tract, namely „to strengthen their friendship and cooperation in order to provide 
the protection of their territories and the independence of the North, which are 
equally threatened by the ambition and desire for territorial expansion of France, 
and to be able to reach these two goals they make this agreement of defensive and 
offensive alliance”.62  
In the meantime, St Petersburg had arranged the situation of the Grand Duchy 
of Finland within the Russian Empire on 11 December 1811. Alexander I, in his 
decree, united the Grand Duchy of Finland with „old Finland”, namely with the 
territories that were annexed to the Russian State in the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721 
and the Treaty of Abo in 1743.63  
In the period after the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, the alliance, signed in St Pe-
tersburg on 24 March 1812, became the most significant event of Russian–
Swedish relations, which was to be completed with two further conventions, on 3 
June 1812 in Vilno,64 and on 18 August in Abo.65 Russia agreed that Norway be 
annexed to Sweden, and Sweden renounced Finland forever. 
The French–Russian alliance was not very popular in Russian circles. By the 
beginning of 1812 more and more debates arose between France and Russia re-
garding the Polish Question and the Continental System.66 These strained rela-
                                                 
62  VPR, Ser. I. t. 6. Dok., 130. Russko-svedskii soiuzni dogovor, St Peterburg, 24 marta (5 
aprelia) 1812 g., 324. 
63  Roginsky, „Istoricheskoie znacheniie fridrikhsgamskogo mira”, 77. 
64  VPR, Ser. I. t. 6. Dok., 171. Dopolnit’elnaia konvenciia k russko-svedskomu soiuznomu 
dogovoru ot 24 marta (5) aprelia) 1812 g., 428–431. 
65  VPR, Ser. I. t. 6. Dok., 230.Vtoraia dopolnit’elnaia konvenciia (sekretnaia) k russko–
svedskomu soiuznomu dogovoru ot 24 marta (5) aprelia) 1812 g., 545–556. 
66  S. M. Solov’ov, Imperator Aleksandr I, Moskva, 1995. 279–281.; Bezotosny, „Vnieshne-
politicheskii vybor Rossii”, 69. 
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tions led to war. Napoleon, with an easy victory over Alexander, wanted to force 
him to return to the conditions of the Treaty of Tilsit, but his campaign in Russia 
ended in failure. At the end of 1812 the Russian Government had the opportunity 
either to finish the war, or, continue and take part in the liberation of Europe, the 
elimination of Napoleonic power. The Russian fight against Napoleon continued 
together with Sweden, entering into the Sixth Coalition between 1813 and 1814. 
The military expedition over the frontiers brought success for Russia, its influence 
in the European affairs strengthened, its status changed in the European political 
theatre. As the strongest state in Europe, and in the world as well, Russia took on 
a missionary role and was to restore peace. Catherine II had still fought for the in-
terests of Russia, whereas Paul I and Alexander I already fought for the interests 
of Europe.67 Sweden also achieved its aim with obtaining Norway in 1814. 
In conclusion, the Swedish Question was a problem successfully managed by 
the Russian Diplomacy between 1801 and 1815. Diplomatic documents show that 
the activity of Russian foreign policy towards this region – which was important 
geopolitically and strategically – did not decrease during the Napoleonic Wars. 
Although, the last Russian–Swedish war (1808–1809) put an end to a peaceful 
cooperative period, it did not have a negative effect on Russian–Swedish relation-
ships. Both states were trying to re-establish their neighbourly relations, Napo-
leon’s policy of expansion and the growth of his European power helped the re-
alization of a Russian–Swedish rapprochement. The Treaty of Fredrikshamn, 
concluding the Finnish War, which ceded the Grand Duchy of Finland to the Rus-
sian Empire, indicated a change, which finally, by 1815 led to an alteration of the 
North-European political system, and also had an influence on Russian European 
policy. After the peace treaty, in 1810 and 1812 further agreements stabilized 
Russian–Swedish relations and the position of the Grand Duchy of Finland within 
the Empire in 1811. New nation-states appeared in the region: the Grand Duchy 
of Finland gaining autonomy and the Kingdom of Norway in personal union with 
Sweden. The changes absolutely correspond with the interests of the Russian Em-
pire in relation to North-European strategies and foreign policies. 
 
 
                                                 




Cultural Conflicts in a Border Town  
– The Question of Russian Serfdom in Vyborg  






During the Finnish War (1808–1809) the Russians tried to pacify the Finns, 
above all, by assuring that Finnish peasants would never be repressed to serf-
dom. Count and General Friedrich Wilhelm von Buxhoevden declared in 1808 
that slavery would never be extended to Finland, and affirmed this by referring 
to the county of Vyborg, where slavery did not exist even though the area had 
long belonged to Russia.2 This shows how the serfdom was one of the greatest 
fears of Finnish subjects. 
Despite the declaration serfdom was not an unknown phenomenon in Vy-
borg (Swedish Viborg, Finnish Viipuri). This Finnish border town had been a 
fortress against East since the Middle Ages. It had always been an important 
trade town and in the late eighteenth century also became an industrial centre 
and a traffic hub. The position as the capital of the county of Vyborg meant that 
government, health care, education and garrison were essential features of the 
town.3 During centuries Vyborg had been the greatest town in the eastern 
Finland and the central point of Karelia. 
Sweden lost Karelia, the region which is called “Old Finland”, to the Rus-
sian Empire after the Greater Wrath and the Treaty of Uusikaupunki (Swedish 
Nystad) in 1721. The region was re-united with the rest of Finland in 1812 and 
from then on constituted a part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. During the 18th 
century, when Old Finland belonged to Russia, the old Swedish laws were 
                                                 
1  This research has been funded by the Kone Foundation and by the project…” …Remove 
“and by the Kone Foundation” at the end of the note. 
2  Declaration 4.6.1808, Kustavi Grotenfelt, Suomenkielisiä historiallisia asiakirjoja Ruotsin 
vallan ajalta (vuosilta 1548–1809) [Historical documents during the Swedish reign in Fin-
nish], Helsinki, 1912, 305–307. I am grateful for Merja Uotila for pointing this out and for 
her comments in general. 
3  Jaakko Paavolainen, ”Väestöolot” [Demography], In: Viipurin kaupungin historia [Vy-
borg’s history] IV: 2, 1840–1917, Eds.  J. W. Ruuth & Erkki Kuujo, Helsinki, 1981, 262. 
The status as a border town is not addressed in this article as the focus is on the cultural 
aspects of serfdom. 
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maintained, but subsequent Swedish regulations were not applied in Karelia, 
which led to eventual Russianization of the legal system. At the beginning of 
19th century, the administrators strove for unifying the government in Old 
Finland with the laws and orders of the Grand Duchy.4 
Vyborg is an interesting and special research subject as a result of its multi-
cultural nature and status as a border town between the Russian Empire and 
Finland. When Old Finland was re-united with the Grand Duchy of Finland the 
national diversity was still characteristic for Vyborg. There were Russian, Ger-
man and Swedish speaking residents while the proportion of Finnish population 
was less than half of the total population.5 In Vyborg the number of Russian in-
habitants and soldiers was larger than in other areas, since it was situated near 
St. Petersburg. Consequently, the cultural impact of Russians was also con-
spicuous even though the Russian influence extended, to some degree, to other 
important towns of the Grand Duchy of Finland as well. 
In this article I will study how serfdom was manifested in Vyborg and how 
serfs were treated at the beginning of the 19th century. The main emphasis is to 
be laid on the cultural conflict of the Russian inhabitants’ attitudes towards serfs 
(Swedish lifegne, träl, Finnish maaorja) compared with the viewpoints of other 
residents of Vyborg. The research period starts from 1812, when the county of 
Vyborg was re-united with the Grand Duchy of Finland, and ends in 1839, 
when the court of appeal was founded in Vyborg. This period is in the focus of 
the study because it is characterized by cultural contrasts: administration and the 
legal system were integrated with the Grand Duchy and residents were living 
                                                 
4  See for example O. A. Kallio, Viipurin läänin järjestämisestä muun Suomen yhteyteen 
[About organizing the county of Vyborg within the rest of Finland], Helsinki, 1901; Jukka 
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Citizens and outsiders: languages and nationalities in the city of Viipuri at the beginning 
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Paskov, Joensuu, 2012, 50–52; K. O. Lindeqvist, Hämeenlinnan kaupungin historia III, 
vuosina 1809–75 [Hämeenlinna’s history], Hämeenlinna, 1930, 74–78; Sigurd Norden-
streng, Haminan kaupungin historia [Hamina’s history] II, Hamina, 1910, 413–414; 
Heikki Waris, “Helsinkiläisyhteiskunta”, In: Helsingin kaupungin historia [Helsinki’s his-
tory] III:2, Helsinki, 1950, 17–33; Räihä, Främmande, 403–40. 
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under pressure of both Russian and Western influences. From 1840s onwards, 
the mental and physical change gathered speed when Vyborg grew in size and 
the Fennomanian national movement strengthened. After this point, references 
to serfs are sparse.6 
The source material consists of documents from the local level as well as 
from the central government. The court record books and appeals reveal fric-
tions and, therefore, the cases involving disputes are the most valuable ones in 
analyzing cultural collisions and differences even if the conflicts are over-
represented and vice versa: “ordinary life” is hard to reach.7 I have researched 
the minutes of the treasurer’s court (Swedish kämnärsrätt, Finnish kämneri-
noikeus) and the magistrate’s court (Swedish magistrat, Finnish maistraatti) in 
five-year intervals.8 The treasurer’s court of Vyborg was the lower court where 
almost all disputes and crimes were processed in the beginning of the 19th cen-
tury. The magistrate’s court mainly concentrated on economic issues. The deci-
sions of the magistrate’s court and governor could be further petitioned in the 
Senate. The Economic department of the Senate received all kinds of appeals 
concerning trade, town administration and many other issues. I have also ana-
lyzed the appeals to the Senate9 throughout the period and used the population 
registers (Swedish mantalslängd, Finnish henkikirja) as complementary source 
material. The population registers of Vyborg differed from the rest of the Grand 
                                                 
6  Ruuth, Viborgs, 794; Jouko Teperi, Vanhan Suomen suomalaisuusliike. 1, Kehityspiirteitä 
ja edustajia 1830-luvulta 1850-luvun alkuun [The Fennomanian movement of the Old 
Finland. Development and representatives.], Helsinki, 1965, 17; Ulla Ijäs, Piikoja ja 
puotipuksuja. Sukupuolittunut työnjako 1820- ja 1830-lukujen Viipurissa [Maids and shop 
assistants. Gendered division of labour in Vyborg in 1820’s and 1830’s, unpublished mas-
ter’s thesis, http://tutkielmat.uta.fi/pdf/gradu02405.pdf], University of Tampere, 2008, 3, 
19. Especially Teperi characterizes the turn of the decade as a critical period. According to 
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mean that there were no serfs in Vyborg, but most likely they were registered in Russia. 
Evidently the amount of serfs anyway decreased. 
7  There are also serfs involved in debt cases but these are not studied in detail in this article. 
See for example Treasurer’s court 9.2.1830 §4, 16.3.1830 §10, 30.9.1830 §4, 28.9.1837 
§4, the archives of Vyborg’s court of appeal, the provincial archive of Mikkeli [hereafter 
PAM]. 
8  The years are 1815, 1820, 1825, 1830 and 1835. Instead of 1825, however, I have read the 
treasurer’s court records for 1826 because it is the last volume in the archives of the town 
court. The later volumes can only be studied as fair copies (Sw. renoverad, F. renovoitu) 
which were sent to the court of appeal for inspection. The differences of versions are not 
relevant in this research. 
9  I have researched all annual records of appeal (Sw. supplikdiarium, F. anomusdiaari) 
within this period and used them as an index to the extensive appeal acts. For a shorter pe-
riod I have also explored the records of letters (Sw. brevdiarium, F. kirjediaari) compris-
ing letters from the officials. 
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Duchy because the entire population was listed and records were compiled only 
from 1818 onwards.10  
The serfs have been – purposefully or purposelessly – an overlooked topic in 
Vyborg’s history. Only Ulla Ijäs has analyzed their role to some degree.11 
Hence the purpose of this paper has been to gain knowledge of serfs in general: 
what did they do in Vyborg, how were they treated and what can be found out 
about residents’ attitudes towards serfdom. Besides Ulla Ijäs’s recent study, the 
most relevant documentations and studies relating to Vyborg’s history originate 
from the 19th century and the first half of 20th century (Gabriel Lagus12 and J. 
W. Ruuth). Even though Ruuth’s studies have later been updated, the basic ap-
proaches and results have been essentially the same. In addition to historical 
facts, there exists a great variety of beliefs, opinions and myths concerning Vy-
borg and its history.  
In this research, I understand culture widely as interaction between actions 
on the one hand, and the world of ideas or values, norms and world views on the 
other hand.13 These are formed within material, social and mental context. This 
definition emphasizes the cultural conflicts caused by the different backgrounds 
of the inhabitants in Vyborg. In Russia the population was numerically domi-
nated by the peasant masses and hence the foundation and identity of the (popu-
lar) culture found its sharpest expression in the patriarchal family and the rural 
commune. Peasants and society’s moral sore point, serfdom, were central issues 
for upper-class culture as well.14 Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that serf-
dom was in the cultural focal point in Vyborg. The concept of multiculturalism 
                                                 
10  For further details of Vyborg’s population registers see Ijäs, Piikoja, 5–6, 20. 
11  Ijäs, Piikoja, especially 93–95. 
12  Gabriel Lagus, Kuvauksia Wiipurin historiasta: muistokirja 1 [Descriptions of Vyborg’s 
history, remembrance book], Wiipuri, 1893; Gabriel Lagus, Kuvauksia Wiipurin historia-
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and linguistic circumstances during the Swedish period, Vyborg’s families], Wiipuri, 1895. 
13  This definition of culture is close to Peter Burke’s. See Peter Burke, Popular Culture in 
Early Modern Europe. Revised reprint, Aldershot 1994, xxiii; see also Piia Einonen, Po-
liittiset areenat ja toimintatavat. 
 Tukholman porvaristo vallan käyttäjänä ja vallankäytön kohteena n. 1592–1644 [Political 
Arenas and Modes of Action 
 The Burghers of Stockholm as Subjects and Objects in Exercise of Power, ca. 1592–
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14  Mark D. Steinberg & Stephen P. Frank, “Introduction,” In: Cultures in Flux: Lower-Class 
Values, Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia, Eds. Stephen P. Frank & Mark 
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on the other hand refers to the variety of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups 
living in Vyborg.  
The beginning of the 19th century witnessed a wider criticism towards serf-
dom in Russia because of the ineffectiv and inhuman nature of the system, but, 
despite this critique, serfdom continued in Russia until 1861.15 
 
 
Serfdom in Karelia 
 
Economically, socially and culturally the most significant difference between 
Russian and Swedish (or “Finnish”) society at the beginning of the 19th century 
was serfdom. In Russia the entire peasantry was bound to the state, church, 
crown or nobility, but in Sweden and Finland the peasants and workers both in 
town and in countryside had traditionally been free although their life was regu-
lated by a number of laws and by the order of compulsory service (Swedish 
tjänstetvång, Finnish palvelupakko).16 In comparison to serfs they were never-
theless paid and free to change place in between contracts. 
Karelia had always been rural by nature and the urban population was 
scarce: only about four percent of the total population in the area lived in an ur-
ban environment in 1815, while in the middle of the century this figure rose to 
six percent.17 Thus, the question of serfdom in Karelia has been mainly re-
searched as related to the fiefdom system. The nature of fiefdom had been inter-
preted sometimes as serfdom, but the latest research suggests that peasants’ 
status and burden in the Karelian donations diverged significantly from the 
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17  Yrjö Kaukiainen, ”Kauppamiesten Karjala” [The Karelia of tradesmen], In: Karjala. His-
toria, kansa, kulttuuri [Karelia. History, people, culture], Eds. Pekka Nevalainen & Han-
nes Sihvo, Helsinki, 1998, 148; compare with Russia (Kimerling Wirtschafter, Russia’s, 
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situation of Russian serfs and their workload was considerably lighter. Even if 
the status of the fiefdom peasants was open to various interpretations the peas-
ants regarded themselves as peasants of the Crown (Swedish skattebonde, Fin-
nish kruununtalonpoika). Office holders, on the other hand, considered that only 
the taxes but no property rights were donated to fief-owners who themselves 
looked upon their donations as eternal and hereditary “vottšina”.18 Therefore, 
different groups construed the situation based on their own cultural background. 
Serfs were also transported to the deserted Karelian villages from other parts of 
Russia19, which made the situation even more complicated. 
In Vyborg serfs were servants and lodgers.20 After the Treaty of Uusikau-
punki in 1721 plenty of Russians moved to Vyborg accompanied by their serfs. 
In the middle of the 18th century there was an intensified period of russification 
in Vyborg during which the immigration of Russian serfs was also promoted. 
Also some of the original families of the town gradually became serf-owners 
and they treated their serfs similarly to the Russians: serfs were considered to be 
property who could be sold and deposited as pawns, and also punished severely. 
Sometimes serfs were also released and, in the late 18th century, liberated serfs 
could even gain a status of a burgher. In 1812 there were altogether 106 serfs in 
Vyborg while, at the same time, the total population was at the minimum circa 
2,900 inhabitants.21 
                                                 
18  Kallio, Viipurin, 5–10, 17–18, 149–169, 257–268; Jyrki Paaskoski, Vanhan Suomen lah-
joitusmaat 1710–1826 [Noble Land-Holding and Serfdom in ’Old Finland’], Helsinki, 
1997, 118, 135–139 (Bibliotheca Historica 24); Partanen, Isän, 37, 51–53, 86–87; com-
pare with Hannes Sihvo (“Karjalainen kulttuuri ja kulttuuri Karjalassa,” [Karelian culture 
and culture in Karelia] In:  Nevalainen & Sihvo, Karjala, 450) who sees that the fiefdom 
system led Karelia nearly to serfdom. See also Teperi, Vanhan, 39–40. 
19  Kaukiainen, Kauppamiesten, 151–152. 
20  Compare with Russia, where there were similar groups of serfs as well (Daniel Field, The 
End of Serfdom. Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855–1861, Cambridge & London, 
1976, 44; Kimerling Wirtschafter, Russia’s, 97; Dennison, Institutions, 60–61, 80–81, 
156–169, 178–179, 230–231). Not all the serfs belonged to the households and especially 
outside city centre there were also serfs living as lodgers. Serf (trälinnan) Lisa Inos was 
even listed as an owner of a real estate and she had lodgers of her own (Population register 
1818, The Digital Archives, http://digi.narc.fi/digi/, The National Archives). Compare 
with the situation in Helsinki, where serfs and emancipated serfs were mainly soldiers 
(Eirik Hornborg, ”Sotaväki ja sotatapahtumat,” [Military and events of war] In: Helsingin 
kaupungin historia III:1, Ajanjakso 1809–1875 [Helsinki’s history], Helsinki, 1950, 222, 
224–225). 
21  Ruuth, Viborgs, 802–803; J. W. Ruuth & Erkki Kuujo, Viipurin kaupungin historia III, 
vuodet 1710–1812 [Vyborg’s history]; Helsinki, 1975, 25, 51, see also 64; compare the 
number of inhabitants with Ijäs (Piikoja, 20). She suggests that the amounts presented in 
the Vyborg’s history are not consistent with the population registers. She also claims that 
there were serfs in the population registers only in 1820, but serfs were listed also 1818. 
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Owning serfs became an issue as Vyborg was re-attached to the Grand 
Duchy of Finland and Swedish laws were emphasized. In his re-union manifest, 
the emperor restricted the nobility’s rights over serfs living in Finland and also 
proclaimed that all inhabitants of the province of Vyborg were to be governed 
according to the Finnish laws. Besides peasants there were plenty of maids, 
hands and self-employed serfs to whom the manifests did not apply. They re-
mained serfs unless they applied for emancipation. In the beginning only a few 
serf families were emancipated but in 1822 and in 1825 dozens of families were 
liberated. In 1826 it was ordained that all the serfs who could prove legally to 
have been registered in the province of Vyborg at the time of the re-union were 
entitled to apply for emancipation, but other serfs did not have such right. Nor 
could the serfs moving from Russia to Finland be registered.  Next year it was 
also prohibited to turn serfs over to Finnish citizens.22 
Nevertheless the upper class Russian households, especially military fami-
lies, kept on having serfs in Vyborg after the re-union.23 In the beginning of the 
19th century, for example, Colonel Axel von Müller had two serfs with their 
families in his household and even one of the “Russian” magistrates of Vyborg, 
Peter Kovaleff, had a serf. But, as previously suggested, owning serfs was 
adapted by non-Russian inhabitants: Civil Counselor (Swedish statsråd) Nils 
Jaenisch24 had two serf families and Titular Counsilor (Swedish titulärråd) Pet-
ter Sutthoff also had serfs. They were both of German origin.25 This shows the 
cultural impact of the Russian regime. 
 
                                                                                                                       
(Ijäs, Piikoja, 94; compare with Sigurd Nordenstreng, Haminan kaupungin historia 
[Hamina’s history] III. Suom. Santeri Ivalo, Hamina, 1912, 644). 
22  Kallio, Viipurin, 18, 102, 266–267. An example of emancipation certificate, see magis-
trates court 27.3.1830 §4, 5.4.1830 §2, 13.9.1830 §6, PAM. The freedom was given to serf 
with his wife, four children and their future inheritors. It was also stated that the serf him-
self had wanted a status under compulsory service. The emancipation had happened four 
years earlier and after that the serf had worked as a hired man for three years and at the 
moment he had applied for a status as a burgher in Vyborg. 
23  Ijäs, Piikoja, 94. 
24  About Jaenisch family see Georg Haggrén, “Jaenisch (1700–1900)“ (The National Biog-
raphy of Finland, http://www.kansallisbiografia.fi/english/). 
25  Treasurer’s court 3./15.11.1815 §1, 11./23.11.1815 §1–§2, PAM; population register 1818; 
Ruuth, Viborgs, 794–795; Ruuth & Kuujo, Viipurin III, 53. Compare with the serfs acting 
as shop-assistants of non-Russian merchants in Hamina (Nordenstreng, Haminan II, 445, 
note 1). Double dates were used in documents because in Russia the Julian calendar was 
in use till 1918 whereas in the Great Duchy of Finland the Gregorian calendar was used. 
In the 19th century the difference between the two calendars was 12 days. In the popula-
tion register 1818 there are no serfs mentioned in the Kovaleff’s household. 
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Serfs in Vyborg: Status and Occupation 
 
When the magistrate’s court of Vyborg decided to grant rights for retail trade 
and burgher rights to bookkeeper Henric Niclas Heitman, mostly Russian mer-
chants complained about the decision and criticized him for being a foreigner. 
In his answer Heitman cast doubts on his opponents’ ability to understand trade 
or the language used in the documents. He pointed out – condescendingly – that 
ignorance was common amongst people who had spent their lives under bur-
densome serfdom.26 Heitman’s insulting reference to serfdom revealed his atti-
tude towards Russians and it is most likely that many other inhabitants of Vy-
borg shared this view. It is also obvious that besides nationality and language 
one of the most distinctive cultural features of Russians was serfdom. This also 
suggests that owning and treating serfs was obtrusive for non-Russian residents 
and the conditions serfs lived in were dubious. 
The Russian population shared a long-term tradition in which serfdom 
played an essential role economically, socially and culturally. The Russian iden-
tity was built on this collective experience, but in the 19th century Vyborg serf-
dom only separated the Russian nationality from others. The Russian nationality 
of Vyborg seemed to be a closed and, to some degree, even isolated group. 
Their social life was restricted by their inability to use other languages besides 
Russian.27 Therefore they were eager to employ artisans of their own national-
ity, which also included employing skillful serfs. In 1822 an emancipated serf, 
Vasilei Schversnikoff, was given burgher rights as a tailor. The tailor guild 
criticized this, but the majority of Russian burghers had wished for his appoint-
ment for tailor master. Schversnikoff had served for 20 years in the manor of 
Monrepos near Vyborg and his master, Baron Ludwig Heinrich von Nicolay, 
had died 1820. Schversnikoff was emancipated when Baron Nicolay died, but 
                                                 
26  Appeal acts Eb: 258, AD 277/179 1823, Economic department of the Senate [hereafter 
ED], National Archives [hereafter NA]. See Einonen, Citizens, 57–59, for more details of 
Heitman’s case. See also Ruuth & Kuujo, Viipurin III, 131 about admission of foreigners 
as burghers. Emancipated serfs were often acting as bookkeepers. This was prohibited in 
1817, but serfs could continue working if they were emancipated or given burgher rights, 
Nordenstreng, Haminan II, 413–414, 436; Ruuth & Kuujo, Viipurin III, 128; J. W. Ruuth 
& Erkki Kuujo, Viipurin kaupungin historia [Vyborg’s history] IV: 1, 1812–1840, Hel-
sinki, 1981, 61; Ijäs, Piikoja, 27. 
27  Dennison, Institutional, 1–5, 91; Einonen, Citizens, 54–55, 59–60, 62; see also Ijäs, 
Piikoja, 39. Compare with the situation in Hamina and Helsinki: Nordenstreng, Haminan 
II, 436–437; Waris, Helsinkiläisyhteiskunta, 28–29 and to Congress Poland’s Warsaw, 
where the Russian population formed a closed colony. Their interaction with the local in-
habitants was characterized by mutual contempt. Stephen D. Corrsin, “Warsaw. Poles and 
Jews in a Conquered City,” In: The City in Late Imperial Russia, Ed. Michael Hamm, 
Bloomington, 1986, 131. 
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he was still occasionally called a serf in the court record books. The artisans 
working in Monrepos were highly appreciated and it is understandable that the 
members of the guild felt their position threatened.28 Even if the tailor guild 
criticized explicitly Vasilei Schversnikoff’s training as a tailor, probably also 
his status as a former serf was an issue. 
There were other emancipated serfs working as professional craftsmen in 
Vyborg. However, as the complaints show, at least some of these burgher rights 
were disputed. All in all, gaining right to exercise handicraft or trade was still at 
that point a process which often included a number of contradictory interests.29 
It was also a process in which all aspects were considered: besides the appli-
cant’s professional skills and training his reputation and nationality were 
weighed as well as the need for artisans and tradesmen. When a former serf, 
Anisia Alexandroff, was given burgher rights as a painter master 1824, the deci-
sion was criticized by another master. Nonetheless, the burghers of Vyborg 
stood up for him, because Alexandroff  had been living and practicing his pro-
fession in town for a long time and there was also plenty of work to do. Some of 
the most prominent merchants had even given him a recommendation praising 
his nature and skills.30 So, if a former serf had integrated himself into the com-
munity and could act economically and professionally as a town-dweller with 
full rights, his status as an emancipated serf was not a problem. 
In his statement, Anisia Alexandroff accused his opponent of striving for a 
monopoly while he also purposefully attacked his opponent’s foreign origin, at 
the same time emphasizing his own Russian nationality. In comparison to his 
critic, he identified himself as a Russian by birth and as a loyal Russian subject. 
Alexandroff also accentuated working for the benefit of the fatherland.31 This 
national pathos indicates that he had an identity of a citizen (Swedish medbor-
gare) – as he became a citizen after his emancipation – and of a burgher. Possi-
bly his long career as a respected craftsman had released him from the burden of 
serfdom. Alexandroff’s arrogant behavior could be interpreted as a reflection of 
xenophobia and chauvinism, which were not uncommon amongst Russians32. 
Handicraft was regulated and controlled in the first decades of the 19th cen-
tury but in Vyborg the Russian and Western practices collided from time to 
                                                 
28  Appeal acts Eb: 249, AD 32/149 1823, ED, NA; Rainer Knapas, “Nicolay, Ludwig Hein-
rich von”, The National Biography of Finland. For more details about this case see Ei-
nonen, Citizens, 59–61. About identification and titles compare with Räihä, Främmande, 
402–403. 
29  See further in Einonen, Citizens, 55–61. About emancipated serfs as burghers in other 
towns see for example Lindeqvist, Hämeenlinnan, 76. 
30  Appeal acts Eb: 282, AD 351/56 1824, ED, NA. 
31  Appeal acts Eb: 282, AD 351/56 1824, ED, NA. 
32  Corrsin, Warsaw, 131; Katriona Kelly, “Popular culture,” In: Cambridge, 126, 130. 
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time. Peter the Great had founded the Russian guild system in the 1720’s, but in 
Russia the guilds were open for foreigners, soldiers and peasants making them 
open in comparison to their Swedish and other western counterparts. Craft, 
training or quality control were not privileged for the guilds and the town order 
of 1785 allowed everybody to earn their living by handicraft if they used no 
helping hands. As the Finnish Ruling Senate had confirmed this order 1804, it 
was considered valid also after 1812. By contrast, Vyborg’s magistrate’s court 
and guilds had been throughout the Russian period trying to preserve the Swed-
ish guild system and applying the Swedish guild regulation of 1720.33 
Due to the contradictory regulations and practices, interpretations of legiti-
mate handicraft varied. Sometimes serfs tried to earn their livelihood by work-
ing as artisans, like Philipoff in 1822. Shoemaker masters had complained to the 
magistrate’s court that Philipoff had been acting as a shoemaker together with 
his sons. He defended himself to have manufactured slippers for merchants to 
sell and claimed that burgomaster had given him permission for crafts in order 
to earn a livelihood for him, for the widow who owned him and for the whole 
family: his parents, two underage brothers, children and wife. If he could not 
work they all would be begging for their bread. Furthermore he had made slip-
pers for municipal magistrate Ivanoffskoij’s shop.34 This shows clearly the 
problems typical for Vyborg. The administrators could follow the old customs 
they were acquainted with and ignore legal orders. On the other hand, the flexi-
bility in interpreting orders created possibilities to act practically. Philipoff‘s 
case shows that magistrates apparently thought that it was better and cheaper to 






                                                 
33  Ruuth & Kuujo, Viipurin III, 153; Ijäs, Piikoja, 41. 
34  Ijäs, Piikoja, 42–43. Philipoff was fined for illegal handicraft. When carpenter master 
Björklund found in 1830 serf Ipatoff working in a building site he immediately confis-
cated his tools and sued him for illegal handicraft. Ipatoff defended himself that the gov-
ernment secretary Alfthan had hired him to finish some details in his new building. 
Alfthan confirmed that he had hired four “peasants” and criticized Björklund’s slowness 
in his work. He said that it would have taken years if Björklund had been hired to do the 
job, magistrate’s court 11.1.1830 §4, PAM. 
35  Ijäs, Piikoja, 43. There were similar cases for example in Hämeenlinna, see Lindeqvist, 
Hämeenlinnan, 119–120. Likewise, the serfs were for instance given permissions to sell 
pictures of saints. Some also applied for license to sell religious books in Russian but as 
the selling of books was privileged for bookbinders the magistrate’s court refused this, 
magistrate’s court 11.2.1837 §4, 12.6.1837 §2, PAM. 
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Marrying a serf 
 
Serfs acted as maids and hands, but since they were the property of their mas-
ters their lives were strictly regulated as compared with their free counterparts. 
In general, the most essential feature of serfdom was the owner’s power to re-
strict serf’s right of moving and marrying.36 When serfs wanted to get married it 
was a complicated issue and such cases were processed in the treasurer’s court 
of Vyborg. In 1820, Johan Oppi, a soldier wanted to marry Colonel Axel von 
Müller’s serf maid, Catharina Johansdotter, and Oppi sued the reluctant colonel 
at court. Oppi and the maid had had a child together, but the child had already 
died. The case concerning a serf could not be decided in the treasurer’s court and 
the members of the court had written for guidance to the governor, who on his part 
turned to the governor-general of Finland, Fabian Steinheil for advice. Obviously, 
the treasurer’s court and the governor were aiming to grant a marriage license, but, 
since von Müller and Colonel de Gervais did not approve of the marriage, the cou-
ple was not granted the license, but received a fine for illegal intercourse instead.37 
It is noteworthy that von Müller and de Gervais did not need to give any jus-
tification for denying the marriage as Catharina Johansdotter was probably de 
Gervais’s property and only working in the household of von Müller. The serf 
owners had also right to separate serf couples or families from each other if they 
wanted to.38 
In 1815, a soldier, Henrik Koppinen had sued magistrate Peter Kovaleff in a 
similar case. Koppinen had had a child together with Kovaleff’s serf maid, 
Maria Petrova. The child had died, similarly to the other four illegitimate chil-
dren to whom Petrova had given birth earlier, but nevertheless Koppinen 
wanted to marry the maid. Kovaleff did not consent to their request of emanci-
pation. Maria Petrova had been sold for the first time 26 years earlier, when she 
was only ten years old, to “an unknown nobleman”. Five years earlier she had 
been sent to Kovaleff as a pawn. According to Russian practice, Kovaleff 
claimed that Koppinen needed to pay for her emancipation and then they could 
                                                 
36  Field, End, 14, 45; Steven L. Hoch, Serfdom and Social Control in Russia. Petrovskoe, a 
Village in Tambov, Chicago and London, 1986, 103; Paaskoski, Vanhan, 168–169; Ijäs, 
Piikoja, 94–95; Dennison, Institutions, 42, 87–90, 223; see also Boris N. Mironov, “Con-
sequences of the price revolution in eighteenth-century Russia”, The Economic History 
Review 45 (1992) 473; T. K. Dennison & Sheilagh Ogilvie, “Serfdom and social capital in 
Bohemia and Russia”, Economic History Review 60 (2007) 518, 521, 534–535. 
37  See for example treasurer’s court 19.4.1820 §1, 20.4.1820 §1, PAM. In the fiefs, the dona-
tion holders tried to pressure their serfs to marry as early as possible as new workers were 
needed. About this and illegal sexual relationships in the Karelian isthmus see Partanen, 
Isän, 61–65, 75. 
38  Field, End, 44–45; Dennison & Ogilvie, Serfdom, 534–535; Ijäs, Piikoja, 95. 
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get married. Kovaleff also complained about all costs which were caused by 
maid’s time in childbed and child’s christening. It could be documented that 
Kovaleff did not own Petrova so Koppinen and his bride were guided to seek 
for emancipation from her real owners in St. Petersburg. They were also to be 
punished for their illegitimate sexual relationship.39 
Kovaleff’s demand for compensation was understandable in the context of 
Russian serfdom, in which a female serf who got married and moved away from 
a fief was obliged to compensate for her master for the lost property and la-
bour.40 Henrik Koppinen answered to Kovaleff that in the Great Duchy of 
Finland everybody was free according to the imperial orders, and hence no-one 
could claim for compensation for a maid’s freedom.41 The cultural difference is 
striking as the Russian merchant was acting according to his comprehension of 
serfdom and power relations whereas to a Finnish soldier freedom was a basic 
right belonging to everybody, also in Vyborg. 
 
 
Serfs as Property 
 
In January 1820, a young burgher, Ivan Alexejeff Golovanoff, was charged in 
the treasurer’s court of Vyborg with sending his serf to St. Petersburg against 
her will. On Sunday 28 June 1818, Golovanoff had without a proper reason 
bound his maid, sent her away with a peasant and kept her belongings. 
Golovanoff had prepared this action carefully: he had obtained a certificate in 
Russian for the peasant to prove that he was legally transporting the serf. When 
customs officer Olof Söderström had stopped the peasant he found Maria 
Ivanova lightly dressed wearing only a headgear, a vest and a shabby skirt. She 
was in a bad shape and had burst into tears when Söderström had asked her 
something. When the peasant was asked for his destination he had presented 
some kind of a freight certificate in Russian which confirmed that he was trans-
porting Ivanova to St. Petersburg to some unidentified person. There she was to 
be sent to the penitentiary because she had been disobedient slave (Swedish 
slaf) or escaped from her household – it was left for the owner to decide which 
argument to use. Söderström testified to have followed his instructions: he 
                                                 
39  See for example treasurer’s court 3./15.11.1815 §1, 11./23.11.1815 §1–§2, PAM. 
40  Paaskoski, Vanhan, 168–169; Tracy Dennison, The institutional framework of Russian 
serfdom. Cambridge, UK/New York, 2011., 57, 74; see also Field, End, 14; Hoch, Serf-
dom, 99–102, 104–106. About demanding compensation for emancipated serfs see also 
appeal acts Eb: 331, AD 432/141 1826, ED, NA. In the Grand Duchy of Finland the 
emancipated male serfs compensated for their masters but later the owners were paid by 
recruits or saleable recruit receipts, see Kallio, Viipurin, 267. 
41  Treasurer’s court 3./15.11.1815 §1, PAM. 
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stopped the peasant and sent him with Maria Ivanova to the governor so that it 
could be legally determined whether she had acted illegally during her service. 
Golovanoff was imprisoned for some time by the treasurer’s court, but he was 
later released by the town court to wait for his court hearing.42 
The crime was characterized as violating peace of vow43 and the case raised 
emotions especially amongst non-Russian residents. Customs officer Olof 
Söderström had evidently been upset by the incident. He considered transport-
ing a maid to be against the law of “New Finland” because there was no slavery 
in Finland.44 All in all, Söderström’s attitude towards serfdom was strictly con-
demning. In his statement he referred to the Grand Duchy of Finland as well as 
Vyborg in comparison to Russian regions and emphasized the “Finnish” laws. This 
view was probably shared by many other non-Russian residents. 
Golovanoff was a second-generation immigrant in Vyborg. In 1818, he was 
only 26 years old and lived in the largest suburb of Viipuri, namely St. Petersburg, 
with his 20 years old wife and their three children. His serf, Maria Ivanova, was 25 
years and they also had a hired man, but, according to the population register, he 
was a free man.45 Golovanoff was not the legal owner of Maria Ivanova even if she 
had been working in his household – and even if he acted as one, when he tied her 
up and sent her to St. Petersburg in the load of a peasant. In 1817, it was prohibited 
to have serfs working in the shops and the order was implemented in Vyborg at 
the beginning of 1818, when many serfs were emancipated or sent back to Rus-
sia.46 Presumably this was also the reason why he tried to smuggle the maid 
                                                 
42  Treasurer’s court 20.1.1820 §2, PAM. About the further proceedings in the treasurer’s 
court see 28.1.1820 §3, 5.2.1820 §1, 12.2.1820 §2, 17.4.1820 §4 and 15.5.1820 §4. The 
case was handled in the court of appeal in Turku 1.12.1819, but it was sent back to Vy-
borg for further investigation because the court of appeal considered it not to be satisfacto-
rily investigated. After the first hearings the treasurer’s court tried unsuccessfully for 
months to reach some of the litigants and sometimes even Golovanoff himself was absent. 
The court proceedings ended in May 1820 and it is unknown whether the case was further 
processed in the court of appeal. The case was not brought up in the town court, see the 
archives of the town court C I: 12 Cb, C IVa: 2 Ca, PAM. Compare with Ijäs, Piikoja, 95. 
43 There was no special paragraph criminalizing this kind of action, see the law of 1734, 
http://agricola.utu.fi/hist/kktk/lait/1734/. 
44  Russian butchers’ right to use serfs in their shops, even if the statute of 1817 prohibited using 
serfs in bourgeois trade, was discussed in 1822. Burghers of Vyborg stated that they had noth-
ing against the butcher, but serfdom was a problem because it did not exist in Finland, see ap-
peal acts Eb: 230, AD 113/148 1822, ED, NA; decision deposit copy Da:13, 25.10.1822, ED, 
NA. Compare with the situation in Helsinki, Waris, Helsinkiläisyhteiskunta, 27. 
45  Population register 1818. 
46  Ruuth, Viborgs, 802; Ruuth & Kuujo, Viipurin IV:1, 61; Ijäs, Piikoja, 94. Golovanoff said 
that Ivanova had had a passport written by Miss Maria Prokorovna Pirskoi and that he 
promised to try to find it, but it was however not presented in the court session. Pro-
korovna Pirskoi was said to be the original owner of Maria Ivanova. 
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away. Serfs were property and they could be treated as such.47 It is nevertheless 
impossible to know whether the serfs in Vyborg were owned by their masters or 
if they were legitimate migrant serfs working with passports.48 
Using serfs as maids and workers in a household was profitable as they did 
not need to be paid and they could be treated as the owner wished. According to 
some of the most drastic cases, they did not need to be fed and could be easily 
moved to other areas where labour was needed. Owners were also entitled to get 
all kinds of services from their female serfs. Clearly in Vyborg the non-Russian 
pressure towards serf owners was restricting their behaviour, thus one serf 
owner was witnessed in a court room to have said that in St. Petersburg he could 
whip his serfs as often as he wanted.49 Apparently these were extreme examples 
and mostly serfs lived and worked in the same way as servants in general did. 
 
 
In the Margins of Society 
 
Many serfs lived in the margins of the organized town society. Although there 
are only a few cases in which serfs committed crimes50, obviously there were a 
plenty of serfs who were staying in Vyborg illegally without necessary docu-
ments. One burgher was charged for hiring a runaway serf maid51 and in 1837 a 
widow, Domna Protopoff was accused of lodging a runaway male serf for 14 
days in her shed. She shuffled off responsibility and answered that her son was 
the master in the household. According to burgher Vasili Protopopoff, the serf 
had only worked for him for a day, but was not lodged. Altogether, the problem 
was that the serf was in Vyborg illegally and had no passport, so he could not be 
identified and his background could not be verified either. Protopopoff ex-
plained to the treasurer’s court that it had not occurred to him to ask for a pass-
port. Nevertheless he was fined.52 Everybody living in a town knew the impor-
                                                 
47  Ruuth & Kuujo, Viipurin III, 51; Field, End, 14.  
48  Dennison, Institutions, 173–176. 
49  Field, End, 14; Ijäs, Piikoja, 94–95; about wages of serfs see for example Ogilvie, Eco-
nomic, 436–438; Dennison, Institutions, 173, 177. 
50  Treasurer’s court 13.9.1820 §2, 19.9.1820 §1, 23.9.1820 §4, 25.9.1820 §4, PAM about a theft 
and town court and 19.7.1830 §2, PAM about using a falsified passport. In 1830, an emanci-
pated serf complained about his wife who was misusing alcohol and fornicating especially with 
Russian soldiers lodged in Vyborg and therefore dishonouring herself as well as her family. 
They were granted a divorce and she was fined for adultery, treasurer’s court 8.7.1830 §4, PAM. 
51  Treasurer’s court 16.3.1826 §5, PAM. 
52  Treasurer’s court 19.5.1837 §4, 26.5.1837 §2, 1.6.1837 §1, 6.6.1837 §3, 17.8.1837 §2. PAM. 
About controlling passports see Kallio, Viipurin, 226–227; about passports and illegal lodging 
in St. Petersburg see Max Engman, Dagligt liv i S:t Petersburg. Bland kejsarens finländska un-
dersåtar [Daily life in St. Petersburg. Among the Finnish subjects of the Emperor], Helsing-
fors & Stockholm, 2003, 181–186; see also Dennison, Institutions, 158, 168, 176, 214. 
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tance of a passport, therefore, it was useless to appeal to this argument in the court 
room. Regardless, these cases suggest that Old Finland and especially Vyborg 
were attractive alternatives to serfs who for some reason had no passport. There 
was work to do and evidently the burghers and officials did not control the offi-
cial documents with such eagerness as they presumably should have done.53 
In 1826, the town prosecutor, (Swedish stadsfiskal, Finnish kaupunginvis-
kaali) Krogerus was ordered by the magistrate’s court to charge five Russian 
merchants with lodging serfs without passports. The governor had ordered in his 
recent circular that such deed should be punished by fines. The defendants 
claimed that their serfs had had passports but they had expired and it was im-
possible to get new ones. One problem was the distance between Vyborg and 
the serfs’ home area. The treasurer’s court decided not to get involved in this case 
and shoved it to the police force.54 Without passports serfs were nonetheless out-
side the organized town society and their legal status was even worse compared to 
serfs with relevant documents. When three brothers, all of them emancipated serfs, 
applied for a job as town’s worker they were rejected because they did not have 
extracts from the church register or certificate of emancipation and the magistrate’s 
court did not know them.55 Employment could have been a chance to secure a 
status in a town community but this was denied to them. 
Even a status as a registered taxpayer in Vyborg was a desired position for 
an emancipated serf. If a serf could provide evidence of his emancipation and 
also prove that he was a legitimate child, a good Christian and a trustworthy 
worker, he could be registered.56 This allowed a legal status in town including 
poor relief and could open new possibilities for social progress.57 
 
 
Serfdom in Vyborg at the Beginning of the 19th century 
 
In Finland, serfdom was seen as an unfamiliar system with dubious and fright-
ening reputation. The annexation of the Old Finland into Russia 1721 meant 
that serfdom was exceeded to Finland in the form of fiefdom system and by mi-
grating Russian households with serf servants. Keeping serfs was a way of 
manifesting power and emphasizing Russians’ status as representatives of the 
                                                 
53  Compare with Russian moving labour: Waris, Helsinkiläisyhteiskunta, 111; Nordenstreng, 
Haminan II, 445. 
54  Treasurer’s court 8.12.1826 §2, PAM. It is not mentioned that the defendants were Rus-
sian, but their names were Russian and thus I have interpreted them to be Russian. 
55  Magistrates court 14.8.1830 §1, PAM. 
56  Magistrate’s court 5.5.1830 §2, PAM; about legal conditions see Kallio, Viipurin, 266–267. 
57  See Gösta Lext, Mantalsskrivningen i Sverige före 1860 [Registration of population in 
Sweden before 1860], Göteborg, 1979, 185–195. 
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conquering empire. At the same time Russian customs and conventions infil-
trated Vyborg through serfdom.  
Although serfdom was primarily a Russian phenomenon, some families of 
German origin also had serfs in Vyborg. A special kind of serfdom appears to 
have existed in Vyborg as there were both emancipated serfs and those working 
within households. Obviously serfs were a labour resource which could be util-
ized as needed but they mainly seem to have been working permanently as maids 
and hands. On the one hand, the rights of serfs were restricted, for instance, when 
soldiers wanted to marry serf maids, but, on the other hand, emancipated serfs 
could integrate into the society as craftsmen or merchants if they had experience 
and proper training and their behavior was blameless. In Vyborg serfs had possi-
bilities for social progress, but they could also hide themselves if needed. 
Even though Vyborg had been under the Russian regime already for ap-
proximately a hundred years by the beginning of the 19th century, serfdom was 
seen among non-Russian residents as a peculiar and even abhorrent feature of 
Russian society and culture. It seems that, although the laws were basically the 
same, the re-union with the Grand Duchy re-enforced Vyborg’s status as Fin-
nish town, emphasized the return to western norms, and created a space for 
criticizing practices of serfdom and thus cultural collisions. The inhabitants of 
Vyborg had had to tolerate serfdom for decades but in the first half of the 19th 
century they were able to raise objections against it. Even a humble soldier em-
phasized the freedom of people and contested a Russian magistrate defending 
















In between and within Great Powers  
– The Comparison of Hungary and the British Colonies  
in North America in the 18th century1 
 
 
In this paper I intend to compare the 18th  –century historical development of Hun-
gary within the Habsburg Empire on the one hand, and the mainland British colo-
nies in North America within the British Empire on the other. In order to be able 
to compare the historical development of Hungary and the British colonies in 
mainland North America, first I must give a very brief summary of 18th –century 
Hungarian history, then I can point out some interesting similarities in the devel-
opments of the two territories. 
 
Hungary in the 18th –century Habsburg Empire2 
 
Due to the Turkish occupation of its capital Buda in 1541, the medieval Kingdom 
of Hungary collapsed under the pressure of the armed forces of the Turks, and the 
territory of the country became a theatre of war in the struggle between two great 
powers, the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. As a result the country became 
divided into three parts: 
1. The Kingdom of Hungary, under the rule of the Habsburg dynasty in the 
northern and western parts of the country. 
2. The Principality of Transylvania in the eastern parts, which was officially 
under the authority of the Turks but was, in reality, relatively independent 
under the rule of Hungarian princes. 
3. The central and southern regions belonging to the Ottoman Empire. 
 
The Habsburg kings of the Kingdom of Hungary tried to rule the country as abso-
lute monarchs without the three Hungarian estates (Catholic clergy, nobility, in-
                                                            
1  This essay is a significantly modified and improved version of the study I published in 
2008 under the title “Within Two Imperial Systems: Hungary and the British Colonies in 
North America Compared in the Writings of Gergely Berzeviczy (1763–1822)”. In 
Europe and its Empires Eds. Mary N. Harris and Csaba Lévai (Edizioni Plus, Pisa Uni-
versity Press, Pisa, 2008.) 31–45.  
2  In my survey of 18th century Hungarian history I extensively used László Kontler’s work: 
L. Kontler, Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary, Budapest, 1999. 
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habitants of the so-called royal free cities) during the 16–17th centuries. These ef-
forts proved to be unsuccessful because of the fact that, by the aid of the Ottoman 
Empire, the confederacy of the estates of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Hun-
garian princes of Transylvania could counterbalance the pressure of the Habs-
burgs. As a result, the Kingdom of Hungary could remain an autonomous part of 
the Habsburg Empire with its own legislative body, and governed by the nobility, 
which dominated the Diet, as well as the county assemblies.3  
This situation changed radically at the end of the 17th century when the Otto-
man Turks were forced to withdraw from the central regions of Hungary with the 
crucial aid of the Habsburg army. The Habsburgs also invaded Transylvania and 
they integrated it into their empire as a separated province from Hungary. Due to 
this fundamental change in the balance of power the Hungarian estates could no 
longer rely on the support of the Turks and the princes of Transylvania against the 
absolutist tendencies of the Habsburgs. Consequently, the Habsburgs started to 
govern the country as an occupied territory. They tried to ignore the traditional 
rights and privileges of the Hungarian estates and the former autonomous status 
of the country within the Habsburg Empire. This policy of Leopold I (1657–1705) 
offended several strata of Hungarian society. He affronted the nobility, since he 
did not summon the Diet after 1688, and “demanded the holders of estates in the 
recovered areas to produce legal documents of ownership; and even if they could 
do so, they were required to pay reparations for the damages of the war.”4 Due to 
the peace treaty with the Turks in 1699 there was no need for fortresses in the 
middle of the country any more. The Habsburg government disbanded the Hun-
garian regiments and garrisons, which provided the opportunity for upward social 
mobility for the peasantry. The war for liberation lasted for more than fifteen 
years (1683–1699) and resulted in the demolition of agriculture and the country-
side. The Habsburg king preferred and supported the Catholic Church and Protes-
tants were clearly discriminated against.5 
The result of the growing discontent was the outbreak of the war of independence 
led by Ferenc Rákóczi (1676–1735) between 1703 and 1711 which was part of 
the great international conflict of the period, the War of Spanish Succession (1701–
1714).6 Rákóczi was aided by Louis XIV of France (1643–1715), and the defeat 
of France also sealed the fate of Rákóczi’s struggle in 1711. Fortunately for the 
                                                            
3  L. Kontler, Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary, Budapest, 1999, 139–
149, 159–180. 
4  L. Kontler, Millennium, cit., pp. 185. 
5  Kontler, Millennium, cit., pp. 181–185. 
6  The War of Spanish Succession ended with three separate peace treaties. France, Spain 
and Great Britain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Prussia and Savoy concluded the Peace of 
Utrecht in 1713. France signed the Peace of Rastatt with the Habsburgs and the Peace of 
Baden with the estates of the German Empire in 1714. 
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Hungarian cause, the Habsburg’s war against Louis XIV came to an end only 
with the peace of Rastatt in March 1714, and the new ruler, Charles III (1711–
1740, as Emperor Charles VI) wanted peace in the Hungarian hinterland. He was 
ready to reach a compromise with the privileged strata of Hungarian society. Ac-
cording to the peace treaty of Szatmár, Charles granted amnesty and the restora-
tion of estates for those supporters of Rákóczi, who returned to the Emperor’s al-
legiance. He promised to be observant of the rights and privileges of the nobility 
and the country, and to stand in with the Diet in governing Hungary. He also 
plighted to secure free worship. In 1712 Charles III summoned the Hungarian 
Diet, and in his coronation charter he promised to maintain the territorial integrity 
of Hungary and to govern it in conformity with its customs and statutes. As 
László Kontler noted, the laws enacted by the Diet  
 
[…] codified the compromise of Szatmár: in other words, unlike in Austria and 
Bohemia, where the crown managed to shake off the control of the feudal estates 
in government and to some extent to curtail their privileges, including those re-
lated to taxation, in Hungary the balance between the crown and the corporate 
structures, that is, the political influence and social privileges mainly of the mag-
nates, was preserved.7 
 
In exchange for that the Hungarian estates accepted the rule of the Habsburgs in 
Hungary and recognized succession in the female line of the dynasty in 1723. In 
that year the hereditary provinces of the Habsburgs and Hungary were declared 
by the Hungarian Diet to be linked “indivisibly and inseparably”, and to be 
obliged to defend each other in case of aggression by foreign powers.8  
Due to the fact that it was advantageous for the Hungarian estates for political 
as well as economic reasons, the compromise worked quite well even after the 
outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). At the beginning of 
this war, Prussian, Saxon, and Bavarian troops invaded the Habsburg Empire, and 
the latter approached even Vienna. Under such circumstances Maria Theresa 
(1740–1780), the daughter and successor of Charles III, decided to summon the 
Hungarian Diet, and could convince the Hungarian estates to support the war ef-
forts of the empire. To the astonishment of all Europe, the Hungarian estates did 
not take the opportunity to attain their independence from the Habsburgs. On the 
contrary, the Hungarian Diet ordered an insurrection of nobles, and offered four 
million florins of war subsidy and thirty thousand recruits to the young queen. As 
László Kontler aptly remarked 
 
It was less a chivalric gesture to an attractive woman in plight (which was the ro-
mantic account of what happened) than an act of prudence: the estates had no 
                                                            
7  Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 196. 
8  Kontler, Millennium, cit., pp. 195–198. 
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suitable pretender, were warned anew of the Ottoman threat, and recognized that 
on the whole their situation was more favorable than that of their counterparts 
elsewhere in the Habsburg Empire or in most of Europe.9 
 
These are the main reasons why the Hungarian estates proved to be faithful to the 
Monarchy during the Seven Years War (1756–1763) too.  During that war the 
Habsburgs were not able to regain Silesia, which they had lost in the War of the 
Austrian Succession. The defeat of the Habsburg army and the loss of Silesia 
made the leaders of the Empire recognize the relative military and economic 
weakness of the monarchy. Consequently, they initiated a series of reforms from 
the 1740s onwards. The lessons of the wars also made the Viennese court realize 
that its “vast territory and natural resources destined Hungary for a central role 
among the bases of the Habsburg Monarchy’s power”.10 As a result, the leaders of 
the Empire made serious attempts to utilize the sources of Hungarian economy 
more effectively.  
The first step was taken in Hungary in 1754 with the introduction of new tariff 
regulations. Inspired by the principles of mercantilism, the government erected an 
internal customs barrier between Hungary and the other parts of the Empire. The 
government substantially subsidized the development of manufactures and trade 
in Austria and the Czech lands. The Viennese court intended to modernize agri-
culture in all parts of the monarchy, but it was the intention to make Hungary the 
main suppliers of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials for the industrial regions 
of Austria and the Czech lands. Low duties were levied on the manufactured 
products of the Western provinces delivered into Hungary, and much higher ones 
on goods that were imported from outside the monarchy. High tariffs were im-
posed on all kinds of Hungarian goods that were to be exported outside the em-
pire, and also on Hungarian industrial products exported to the Western provinces 
of the empire. This means that the Habsburg government wanted to establish a di-
vision of labor between Hungary and Austria and the Czech lands. The Viennese 
government tried to develop the established branches of the economy in both 
halves of the empire: agriculture, the production of food and raw materials in 
Hungary, and manufactures and industrial output in the western lands.11 
Maria Theresa tried to raise more revenue from Hungary in other ways, too. 
The queen grew increasingly impatient with the insistence of the Hungarian es-
                                                            
  9 Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 201–202. 
10  Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 203. 
11  On the reign of Maria Theresa see K. A. Roider, Maria Theresa, Englewood Cliffs 1973. 
On the economic policy of Maria Theresa see P. G. M. Dickson, Government and Finance 
under Maria Theresa 1740–1780, Oxford 1987. On the reforms of Enlightened Absolut-
ism in Hungary see É. H. Balázs, Hungary and the Habsburgs 1765–1800: An Experiment 
in Enlightened Absolutism, Budapest 1997. 
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tates on their privileges, especially those concerning taxation. She demanded the 
Diet, summoned in 1764, to increase the war subsidy. The queen called the atten-
tion of the estates to the ineffectiveness of noble insurrection and wanted to con-
vert it to cash payment by the nobility. Maria Theresa also made it clear that she 
wanted to regulate by law the peasant dues and services and lord-serf relations. 
But due to the resistance of the estates she decided to dispense with the Diet, and 
for nearly three decades Hungary was governed by decrees between 1765 and 
1790. It is also true that the queen also made efforts to appease the nobility, and 
during her reign, the growing disaffection between the bulk of the nobility and the 
monarch did not transform into an open resistance movement.12 
But with the accession of her son and successor Joseph II (1780–1790) in 
1780, the style of Habsburg policy changed markedly. The new monarch did not 
care about the old compromise at all. Inspired by the ideas of enlightened absolut-
ism, he tried to create 
 
[…] a unitary state not made up of heterogeneous parts, but established on the 
clear principles of reason and ruled by one ruler and a centralized bureaucracy 
and army… Joseph recognized that the privileges of the nobility and the Catholic 
Church, regional rights and institutions were major obstacles in attaining these 
objectives.13 
 
Joseph also tried to centralize the government of Hungary. In May 1784 he made 
German the language of all official communication and education in Hungary. He 
argued that Latin was a dead language, and that Hungarian was not civilized 
enough for the requirements of a modernized government, not to mention the fact 
that it was spoken by less than 50 per cent of the population of the country. Offi-
cials had to learn German within three years. Joseph also ordered a national cen-
sus and land survey, which were regarded by the nobility as a first step towards 
abolishing its privileges concerning taxation.14 
The administrative system of Hungary was traditionally based on the county 
system, in which the government of the counties was in the hands of the nobility. 
In March 1785 Joseph abolished the old county system and introduced ten dis-
                                                            
12  The queen created a fund for Hungarian nobles to study in Vienna in 1749, and estab-
lished the Royal Hungarian Bodyguard in 1760. She re-acquired the Saxon towns of 
Szepes from Poland in 1772, reintegrated some military frontier regions into the Hungar-
ian administrative system, and annexed the port of Fiume (now Rijeka in Croatia) on the 
Adriatic to Hungary. 
13  Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 212. On the reign of Joseph II see T. C. W. Blanning, Joseph 
II, Cambridge 1994. 
14  On the census and land survey see P. G. M. Dickson, Joseph II’s Hungarian Land Survey, 
in “English Historical Review”, 1991, pp.  611–634. 
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tricts, headed by royal commissars appointed directly by the monarch. In August 
1785 the ruler “abolished by decree the name serf and conceded the right of free 
migration, of the free choice of profession and of the free disposition over prop-
erty to the peasantry”.15 Through the patent of February 1789 the monarch levied 
a uniform tax on all landed property, which nobles were also expected to pay. 
They would have to pay 12.25 per cent of their income from land.16 
The measures of Joseph II violated the traditional positions of the privileged 
groups of contemporary Hungarian society. The counties led by the nobility pro-
tested vehemently against the census and the land survey. Due to the resistance of 
the counties it proved to be impossible to put the language decree into practice, 
“and the military had to be dispatched on several occasions to carry out the census 
amidst the turbulence.”17 The estates wanted the Diet to be summoned, and dissat-
isfied nobles devised plans for an insurrection and for inviting an English or Prus-
sian prince to the throne of Hungary. By 1789 Hungary was on the brink of armed 
revolt.18 
 
The Comparison of the position of Hungary  
and the British Colonies in North America 
 
If one compares the position of Hungary within the Habsburg Empire to the posi-
tion of the mainland colonies in North America within the British Empire in the 
1770s and 1780s, many interesting similarities can be found. I do not doubt that 
there were fundamental differences as well between the two territories regarding 
their social structure, economic development, and political institutions. Nonethe-
less, in this essay I intend to stress the similarities between Hungary and the Brit-
ish colonies in North America. 
 
The Constitutional Position of the Two Territories 
 
Before the reforms of Maria Theresa and especially those of Joseph II, Hungary 
enjoyed some kind of autonomy and self-government within the empire. The cur-
rent ruler of the empire was the king or queen of Hungary at the same time, and 
Hungary had her own legislative body, the Hungarian Diet. The mainland colo-
nies in North America also enjoyed widespread self-government within the Brit-
                                                            
15  Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 217. 
16  Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 217. 
17  Kontler, Millennium, cit., pp. 215. 
18  On the 18th-century history of the Habsburg Empire in general see J. Berenger, A History 
of the Habsburg Empire, 1700–1918, Harlow 1997; C. W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monar-
chy, 1618–1815, Cambridge 1994. 
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ish Empire. The king of Britain was the ruler of the colonies, but the colonies also 
had their own legislative bodies. The governments in Vienna and London were 
required to approve the decisions of the local legislative bodies, but it was also in 
the interest of the imperial governments to assure their cooperation. This means 
that before the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II in Hungary, and before the 
end of the Seven Years War in North America, the local and imperial elites could 
reach a well-working compromise. The North American colonies as well as Hun-
gary profited from participation in imperial structures. Both of them needed mili-
tary assistance for example, against the Turks and the French. This is not to sug-
gest that the situation on both sides of the Atlantic was exactly the same. The two 
systems of representation were very different. In the Hungarian Diet only the tra-
ditional estates (nobility, Catholic clergy, inhabitants of the so-called royal free 
towns) were represented, and they constituted a small minority of the total popu-
lation. It is true that colonial assemblies were also controlled by the local elites, 
and suffrage was quite restricted. Ownership of freehold land was an important 
qualification for the franchise, but religious considerations were also deemed im-
portant. Jews in seven and Roman Catholics in five colonies had been excluded. 
Nevertheless, suffrage was still less restricted than in the mother country. Accord-
ing to Colin Bonwick “the probable range of voting was between 50 and 80 per 
cent of all free white adult males.”19 On the whole it means that far more people 
had a say in politics in North America than in Hungary. The social structure of 
Hungarian society was naturally very different, as well. In Hungary serfdom was 
still in existence and serfs constituted by far the largest stratum of society. The 
bourgeoisie was much smaller and weaker, and society was still dominated by the 
privileged estates of the nobility and the Catholic clergy.20 
 
The Reasons for the Split between the Peripheries  
and the Cores of the Empires 
 
Both empires were deeply involved in the international conflicts of the 18th cen-
tury. It is very interesting that the attitude of the two elites concerning these wars 
was quite similar again. They supported the war efforts of the empires, but always 
in view of their own special interests. The consequences of these wars were also 
similar in Hungary and North America. The British government initiated a new 
policy towards the colonies at the end of the Seven Years’ War, in order to reor-
                                                            
19 C. Bonwick, The American Revolution, Charlottesville, 1991. pp. 46–47.  
20  J. P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Poli-
ties of the British Empire and the United States 1607–1788, New York, 1990, pp. 7–76; I. 
K. Steele, The Anointed, the Appointed, and the Elected: Governance of the British Em-
pire, 1689–1784, in P. J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: The 
Eighteenth Century, Oxford 1998, vol. 2. pp. 105–127. 
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ganize the structure of the enlarged empire. The Viennese court experimented 
with the same, in order to mobilize the resources of the empire to be able to take 
revenge against Prussia. Both states became severely indebted, and in order to 
raise revenue, imperial governments tried to invent more efficient governmental 
structures. In doing so, the Viennese and the British governments kept in view the 
ideal of a more centralized and unified empire, serving basically the interests of 
the imperial centers. They subordinated the local interests of their peripheries to 
the welfare of the empire as a whole.21 
 
The Means of Imperial Intervention 
 
Mercantilist economic policy 
 
The economic policies of both empires were inspired mainly by mercantilism. In 
mercantilist theory, the value of an empire came to be defined by its utility as both 
a supplier of raw materials and a market for finished products. To promote its 
economic interests, the British government introduced several measures for regu-
lating its colonial economy during the 17th century and in the first half of the 18th 
century.22 But the British administrations in the first half of the 18th century also 
developed an approach to colonial affairs known as “salutary neglect”. The result 
of this policy was that the executive power was occasionally lax and always selec-
tive in the enforcement of legislation. This meant that the colonists “enjoyed the 
benefits of British protection and the advantages of trade within the imperial sys-
tem, while they avoided many of the restrictions aimed at them”.23 As it is well 
known, Americans complained a lot about the regulation of their economy by the 
British government even before the Seven Years’ War. Some elements of these 
regulations were discriminatory to be sure, but others definitely supported the de-
velopment of colonial economy. According to most modern economic historians, 
on the whole, the British regulations introduced before 1763 rather improved the 
economic position of the colonies than worsened it.24 
                                                            
21  C. Bonwick, The American Revolution, Charlottesville, 1991, pp. 69–77; P. Lucas, Ameri-
can Odyssey, 1607–1789, Englewood Cliffs 1984, pp. 212–218. 
22  For example the Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660, 1663, 1673, the Wool Act of 1699, the 
Trade Act of 1705, the Hat Act of 1732, the Molasses Act of 1733, or the Iron Act of 
1750. On British mercantilist policy see J. Hughes, American Economic History, Boston 
1990, pp. 65–81. 
23  Lucas, American Odyssey cit., p. 133. On mercantilism and “salutary neglect” see ibid., 
pp. 57–72, 127–142. There is still a debate among economic historians about the impact 
of British rule on the colonial economy. On these debates see Hughes, American Eco-
nomic History cit., pp. 65–81. 
24  Hughes, American Economic History cit., pp. 65–81. 
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The Hungarian economy was in a similar position within the Habsburg Empire 
in the first half of the 18th century. The expulsion of the Turks did provide Hun-
gary with a chance to revive its economy. The growing demand for foodstuffs in 
the more populous and industrialized Western Habsburg provinces stimulated 
Hungarian agricultural production. This development was suited to the plans of 
the Viennese court. Consequently, the Habsburg government, just like the British 
government in North America, tried to promote the sectors of Hungarian econ-
omy that seemed to be the most useful from the point of view of the imperial cen-
ter. The Viennese court promoted the introduction of better methods of cultivation 
and animal husbandry in Hungary. It helped to popularize such new plants as 
corn, tobacco, the potato, hemp, and the mulberry tree in Hungary, just like the 
British government subsidized the cultivation of indigo in South Carolina and 
Georgia. Since most cultivated lands were in the hands of the nobility and the 
Catholic clergy, these developments proved to be profitable for the privileged es-
tates of Hungarian society. Under these circumstances they were ready to reach a 
compromise with the Habsburgs, and to accept the integration of the country into 
the empire. It is very important to note that, the new tariff regulations of 1754 did 
not “demolish” Hungarian economy, despite the arguments of some contempo-
rary authors. Such enlightened Hungarian writers as Gergely Berzeviczy (1763–
1822) complained about it after 1790. These regulations were clearly discrimina-
tory, but the inequality regarding the industrial development of Hungary and the 
Western Habsburg provinces did not emerge as a result of the new regulations, 
and did not increase as a result of them. Hungary exported agricultural products 
outside the Habsburg Empire in large quantities before 1754: cattle to Venice and 
Northern Italy, wine to Poland and Western Europe, and grain to several coun-
tries. It means that Hungarian economy was in dependence of foreign regions 
even before the introduction of the new tariff regulations. László Kontler argued:  
What now happened was that some of her main partners were changed. For 
the Hungarian purchaser it was probably inconvenient that better and cheaper 
products from Silesia and Germany were now replaced with somewhat inferior 
and more expensive articles from the neighboring Habsburg lands. But for Hun-
garian craftsmen and the few industrialists, the competition of these products was 
less dangerous, and consequently more conducive to progress, which… did take 
place in the number of capitalist factories and the sophistication of their products 
as well.25 
 
Attention is to be called to the fact that the impact of imperial economic regula-
tions was also similar in Hungary and colonial North America. Although imperial 
centers wanted to restrict and regulate the economic activities of their peripheries, 
                                                            
25  Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 204–205. 
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the economies of Hungary and British North America did not “collapse” as a re-
sult of them, despite the serious complaints of contemporaries at both places. On 
the contrary, according to modern economic historians, the economies of both pe-
ripheries could also profit from them.But under the pressure of urgent need for the 
reorganization of the structure of their empires, both imperial governments ended 
the compromises of former years. The Viennese court introduced the new tariff 
regulations of 1754, and made preparations for the reform of the tax system. The 
London government also invented new methods to raise revenue in the colonies, 
and to tighten the control of them after 1763.26 And in contrast to the former dec-
ades, decision-makers in Vienna and London made it clear that they were deter-
mined to enforce new regulations. 
 
The Reaction of the Hungarian Estates and the North American  
Colonists to the New Intervention of Imperial Centers 
 
Fluctuations in the balance of power 
On both sides of the Atlantic a peculiar fluctuation was observable in the relation-
ship between the imperial peripheries and centers during the 18th century. The os-
cillation of the pendulum depended upon the actual balance of power between the 
two sides. The Passing of the Declaratory Act in 1766 after the repeal of the 
Stamp Act, the Townshend Acts a year later in the British Empire and the acces-
sion of Joseph II to the throne in 1780 in the Habsburg Empire, were clear signs 
that both imperial governments were determined to continue their administrative 
reforms.27  
 
The role of the local legislations  
In the North American mainland, the colonial assemblies were bastions of local 
self-government and centers of resistance against the encroachments of the British 
government. In Hungary, local government and administration were managed by 
the county assemblies, in which only the nobility was represented. These assem-
blies were not only bastions against the encroachments of the Habsburgs, but also 
the main defenders of the traditional privileges of the nobility. No wonder that 
one of the principal aims of Joseph II was to eliminate the counties from the ad-
ministrative system of the country. Instead of having more than sixty counties, he 
organized ten districts, which were headed by loyal royal commissars. The two-
                                                            
26  For example: the Proclamation of 1763, the American Revenue or Sugar Act of 1764, the 
Stamp Act of 1765. 
27  On the Declaratory Act, the Stamp Act and the Townshend Duties see: C. Bonwick: The 
American Revolution, pp. 71–75.  
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fold aim of this measure was to rationalize and modernize the administration of 
the empire, and to crush the resistance of the Hungarian nobility. The British gov-
ernment also tried to crush the resistance of the colonial assemblies, and loyal co-
lonial governors had the same conflict with the assemblies as the royal commis-
sars with the counties in Hungary.28 
 
Loyalists in British North America and Hungary 
Nevertheless, not all Hungarians were hostile towards the measures of Joseph II. 
He had a little group of devoted followers, the Hungarian Josephists. They real-
ized the backwardness of their homeland, and as faithful disciples of the Enlight-
enment, they had confidence in an enlightened monarch. As royal commissars 
and other civil servants appointed by Joseph, Hungarian Josephists played a cru-
cial role in Hungarian state administration during his reign. They were shocked by 
the resistance of their compatriots to the “benevolent” reforms of Joseph. But they 
were also Hungarians who worried about some of their ruler’s measures, espe-
cially the language decree and the subordination of Hungarian interests to the 
ideal of a centralized monarchy. The American loyalists, especially the royal gov-
ernors of American origin – Thomas Hutchinson (1711–1780) the last civilian 
governor of Massachusetts, is the best example – were in a very similar position 
in revolutionary North America. They also tried to reconcile their loyalty to the 
mother country and their homeland. On the other hand, loyalists constituted a 
much larger proportion of colonial society than the tiny fraction of Hungarian Jo-
sephists. According to some estimates, loyalists constituted some 20-30 per cent 
of the total population of the thirteen North American colonies, and the represen-
tatives of all social strata could be found among them. The proportion of Hungar-
ian Josephists in the total population was much lower and they were almost ex-
clusively noblemen and intellectuals.29 
 
                                                            
28  On the colonial assemblies see for example J. P. Greene, Peripheries cit., pp. 19–76; Lu-
cas, American Odyssey cit., pp. 169–176. On the role of the counties in Hungary see 
Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 215–217. 
29  It should be also added that regions differed greatly in regard to the proportion of loyalists 
in them. The proportion hardly exceeded 10 per cent in New England, while in the South 
as a whole it was around 25-30 per cent. Regarding the middle colonies we know for ex-
ample that 27 per cent of adult males voted against independence in Queen’s county (New 
York) in September 1776. On loyalists see Bonwick, The American Revolution cit., 96–101. 
o. On Hungarian Josephists see Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 212–213. On the role of colonial 
governors see Greene, Peripheries cit., pp. 21–22, 34–42, 46–47. On the life and career of Tho-
mas Hutchinson see B. Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, Cambridge, Mass. 1974. 
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The role of the local elites 
Hungarian nobles were eager to maintain their traditional privileges and also their 
leading role against their social inferiors on the one hand, and they were the de-
fenders of the country’s independence against the absolutist tendencies of the 
Habsburg emperors on the other. In some ways, colonial elites were in the same 
position. They dominated the colonial assemblies and they were the leaders of the 
resistance against the new measures of the British. On the other hand, they were 
also eager to maintain their privileged position and opposed the radicalization of 
the revolution.30 
 
Similarities in the arguments of the opposition 
It is very interesting that the arguments used by the local assemblies in Hungary 
and North America were similar too. They argued that they simply defended their 
“ancient rights and liberties” against the tyrannical intrusions and innovations of 
their respective rulers. They emphasized that they wanted nothing more but to re-
turn to the “good old days” of the former compromise.31 
 
Changing identities in British North America and Hungary 
Resistance to the encroachments of the imperial centers proved to be a major cata-
lyst in the birth of modern nationalism and national consciousness in both places. 
The resistance to the language decree of Joseph gave a major impetus to the 
movement for the modernization of the Hungarian language. These were the days 
of the birth of modern Hungarian literature and science. Every “true Hungarian” 
gentleman and lady wore stylized national costumes to demonstrate their national 
identity and resistance against Joseph. The breach with Great Britain also forced 
the American colonists to try to redefine their identity. First, they emphasized  
that they were the true heirs to English liberties, but after independence, they had 
                                                            
30  Bonwick, The American Revolution cit., pp. 38–42, 45–48, 61–65, 112–114, 126–129, 
197–198. On Hungarian nobility see Kontler, Millennium cit., pp. 198–200. 
31  On the ideology of the American Revolution see B. Bailyn, The Ideological origins of the 
American Revolution, Cambridge, Mass. 1967; G. S. Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic 1776–1787, Chapel Hill 1969; J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: 
Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton, 1975. On 
the influence of Enlightenment in Hungary see G. Barany, Hoping Against Hope: The 
Enlightened Age in Hungary, in “American Historical Review”, 1971, 76, 1, pp. 319–357. 
P. F. Sugar, The Influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in Eighteenth-
Century Hungary, in “Journal of Central European Affairs”, 1958, 17, pp. 331–355. 
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The resistance to the measures of Joseph II brought Hungary to the brink of an 
open revolt. Nevertheless, in contrast to the mainland colonies in North America, 
this dissatisfaction with the policy of the imperial center never led to an open re-
bellion, despite the above-mentioned similarities. Under the pressure of interna-
tional (unsuccessful war against the Ottoman Empire, rebellion in the Austrian 
Netherlands, and the outbreak of the French Revolution) and domestic events, the 
disillusioned and mortally ill Joseph revoked all his decrees except for the Patent 
of Toleration and those relating to parishes and the peasantry four weeks before 
his death, at the end of January 1790. His successor and younger brother, Leo-
pold, shared the fundamental principles but not the rigidity of his brother, and was 
a more tactical politician. Leopold II (1790–1792) summoned the Hungarian Diet, 
which ended with a compromise again. The Hungarian estates acknowledged the 
rule of the Habsburg dynasty in Hungary again, while a law passed by the Diet 
and adopted by the king, described the country as a “free and independent king-
dom”, to be governed by its laws only. The ruler was obliged to summon the Diet 
every three years and the exclusive right to vote taxes and recruitment was also 
given to it.33 
                                                            
32  J. P. Greene, Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolu-
tion, in Marshall (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire cit., pp. 208–230. Kontler, 
Millennium cit., pp. 215–216. 




Ein kleines Land mit Großmachtallüren 




Für mich als Literaturhistoriker, der sich vor allem mit der niederländischen 
(kolonialen) Literatur beschäftigt, war es eine schöne Aufgabe und zugleich ei-
ne große Herausforderung, mich auf das Gebiet der Historiker zu wagen. Die 
Frage, was die Niederlande nun war, eine Großmacht oder ein kleines Land im 
Nordwesten Europas, ist eine ambivalente. Im weiteren versuche ich diese Fra-
ge zu beantworten und zu zeigen, wie sich im Laufe der Jahrhunderte die Stel-




Eine kleine Großmacht 
 
Die Niederlande waren seit ihrer Unabhängigkeit im Jahre 1648 nicht nur ein 
Land des wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Aufschwungs im Goldenen Jahrhun-
dert, sondern auch eine der bedeutendsten Seemächte Europas. Sie haben mit 
Erfolg gegen eines der mächtigsten Länder des damaligen Europas, gegen Spa-
nien, gekämpft und die Unabhängigkeit erworben. Die Niederlande wurden 
nach der Schweiz die zweite Republik Europas. 
Die Niederländer konnten 1652 im Ersten Englisch–Niederländischen Krieg, 
der wegen dem Act of Navigation (1651) ausgebrochen war,  die englische Flot-
te schlagen,1 im Nordischen Krieg (1655–1660) um den Sund konnte die nieder-
ländische Flotte die Schweden zurückdrängen und im Zweiten Englisch–
Niederländischen Krieg (1665–1667) haben die Holländer ihren Feind auf eige-
nem Boden geschlagen. Auf der Themse fuhr die niederländische Flotte bis 
Chatham, durchbrach die englische Blockade und vernichtete die englische 
Flotte.2 1672, im sogenannten „Katastrophenjahr“, als die vereinte englisch–
französische Flotte und die Bistümer Köln und Münster zu gleicher Zeit die 
                                                 
1  Klaas Jansma, Meinert Schroor (red.), Onze vaderlandse geschiedenis Rebo Productions, 
Lisse, 1991, 218. 




junge Republik angriffen, konnte Holland diesen feindlichen Angriff abweh-
ren.3 Diese militärischen Erfolge gegen die Großmächte Europas zeigen die 
ökonomische und militärische Stärke der jungen Republik und machen deutlich, 
dass die Niederlande im 17. Jahrhundert selbst zu den Großmächten gehörten.  
Neben dem Erkämpfen der Unabhängigkeit, dem Abwehren der Anfälle der 
Feinde und der kulturellen Blütezeit4 hatte das Land auch genug Mittel und 
Kraft, die Expansion in Übersee zu beginnen. Die Expansion begann bereits 
Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts und war ein reines Handelsunternehmen.5 Für die 
Niederländer war neben dem lukrativen Ostseehandel der Vertrieb der asiati-
schen Gewürze in Nordeuropa eine der wichtigsten Handelsaktivitäten. Die 
Gewürze (vor allem Pfeffer, Gewürznelken und Zimt) kamen in portugiesischen 
Schiffen aus Asien in Lissabon an und wurden unter anderen an niederländische 
Händler verkauft.6 Die Niederländer haben dann die Märkte von Nordeuropa 
mit der exotischen und sehr teuren Ware versorgt. Es war eine sehr rentable Ak-
tivität, die die holländischen Kaufleute auch am Anfang des Krieges gegen Spa-
nien (1568–1648) ausüben konnten. Dass die Niederländer doch selbst den See-
weg nach Asien suchten, war verschiedenen Faktoren zu danken. Der erste Fak-
tor war das veränderte Machtverhältnis in Portugal. Der spanische König Philip 
II. annektierte Portugal und wurde ab 1580 auch portugiesischer König. Das 
hatte erst keinen direkten Einfluss auf den Handel mit Holland, aber Philip II. 
hat 1585 die spanischen und portugiesischen Häfen geschlossen und die auslän-
dischen Schiffe beschlagnahmt.7 Der zweite Faktor war, dass die Portugiesen ab 
1580 die Gewürze in Lissabon nicht mehr frei an die ausländischen Händler 
verkauften, sondern sogenannte „Pfefferverträge“ schlossen. Damit wollten die 
Portugiesen vor allem süddeutsche Handelshäuser, wie zum Beispiel die Fugger 
und Welser, oder spanische und italienische Händler bevorzugen und die Nie-
derländer zurückdrängen.8 Ein dritter Faktor war der Preis des Pfeffers, der ab 
1592 drastisch stieg. Das war den Engländer zu danken, die alles getan haben, 
um portugiesische und spanische Schiffe zu erobern und zu versenken, bevor 
diese die portugiesischen Häfen erreichten. Demzufolge erreichte nur ein Teil 
der mit Pfeffer beladenen portugiesischen Schiffe aus Asien Lissabon. Es kam 
also immer weniger Pfeffer auf den europäischen Markt, obwohl die Nachfrage 
                                                 
3  Klaas Jansma, Meinert Schroor (red.), Onze vaderlandse geschiedenis Rebo Productions, 
Lisse, 1991, 224. 
4  Denken wir nur an die berühmten niederländischen Maler der Zeit wie Rembrandt, Frans 
Hals oder Vermeer. Siehe weiter: J. J. M. Timmers, De glorie van Nederland, Tirion, 
Baarn, 1989, 180–264. 
5  J. J.P. De Jong, De waaier van het Fortuin, SDU, Den Haag, 1999, 7. 
6  J. van Goor, J. van, De Nederlandse koloniën, SDU, Den Haag 1994, 16. 
7  Femme S. Gaastra, Geschiedenis van de VOC, Walburgpwers, Zutphen, 2009, 11. 
8  Idem. 
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immer größer wurde. Venedig hatte natürlich auch einen Anteil an dem europäi-
schen Gewürzmarkt, aber konnte die steigende Nachfrage auch nicht befriedi-
gen.9 Ein vierter Faktor war die Besetzung von Antwerpen 1585. Gerade in dem 
Jahr, als Philip II. die niederländischen Schiffe in den portugiesischen und spa-
nischen Häfen beschlagnahmte, besetzten die Spanier mit Antwerpen die wich-
tigste Hafenstadt der Niederlande.10 Die Bewohner der Stadt, unter anderen 
Händler, Künstler, Wissenschaftler und reiche Bürger, flohen in den Norden. 
Sie nahmen ihr Hab und Gut, aber auch ihr Wissen, die Kunst und Handelsbe-
ziehungen mit. Die niederländische Flotte schloss die Schelde ab und versperrte 
damit den Zugang zum Hafen.11 Antwerpen als wichtigster Pfeffermarkt in 
Nordeuropa ging verloren und es sah so aus, dass seine Rolle von Hamburg 
übernommen würde.12 Die Flüchtlinge aus Antwerpen stimulierten durch ihr 
mitgenommenes Kapital, Wissen und die Beziehungen die nordniederländische 
Ökonomie. Auch ihnen war es zu danken, dass Amsterdam, das als Pfeffermarkt 
bis dahin nur eine sehr bescheidene Rolle gespielt hatte,13 letztendlich die Rolle 
von Antwerpen übernahm.14 Der fünfte Faktor war, dass die Niederländer zu 
dieser Zeit schon genügend Kenntnisse hatten, um die Reise nach Asien zu wa-
gen. Sie hatten jahrhundertelange Erfahrung auf der Ostsee, Nordsee und dem 
Mittelmeer. Außerdem waren in der Zeit in Holland Beschreibungen über Asien 
erschienen. Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer schrieb 1592 das Werk Tresoor der 
Zeevaert, in dem das bereits früher herausgegebene Werk von Dirck Gerrits-
zoon China aufgenommen war. 1596 erschien von Jan Huigen van Linschoten 
Itinerario, eine wichtige Beschreibung des Seeweges von Europa nach Asien. 
Van Linschoten machte 1584 in portugiesischem Dienst eine Reise von Lissa-
bon nach Asien und kam erst 1592 nach Europa zurück. Er hat während seiner 
Reise insgeheim Karten gezeichnet und Notizen gemacht und übte damit eine 
Art Betriebsspionage gegen die Portugiesen aus.  
Diese fünf Faktoren haben dazu geführt, dass die Niederländer den Schritt 
wagten, aus eigenen Kräften den Seeweg zu den Gewürzinseln zu finden. Die 
Zeit war reif für ein eigenes Unternehmen: Die bisherigen Handelsquellen in 
Portugal gab es nicht mehr, es gab genug Kapital, Wissen und Erfahrung im ei-
genen Land und es lohnte sich, die Reise zu riskieren, denn die Pfefferpreise 
waren unglaublich hoch. Nach einigen fehlgeschlagenen Versuchen Richtung 
                                                 
 9  Idem. 13. 
10  J. C. Blom, E. Lamberts (red.), Geschiedenis van de Lage Landen, HB Baarn, 2006, 115. 
11  Gert Mak, Amszterdam, egy város életrajza, Corvina, Budapest, 2001, 73. 
12  Femme S. Gaastra, Geschiedenis van de VOC, Walburgpwers, Zutphen, 2009, 11. 
13  Idem. 




Norden15 sind 1595 vier Schiffe mit 249 Mann an Bord unter Kommando von 
Cornelis de Houtman Richtung Süden in See gestochen. Es war ein Sprung ins 
Dunkel. Keiner wusste, ob die Schiffe jemals zurückkehren würden. Deshalb 
versuchte man die (finanziellen) Risiken zu minimalisieren. Neun Kaufleute aus 
Amsterdam haben eine „Compagnie“, eine Handelsgesellschaft, gegründet und 
das Geld (300.000 Gulden) für die Expedition zusammengebracht. Das war die 
„Compagnie van Verre.“ De Houtman ist nach zwei Jahren 1597 nach Amster-
dam zurückgekehrt mit drei Schiffen und nur 89 Überlebenden an Bord, aber 
mit Pfeffer im Laderaum. Was aber das wichtigste war, der Seeweg war gefun-
den. Der Gewürzhandel war kein Monopol mehr der Portugiesen, er stand jetzt 
auch den Niederländern offen. Sie eroberten wichtige Handelshäfen und Küs-
ten, gründeten Faktoreien unter anderem auf Java und Sumatra, in Südafrika, 
Indien, Ceylon, China, Malakka, den Philippinen und Japan. Die 1602 gegrün-
dete Niederländische Ostindien-Kompanie (Verenigde Oostindische Compag-
nie) war weltweit das größte und kapitalstärkste Unternehmen seiner Zeit.16 Die 
Holländer schalteten ihre portugiesische und englische Konkurrenz aus und be-
herrschten nicht nur den Handel zwischen Java und Europa, sondern spielten 
auch im asiatischen Handel eine bedeutende Rolle. 1619 wurde von Jan Pieters-
zon Coen Batavia das heutige Jakarta gegründet.17 Aus einem unwichtigen Küs-
tenort wurde das wichtigste Handelszentrum Südostasiens. Auch in Afrika 
(Kapkolonie) und Amerika (Suriname, Antillen) besaß Holland Handelsgebiete, 
aber die wichtigsten und größten Gebiete besaßen die Niederlande unter dem 
Namen Niederländisch-Indien, dem heutigen Indonesien, im Südosten Asiens. 
Dank der ökonomischen Erfolge konnten die Niederlande in Asien ein Imperi-
um aufbauen und damit im 17. Jahrhundert die Stabilität und den Wohlstand im 
Mutterland sichern. Was Oberfläche und Bevölkerungszahl anging, waren die 
Niederlande ein kleines Land, aber nach der ökonomischen und militärischen 
(vor allem maritimen) Kraft zu urteilen, war das Land eine Großmacht. Eine 
„kleine Großmacht“ also. Das „Goldene Jahrhundert“ nahm im 18. Jahrhundert 
ein Ende, die Ökonomie kränkelte und die Bedeutung von Holland in der euro-
päischen Politik nahm rasch ab.  
 
                                                 
15  Die Expeditionen von Willem Barendsz auf Initiative des Geografen und Theologen 
Petrus Plancius, um den Seeweg über den Norden (eine nordöstliche Passage) nach Asien 
zu finden, waren misslungen. Barentsz starb auf der letzten Fahrt 1595. Siehe dazu mehr 
in Karel Bostoen (red.), Verhalen over verre landen, Amsterdam University Press, Ams-
terdam, 2001, 19–27.   
16  Els M. Jacobs, Varen om peper en thee, Zutphen, 1991, 95. 
17  Theo D’Haen, Inleiding, Theo D’Haen (red.), Europa Buitnegaats, Koloniale en 
postkoloniale literaturen in Europeische talen, Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2002, 43. 
EIN KLEINES LAND MIT GROßMACHTALLÜREN 
 
147 
Ein kleines europäisches Land 
 
Im 18. Jahrhundert war die Position der Niederlande geschwächt. Am Ende des 
Jahrhunderts sorgten Konflikte zwischen Patrioten (Sympathisanten der franzö-
sischen Revolution) und sogenannten Prinsgezinden (Anhängern der Oranier) 
für blutige Auseinandersetzungen.18 Die französische Besatzung 1795 und das 
Ausrufen der Bataafse Republiek, das Königreich Holland 1806 und schließlich 
die Einverleibung der Niederlande in Frankreich 1810 führten Anfang des 19. 
Jahrhunderts das endgültige Ende der Großmachtstellung von Holland herbei.19 
Die Briten haben schon Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts angefangen, die niederländi-
schen Kolonien zu besetzen. Nach der französischen Invasion in den Niederlan-
den sahen die Briten, die seit 1793 gegen Frankreich Krieg führten, ihre Positi-
on in Übersee gefährdet und wollten verhindern, dass strategische Gebiete, wie 
z.B. Kapstadt und die Kapkolonie in die Hände der Franzosen fielen. Das hätte 
weitgehende Folgen für die britischen Kolonien in Asien, wie z.B. für Indien, 
gehabt. Auf diese Weise haben die Niederlande alle ihre Gebiete in Übersee 
verloren. Während der „französischen Zeit“ kam die Niederländische Ostindien-
Kompanie (VOC) endgültig in Probleme.20  
Während die Niederländische Ostindien-Kompanie im 17. Jahrhundert Ge-
winne in astronomischer Höhe machte, verfiel sie im 18. Jahrhundert.  Dabei 
spielten Konflikte mit England (vor allem der letzte Englisch–Niederländische 
Krieg 1780–1784), Organisationsprobleme, Korruption und die immer stärker 
werdende Konkurrenz eine wichtige Rolle und besiegelten Ende des Jahrhun-
derts den Untergang der Handelsgesellschaft.21 
Die Niederländische Ostindien-Kompanie ging 1799 bankrott. Der nieder-
ländische Staat übernahm den Rest der Gesellschaft samt aller Schulden (die 
mehr als 140 Millionen Gulden betrugen) und Besitztümer.22 Erst die französi-
sche Besetzung und Plünderung des Landes,23 der Bankrott der größten Han-
delsgesellschaft des Landes sowie der Verlust der Gebiete in Übersee machten 
aus Holland ein unbedeutendes, kleines europäisches Land an der Nordsee. 
 
                                                 
18  Klaas Jansma, Meinert Schroor (red.), Onze vaderlandse geschiedenis Rebo Productions, 
Lisse, 1991, 254–260. 
19  Idem. 282. 
20  E. H. Kossmann, De Lage Landen 1780/1980 deel I., Agon, Amsterdam, 1986, 142. 
21  Femme S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC, Zutphen, 1991, 170. 
22  E. M. Beekman, Paradijzen van weleer, Prometheus, Amsterdam, 1998, 22. 
23  Klaas Jansma, Meinert Schroor (red.), Onze vaderlandse geschiedenis, Rebo Productions, 




Nach dem Fall von Napoleon bekamen die Niederlande 1814 die wichtigsten 
Kolonien von England zurück.24 Ceylon, die Kapkolonie (Südafrika) und weite-
re Gebiete in Afrika behielten die Briten aber. Dass die Holländer die wichtigs-
ten Kolonien (vor allem Niederländisch-Indien) zurückbekamen, ist damit zu 
erklären, dass England und die anderen Siegermächte das neue Europa beim 
Wiener Kongress so einrichten wollten, dass Frankreich keine Chance mehr hat-
te, seine Nachbarn zu bedrohen. Deshalb wollte man nördlich von Frankreich 
einen stabilen Staat schaffen.25 Das wurde das Königreich der Niederlande 
(1815–1830), das aus dem heutigen Holland, Belgien und Luxemburg bestand. 
Es konnte nach den damaligen Auffassungen nur stark sein, wenn es auch Ko-
lonien besaß.26 Die Niederlande mussten also nach der Befreiung von der fran-
zösischen Besatzung eine Großmachtfunktion nördlich von Frankreich erfüllen, 
aber das dauerte nur kurz. Der erste König des neuen Königreichs wurde Wil-
helm I. aus dem Hause Oranien-Nassau. Die Provinzen im Süden des Landes 
(Flandern und Wallonien) akzeptierten die Politik des Königs nicht.27 1830 
brach ein Aufstand aus, dessen Ziel es war, den südlichen Landesteil aus dem 
Königreich auszugliedern und einen neuen Staat unter den Namen Belgien zu 
gründen.28 Die Niederlande, die im 17. Jahrhundert noch eine europäische 
Großmacht waren, in militärischen Konflikten England, Schweden und Frank-
reich schlagen konnten, waren jetzt nicht mehr fähig, einen Aufstand in Flan-
dern zu bezwingen. Die letzte Chance, aus den Niederlanden wieder eine 
Großmacht zu machen, war 1830 verflogen. Holland wurde endgültig ein klei-
nes Land am westlichen Rande Europas mit einer kleinen Wirtschaft, einer un-
bedeutenden Armee und geringem politischen Gewicht. Trotzdem gab es ein 
Gebiet, auf dem die Niederlande mit den europäischen Großmächten gleichzo-





                                                 
24  J.C.H. Blom, E. Lamberts (red.), Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden, Baarn, 2006, 248. 
25  E. H. Kossmann, De Lage Landen 1780/1980 deel I., Agon, Amsterdam, 1986, 100. 
26 Idem. 
27  Klaas Jansma, Meinert Schroor (red.), Onze vaderlandse geschiedenis, Rebo Productions, 
Lisse, 1991, 285. 
28  Der König Willhelm I. akzeptierte das neue Land Belgien bis 1838 nicht, weil er es immer 
noch als Teil seines Königreichs betrachtete. Nur unter dem Druck von England und 
Frankreich war er bereit, acht Jahre nach dem Aufstand den Vertrag mit Belgien zu unter-
zeichnen. Siehe dazu: E. H. Kossmann, De Lage Landen 1780/1980 deel I., Agon, Ams-
terdam, 1986, 100. 
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Bescheidenheit in Europa aber Großmachtallüren in Asien 
 
Nach der Aufhebung des Königreichs der Niederlande 1830 brachte das 19. 
Jahrhundert für Holland nichts Aufregendes. Das Land zog sich zurück, nahm 
an den großen europäischen politischen Prozessen nicht teil und verfolgte eine 
passive Neutralitätspolitik.29 Als 1848 in den meisten europäischen Ländern ei-
ne bürgerliche Revolution ausbrach (z.B. in Italien, Frankreich, Deutschland, 
Polen, Ungarn usw.), blieb es in Holland bei einer Verfassungsreform. Auch der 
Deutsch–Österreichische Krieg (1866) und der Deutsch–Französische Krieg 
(1870–71) hatten für Holland keine weitgehenden Folgen, Holland blieb neutral 
und passiv.30 Die Niederlande vermieden alle Konflikte auf dem alten Kontinent 
und zogen sich in ihr Schneckenhaus zurück. Das Land war wehrlos und 
schwach.31  
Im Gegensatz zu der passiven Neutralitätspolitik in Europa verfolgten die 
Niederlande nach anfänglichem Zögern im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert in ihren Ko-
lonien eine sehr aktive und aggressive Expansionspolitik, sowohl auf wirtschaft-
lichem als auch auf militärischem Gebiet.  
Von den ausgedehnten Handelsgebieten der Niederländischen Ostindien-
Kompanie blieb nach dem Wiener Kongress nicht viel übrig. Nur Niederlän-
disch-Indien wurde 1816 wieder holländischer Besitz, Ceylon und Südafrika 
(Kapkolonie) haben die Briten behalten.32 Der Regierungsstil des englischen 
Gouverneurs Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles (besser bekannt als Gründer von 
Singapur) orientierte sich an den Werten der Aufklärung und war auch später 
für seinen niederländischen Nachfolger Van der Capellen ein Vorbild. Van der 
Capellen führte eine doppelte Verwaltung ein, in die neben dem holländischen 
Kolonialbeamten auch die örtliche Eingeborenenaristokratie einbezogen war. 
Niederländische Beamte waren verpflichtet, die einheimische Sprache zu erler-
nen, der Gouverneur stimulierte die Erforschung der einheimischen Sprachen 
und Kultur, förderte den Unterricht der Einheimischen, gründete den botani-
schen Garten in Buitenzorg (heute Bogor) und versuchte zu verhindern, dass eu-
ropäische Großunternehmer Plantagen auf Java gründeten, weil er davon über-
                                                 
29  Klaas Jansma, Meinert Schroor (red.), Onze vaderlandse geschiedenis, Rebo Productions, 
Lisse, 1991, 354. 
30  Abgesehen von einer fehlgeschlagenen und katastrophal langsamen Mobilisierung, wes-
halb der zuständige Minister entlassen wurde, und ungefähr 23.000 niederländischen To-
ten im Folge einer Pockenepidemie, die wegen des Krieges ausgebrochen war, hatte der 
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Klaas Jansma, Meinert Schroor (red.), Onze vaderlandse geschiedenis, Rebo Productions, 
Lisse, 1991, 354. 
31  E. H. Kossmann, De Lage Landen 1780/1980 deel I., Agon, Amsterdam, 1986, 142. 




zeugt war, dass dies nur zur Ausbeutung der Bevölkerung führen würde. Diese 
Maßnahmen waren ganz im Sinne der Aufklärung, aber kosteten sehr viel Geld. 
Das Defizit der Kolonie betrug 20 Millionen Gulden. Die Kolonie kostete den 
niederländischen Staat eine Menge Geld, statt Geld zu verdienen. Parallel dazu 
wurden Aufstände und bewaffnete Konflikte in dem Gebiet immer häufiger. 
Der niederländische Staat, der sich in Europa neutral und passiv aufstellte, woll-
te im 19. Jahrhundert seine Macht auf dem Archipel ausbreiten. Diese aggressi-
ve Expansionspolitik der Niederländer stieß aber oft auf den Widerstand der ört-
lichen Sultane. Auf Sumatra gab es den Padri-Krieg (1819–1825), den außer-
gewöhnlich blutigen und langen Atjeh-Krieg (1873–1914) und den Batak-Krieg 
(1872–1895), auf Java den Java-Krieg (1825–1830), auf Borneo den Chinesi-
schen Aufstand (1823), auf Celebes den Bone-Krieg (1825) und auf Ambon den 
Ambon–Krieg (1817), der dem Kolonisator sehr ernsthafte Probleme und noch 
höhere Ausgaben einbrachte. Allein der Atjeh-Krieg kostete den niederländi-
schen Staat zwischen 7 und 20 Millionen Gulden pro Jahr.33 Im Gegensatz zur 
holländischen Haltung in Europa, verfolgten die Niederlande im 19. Jahrhundert 
in ihren Kolonien also eine sehr aggressive Politik, die viel Geld kostete. Am 
Ende des Java-Krieges hatte sich das Defizit der Kolonie verdoppelt und betrug 
40 Millionen Gulden. Die Regierung in Den Haag hatte genug von der Führung 
der Kolonie, die nur Verluste machte. Ein neuer Gouverneur General wurde er-
nannt: Johannes van den Bosch. Van den Bosch leitete die Kolonie mit harter 
Hand und führte ein System ein, mit dem das Mutterland Gewinn aus der Kolo-
nie ziehen konnte. Es wurde unter dem Namen „Kultursystem“ [cultuurstelsel] 
bekannt.34 Man ging davon aus, dass alles Land in der Kolonie dem Staat gehör-
te. Wenn jemand das Land oder einen Teil davon benutzte, musste er dafür zah-
len. Auch der kleine Bauer, der auf einem kleinen Acker Reis anbaute, musste 
eine Art Steuer dafür zahlen. Die Regierung wollte diese Steuer aber nicht in 
Bargeld, sondern in Naturalien einnehmen. Die Bauern wurden verpflichtet, auf 
einem Fünftel ihres Landes Kulturpflanzen anzubauen, die für den europäischen 
Markt wichtig waren. Daher kommt der Name „Kultursystem“. Diese Pflanzen 
waren vor allem Kaffee, Tee, Zuckerrohr, Tabak usw. Die Ernte wurde für ei-
nen sehr niedrigen, von dem Gouvernement festgelegten Preis von den Bauern 
aufgekauft. Die Erzeugnisse wurden später auf dem europäischen Markt teuer, 
also mit viel Gewinn, verkauft. Das System wurde 1830 eingeführt und schon 
ein Jahr später konnte man einen Gewinn verbuchen. 1831 machte man schon 
200.000 Gulden Profit. Im Vergleich zu den Verlusten der Jahre davor, war das 
ein sehr gutes Ergebnis. Die Gewinne wurden immer höher: 1834 6 Millionen 
Gulden, 1857 45 Millionen Gulden. Zwischen 1831 und 1877 zog die Kolonie 
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Niederländisch-Indien eine positive Bilanz mit 823 Millionen Gulden Gewinn.35 
Das ist eine sehr hohe Summe, wenn man bedenkt, dass ein Arbeiter in dieser 
Zeit in Holland im Durchschnitt ungefähr 1 Gulden pro Tag verdiente.36 Dank 
dieser Einnahmen konnten die Niederlande ihre anderen Kolonien mit einer ne-
gativen Bilanz finanzieren, sie konnten die Sklaverei abschaffen (1863), zahlten 
ihre Staatsschulden zurück und konnten im 19. Jahrhundert ihr gesamtes Eisen-
bahnnetz finanzieren.37 Außerdem bildete die Kolonie einen riesigen Absatz-
markt für holländische Textilwaren.38 Für die einheimische Bevölkerung von 
Java hatte das Kultursystem jedoch verheerende Folgen. Da die Bauern nicht 
auf ihrem ganzen Land Reis anbauen konnten, wurden ihre Vorräte an diesem 
Hauptnahrungsmittel immer knapper. Ein einziges Jahr mit Missernten reichte, 
damit eine Hungersnot ausbrach. Das Kultursystem hatte in Holland wirtschaft-
lichen Aufschwung und Wohlstand zu Folge, auf Java bedeutete es aber Hunger 
und Entbehrungen.39 
Die liberale Regierung der Niederlande hob das Kultursystem 1870 auf.40 
Zur gleichen Zeit wurde die Kolonie für europäische Landbauunternehmer ge-
öffnet. In dieser Zeit entstanden die großen Plantagen auf Java, wo vor allem 
Tee, Zuckerrohr und Kaffee angebaut wurde. Europäische Unternehmer konn-
ten von der Regierung für 75 Jahre Landgüter pachten.41 Auch in anderer Hin-
sicht kamen Änderungen in den kolonialen Alltag. 1869 wurde der Suezkanal 
eröffnet, womit die Reise zwischen der Kolonie und dem Mutterland wesentlich 
kürzer wurde.42 Regelmäßige Dampfschifffahrtlinien entstanden, Gasbeleuch-
tung, Telegraf, Telefon, Elektrizität, Eisenbahnlinien und später das Automobil 
machten das Leben in den Tropen wesentlich erträglicher. Diese Entwicklung 
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hat dazu beigetragen, dass mehr Europäer, vor allem mehr Frauen, nach Nieder-
ländisch-Indien reisten. Das Leben in der Kolonie wurde europäischer.  
Nach dem Ende des Kultursystems 1870 wurde die Staatskasse etwas ärmer. 
Die Staatseinnahmen kamen in den 50er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts zu 31% 
aus den Kolonien, nach 1870 betrug der Anteil nur noch 13%.43 Trotz dieser fi-
nanziellen Einbußen wurde das Kultursystem nicht wieder eingeführt, sondern 
die freie Arbeit gefördert. Man ging in der niederländischen Kolonie von einem 
feudalen System zu einem kapitalistisch-liberalen System über. Riesige Planta-
gen entstanden auf Java und auf Sumatra, die in den Händen von internationalen 
Gesellschaften waren. Neben traditionellen Produkten wie Tabak, Kaffee, Tee 
und Zuckerrohr kam der Kautschuk als wichtige Kulturpflanze hinzu. Man pro-
duzierte für den Weltmarkt und verdiente sehr gut damit. 
Neben finanziellem Gewinn und Reformen brachte die Jahrhundertwende 
auch politische Turbulenzen. Der Zweite Burenkrieg (1899–1902) verursachte 
in den Niederlanden große Aufregung unter der Bevölkerung. Die Holländer 
fühlten sich sowohl kulturell, volkstümlich als auch sprachlich mit den Buren 
verwandt und unterstützten sie – moralisch jedenfalls – in ihrem Kampf gegen 
die machtgierigen Briten. Das grobe britische Auftreten in Südafrika gegen die 
Buren und auch gegen niederländische Staatsbürger empörte die Holländer in 
Europa.44 Proteste und Demonstrationen waren die Folgen, aber die niederländi-
sche Regierung wagte es nicht, deutliche Schritte gegen London zu unterneh-
men, denn sie hatte Angst, die Briten könnten etwas gegen Niederländisch-
Indien unternehmen.45 Auch in so einer schwierigen Situation im Inland haben 
die Niederlande also die europäische Passivität gewählt, um ihre Kolonie, also 
den aktiven Teil ihrer Politik, zu schützen.   
Im Fall Curacao wurde auch deutlich, wo der Primat der niederländischen 
Außenpolitik lag, nämlich in den Kolonien und nicht in Europa. Die wichtigste 
und größte Kolonie der Niederlande war zwar Niederländisch-Indien, aber das 
Land hatte auch im karibischen Gebiet Besitzungen: Curacao und Suriname. 
Nachdem die Bedeutung der USA in dieser Region in der Folge des Spanisch-
Amerikanischen Krieges (1898) zugenommen hatte, versuchten die Amerikaner 
andere Kolonialmächte aus der Karibik zu vertreiben. 1902 hatte Washington 
von Dänemark die Jungferninseln gekauft und zeigte Interesse an dem nieder-
ländischen Besitz Curacao. Die holländische Regierung hat den Amerikanern 
deutlich gemacht, dass die Insel nicht zu verkaufen sei.46 Als 1908 Venezuela 
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versuchte, gegen die niederländischen Handelsinteressen auf Curacao aufzutre-
ten, haben die Niederländer hart zurückgeschlagen. Mit politischen und militäri-
schen Mitteln haben sie den Diktator Cipriano Castro aus Venezuela verjagt.47 
Wieder hat sich gezeigt, dass die passive, neutrale Isolationspolitik der Nieder-
lande nur für Europa galt. Wenn es aber um Besitzungen in Übersee ging, war 
das kleine neutrale Holland schnell, entschlossen und aggressiv.  
Parallel zum finanziellen Gewinn aus Niederländisch-Indien war die politi-
sche Führung in Den Haag geneigt, das Leben der Einheimischen zu verbessern. 
1901 war mit der Thronrede der Königin Wilhelmina das Startsignal gegeben. 
Einheimische sollten auch von den finanziellen Früchten der Kolonie profitieren. 
Vor allem auf dem Gebiet des Unterrichtswesens und des Gesundheitswesens 
kamen viele Verbesserungen. Das nannte man „ethische Politik“.48 Konservative 
Politiker warnten, diese Entwicklung könne das Ende des Kolonialreichs bedeu-
ten. International gesehen gab es reichlich Anzeichen in diese Richtung. Um die 
Jahrhundertwende können wir von einem Erwachen Asiens sprechen. Der Japa-
nisch-Russische Krieg (1905), die Entwicklungen in Britisch-Indien (1885 wurde 
der Indian National Congress gegründet, der nach 1905 öffentlich die Unabhän-
gigkeit anstrebte.) und die Entlassung der Philippinen in die Unabhängigkeit 
von den USA (1907) sind alles Zeichen der veränderten Zeiten.  
Das Unabhängigkeitsstreben und der Freiheitsdrang der Einheimischen in 
Niederländisch-Indien führten zu zahlreichen Konflikten zwischen Kolonisator 
und Kolonisierten. Die Gruppen radikalisierten sich, Konflikte konnten nicht 
mehr friedlich geregelt werden. Finanzielle Schwierigkeiten während des ersten 
Weltkriegs und in der Weltwirtschaftskrise in den Dreißiger Jahren  trugen zu 
den Spannungen bei.  
Als die Japaner im März 1942 Niederländisch-Indien besetzten, machten sie 
nicht nur diesen Konflikten zwischen Einheimischen und Kolonisator plötzlich 
ein Ende, sondern auch dem niederländischen Kolonialreich. 1945 wurde die 
Unabhängigkeit Indonesiens ausgerufen, worauf ein blutiger Kolonialkrieg folg-
te, der vier Jahre dauerte. Die Niederlande, die im Mai 1940 innerhalb von fünf 
Tagen ohne wesentlichen Widerstand von der Wehrmacht besetzt wurden, 
schickten 1945 eine 100.000 Mann starke Armee nach Indonesien und kämpften 
bis 1949 für ihr Kolonialreich – vergeblich.  
 
* 
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Die Position der Niederlande war im 19. und in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahr-
hunderts in der Welt sehr ambivalent. Die Niederlande waren ein “kolonialer 
Riese und zugleich ein politischer Zwerg.”49 Holland war zwar nach europäi-
schen Maßstäben ein kleines Land, trotzdem hatte es, dank seiner Kolonien, vor 
allem Niederländisch-Indien, Großmachtallüren. In Europa war es klein, aber in 
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Gábor Szabó-Zsoldos  
 
 
The Anglo-Boer Political Relations and  
South African Confederation, 1877–1881 




From many aspects the 1870s was one of the most important periods in the his-
tory of Southern Africa. Key events such as the mineral revolution, the discovery 
of the diamond fields in Griqualand West, the subjugation of the Zulu kingdom 
and other independent African chiefdoms, the Transvaal Rebellion (1880–1881) 
and the strengthening of the Afrikaner nationalism indisputably shaped the face of 
the subcontinent.  
My hypothesis is that the British colonial policy in Southern Africa during the 
second half of the 19th century can be characterized by different tendencies and 
changes. One of these tendencies was the British intention for the unification of 
the divided subcontinent (colonies and states) to organize a loyal, self-governing, 
white (particularly British)-dominated British South African colony like Canada, 
New-Zeeland or Australia. This study discusses this unification, with reference to 
the British official political tools and methods used in the Transvaal for the inte-
gration of the republic, as well as the role of this territory in various British con-
federation schemes. Between 1877 and 1881 the South African Republic was un-
der British rule, which (term) situation provided a unique chance for the Colonial 
Office to promote the confederation there.  This was the main reason why I chose 
this period. 
Concerning the historiography of the South African Confederation, I have to 
highlight two historians. The first is Clement Francis Goodfellow and his book 
called Great Britain & South African Confederation (1870–1881).1 Goodfellow 
examined the impact of the British statesmen’s personalities on the South African 
colonial policy. Unlike him, Norman Etheringhton neglected the „Imperial Fac-
tor” and emphasized the importance of the local intentions (especially the inter-
ests of Natal) and the labour supply.2  
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The main sources of my research were the official correspondence between 
the statesmen of the Colonial Office, for instance Lord Carnarvon, and the men 
on the spot, the Governors and High Commissioners, like Sir Bartle Frere or 
Theophilus Shepstone. Furthermore, I examined the Hansard’s Parliamentary De-
bates and other official documents, for instance the South Africa Bill or the Con-
stitution of the South African Republic.  
 
 
Southern Africa and the South African Republic in the 1870s 
 
In this period the subcontinent was economically, culturally and, above all, politi-
cally divided into the British colonies (Cape Colony, Natal, Griqualand West), the 
Boer republics (Orange Free State, Transvaal), and African chiefdoms.  
According to the theme of this presentation now I only focus on Transvaal’s 
political system. „The right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves 
according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British 
Government”3 was guaranteed for the Transvaalers by the Sand River Convention 
of 1852. This document determined the Anglo-Boer relations for more than the 
next two decades. Although the constitution of the South African Republic the 
Grondwet, which came into force in 1858, just like in the case of the Orange Free 
State, was based on the constitution of the United States, some differences can be 
found between the two constitutions. For example according to the former docu-
ment, in Transvaal it was only the members of the Dutch Reformed Church (Ned-
erduitsch Hervormde Kerk) who possessed the franchise and could bear office.4 
In a comparison with Cape Colony’s political system, where the franchise did not 
depend on religion or race, more serious dissimilarities appear. The Africans, the 
colored were completely disfranchised, as the resolution of the Volksraad stated: 
„ […] they [all the colored people] may never be given or granted rights of burgh-
ership.”5 
As the Grondwet stated: The President of the Executive Council is the first or 
highest official” in the republic and „[…] all public officials are subject to him.”6 
The place (institution) of the legislation was the unicameral Volksraad, which was 
elected only by white burghers. Besides the President, the Commandant-General, 
who was the leader of the army, was also an influential official, and member of 
the Executive Council.   
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Basically, with respect to the relationship with Great-Britain and the British 
colonial policy, Transvaal had two disputed questions. The first issue was a terri-
torial debate in the Keate Award area (in the Western border of the Transvaal) 
and the plan for a railway between Pretoria and the Delagoa-Bay, which would 
provide an outlet for Transvaal to the sea and it would certainly open up the re-
public for other powers (for example Germany). To prevent the building of this 
railway was a vital question for the Colonial Office.7 
 
 
The British Colonial Policy and the Transvaal  
in the Light of the Confederation Schemes, 1850–1881 
 
The history of South African Confederation can be easily traced back to the 1850s 
when the third Earl Grey was Secretary of State for the Colonies. The idea of the 
South African unity and the federal transformation of the subcontinent, a major 
pattern of the British colonial policy in this region in the 1870s, were born during 
his term of office, between 1846 and 1852. In order to understand the Transvaal’s 
role in these plans, it is necessary to have a short, schematic review of the various 
British South African confederation schemes, 1850–1881. 
In a chronological order the first was the third Earl Grey who planned the uni-
fication of the subcontinent on official level. He visioned a great South African 
colony, the extension of the British control to the hinterland and the introduction 
of the free trade as well. From his point a view the confederation would defend 
the Africans from the encroachments committed by white settlers, it would also 
provide better conditions for the civilization of the tribes and spreading the Chris-
tianity among them. From his point of view Britain had a great responsibility by 
the possessing of the colonies and had great and dignified duty: “I conceive that, 
by the acquisition of its Colonial dominions, the Nation has incurred a responsi-
bility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off. The authority of 
the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Provi-
dence, of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth, and 
thereby assists in diffusing amongst millions of the human race, the blessings of 
Christianity and civilization.”8 Lord Grey was convinced about the “civilizing in-
fluence of commerce”, which with the work of the missionaries, within the bor-
ders of a confederation would civilize the native tribes.9 Although Earl Grey’s 
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scheme, which was based on his humanitarian and philanthropic attitude, was re-
jected probably by the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, he permanently ex-
posed his views about the South African politics during the next decades.10 Lord 
Grey published three pamphlets which concerned with the South African Confed-
eration and the problems of the unification of the subcontinent which indicate the 
importance what that question meant for him.11 
The next proposer of the confederation was Sir George Grey, the Governor of 
the Cape and High Commissioner (1854–1861). This was the first, but not the last 
time that the confederation policy was elaborated in South Africa, which caused 
conflicts in some periods between the Governorship and the Colonial Office. In 
Sir George Grey’s case there were huge differences between his plans about the 
confederation plans and the South African policy of the Colonial Office (the Sec-
retary of State for the Colonies was Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton).12 
The concept of the South African Confederation was in some parts similar to 
Earl Grey’s scheme when the Duke of Buckingham and Earl Granville were the 
heads of the Colonial Office. Both of them were convinced that the protection of 
the Africans was the Imperial Government’s duty, but in order to reduce the Im-
perial responsibilities, the white settlers had to defend themselves. It meant that 
Earl Granville started to withdraw the Imperial troops from South Africa.  
For Lord Kimberley, the leader of the Colonial Office during Gladstone’s first 
Premiership from 1870 to 1874, the consolidation of the Diamond Fields crisis 
was the main South African issue. He was hoping that the ownership dispute 
about the Diamond Fields would be easily solved within the Confederation. The 
cornerstone of Kimberley’s scheme was Cape Colony and the colonial initiation, 
the desire for the unity, which he found the most important preliminary necessity 
for forming the Confederation but the unwillingness of Cape political leaders de-
termined the fall of the liberal plan. 
The British confederation schemes of the period before 1874 can be divided 
into two groups:  
To the first belong the Earl Grey’s plan and those which viewed the Confed-
eration from a humanitarian and philanthropic aspect. Others emphasized the fi-
nancial advantages of the united South African colony, namely the reduction of 
the Imperial expenditures and responsibilities. 
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Lord Carnarvon’s Confederation Policy, 1874–1878 
 
Disraeli’s second government brought about various changes in the British colo-
nial policy, particularly in South Africa. Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies had great experience in the process of the colonial unification. 
During his first Secretaryship of State, in 1867 the British North America Act was 
introduced which brought federal unity for the British colonies in North America. 
The Canadian model was in many parts an example for Carnarvon in the case of 
South Africa.13  
Carnarvon’s confederation scheme can be summarized by its three main ele-
ments: 
The first, which was his primary motive, was to secure the hinterland of 
Simon’s Bay and its military and naval station which had a high strategic impor-
tance in Imperial level. Simon’s Bay, from his point of view, even in the case of 
the Confederation, had to be retained under Imperial control. In favor of the better 
protection of this second Gibraltar (that is the second point) Carnarvon knew well 
that the colonists’ loyalty was indispensable. To attain this purpose it seemed nec-
essary to give them self-government. The third main point of his plan and strategy 
concerned with the native relations. Carnarvon hoped that the shadow of the anti-
white black alliance and the independent tribes would convince the white com-
munities about the necessity of the intercolonial common policy affecting Afri-
cans, which could be the first step on the road to the South African Confederation. 
Nevertheless, he and other leaders of the Colonial Office found essential to main-
tain some control over the South African native policy. 
In addition, there were other patterns which highlight Carnarvon’s policy from 
others. Unlike his predecessors, who had only concentrated on the remedy of the 
actual conflicts, Lord Carnarvon had a colonial and imperial perspective and be-
lieved that the Confederation would determine the future of the British interests in 
the subcontinent for a long time. The South African Confederation, being the way 
to guarantee the security of Cape’s naval station, was a cardinal part of his impe-
rial perception.  
In contrast with Lord Cardwell or Lord Granville Lord Carnarvon did not care 
about the financial burden of the British colonial policy in South Africa and 
unlike Kimberley, he did not wait for the South African initiation to propose the 
confederation. 
Although his successors, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach (1878–1880) through Sir 
Bartle Frere, the Governor of Cape, and for a short time the liberal Lord Kimber-
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ley attempted to maintain the confederation policy (after the British defeat in 
Isandhlwana just the sham policy), Carnarvon’s scheme failed during the summer 
of 1880 because of the resistance of the colonies.  
 
 
The Annexation of the Transvaal 
 
It is necessary to emphasize the fact that between 1877 and 1881 the Transvaal 
was under a direct British rule. The roots of the British annexation can be found 
in the South African Republic in 1876.  
The failures of the war with the Pedis in North Transvaal as well as the empty 
Treasury induced the Volksraad to ask Her Majesty’s Government to undertake 
the governing of their country.14 It seemed a unique and historical chance for the 
Colonial Office to neutralize the Sand River Convention of 1852 and carry out a 
bloodless annexation. In his letter to Sir Henry Barkly, the Governor of Cape and 
High Commissioner, Carnarvon exposed his opinion: „It would then, in any case, 
be necessary for Her Majesty’s Government to insist upon this war being brought 
to a speedy close, and to take sufficient guarantees against any similar danger to 
British interests in future. There can be no doubt that the safety and prosperity of 
the Republic would be best assured by its union with the British Colonies, when 
no occasion for local wars would continue to exist. […] But the course which 
events have taken leave me no longer in the same position, and it is obvious that 
my inclination in favour of continuing to co-operate with the Transvaal as a sepa-
rate State may have to be modified.”15 
Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who entered to the Transvaal on 4th January 1877, 
was sent to the South African Republic as a Special Commissioner.16 His mission 
was to convince the Volksraad about the necessity of the annexation, but when 
President Burgers and the political leaders showed unwillingness, Shepstone pro-
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Political Tools and Methods 
 
Lord Carnarvon, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach and Lord Kimberley, the Secretaries of 
State for the Colonies between 1877 and 1881, operated with numerous political 
tools and methods in order to involve the Transvaal to the South African Confed-
eration. 
The Colonial Office sought to organize a conference, presided by the Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies, where the delegates of the South African states and 
colonies would make a decision in favor of the confederation and would negotiate 
about the details of the unity. Although year by year the conference appeared in 
the sources as a potential solution for the conflicts, the Colonial Office could not 
convene all the delegates.17 
Moreover, especially in period between 1874 and 1875, Lord Carnarvon at-
tempted to bind Transvaal and President Burgers closer to Britain by promises. 
The Secretary of State tried to exploit the Transvaaler’s land shortage and the de-
sire to expand in the Keate Award Area and in the Zulu territory, exactly in the 
Utrecht region. 
Furthermore President Burgers’ long-cherished dream about the railway be-
tween Pretoria and Delagoa Bay, which would provide a sea outpost for Trans-
vaal, a link to the world and a chance to break out from the British encirclement, 
was also an important but less effective element of Carnarvon’s stratagem. In a 
case of Transvaal’s willingness to take part in the Confederation, he promised 
British capital to Burgers and contractors to build the desired railway as well as a 
possibility to expand the borders of the South African Republic within the Con-
federation. 
During the negotiations in London 1875 Burgers seemed to be openminded 
about Carnarvon’s plans. As Lord Carnarvon notced in his diary Burgers accord-
ing to the Confederation: “approved of every word and that he would give me 
every support and assistance in his power”.18 Although the promising signs, the 
attempt to make the Transvaalers enthusiastic supporters of the federal unity in 
this way was unsuccessful. The efforts to bind the Boers closer by the British con-
structed railway also failed – the Boers tried to find investors on the continent, for 
instance in Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and Germany.19 
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Lord Carnarvon and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach relied largely on the British co-
lonial officials, the Governors and High Commissioners, the men on the spot. It is 
worth to highlight two officials from that factor: Anthony James Froude and Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone. 
Froude, historian and the editor of Fraser’s Magazine, was Carnarvon’s eye 
and ear in South Africa in the period between 1874 and 1875 without any offi-
cial power, before the Secretary of State launched his new policy. In Clement 
Francis Goodfellow’s opinion he was the primary source of information about 
the subcontinent for Carnarvon, who based the confederation scheme upon 
Froude’s experience.20 Froude was an enthusiastic advocate of colonial federa-
tion and was definitely against any policy which purpose was to get rid of the 
colonies. He criticized hevily the colonial policy of Gladstone and Lord Kim-
berley: “Gladstone and Co. deliberately intend to shake off the Colonies. They 
are privately using their command of the situation to make the separation inevi-
table.”21 
In March 1874 Froude informed Carnarvon about his plan: travelling to Aus-
tralia to scrutinize whether the colonies could be drawn closer to Britain. Lord 
Carnarvon offered South Africa instead of Australia. For Carnarvon Froude as a 
well-known supporter of the idea of the colonial federation, seemed to be the 
most suitable and reliable person for gathering secretly informations about the 
chances of the unification of the South African colonies and states. Carnarvon no-
ticed in his diary the objects of Froude’s secret mission: “I explained what I 
wished him to give his attention to in South Africa, specifying three subjects in 
particular: 
1.  generally Federation 
2.  relations of Free States and Nations and ourselves 
3.  Natal in reference to recent insurrection. Agreed on this head that if neces-
sary I should write to him and appoint him a Commissioner to enquire on 
the spot. […] He expressed himself as fully and entirely satisfied in this re-
spect.”22 Furthermore the Secretary of State provided for Froude, with the 
approval of Lord Derby and Disraeli, £1000 for his secret service, which il-
lustrates well that Lord Carnarvon did not care about the financial side of 
his colonial policy.23 
  
Froude sailed to South Africa in August 1874 and visited each colonies and states 
including the Transvaal where he had promising impressions: “If we can make up 
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our minds to allow the colonists to manage the natives their own way, we may 
safely confederate the whole country. The Dutch will be in the majority, and the 
Dutch method of management will more or less prevail. They will be left wholly 
to themselves for selfdefence, and prudence will prevent them from trying really 
harsh or aggressive measures. In other respects the Dutch are politically conserva-
tive, and will give us little trouble.”24 He became convinced that President Bur-
gers and his people would accept the Confederation if they were compensated for 
their lost share from the Diamond Fields. 
Sir Theophilus Shepstone was one of the key figures who played a crucial role 
in the integration of Transvaal to the South African unity. By 1877 Shepstone was 
know as an experienced and reliable colonial officer especially in the native pol-
icy. He was Secretary for Native Affairs (Shepstone was invited to the coronation 
of Cetshwayo in 1873) and tried to conciliate the territorial conflict between the 
Zulus and the Transvaal in favor of the former.25 His knowledge was noted in 
Carnarvon’s speech about the South Africa Bill in the House of Lords 23. April 
1877: „They sent additional troops to the frontier, and they sent also as a Special 
Commissioner, and armed with the authority which they could give, Sir Theophi-
lus Shepstone. But no authority which Her Majesty's Government could delegate 
to him is as great as that which his capacity, his knowledge of the Natives, and his 
great experience have given him. I have known him now for several years, and I 
am satisfied that there is no other man in South Africa more competent to deal 
with the difficulties of such a case as that which now exists in the Transvaal.”26 
On 12th April 1877 Shepstone declared Transvaal as a British colony. In the 
proclamation he referred to „the inherent weakness” and the faults of the Gov-
ernment of Transvaal in the conflicts with the neighbouring native tribes. The 
Special Commissioner justified the annexation with the vulnerability of the South 
African Republic in case of the threatening African attack.27  Shepstone guaran-
teed a wide autonomy for the Transvaal, which resulted in further conflicts with 
the Colonial Office, between his conception and Carnarvon’s confederation 
scheme, which operated with a central government: „And I further proclaim and 
make known that the Transvaal will remain a separate Government, with its own 
laws and legislature, and that it is the wish of Her Most Gracious Majesty that it 
shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of 
the country and the intelligence of its people.”28  
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The annexation meant an excellent possibility for him to realize his scheme 
about the labour supply, influenced by Natal Expansionism.29 It also seemed a 
chance for the development of the South African interior, and in this way the 
Transvaal could be, in the dimension of labour supply, one of the most important 
bases of this process owing to his progressive native policy.30 As a Lieutenant-
Governor Shepstone ruled the country like a king, but it came from the actual po-
litical situation and not from his personality. He became involved in the Trans-
vaal-Zulu conflict and stood on the Boer’s side in this case. Thus Shepstone was 
often absent from Pretoria, where he left the provisional administration to his sec-
retary Melmoth Osborn and Joseph Henderson, his adviser. The Zulu conflict ab-
sorbed his energies and he couldn’t concentrate on the confederation, which was 
unacceptable for the Transvaalers without the elected Volksraad.31  
Moreover, the personal rule, his incompetence in the financial problems and 
his own concept about the Transvaal made him unpopular both in Pretoria and 
London, which resulted in his recall.  
The annexation of the Transvaal and the discussion of the South Africa Bill in 
the Imperial Parliament happened almost at the same time. It received the Royal 
Assent on 10th August 1877 and was published as the South Africa Act. The per-
missive Bill, whose first draft was elaborated by Lord Carnarvon’s staff in the 
winter of 1876, was to ensure the framework of the proposed Union’s political 
structure: „A Bill intituled an Act for the Union under one Government of such of 
the South African Colonies and States as may thereto, and for the Government of 
such Union; and for purposes connected therewith. […] And whereas it is expedi-
ent to declare and define the general principles on which the constitution of the 
legislative authority and of the Executive Government in the Union may be estab-
lished”.32  
The main principles and the political concept were based on the British North 
America Act. Although in some parts these two documents were word by word 
the same, a few differences can still be found, for instance unlike in Canada the 
Governor-General of South Africa would possess a power to disallow provincial 
Acts.33 
Related to the Transvaal, the first draft stated: „In the event of the admission 
into the Union of the Orange Free State or the South African Republic, otherwise 
called the Transvaal Republic, all persons at the time resident in and enjoying the 
rights of citizenship within the said State and Republic respectively, and not being 
already British subjects, shall be and they are hereby declared to be henceforth 
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ipso facto naturalized subjects of the Queen.”34 Nevertheless the naturalization 
was canceled by the amendments in the House of Commons on 31 July 1877 and 
the Transvaal was not mentioned in the South Africa Act.35 
From late 1876 Carnarvon hoped that Natal would annex the South African 
Republic and the 58th clause of the South Africa Act rendered a possibility for the 
British colony (as well as Cape Colony) to incorporate the republic.36 
In case of the Transvaal there were some problematic points of the Act. First 
of all, as Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies and Carnar-
von’s cousin and adviser stated, Shepstone’s guarantee for the South African Re-
public stood as an obstacle on the way to the federal unity and to the acceptance 
the unification by the Transvaalers and to the incorporation of the republic by Na-
tal. The Special Commissioner’s proclamation had promised „that the Transvaal 
will remain a separate Government, with its own laws and legislature”37, but the 
South Africa Act distributed the legislative power between the bicameral Union 
Parliament (Legislative Council, House of Assembly) and the provincial councils, 
just like in the case of the central executive power and the provincial govern-
ments. Furthermore, the restoration of the elected Volksraad was an essential po-
litical purpose and condition for any political cooperation. 
A few symbolic elements can be found in the British confederation schemes 
which were mostly to convince the Transvaalers about the advantages of the 
unity. For instance, Owen Lanyon, Shepstone’s successor tried to pacify the 
Transvaal People’s Committee and neutralize their demands with plans about the 
new flag of the colony, which might combine the Union Jack and the Vierkleur. 
Probably the language was a more significant question than the national col-
ours. Shepstone’s proclamation gave the Dutch language the parity with English: 
„That arrangements will be made by which the Dutch language will practically be 
as much the official language as the English; all laws, proclamations, and Gov-
ernment notices will be published in the Dutch language; in the Legislative As-
sembly members may, as they do now, use either language;”.38 As opposed to the 
proclamation, the South Africa Bill did not contain any clause about the use of 
language. 
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Carnarvon knew well that he had to make some kind of concessions for the 
South African Republic. For example in the South Africa Bill the President can be 
found among the chief executive officers of the provinces, such as the Governor, 
Lieutenant-Governor and Administrator.39 Considering the Transvaaler’s republi-
canism, according to the plans, the chief executive officer would be called Presi-
dent, which was excepted to be more acceptable for the Boers than the Governor 
or the Lieutenant-Governor. 
 
 
Concepts about the Transvaal  
after Lord Carnarvon’s resignation 
 
The leaders of the British colonial policy who succeeded Carnarvon had to con-
centrate on preventing the escalation of a crisis in Transvaal. This was the pri-
mary motive and purpose of the Colonial Office in this colony after the devastat-
ing British defeat in Isandhlwana on 22 Jan. 1879. (Zulu war), which meant the 
fail of Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of 
the Cape Colony, and his grand design about the transformation of the whole sub-
continent.  
By the spring of 1879 it seemed that the temple of Janus would not be closed 
in South Africa. Reports informed Frere that the Boer leaders and their followers 
assembled in an armed camp where Zulu envoys visited them. It induced Frere to 
transmit the People’s Committee demands to London. In that document, which 
was signed by Marthinus Wessel Pretorius, M. J. Viljoen the chairmen of the 
Committee and W. Edward Bok, secretary, the authors demanded the freedom of 
their country from the Queen. For this purpose unwillingly but they were ready to 
fight: “What else can we do? Must we draw the sword? […] Must it then, your 
Majesty, come to war? It cannot be your will, just as it is not our wish.”40 For the 
conflicts and the problems they, just as Frere blamed Shepstone: “Now, how Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone able to get Her Majesty’s Government to approve of the 
annexation? By the untruthful reports that the very great majority of the people 
was for annexation.”41 It is interesting that in the end of the memorandum the 
Boer leaders emphasized that Transvaal is open for the discussion on the South 
African unity: “Your Majesty cannot desire to rule over unwilling subjects. Un-
willing subjects but faithful neighbours, we will be. […] Three years ago it was 
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the South African Republic that intimated its readiness to attend a conference for 
the purpose of discussing common interests in South Africa, which was invited by 
Lord Carnarvon, in order to discuss confederation. Two years ago Volksraad re-
solved as stated above, and in the name of the people of the South African Repub-
lic we solemnly repeat the assurance in everything that can conduce tot the unity 
and welfare of the several States in South Africa we will co-operate now and 
ever.”42  
According to the point of view of Sir Garnet Wolseley, the High Commis-
sioner for South-East Africa and Governor of Natal and Transvaal, if the Boers 
were reluctant to compromise, the Colonial Office would have to choose between 
two ways:  
1., the maintenance of the colony would require more troops there  
Or  
2., the abandonment Transvaal. The idea of the abandonment and withdrawal 
of the imperial troops was not alien from Hicks-Beach and some officers of the 
Colonial Office, for instance Edward Fairfield.43 
After the Liberals had won the general elections in 1880, Gladstone and Lord 
Kimberley, the next Secretary of State for the Colonies attempted to continue the 
confederation policy. Although the Legislative Assembly of the Transvaal passed 
the resolution in favour of the Federal Union on 7 June 1880, this represented 
only the view of the English minority in Transvaal.44 Furthermore, during the 
winter of 1880 five thousand Boers proclaimed the re-establishment the South Af-
rican Republic in Heidelberg, which led to the Transvaal Rebellion. The Trans-
vaaler’s victory in the battlefields resulted in the Pretoria Convention and the res-
toration of the almost entire independence of the republic. By the Pretoria Con-
vention Britain retained the control over Transvaal in just three questions: “(a) the 
right from time to time to appoint a British Resident in and for the said State, with 
such duties and functions as are herein-after defined; (b) the right to move troops 
through the said State in time of war, or in case of the apprehension of immediate 
war between the Suzerain Power and any Foreign State or Native tribe in South 
Africa; and (c) the control of the external relations of the said State, including the 
conclusion of treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with Foreign 
Powers, such intercourse to be carried on through Her Majesty’s diplomatic and 
consular offices abroad.”45 
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Despite the fact that the Transvaal Rebellion and the Pretoria Convention meant 
the end of the British rule in the Transvaal for two decades, the refusal of the 
Cape’s Legislature towards the federal unity and resistance against Carnarvon’s 
scheme resulted in the failure of the Confederation policy. Kruger and Joubert ar-
gued in the letter that they sent to Leonard Courtney, a pro-Boer member in the 
House of Commons, reflecting to the debate in the Cape’s Parliament: „Yester-
day, the Imperial policy of the last six years received its deathblow”.46  
The military conflict with the Transvaalers drew the attention of both the Brit-
ish public opinion and the Treasury to the South African burden on the Imperial 
budget. The South African military expenditures increased from £143,561 in 
1870-1 to £1,532,392 in 1878-9.47 The high costs as well as the British defeats in-
duced the press to criticize the annexation and the former South African colonial 
policy: „The annexation, even if it were justifiable as regarded the Boers, was the 
grossest of blunders. If the measure were expedient, it might have adopted within 
a short time on the application of the very community which has since denounced 
it as usurpation.”48 Another critic suggested the abandonment of the British liab-
lities in South Africa: „If by any means, therefore, we can retain our hold on our 
naval station at the Cape, and leave all the rest of South Africa to take care of it-
self with some reasonable prospect of success, we shall be at once ridding our-
selves of a most troublesome burden, and retaining in South Africa the footing for 
the sake of which we seized Cape Town at the beginning of the present century. 
In other words, what has to be done is to set the whole of South Africa free of the 
British flag, only retaining for ourselves, by treaty, the few square miles necessary 
for the existence of our naval port at Simon’s Bay.”49 
In light of the Transvaal the fall had various causes: 
First of all, the Colonial Office did not give appropriate answers for the politi-
cal challenges in the Transvaal in almost any case. Although Boer delegations had 
negotiated with the Secretaries of States two times between 1877 and 1881, the 
British did not take the demands of the Transvaalers and threatening clouds above 
this new colony seriously enough. Moreover the Boer political leaders were un-
derestimated by the British officials. For instance Paul Kruger, the former Vice-
President and his political adviser, the former State-Attorney Dr Edward Jorissen 
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paid a visit on 30th October 1877 in Highclere, Carnarvon’s residence. The Boer 
delegates visited the Secretary of State in a hope for a plebiscite on a wider free-
dom, a self-government for Transvaal. Lord Carnarvon, who noticed the meeting 
in his diary, was satisfied with the loyalty of those Boer politicians: “Both he 
(Kruger) and Jorissen promised to do all they could to influence their countrymen 
for good and to serve the Queen faithfully on their return.”50 Carnarvon’s impres-
sions about Kruger from his journal illustrate well the attitude of the British offi-
cals and statemen to the political leaders of Transvaal: “Old Kruger is a curious 
and really an interesting specimen. He illustrates, I take it, perfectly the Dutch 
“Dopper Boer”51 − obstinate, narrow, rough, unlettered, prejudiced: but shrewd, 
not untruthful, homely and except as regards natives by no means unkindly. He 
looked at Margaret as she sat by me at luncheon with evident admiration and 
watched her as she moved about. But his chief admiration was for the stables and 
the horses: and when I had a breaking-in bit put into the mouth of one of the 
horses and a dumb jockey placed on the animals back he was extremely inter-
ested.”52 Carnarvon knew it well from the day when he received the news about 
Shepstone’s proclamation (7th May 1877) that the annexation of the Transvaal 
would be one of the most important key events of his second Secretaryship of 
State and could have a crucial impact on the judgement of his whole political ca-
reer: “It is a step which I think has no precedent for many a long year but I think it 
is right and it will anyhow mark my tenure of office.”53 He was right. Two years 
later Lord Derby blamed Carnarvon and his policy for the South African prob-
lems: “I always doubted the wisdom of the policy of annexation, & assented to it 
reluctantly. It was a mistake, & one for which Carnarvon as colonial secretary is 
primarily responsible”.54 
The other important factor in the fall of the British control was the incompe-
tence of the men on the spot. The appointed colonial officers in the Transvaal 
were unable to make the Confederation and the British suzerainty acceptable for 
the Transvaalers. During the era of Shepstone the building of the Volksraad was 
rather an English club, filled with English Transvaalers, than the place of the leg-
islation, and the former influential political leaders were not members of the new 
Executive and Legislative bodies.  
Kruger and Joubert also blamed this factor, exactly Sir Bartle Frere for the 
conflicts: „Of all British officials who have honoured the Transvaal with a visit, 
there is certainly not one who has created a deeper impression of distrust than this 
writer; and there is no English statesman who has increased the aversion of our 
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countrymen against British rule to such a degree, as Sir Bartle Frere has done.”55 
Moreover, they found the British colonial policy absolutistic: „This system is the 
establishment and the extension of a British-Napoleonic Empire, ostensibly sub-
ject to the Home Parliament, but really governed by two or three persons in 
Downing Street, and governed as arbitrarily, as for instance, Cayenne under Na-
poleon III.”56  
The difference between the South African federal schemes which were elabo-
rated by the Colonial Office and the plans and strategies of the men on the spot 
was also an obstacle stood on the way to the successful unification of the British 
colonies and the Boer Republics. One of the most problematic point was the self-
government what Shepstone promised for the Transvaalers by his proclamation of 
April 1877. One part of the British officals and public opinion found the roots of 
the Transvaal Rebellion and the conflicts of South Africa in Shepstone’s policy. 
For instance Frere, who wrote to his wife in 1879 about this problem: “It was 
clear to me that it was not the annexation so much as the neglect to fulfil the 
promises and the expectations held out by Shepstone when he took over the gov-
ernment, that has stirred up the great mass of the Boers and given a handle to agi-
tators.”57 The third Earl Grey, who proposed the confederation of South Africa 
first also blamed Shepstone in his pamphlet, The Prospect in South Africa: “[…] 
promises were made to the Boers that powers of selfgovernment should be con-
ferred upon them, without taking thought, apperantly, of the fact that self-
government, according to the understanding of the Boers, meant that they were to 
be allowed to manage the affairs of the territory as they thought best for them-
selves […] The ill-judged promise to give the Boers greater power in the govern-
ment was not performed as soon as they had been led to expect, and in conse-
quence they began to demand the restoration of their independence.”58 
For the short period, between 1877 and 1881, the leaders of the Colonial Of-
fice, especially Lord Carnarvon tried to break certain tendencies, such as the de-
crease in the expenditures, which were indisputable for the former Secretaries of 
State. This attempt necessarily required innovation in the field of the political 
tools, methods and more initiative from the Colonial Office as well as from the 
men on the spot. By 1880 the change of the tendency broke under the external 
(resistance of the colonies, clash of the colonial interests) and internal (increasing 
South African expenditures) pressure. Under Gladstone’s second Premiership the 
restoration of former tendencies occurred.  
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Two Small Nations in between Two Great Imperial  
Powers – The Boers and the Finns  





This article seeks to analyse and discuss the imperial connection of the British 
Empire to the two Boer Republics of the late nineteenth century, the Transvaal 
and the Orange Free State, in comparison with the attempted Russification of the 
Grand Duchy of Finland by the Russian Empire. The temporal context is the “era 
of imperialism” which culminated in the collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hun-
garian and German empires during the First World War. This era in world politics 
was strongly influenced by the struggle for civil liberties, which reached its ful-
filment in the case of Finns in 1917, when Finland achieved its full independence, 
and in the case of Boers in 1909, when a national constitution embodying the 
principle of responsible government was granted to the Union of South Africa. 
The comparison of the case of Boers with that of Finns is mostly made in the 
context of the Victorian periodical press. Victorian Britain was the first “jour-
nalizing” society in the world, thus the mass media can be interpreted as the 
ideological environment of the modern world.1 In the course of the nineteenth 
century books began slowly to lose their previous status as the primary source 
of information and conversation. As their status waned, the new and more de-
mocratic means of reaching the masses, newspapers, pamphlets, periodicals and 
other various printed ephemera began to displace books. For contemporaries, 
these new channels of information, newspapers and periodicals (weeklies, re-
views and magazines) offered a channel through which to challenge some older 
interpretations of political thinking and political concepts as well as to start a debate, 
to criticise the opinions of others and to seek support for one’s own views.2 The 
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type of sources used in this article, can be categorised as presentative,3 since 
they introduced new ideas and engendered new points of view. 
The foundations of the popular press were laid in fertile ground. A growing 
middle class was eager to acquire the education it lacked and to question tradi-
tional thought and values.4 In many imperial bodies, censorship of books, pam-
phlets, newspapers and periodicals made expressions of public opinion increas-
ingly difficult in the course of the nineteenth century. In the Russian Empire, the 
supervision of “anti-Empire” expressions in publications was defined by law, but 
in reality this was a very broad field to be supervised and numerous guidelines also 
made interpretation hard for the staff of the Board of Censors. The situation in 
Finland shifted throughout the century and became intolerable only in the 1890s 
when several newspapers were permanently suppressed.5 In the British Empire, the 
situation worsened in the early twentieth century when censorship laws were first 
implemented in the British India in 1907,6 but in Britain authors could see their 
texts in print without distortion or manipulation by censors.  
The lists of contributors of the Victorian periodicals reveal many prominent 
intellectuals who analysed civil rights of the Boers and the Finns. Among the 
most important Finnish contributors were Docent Julio Reuter (1862–1937) and 
Professor Edward Westermarck (1862–1939), the future Professor of Sociology 
at the London School of Economics. Out of the British intellectuals, one of the 
most important contributors to the civil rights question was David G. Ritchie 
(1853–1903), Professor of Logic, Rhetoric and Metaphysics at St Andrews. 
There were also whole papers devoted to the cause of the Finnish people, like 
Finland, a British liberal journal published by Finnish activists and British Lib-
erals together between 1899 and 1900. 
The subject matter under the present investigation is closely related to the 
term “imperialism”. Used either to proclaim or to denounce imperial rule, it is 
known to communicate notoriously poorly both temporally and spatially. The 
modern concepts of “empire”, “imperial power” and “imperialism” were de-
rived from the Latin term imperium but their usage has varied at different times 
in history and in different places.7 According to Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 
                                                 
3  Martin Wallace, The New Age under Orage. Chapters in English Cultural History, Man-
chester, 1967, 2. 
4  Walter E. Houghton, “Periodical literature and the articulate classes,” In: Victorian Peri-
odical Press, 4–7. 
5  For further information see Tuomo Polvinen, Imperial Borderland. Bobrikov and the At-
tempted Russification of Finland, 1898–1904, Translated from Finnish by Steven Huxley, 
London, 1995, 192–195.  
6  Gerald, N. Barrier, Banned – Controversial Literature and Political Control in British In-
dia, 1907–1947, University of Missouri Press, 1974, 4–8.  
7  Richard Koebner, Empire, Cambridge, 1961, 18–19. 
TWO SMALL NATIONS IN BETWEEN TWO GREAT IMPERIAL POWERS 
 
173 
“traditional” and “modern” connotations can be separated in relation to imperi-
alism. The traditional connotations were synonymous with despotism. The mo-
dern connotations emerged in the 1880s and referred to imperial rule. From the 
modern point of view, an imperialist was, therefore, simply a person who re-
spected imperial rule.8 Furthermore, specific national connotations can be sepa-
rated in relation to imperialism and they should be interpreted in their national 
political contexts. 
As R. G. Collingwood, the late Oxford philosopher, has argued, in history, 
of all the academic fields, no timeless questions exist. Human thought commu-
nicates poorly temporally and spatially and thus it should always be analysed in 
its context. Therefore, it is the task of the historian to reconstruct the questions 
of the time rather than try to seek any ready-made answers.9 That is to empha-
sise the importance of analysing past concerns in their own right. The subject 
matters being studied should be treated and discussed only in their historical 
context and not subjected to or involved with current political debate.10 How-
ever, past debates and concerns over civil rights and imperialism have their 
value today because even if the empires they refer had collapsed, imperialism 
did not pass away with them. The durability of theories of imperialism demon-
strates how each generation has recycled and found them illuminating for their 
own time. Past concerns can indeed be socially important and relevant today. 
 
 
The Dispute over Civil Rights in the Boer States 
 
For the British Liberals of the late 1890s, imperialism referred particularly to 
South Africa, where the two Boer Republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State waged a bitter three-year war (1899–1902) against the British. A century 
after this war, historians have re-evaluated some of the old interpretations of the 
war, its impact and participants. The intention of the authors of these studies has 
been to go beyond standard conceptualisations of the war by placing it in a 
wider context of globalisation – an orientation which is illustrated, for example, 
by the compilation entitled Writing a Wider War. They feel that previous con-
ceptualisations did not sufficiently take account of new research perspectives 
on, for example, race, gender and identity. In addition, the name “South African 
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War” rather than “the Boer War” or “the Anglo-Boer War” is considered more 
fitting to reflect the complex nature of the conflict.11 
South Africa in the late nineteenth century consisted of British colonies and 
protectorates in an uneasy alliance with the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State. In the war of 1881 (in Boer eyes, the War of Independence) the Transvaal 
had defeated British troops at the battle of Majuba Hill. At the London Conven-
tion which followed, the President of the Republic, Paul Krüger, won a series of 
diplomatic victories over the British. Despite these victories, the Transvaal was 
surrounded by expanding British territory in the course of the 1880s. This di-
minished the authority of Krüger, whose presidency was already undermined by 
corruption charges. The dispute that was to alter the President’s situation alto-
gether was over the political rights of the “uitlanders” (outlanders), immigrants 
of mostly British origin, who constituted a majority of the white population in 
the major cities of the Transvaal. Johannesburg, a large cosmopolitan city at the 
time, was inhabited by some ten thousand white and a hundred thousand black 
miners working in the gold mines of the Witwatersrand (the Rand). The uit-
lander franchise question had originated in the early 1890s but beneath it lay the 
Rand capitalists’ discomfort over the government’s mining policy which was 
believed to weaken mining-houses.12 
South Africa was in the eyes of the world a peripheral country up until the 
mid-nineteenth century when diamond findings in the country west of Bloem-
fontein (later known as the Kimberley diamond fields) altered South Africa’s 
significance radically. By the 1870’s these diamond fields had already been 
transformed from being simply an area of small claims into an area run by joint 
stock companies. In 1871, ignoring the rival claims of the region’s indigenous 
Tswana people and the Boer republics, the British Government declared the 
diamond fields a British crown colony, Griqualand West, which was eventually 
incorporated into Cape Colony in 1880. The annexation of Griqualand West 
opened a new aggressive phase of imperial expansion in South Africa. Tens of 
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thousands of whites and blacks rushed to the area where the diamond city Kimber-
ley was born in 1872. In the struggle for holdings that followed, a few young im-
migrants from Europe managed to overcome their competitors. The most success-
ful of them all proved to be Cecil John Rhodes and Charles Dunnel Rudd, who 
owned the mining business venture founded in 1888, De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd., which was one of the largest British companies of the time.13 
By the late 1880s, Rhodes’s and Rudd’s visions were already directed to-
wards the north, the highlands of central South Africa. Between 1889 and 1895 
they managed to subjugate all the remaining independent African polities south 
of the Limpopo River to the rule of the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC).14 
The country was renamed Rhodesia in 1895 in honour of Rhodes. By the late 
nineties, however, it was already evident that mines in the newly-occupied terri-
tories of Rhodesia were not rich enough to compete with the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand in the Transvaal. 
For Rhodes, the dispute over uitlander civil rights offered an opportunity to 
undermine the Boer political power in South Africa. Furthermore, it seemed to 
serve his purpose to secure a British dominated white South Africa. From late 
1894 onwards, Rhodes began actively to seek an opportunity to stir up an uit-
lander rebellion in the Witwatersrand aimed at overthrowing Krüger’s govern-
ment. Following these developments, in December 1895, a column of irregular 
mounted infantry lead by Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, a close friend and admirer 
of Rhodes, launched a raid into the Transvaal hoping it would serve as a starting 
point for an uitlander uprising.15 
Without support and any true knowledge of the situation in the country, the 
poorly-informed Jameson forces were soon forced to surrender to the Boer 
forces. The miserable Jameson Raid was to have far-reaching effects on Anglo-
Boer relations. Firstly, after the Jameson Raid, the hostility between uitlanders 
and the Boer authorities intensified, and allegations of police misbehavior 
against uitlanders were frequent. Secondly, it united the people behind Krüger 
and his government. The third great effect of the Raid was that the Orange Free 
State, the sister republic of the Transvaal that had gained its full independence 
in 1854, determined to enter into a closer union with the Transvaal. A military 
pact between the two republics was concluded in 1897. Lastly, the moral sup-
port expressed by Kaiser Wilhelm II led Boers to believe that in future Germany 
would back their cause. By September 1899, an armed conflict between Boers 
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and the Empire seemed inevitable. After weeks of hesitation, the Boers finally 
issued an ultimatum on 9 October. Three days later the Boer columns moved 
into Natal, where the first battles took place.16  
In the global context the great effect of the South African War was that it ul-
timately severed many intellectuals from the British imperial mission, civilizing 
efforts of which had been thus far widely accepted. South African authors, like 
Olive Schreiner who together with her husband S. C. Cronwright Schreiner 
wrote a series of essays and political tracts in the 1890s attempting to shape per-
ceptions of South Africa and British-South African relations, gave a face to the 
sympathy for the Boers which existed at the time throughout Europe and the 
United States.17 
In rivalling imperial bodies, such as in France, Germany and Russia, the 
South African War and the widespread pro-Boerism offered an opportunity to 
express anti-British and anti-imperialist feelings but also to stress the defects of 
British colonial policy compared with that of the French, the Germans or the 
Russians.18 Many voluntary groups, fighting in the Boer ranks, including Ame-
rican, Russian, German, French, Hungarian and Scandinavian, expressed the 
whole pro-Boer atmosphere in practical terms. In a post-apartheid world it is 
sometimes difficult to remember how persistent a phenomenon pro-Boerism in 
fact was. Up to the 1960’s Boers were still being seen as a progressive rather 
than a pariah people in many parts of the world.19 
Pro-Boer sentiments were stronger in the Russian Empire than anywhere 
else in Europe. On the one hand, Russian pro-Boerism was closely connected 
with nationalism. In this context, the British South African policy was under-
stood in terms of a liberal capitalism which did not show any respect for the 
Boer rural culture. On the other hand, in a way quite opposite to nationalist po-
litical thinking, pro-Boer sentiment was for the Russian social-democrats and 
liberals a way of expressing their anti-Tsarist attitudes. The social-democrats 
and the liberals consequently searched actively for points of correlation between 
the Boers and the minorities in the Russian Empire.20 
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Philosophical Arguments in Justification  
and Condemnation of the War 
 
The vastly expanded uitlander population in Johannesburg had placed civil 
rights at the heart of the Anglo-Boer conflict in the early 1890’s, but diverse and 
even contradictory connotations of liberty have existed in political theory for 
almost four centuries. In the 1640’s England, the King and the parliamentarians 
fought a series of battles over military and political hegemony, but also over po-
litical vocabulary. In this battle, the classical form of liberty was defined as be-
ing free to act at one’s own will. This understanding was further defined by 
Thomas Hobbes in De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651), in which his view of 
state sovereignty reached its mature form. According to Hobbes’s definition, 
civil liberty was the degree of freedom of will which was left outside the do-
main of the law.21  
Supporters of the English republic, in their turn, supported a parallel, neo-
Roman theory of civil liberty, which was put forward by James Harrington in The 
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656). The focus of neo-Roman civil rights was not so 
much on individual rights as on the liberty of the Commonwealth, the whole body 
of the people. These liberties were undermined if they were threatened by force by 
another state. This argument clearly arises from the Declaration of American 
Independence. Being colonised and thus enslaved by the English, the thirteen 
North American colonies considered their liberties to be threatened.22 
After losing the thirteen American colonies, Britain reoriented the mercantil-
ist system towards its Empire in Asia and Africa, stretching from the Indian 
subcontinent to the southern shores of Africa by early nineteenth century. Under 
the mercantilist system, the expansionist dynamic came from trading companies 
with only a little encouragement from the British government. The critics of the 
mercantilist system now asked whether the lessons of North America were simi-
larly valid elsewhere in the Empire and what the purpose of possessing colonies 
was in general. The national economic advantages could be obtained by colonial 
trade which did not require the actual possession of colonies. In fact, the whole 
origin of the history of a critical attitude to empire lay in this liberal criticism of 
the mercantile system. In the mid-nineteenth century, the critics of colonialism 
were only a minority faction among Liberals but they managed to lay the foun-
dations for late nineteenth century liberal anti-imperialism. 
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Another important contribution to the liberal political theory came from Brit-
ish idealism, which was a deeply responsive philosophy in dealing with many of 
the concerns of the Late-Victorian and Edwardian eras.23 Idealists had to fight 
many battles over the prejudices against German philosophy in Britain. Idealism 
was typically regarded as incoherent and absurd or even dangerous as it was as-
sociated with continental upheavals and crises. These prejudices concerning 
idealism reached their climax in 1914 when the British idealists had to defend 
their position against accusations of harbouring blind state obedience or even a 
Prussian type of militarism in their thought.24 Idealists did not offer a single re-
sponse to the South African crisis nor did they agree on whether the Russian 
Empire possessed any rights that could have justified its repressive actions in 
Finland. They did, however, make important contributions in translating idealist 
theory into practical policies. Ritchie, among some other idealist thinkers, most 
notably R. B. Haldane, Henry Jones and J. S. Mackenzie, endorsed the war on 
the grounds that the Boer Republics were morally corrupt.25 
The Boer Republics based their claim for national self-determination on the 
natural rights theory, which had already been challenged by Edmund Burke, 
Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx.26 Ritchie’s challenge, however, was practical 
rather than theoretical. Ritchie, like many contemporary British idealist think-
ers, oriented his philosophical idealism towards contemporary political issues. 
In doing so he gained a reputation for progressive political sympathies and 
joined many of radical societies and movements of the time, including the Brit-
ish signatories of the international petition to the cause of the Finnish people.27 
However, Ritchie did not have one single programme but he was interested in 
developing a political and social philosophy from idealist foundations. His 
uniqueness in idealist thinking rises from his analysis of the application of evo-
lutionary theories to political thought.28  
In Darwinism and Politics (1889), Principles of State Interference (1891) 
and in Darwin and Hegel (1893) Ritchie argued against the individualist dogma 
of laissez-faire expressed by Herbert Spencer and J. S. Mill. He challenged the 
antithesis between the individual and the state and pointed out the need for in-
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creased state intervention.29 Furthermore, he described the state and, indeed, the 
Empire as moral entities. As the state had its end in realising the best life for the 
individual, the Empire, in accordance with the previous statement, had its end in 
realising the best life for the colonies.  
In Ritchie’s evolutionary ethics rights, such as the right to self-determi-
nation, were not natural but derived from social utility and varied according to 
evolutionary standards. His evolutionary ethics justified a wide range of social 
institutions. Slavery, for example, would have been a perfectly justified social 
institution if only it had served a social purpose.30 Ritchie’s rights theory con-
cerned itself with human capacities in a global context. Therefore, the races of 
mankind did not possess any natural rights but rights that varied according to 
the civilised standards of the time.31 Ritchie supported the war because he felt 
that the Boer Republics were corrupted by their morals. Without the British, the 
oligarchic Boer Republics would have exploited the natives endlessly. Ritchie 
asked, to support his theory, if Cromwell would have put the rights of the An-
glo-Saxon race before the political freedom of mankind.32 
An idea of mature nations assisting younger nations to reach full citizenship 
was appealing for Ritchie, who defended South African war policy on the prin-
ciple that the war was like a classical struggle for “true constitutional democ-
racy”. The cause of the British Empire seemed to him as just and the South Af-
rican War as inevitable as had been the struggle between the North and the 
South in America. In Ritchie’s mind, the war was fought for democracy, civili-
zation and progress.33 He pointed out that self-determination based on the natu-
ral rights theory was meaningless if society itself was not capable of self-
determination. This argument justified the actions taken by the Jameson Raid 
which Ritchie compared to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American 
Declaration of Independence of 1776.34  
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At the turn of the twentieth century, the dispute over the political rights of 
the uitlanders was widely compared by liberal intellectuals in the London press 
to minority rights questions then acute in various other imperial powers, includ-
ing the Russian Empire. The simultaneously occurred attempted Russification 
of Finland offered the liberal intellectuals an opportunity, not only to express 
their sympathy for the Finns, but also to point out the liberal principles’ incon-
sistency with imperialism. 
 
 
The Boer States and the Grand Duchy of Finland:  
a Historical Comparison 
 
 “Over forty years ago, at the brink of the twentieth century, two small nations 
were unjustifiably attacked by their much bigger and powerful neighbours. The 
one was of our own people [the Finns], whose national privileges were com-
promised by the so called Manifesto of February 15th, and the other was the 
Boer people who lived at the far side of the world.”35 
In June 1902, the desperate Boer guerrilla war was over and this paved the 
way for the Boer political campaign. One of the best-sellers during the Boer na-
tional campaign was the war memoirs of the Boer General Christiaan De Wet 
(1854–1922) De strijd tusschen Boer en Brit (1902) which was immediately 
translated from the Dutch original into English (with the title Three Years War) 
and Finnish. In Finland, De Wet’s war memoirs were for long regarded as a 
handbook suited to the Finnish national struggle with the Russian Empire (or 
later with the Soviet Union). In 1942, at the time of the Continuation War, 
Finland’s political similarities to those of the Boer Republics were recalled in 
the manner quoted above. 
Finland, an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire since 
1809, had her own political institutions (the Imperial Senate of Finland), her 
own (Lutheran) church, army, her own legislation (Swedish) and gold-based 
currency (since 1863). The country also had a liberal middle class who felt 
greater affinity with the Western countries, especially Sweden, than with Russia 
and its authoritarian tradition.36 By the turn of the century, the Russian Empire 
was increasingly being transformed into a multinational state. Together with its 
chief national group, the Great Russians, there were Ukrainians, Belorussians, 
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Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Finns and other Finnic Peoples, Ger-
mans, Jews, and Romanians among other nationalities. The attitude towards na-
tional minorities shifted throughout the centuries. Before the reform era of Peter 
the Great religion had played a central role. The aim was to convert the non-
Christian subjects to the Orthodox religion. With the ‘secularisation’ of the 
monarchy in the nineteenth century these religious interests were superseded by 
political and economic ones.37 
The origins of the Finnish notions of empire, imperial power and imperial-
ism lay in attempts to conceptualise the Russian imperial power. The attempted 
Russification of Finland by the Russian Empire and the imperial power of the 
Soviet Union were understood in terms of imperial language. One should note, 
however, that Finns were never mere victims of imperialism but active partici-
pants in the creation of imperial vocabulary. Finns did not hesitate to describe 
their country as forming a part of the Russian Empire, analogous to that which 
we speak of the British Empire. Imperial ventures and wars were highly popular 
topics in the early twentieth century Finnish literature. Some Finns even partici-
pated in empire-building in Southern Africa. That is to argue that national his-
tory writing itself tends to contain elements of power as subjects, terminology 
and the styles of narration are chosen by the authors. There is no unit of power 
and, therefore, “power” cannot be quantified. At best we can speak of some 
having “less power” or “more power”. Studying power is consequently a prob-
lematic task for those who try to understand national history writing. 
One of the early Russian intellectuals who took interest in the case of 
Finland was Peter Kropotkin (Pjotr Krapotkin), an emigrant anarchist who es-
caped political oppression from Russia through Finland to Britain in 1876. 
Krapotkin’s article “Finland: A Rising Nationality”, published in 1885 by the 
Nineteenth Century, a liberal-minded London journal founded by James Tho-
mas Knowles in 1877, was the first straightforward political statement for the 
national constitution of Finns published by the London press. It was not, how-
ever, until Finns’ national privileges were compromised by the Manifesto of 
February 15th in 1899, a new Army Bill aiming to raise the military force in the 
Grand Duchy of Finland from 5,000 to 35,000, that the fate of Finland was in-
creasingly seen as an indication of a triumph of the autocratic principles of the 
East over the constitutional methods of the West. 
By the end of 1899 the Grand Duchy of Finland had entered a period of po-
litical conflict with the Russian Empire. In Finland as well as in Britain, some 
liberals recognised the similarity between the political situation of the Grand 
Duchy and that of the Boer Republics’ so far as questions of national self-
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determination and an imperial connection were concerned. Finland was seen as 
an example of a nation that had cultivated its inner national interests instead of 
setting out to colonise: “[…] it is the small states alone who, unable to attempt 
to compete in the race for territorial aggrandizement, are enabled to develop 
their own countries unburdened by the crushing expense of an army out of pro-
portion to their resources”.38  
In Augustine Birrell’s article “Finland and Russia”, published in July 1900 
by the Contemporary Review, the political rights and privileges in the “Consti-
tution of Finland”, granted to the Finns by Tsar Alexander I and reconfirmed by 
Tsar Alexander II, were seen as an example of a proper handling of imperial 
minorities.39 Founded in 1866, the Contemporary Review attracted from the 
very beginning many prominent writers including Arnold, Gladstone, Huxley 
and Spencer. However, despite the Contemporary Review’s liberal and tolerant 
tone, a more activist approach was not adopted until Percy William Bunting 
took over editorship in 1882. As a supporter of social reform and liberalism, the 
articles he included on foreign issues began to follow the same sors of argument 
which had already been pursued in relation to social matters.40 
In Birrell’s provocative article, Russia and its authoritarian tradition, repre-
sented by Governor-General of Finland, had no respect for constitutionalism. 
“Autocracy he [Governor-General Bobrikoff] knows. It is power unlimited. 
How is it possible, he asks, that what is unlimited in mighty Russia can be re-
stricted in tiny Finland? A Constitution is but a Ukase, and what a Ukase did, 
another Ukase can undo.” Imperious and imperial ideas, whether the Anglo-
Saxon idea or the Pan-Slavonic idea, seemed like to dominate the world at the 
time when the civil rights question were acute in places like Finland, Ireland, 
Canada (with the French Canadians) and South Africa. “Why be Finns?—
become Russians! Why to be Dutch in South Africa?—become English!… How 
absurd to be a Finn! What is the Finnish idea?”41 
It should be stressed, however, that not even the British liberals wished any 
other political solution to the South African situation than one compatible with 
imperial interests. An anti-war policy did not inevitably imply pro-Boer activity 
let alone anti-British feelings. In the heat of the war, any criticism was easily 
taken as a pro-Boer or anti-British statement. James Bryce, the author of Impres-
sion of South Africa (1897), for example, was seen as an opponent of the war but 
was by no means pro-Boer let alone anti-British.42 The British liberals acknowl-
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edged that Russia had an important civilising mission in Central Asia and the Far 
East.  
Richard Cobden’s (1804–1865) pamphlet Russia (1836) was arguing against 
writers and speakers who supported Britain’s intervention in the affairs of Rus-
sia and Turkey, as Cobden believed, on the false pretence that Britain’s com-
merce, colonies and national existence required her to do so. The Turks, ‘a race 
of Tartars of Asia’ as Cobden saw them, were described, in terms of economics 
and culture, as a backward people. In the same sor of ‘fierce tribes’ with ‘the 
rude habits of savages’ belonged the peoples of the Caucasus against whom the 
Russians were compelled to guard their Southern borders. Things were quite the 
opposite in the case of the Turks and, if the Russians were to seize Constan-
tinople they would be doing as great a favour for civilisation and humanity as 
they had done by their conquests in the Gulf of Finland. However, as this pros-
pect did not satisfy the trade interests of Britain, she blocked Russia from the 
markets and concentrated on a colonial trade that was not based on economic 
rationality or the principles of free trade.43 
Paradoxically, the British people accused the Russians of being an aggran-
dising people: ‘If during the last century Russia has plundered Sweden, Poland, 
Turkey, and Persia […] Great Britain has, in the same period, robbed – no, that 
would be an unpolite phrase – “has enlarged the bounds of his Majesty’s domin-
ions” at the expense of France, Holland, and Spain’. They had not even ques-
tioned their own expansion based on unsound morality: ‘[…] but surely we, 
who are staggering under the embarrassing weight of our colonies, with one 
foot upon the rock of Gibraltar and the other at the Cape of Good Hope – with 
Canada, Australia, and the Peninsula of India, forming, Cerberus-like, the heads 
of our monstrous empire – […] surely we are not exactly the nation to preach 
homilies to other people […]’. England had simultaneously acted aggressively 
against other powers and seized upon colonies while accusing the Russians of 
conquering Ukraine, Finland and the Crimea. These accusations were carried 
out even though Russia was surrounded by ‘barbarous nations’ one of which 
(i.e. Turkey) had institutions that were by their nature warlike and aggressive.44 
According to Cobden’s argument Russia was morally justified in having 
subjugated ‘less civilised states’. Russia had rooted out the ‘predatory habits’ of 
the ‘barbarous and indolent’ inhabitants of its Southern borders and kept Swed-
ish laws and the peasantry’s privileges alive in Finland by incorporating it into 
Russia. Annexation of Turkey by Russia would have been a morally righteous 
and humane act that would have led to a civilising intercourse with commercial 
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nations. Otherwise ‘these worse than savages’ would have spread war, destruc-
tion and pestilence amongst the European states.45 
Despite this legitimacy of Russia’s civilising mission in the East, they saw 
Finland as “a nursery of western ideas and western culture” within the vast Rus-
sian Empire as expressed by R. Nisbet Bain in his article titled “Finland and the 
Tsar” published in May 1899 in the radical liberal Fortnightly Review.46  
Professor John Westlake by his turn compared in his National Review article 
“The Case of Finland”, published in March 1900, the turn-of-the-century politi-
cal situation of Finland to England in the 1640’s where the King and the parlia-
mentarians were fighting over military and political hegemony but also over po-
litical vocabulary.47 In the case of Finland the Tsar had broken his promise to 
the Finnish people and thus violated their liberties. 
After the Manifesto of 15 February Finnish activists founded the so called 
Literary committee, the purpose of which was to promote the cause of the Fin-
nish people in foreign press. In London, its representatives included Julio 
Reuter and Edward Westermarck.48 Westermarck’s article “Finland and the 
Tsar” was published by the Contemporary Review in May 1899 and Reuter’s ar-
ticle “Russia in Finland” was published by the Nineteenth Century in May 1899. 
They illustrate strikingly the Literary Committee’s efforts. Both articles were 
published in liberal journals and they were both aimed at liberal-minded intel-
lectuals. The tone and the purpose of the articles were also similar: to explain 
the nature of Finnish autonomy to the British audience and the fundamental un-
ease the Manifesto had caused to that autonomy.49 
The Literary Committee’s work reached its fulfilment in June 1899 when 
Finland, an English journal devoted to the cause of the Finnish people was 
founded. Although Finland was short-lived, its last number was published in 
May 1900, it managed to achieve its purpose from both British and Finnish lib-
eral points of view: for the British liberal intellectuals it offered an opportunity 
to express their sympathy for the Finns and to point out the inconsistency of lib-
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eral principles with imperialism and for the Finnish activists it was a way to 
promote Finnish civil rights. 
The British liberals who were devoted to the cause of the Finns were anti-
imperialists by definition but not pro-Boer. Therefore, Finland’s pro-Boer 
movement was a very complicated issue for the British supporters of Finland’s 
national interests. The Finnish pro-Boer activists considered the South African 
War a British attempt to steal Boer land as a payback from the First Boer War in 
1881. The Boer Republics were believed to be in no way guilty for the outbreak 
of the war. The blame was placed on the “foreign gold seekers and criminals” 
who swarmed to Johannesburg. The war was also analysed in the wider context 
of British imperialism; the independent Boer states were in the way of the Char-
tered Company and Rhodes. After the Jameson Raid had failed, the British 
Government started to support imperialists in order to steal the Boer land and 
gold. Unlike the British, the Boers were believed to be a peace-loving people 
who were forced to defend their national sovereignty with arms.50 
However, the pro-Boer attitudes were not shared by everybody in Finland. 
Free Church journalist Frederick Lönnbeck’s (1854–1914) pamphlet Pro Brit-
tania (in Swedish, 1900) was warmly welcomed by the journal Finland since it 
tried to convince Finns that the Boers were not to be idealised.51 Lönnbeck ar-
gued that Boer social life was entirely based on slavery, a fact which conse-
quently revealed the brutal and fanatic nature of the Boer people. Finns were not 
properly equipped to make valid judgements about the political situation in the 
Transvaal. According to Lönnbeck, “Dutch race superiority in South Africa” did 
not serve “the general interest of peace” and consequently did not legitimate the 
Boer national existence. The British Empire, however, had shown its civilising 
capacity and was therefore capable of furthering European culture and Christen-
dom in South Africa. By expressing their pro-Boer attitudes, the Finnish people 
showed a lack of respect for the British civilising mission – something incompre-
hensible to Lönnbeck. Finns, who had taken their side with the anti-British party, 
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This British devotion to the cause of the Finnish people and the Finnish pro-
Boer attitudes exemplify how problematic political and ideological categories 
such as “imperialist” or “anti-imperialist” can be. For the British liberals, Fin-
land offered a channel, not only for supporting Finnish national interests but 
also for criticising despotic forms of government in Russia and the British Em-
pire. In terms of the traditional understanding of imperialism, liberals opposed 
British imperialism since the traditional pejorative connotations of the concept 
were closely connected to despotism. Yet, in its context Finland and its liberal 
supporters were neither pro-Boer nor anti-British. Finland’s autonomous status 
was understood as a suitable example of the proper handling of imperial and na-
tional minorities; a question that was quickly becoming a highly acute political 
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In this paper, I am going to analyse and compare policies of two states, Finland 
and Britain, relating to the League of Nations minority protection system. When 
boundaries were changed and new states were created in the peace settlement 
following World War One, a number of minority treaties were concluded and 
subsequently placed under the guarantee of the League. It was precisely the 
small states between Germany and the Soviet Union that had to assume obliga-
tions on minority protection after World War One. This paper discusses the role 
of Finland, a small state, in sharp contrast with Britain, a great power. I am 
starting from the premise that due to different positions of the two states, Britain 
had a more central, influential and visible role than Finland in the League of 
Nations Council.  
Sally Marks has argued that small nations were attracted to the League of 
Nations because of the promises that had been made concerning collective secu-
rity and the principle of equality of nations. However, they soon found out that 
equality between member states was only a theoretic principle. The great pow-
ers settled the most important political matters behind the scenes of the League 
or in separate closed meetings.1 Therefore, it is interesting to ask if matters re-
lating to protection of ethnic minorities were deemed as a realm of the great 
powers or if a small state could wield influence in them. In any case, Council 
members simply had to familiarise themselves with all issues which came on 
the Council’s agenda. 
Britain had no obligations towards minority protection under international 
law. As one of the most powerful League members, it had strong interest in the 
smooth functioning of the system and securing peaceful conditions in East Cen-
tral Europe. Britain also had long traditions in being relatively sympathetic – at 
least on a rhetorical level – towards human rights and minority rights in Eastern 
Europe. Britain had no problem in protecting minorities in other countries, but 
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the situation in her own empire was quite different: all outside attempts to ex-
tend minority protection to the British realm were completely rejected. 
As for Finland, it is important to note that Finland itself believed she “had no 
obligations” under minority treaties.2 The real situation was not that straight-
forward: Finland was bound by something akin to a minority treaty, namely the 
treaty on the position of the Åland Islands, 1921, concluded under the League of 
Nations. Sweden had intended to annex the islands, but the League awarded 
them to Finland. In the treaty, Finland offered certain guarantees to the popula-
tion of the islands for the preservation of their language, culture, and local tradi-
tions. The treaty was always mentioned when the League of Nations catalogued 
minority treaties, but it nevertheless differed from “normal” minority obliga-
tions. Originally, when Finland had joined the League, it had been asked to 
show commitment as to the rights of minorities. The demand came primarily 
from Jewish organisations in Europe. Finland opposed this, arguing that minori-
ties were treated equally within its borders. However, Finland was required to 
furnish the Council with information on the position of minorities, which appar-
ently passed without problem through the League machinery.3 
Within the League of Nations, the League Council acted as an executive 
body, meeting approximately five times a year. The Council had both perma-
nent and non-permanent members which were elected by the Assembly. Britain 
was one of the permanent members of the Council, the others being France, It-
aly, Japan, as well as Germany, who had joined the League only in 1926. Two 
semi-permanent members were Poland and Spain. In addition, there were seven 
non-permanent members, elected for three years. In practice, one seat was for a 
Latin American state, one for an Asian country, one for the Little Entente coun-
tries, one for neutral European states – to which category Finland was counted – 
and one for the British Empire.  Finland was a non-permanent member of the 
Council from September 1927 to September 1930. 
In Finland, the president formally has the right to make the foreign policy 
decisions. However, President Lauri Kristian Relander (1925–1931) mainly left 
foreign policy decisions to foreign secretary Hjalmar Procopé,4 whose role 
seems to have been large in the League of Nations matters. There was also the 
cabinet foreign affairs committee consisting of the prime minister, the foreign 
secretary and three other ministers. Ministry for Foreign Affairs bore the main 
responsibility of practical work. In addition, there was the foreign affairs com-
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mittee of the Finnish Parliament, which was primarily a discussion forum. 
However, in the League of Nations policy, the committee also had preparatory 
powers.5 In Britain, on the other hand, the so-called Royal prerogative tradition-
ally reserved the foreign affairs to the monarch, and by extension to the cabi-
net.6 The executive branch of the government dominated the conduct of British 
foreign policy also during the interwar era. The British parliament did not have, 
for instance, a foreign affairs committee.  
Hjalmar Procopé usually represented Finland in the Council, while Rudolf Hol-
sti7, Rafael Erich and Väinö Voionmaa participated occasionally.8 For Britain, the 
delegates to the Council varied more, with the foreign secretary in less regular 
attendance. For instance, the change of government in early summer 1929 had 
an effect on representation and, further, to the British role in the following 
Council session. Out of the British delegates, foreign secretary Austen Cham-
berlain had the most central role in the matters discussed in this article. 
Minority issues were handled in the Council from two perspectives. Firstly, 
minority issues were discussed in the Council sessions on a general level, as 
questions of procedure and principle. On the grounds that there were significant 
debates on procedural amendments during the late 1920s, this paper focuses on 
this aspect.  
In order to understand the arguments made in favour and against procedural 
changes, it is necessary to familiarize ourselves with the basic operation of the 
League of Nations’ minority protection. There were rules on how the petitions, 
i.e. claims to the League that a state had violated its treaty obligations, were to 
be examined. The examination of these petitions also constituted the second as-
pect of the Council work on minority issues. The petitions were handled in 
separate committees consisting of three Council members as well as in regular 
Council sessions in those cases in which the committees of three had not man-
aged to reach a compromise solution.  
Anyone could send a petition to the League of Nations, claiming that a 
breach of a minority treaty had occurred. The minorities section of the League 
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Secretariat examined the petition in order to deem it either receivable or not re-
ceivable, according to certain criteria. Whenever a petition was receivable, ob-
servations of the state in question were next invited. Then all the documents that 
had been generated thus far were communicated to the League Council, in 
which a committee of three, consisting of three Council members, was set up to 
examine the petition. The matter was dropped at this stage if infractions were 
unfounded or the reply of the accused state was deemed satisfactory. Whenever 
breaches of the treaty were found, the state was induced to enter into informal 
negotiations with the minority to correct its behaviour and make compromises.9 
If a compromise could not be reached, the matter was brought officially on 
the Council agenda by one of the Council members. One of the members acted 
as the rapporteur (during the late 1920s always the Japanese delegate) who 
summarised the question in a report which was then circulated to the Council. 
The state could at this point offer compensation or it could reverse its policy, 
thus settling the matter. If a settlement could not be reached even at this stage, 
the matter was referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.10 
 
 
The Beginning of the Discussion  
on Minority Protection in Late 1928 and Early 1929 
 
In 1929 there was a major discussion in the League of Nations as to whether 
any changes to the existing minority protection procedure should be made. 
These proposals related mainly to the transparency of the procedure, publicity 
and the rights of those who petitioned the League. The whole discussion origi-
nated from the Council session of December 1928, when petitions of Germans 
in Polish Silesia were, in a normal way, on the Council agenda. The Canadian 
delegate Raoul Dandurand proposed, quite unexpectedly, that the League mi-
nority procedure should be opened up and discussed in the following Council 
session. This led to an exchange of words between August Zaleski, the Polish 
foreign secretary, and Gustav Stresemann, the German foreign secretary.11 
Austen Chamberlain, the British foreign secretary, was not happy about the 
course the matters were taking, apparently fearing that the whole question 
would go too far and destabilise the political situation in Eastern Europe. He 
remarked to Eric Drummond, the secretary general of the League: “Now we are 
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in for a hell of a row!”12 This was just the beginning. During the following months, 
there was frenzied action around minority protection. It transpired that Canada, 
Germany and Poland were all planning to submit suggestions at the March Coun-
cil. The first stages of the discussion in both Britain and Finland centred on con-
tents of these proposals, information-gathering and subsequent reactions. 
From the British point of view, there were, at first, the Canadian suggestions, 
which related purely to procedural questions. The matter was somewhat delicate 
as Canada was a British dominion, thus part of the British Empire. It has to be 
noted that Britain was not in any way party to the Canadian proposal and for 
Britain the initiative had come as a complete surprise. Alexander Cadogan, the 
leading expert on the League of Nations at the British Foreign Office, painstak-
ingly prepared a memorandum commenting on Dandurand’s views in which he 
generally shot the Canadian proposals down and did not even take them very se-
riously.13 
The Polish diplomatic representatives kept trying to get support for their 
ideas in many European capitals. In early February 1929, the Polish government 
introduced their proposal of the general minority convention to the British For-
eign Office. The Foreign Office, not surprisingly, found the idea unrealistic and 
ill-advised: the Poles aimed at generalising the minority obligations, a policy 
that Britain always opposed. The universal minority convention, apart from be-
ing generally impractical, also had potentially dangerous relevance to the Brit-
ish Empire, especially to “certain parts” of dominions.14 
Soon after, Chamberlain and the Foreign Office heard from Drummond in 
Geneva that the Polish government did not want to put the proposal of universal 
minority convention on the Council agenda after all. The sudden volte-face was 
due to the pressure the French government had used on Poland – France did not 
want universal minority protection either and, due to the close relations between 
the countries, France had been able to influence Poland.15 This also supports the 
argument emphasising the great power prerogative in minority questions. 
Chamberlain conceded he was not entirely happy with the existing minority 
procedure. He advocated the upcoming Council discussion on the principles and 
procedure of minority protection, provided it did not go into details of individ-
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ual minorities or petitions. Chamberlain also considered that in view of public 
opinion in Britain he did not want to appear to be suppressing the debate. In any 
case, Stresemann could not abandon his proposal now, once he had so publicly 
broadcasted it, and Britain and France should save their energies to more impor-
tant questions in their relations with Germany, such as reparations and military 
occupation which were currently under reconsideration.16 Richard S. Grayson, 
in his study on Chamberlain’s foreign policy, has emphasised precisely this as-
pect: Chamberlain was happy to let Stresemann make pro-minority gestures di-
rected mainly to German public, while the real issues at the time were repara-
tions and occupation.17 
While Britain was examining the situation from a number of perspectives, 
Finland was very uncertain what line to adopt. The Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs primarily attempted to gather information on the attitudes of other gov-
ernments, in order to form their own opinion. At first, they tried to find out what 
the Canadian, German and Polish propositions would actually entail.18 In Lon-
don Eino Wälikangas, the Finnish chargé d’affaires, found out from the Foreign 
Office, the Canadian representatives and the Daily Telegraph that Dandurand’s 
proposal was about the minority petitions procedure.19  
The Finnish Embassy in Paris, for example, had heard unspecified rumours 
on the contents of the proposals and on the attitudes other governments were 
going to adopt and therefore asked information from the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs.20 In order to seek more information on the attitudes towards the Polish 
proposal, Procopé sent a circular telegraph to five Finnish embassies:  
 
Poland is probably going to put forward in the March Council a proposition 
to the effect of extending the minority regulations to all minorities. Please 
enquire carefully about the opinion of the government you are accredited to. 
Our attitude towards these kinds of plans has thus far been negative.21 
 
Therefore, the Finnish attitude towards the general minority convention was 
negative just like Britain’s. In general, discussion in the MFA focused on the 
Polish proposal. The Finnish minister in Berlin, Väinö Wuolijoki, then reported 
                                                 
16  TNA FO 371/14123/1544, Chamberlain to Tyrrell (Paris), 20 Feb. 1929.  
17  Richard S. Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign 
Policy 1924–29, London 1997, 133–134. 
18  See, for example, UM [Archives of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs] 15: IB 1a, 
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19  UM 15: IB 1a, Wälikangas to MFA, 7 Feb. 1929. 
20  UM 15: IB 1a, Paris embassy to MFA, 9 Feb. 1929. 
21  UM 15: IB 1a, Procopé to Rome, Berlin, Paris, London and Stockholm embassies, 11 Feb. 
1929. [Translated from Finnish by the author.] 
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that Poland had cancelled its proposition, largely due to the opposition from 
France.22 Subsequently, the Polish minister in Helsinki, Franciszek Charwat,23 
sought Finnish support for the postponement of the whole minority question in 
the Council. To that effect, he had a meeting with the highest official in the Fin-
nish Foreign Ministry, Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen. Charwat also enquired after the 
Finnish attitude towards the statements made by the so-called minority states, 
i.e. Poland, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. In the statements, 
it was argued that certain features of the current minority procedure were against 
minority treaties but, on the other hand, no changes to the system could be made 
without the consent of the minority states. Yrjö-Koskinen promised he would get 
back to Charwat once the Finnish cabinet discussed the matter, which was per-
haps a tactic designed to delay the Finnish reply intentionally.24 
There was a meeting of the foreign affairs committee of the Finnish Parlia-
ment (Eduskunta) on 26 February. In the meeting, Procopé gave a statement on 
the history and current situation of minority issues under the League. In the 
conversation that followed, a number of committee members expressed their 
wish to see the minority protection system enlarged. In general, the mood of 
parliamentarians was, according to Procopé, “minority-friendly”. However, the 
chair of the committee, Georg Schauman, disagreed and adopted a similar view 
as Prime Minister Oskari Mantere had in an earlier cabinet foreign affairs com-
mittee meeting: the minority question could not be solved in a formulaic man-
ner. This appeared to be the official Finnish line of policy at the time. It essen-
tially meant supporting the existing system. The committee, in any case, did not 
make a formal proposal on the matter.25 
Yrjö-Koskinen then asked Procopé’s advice on what to do with Charwat. He 
assumed that Charwat’s questions did not require any reply or statement on Fin-
nish policy. In any case, the Finnish Foreign Ministry had been instructed to as-
sume a “watchful attitude”.26 Procopé replied: 
 
If you are compelled to reply to Charwat, act evasive for example by pre-
tending you did not reach me and saying that we firstly have to familiarise 
ourselves with Dandurand’s proposal which I so far know only from news-
paper accounts. For your information: I think it is impossible to give the 
                                                 
22  UM 15: IB 1a, Berlin embassy to MFA, 14 Feb. 1929. 
23  A list of Polish diplomats, 
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24  UM 15: IB 1a, minute by Yrjö-Koskinen, 27 Feb. 1929. Enclosure: statement of Poland, 
Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, 20 Feb. 1929. 
25  UAV minutes, 26 Feb. 1929; UM 15: IB 1a, memo by Procopé, 4 March 1929. 
26  UM 15: IB 1a, Yrjö-Koskinen to Procopé, 27 Feb. 1929. 
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promises Poland is asking. Our attitude depends on the situation in Geneva. 
So far I do no see any reason to change our opinion which is, as instructed, 
favourable to Dandurand’s proposal as far as I understand.27 
 
This letter is very informative. Firstly, Procopé instructs the officials to lie if 
necessary. Secondly, the Finnish position at the time is revealed in this commu-
nication: Finland essentially supported the Canadian proposal. 
In general, there had been a widespread confusion across Europe, especially 
in the press, as to what the Council would actually deliberate at the March ses-
sion. Alexander Cadogan at the British Foreign Office summarised the situa-
tion: 
 
In particular, it seems to be expected in some quarters that the Council is go-
ing to reconsider the whole question of its rights and duties as regards mi-
norities, and revise its whole regime, if not produce a new one. Any such 
idea is to be discouraged. We do not, of course, yet know exactly what case, 
if any, Herr Stresemann is going to present. At present, the only concrete 
proposal on the agenda relate to League procedure: no question has been 
raised regarding the basis of League action, League responsibility, or the 
fundamental principles of the protection of minorities.28 
 
Therefore, two items relating to the protection of minorities were on the agenda 
for the March Council session: the procedural amendments proposed by Dandu-
rand and “the Guarantee by the League of Nations of the provisions concerning 
the protection of minorities” proposed by Stresemann. The British goal was to 
preserve the existing system which was believed to be the most functional pro-
cedural alternative. The Minorities Section of the League secretariat and 
Drummond called for Chamberlain to take initiative at the session. Chamberlain 
was asked to deliver a somewhat patronising introductory statement on the prin-
ciples of the League minority protection to “lower the temperature” and to clar-
ify the “true” situation. The Foreign Office was unenthusiastic. Cadogan be-
lieved it was best to wait how the discussion developed and react only then.29 
Interestingly, Finland was in fact doing the same thing. 
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The March Council Session 
 
When Procopé arrived at Geneva, it soon became apparent to him that Poland’s 
wishes for the postponement of the minority question were not realistic. Pro-
copé advised that the Foreign Ministry should act cautiously on Finnish soil and 
not commit to Charwat’s ideas.30 Procopé had meetings with League officials 
and delegates of other states, for example, Chamberlain and Eric Drummond, 
who all explained their views on various proposals which had been made.31  
The Polish representatives again sought Finnish assistance. The Polish per-
manent delegate to the League, Franciszek Sokal, wanted Finnish support in 
squashing the whole discussion along the same lines Charwat had already ap-
proached Yrjö-Koskinen in Helsinki. Sokal asked Procopé to put forward a 
proposition for a committee that would swiftly reject the Canadian and German 
suggestions as futile. Procopé, however, told Sokal he believed that setting up a 
more substantial committee – which was the general mood at the time – was a 
good idea. Later Zaleski warned Procopé not to support the British, French and 
Italian version of the future special committee. Procopé replied that, to Finland, 
this was a matter of principle relating to the interests of the League and to fair 
treatment. Procopé tried to assure Zaleski that the Finnish policy was not di-
rected against Poland.32 Therefore, in practice he refused to cooperate with Po-
land in the matter. Perhaps the Finnish policy was genuinely idealistic in calling 
for fair treatment and high principles, but it is also possible that Finland was us-
ing these arguments to justify its passivity. 
However, Finland was now on a collision course with Poland. The relations 
between the two countries were not very smooth at this point. In early 1929, Po-
land had tried to press Finland to sign the so-called Litvinov Protocol which had 
been suggested to Poland by the Soviet Union. The Poles wanted other 
neighbours of the Soviet Union to join as well. The protocol was meant to re-
nounce war among its signatories according to the principles of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact. Finland refused to enter the agreement. The Soviet Union, how-
ever, then signed the pact with Poland, Estonia, Romania and Latvia.33  
In the view of the endless machinations during the two previous months, the 
Council session of March 1929 was somewhat anti-climatic. Dandurand and Stre-
semann both spoke at length. Dandurand presented his well-known suggestions. 
Stresemann spoke, for instance, about publicity, communication with petitioners, 
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and the permanent nature of protection given to minorities. Finally, he proposed 
the establishment of a committee of enquiry to report to the Council in June.34  
Chamberlain was forced to comment on the subject of permanent minority 
protection, as Stresemann had referred to Chamberlain’s often cited remark 
from 1925, in which he had said that minorities were gradually prepared “to be 
merged in the national community.” Chamberlain now explained that he had not 
meant the abolishment of cultural characteristics of minorities, but had sug-
gested that the treaties would bring about conditions in which minorities could 
be loyal citizens. In his speech, he defended the committees of three, and sup-
ported the formation of the study committee. He also called for two improve-
ments for the minority procedure: greater publicity and speedier administration 
of petitions.35  
Procopé had considered beforehand that it was necessary for him to speak 
out on the grounds that the matter was important. He also wanted to emphasise 
the view of law and justice prevalent in Scandinavia. Thirdly, he did not want 
Germany to appear as the only champion of minorities.36 In his speech, Procopé 
argued that protection of minorities was one of the most important aspects of 
the League work and that it was based on the maintenance of justice in relations 
between peoples. Procopé worded his speech carefully, claiming to understand 
different viewpoints. Definite decisions on the large number of suggestions 
could not be made hastily and therefore Procopé expressed his support for es-
tablishment of a special committee.37 
The end result of the Council session was thus only a resolution which con-
tained the outlines for the work of the special committee. The Council in-
structed the minority rapporteur, Mineitciro Adatci of Japan, together with Aus-
ten Chamberlain from Britain and Jose Maria Quinones de Leon of Spain, to 
prepare a report on the basis of German and Canadian proposals and general 
discussion at the Council. The report was to be discussed at the June session.38  
During private negotiations, the great powers had asked Procopé to serve in 
the committee. Procopé did not outright refuse, but complained that it was diffi-
cult for him to be away from Finland at the time the committee would meet. 
However, the idea of including Procopé was soon rebuffed by the minority 
states on which, especially Poland, Procopé’s speech had made a bad impres-
sion and had branded him as a friend of revisionist minorities. Procopé however 
believed he had then managed to pacify the Polish representatives by supporting 
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a Pole to a membership in the League Financial Committee.39 Meanwhile, some 
misleading articles had appeared in Finnish and Estonian newspapers claiming, 
for instance, that Procopé had mainly supported the German view in the Coun-
cil. Polish reactions were likely to follow and, in fact, the Polish minister in 
Finland, Franciszek Charwat, had been “in a bad mood”. Therefore, the Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs asked Procopé to send a text of his speech quickly to the 
Ministry.40 Procopé believed the Poles would in any case calm down eventu-
ally.41 Apparently this was the case and the relations between Poland and Fin-
land seemed to improve during the following months. 
 
 
The preparation of the London Report 
 
The work of the special committee that had been set up by the Council com-
menced straight after the Council session. The British Foreign Office, together 
with the League secretariat, shared the main burden of the work. Along the lines 
laid down mainly by British foreign secretary Chamberlain and Secretary Gen-
eral of the League Drummond, the League secretariat and the Foreign Office 
began to draft an extensive memorandum on the minority question for the use of 
the committee.42  
The Council had stipulated that those states which were bound by the provi-
sions for the protection of minorities could send observations to the committee – 
so could other members of the League. This was by no means compulsory. 
However, Mineitciro Adatci, the chair of the committee, had wished Finland 
would submit observations for the committee.43 At this point, Finland was inter-
ested in the mood amongst the League secretariat and in the statements which 
other governments were going to submit to the committee44, while the others 
were also keen to know if Finland would prepare a statement of its own. Hun-
garians hoped Finland would contribute something. Hungary, usually adopting 
the opposite stand to those of the minority states, had naturally been happy with 
Procopé’s attitude in the previous Council.45  
The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was also eagerly following what 
happened in the capitals of the great powers and – in vain – tried to find out 
about the results of the committee work. In May Procopé telegraphed to Harri 
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Holma, the Finnish ambassador in Paris: “In the minority question you must 
remain fully passive.”46 
In mid-April, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs invited a working group 
which discussed the minority question in cooperation with the MFA and prepared 
a statement on the matter. The members of the group, chaired by Procopé, were 
Members of Parliament Georg Schauman (the chair of the parliamentary foreign 
affairs committee), J.H. Vennola, Väinö Voionmaa (former foreign secretary), 
Eino Aaltio and Yrjö Pulkkinen.47 Apparently the group had trouble agreeing on 
the statement, a fact that was lamented by Schauman. Vennola, for instance, sup-
ported the German proposal for a more extensive study committee to be set up 
later, contrary to the “official” Finnish opinion.48 In any case, the statement was 
to a large extent prepared and edited by the MFA. The reasons for the prepara-
tion of the document and its peculiar timing are unclear. Finland apparently did 
not want to submit a proper statement for the consideration of the committee, 
but wanted in some way express its opinion on the minority procedure. The 
Finnish policy in this situation seems very cautious and noncommittal. 
In the statement, Finland argued that minority obligations should not be ex-
tended. Nevertheless, the improvement of procedure did not constitute exten-
sion of obligations and was thus desirable. Procopé suggested amendments to 
the working practices of committees of three, for example by adding a prepara-
tory stage during which assistants to Council delegates would first examine 
relevant materials. Increased publicity was also called for.49 The statement was 
sent to Adatci as late as on 16 May, which meant it did not arrive for the Lon-
don meeting and neither was it meant to.50  
In London, special committee of three met on the 29 April. The committee 
considered observations made by states and interest groups. The resulting re-
port, i.e. the London report, included a lengthy historical section, a description 
of the current procedure, and recommendations of the committee.51 To con-
clude, the London Report rejected proposals made by Canada and Germany, 
and thus upheld the existing minority protection system. However, the report 
suggested some minor procedural amendments. Petitioners were to be informed 
of the rejection of their petitions, committees of three were to report the results 
of their work to the Council, and annual statistics of the minority petitions were 
to be published. The issue of greater publicity was deemed secondary to the 
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smooth functioning of the informal committee of three negotiations.52 The end 
result mirrored the views of the great powers Britain, France and Italy along 
with Japan: the system should be preserved in essence but minor modifications 
could be made. 
 
 
The June Council session  
 
As mentioned above, the London Report was to be discussed at the Council ses-
sion in Madrid which was held in early to mid-June 1929. Both Britain and 
Finland had some problems in preparing for the session. There was a general 
election in Britain on 30 May, and the Conservatives suffered a defeat. Conse-
quently, Ramsay MacDonald formed a minority Labour government. Given that 
Arthur Henderson replaced Austen Chamberlain as foreign secretary on June 5, 
neither was able to attend the Madrid meeting. The British delegate was thus Sir 
George Dixon Grahame, the Ambassador to Spain. He was coached by the out-
going Chamberlain. Chamberlain instructed Grahame to support the London re-
port.53 Hjalmar Procopé, attending for Finland, received the London Report only 
when he was already on his way to Spain. Therefore, the Finnish cabinet and 
foreign affairs committee of parliament could not be consulted beforehand and 
Procopé did not get any instructions.54 Both delegates brought their difficult 
situation up in the meeting of the Council in committee on 7 June.55 
In Madrid, the “Council in committee” discussed the proposal of the study 
committee, to prepare the matter to the Council session proper. Romania, in 
unison with Poland, wanted the London Report to be accepted as a whole, there-
fore closing doors for further discussions in the future, while Germany could 
not accept the report as a whole.56 Stresemann presented three alternatives on 
how to proceed: postponement, referral to the Permanent Court of Justice, or 
adoption of practical conclusions of the London Report with all parties reserv-
ing their opinions on the question of principle. Others generally favoured at 
least a partial solution by way of acceptance of the practical conclusions.57 
France and Britain tried to calm Stresemann down by promising a separate 
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meeting on the war reparations question and other outstanding issues deriving 
from the Versailles settlement. Their tactics succeeded.58  
Procopé at first thought the London report was unsatisfactory and was bound 
to be so in the view of the Finnish government and public opinion. He believed 
that the report in fact tried to protect minority states against their treaty obliga-
tions. When the Council in committee suggested some improvements, mainly 
related to publicity, Procopé pointed out to the MFA that those were in fact 
similar to what Finland had suggested in its statement in May. In the Council in 
committee session, he raised the suggestion relating to preparatory work that 
would be undertaken by “assistants” prior to Council sessions59. In his opinion, 
the report should not be adopted in its entirety, although the procedural changes 
could be authorized. He also pointed out that the change of government in Brit-
ain meant that the new Labour government was not keen to cling on the report 
that had been compiled under their predecessors.60 Procopé gave an impression 
of active participation in the discussion both in the sessions where he raised a 
number of points and in private negotiations. He also demonstrated in his 
memorandum how delegates of the great powers, such as Stresemann, seemed 
to trust him and valued his opinion. 
Thus the core of the matter was if the London report should be approved as 
such and in principle or if only the practical suggestions of the report were to be 
adopted. The latter line of action was chosen. Adatci drafted a number of differ-
ent versions on the practical suggestions during the committee stage, and finally 
a text that more or less satisfied the others was submitted to the public session 
of the Council.61 
At the Foreign Office, Ivone Kirkpatrick, a clerk in the Western Department, 
had a very low opinion of the competence of most Council members: 
 
An agreed solution will be difficult to find. Nobody except the Committee of 
Three appears to have gone into the question thoroughly and the views of the 
members of the Council are distorted by ignorance as well as prejudice. The 
Germans, for example, seem to have little idea of the complexity of the prob-
lem. As for the egregious Senator Dandurand, he is completely enveloped in 
ignorance. His un-called for intervention is most embarrassing.62 
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Others may have been ignorant, but the British representative Grahame him-
self, as a representative, was passive and voiced hardly any opinions during the 
sessions. There is no review of the role of Grahame in the Foreign Office min-
utes. However, an interesting remark is included in a despatch from Berlin in 
which Ambassador Rumbold describes German views on the Madrid meeting. 
According to some German observers, “the absence of a British representative 
capable of taking important decisions either in or outside the Council would 
necessarily deprive the Madrid Meeting of much of its importance”.63 
At the Council session on 13 June, the Japanese delegate Mineitciro Adatci, 
who had consistently defended the London Report during the previous meet-
ings, submitted the resolution on the recommendations of the report. Dandurand 
now expressed his satisfaction, and Stresemann had a conciliatory tone as well. 
The resolution was then unanimously adopted in a “much better” atmosphere 
than during the preceding negotiations.64 Grahame participated in the discussion 
by supporting the London Report as a distinct improvement, and by pointing out 
that public opinion would condemn the Council if a solution was not found.65   
The Foreign Office was relieved, although there were fears that the question 
would be reopened at the following Council session in the autumn.66 However, 
the minority question was not reopened in the League bodies in autumn 1929. In 
Finland, Hjalmar Procopé appeared relieved as well. He concluded that the Ma-
drid session and its end results had proved quite satisfactory from the Finnish 
point of view, linking the matter again to relations with Poland: 
 
“It is hard to evaluate how the matter worked out, but I feel that we have 
relatively well steered away from troubles. At least with the Poles the rela-
tions are much improved from winter.”67 
 
 
The Council and individual minority cases 
 
Apart from the discussion on general principles and procedure of minority pro-
tection, the League Council also handled those individual minority petitions 
which reached the committee of three or Council stages.  Minorities in Silesia 
formed an exception: according to the agreement between Germany and Poland 
in 1922 Silesian petitions were sent directly to the Council. Therefore, Silesian 
minority affairs came up practically in every Council session during the time 
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period under examination.68 Silesian minority petitions often received only a 
cursory reading in the Council, and actual negotiations were carried out behind 
the scenes. Sometimes, however, more detailed discussions on Silesia occurred. 
In general, both Britain and especially Finland were relatively passive in these 
occasions, while the Japanese delegate, who acted as minority rapporteur, and 
Polish and German delegates spoke out.69 It has to be noted that, as mentioned 
above, it was a debate on the Silesian petitions that originally sparked the whole 
question on procedure at the Council session in December 1928.   
As for other minority matters – apart from Silesia – only one case reached 
the Council in the period under scrutiny. The matter was discussed in the 58th 
Council session in January 1930. It was the case of ethnic Russians who had 
had their property confiscated during the Lithuanian agrarian reform. Interest-
ingly, Hjalmar Procopé had been the chair of the committee of three which had 
handled the matter and had subsequently referred it to the Council. However, 
the matter was not resolved even at this point, but was instead referred back to 
the committee, since Lithuania had made concessions that enabled the negotia-
tions to proceed.70  
At a lower procedural level, both Finland and Britain did their share in the 
committees of three. In fact, Finland seemed to be quite heavily utilised in this 
respect, relatively more so than Britain. Committee work often took a lot of 
time and matters were not resolved in one sitting. The League secretariat admin-
istered the handling of the large bulk of correspondence relating to these issues. 
The secretariat forwarded petitions and government responses to Council mem-
bers. Subsequently, examination by the committees did not involve that much 
politically motivated wrangling between committee members. The role of the 
rapporteur, during this period the Japanese representative, was also significant 
in completing the report in those cases in which a matter was referred to the 
Council. Finland and Britain were in some committees of three together. For 
example, in March 1929, a committee consisting of Finland (president), Britain 
and Italy examined a petition relating to Russian minority in Lithuania. Finland 
also chaired another committee at the same time, with Britain and Chile as other 
members. This committee addressed a petition relating to the rights of Bulgarian 
minority in the Romanian-governed Dobrudja.71  
Concerning the proceedings of the committees of three and the influence of 
committee members and the League Secretariat, Alexander Cadogan from the 
British Foreign Office observed in 1929: 
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It is, of course, true that I have only attended the small proportion of the mi-
norities committees, of which the British Delegate is a member, and I am 
bound to confess that on most occasions his two colleagues are not ex-
tremely helpful and do not appear to take a very lively interest in the pro-
ceedings, and it may be that on certain other committees, which do not hap-
pen to contain an efficient or conscientious member, the decisions may be 
influenced unduly by the Secretariat.72  
 
Cadogan thus lamented other members’ ignorance, but it is not known which 
members he was particularly referring to. And, unfortunately, there is no infor-





The question of altering the minority protection system of the League of Na-
tions came up in late 1928 and soon began to focus on improving the existing 
procedure. The initiatives came from Canada, Germany and Poland, while nei-
ther Britain nor Finland was very happy to open the matter. The first stages of 
the discussion centred on the contents and merits of different proposals. Finland 
and Britain essentially only reacted to others’ initiatives at this point. Britain 
was, however, much better informed on developments that Finland was. Finland 
seemed to have major problems in its information-gathering before the March 
Council session. This seems to illustrate that the great powers were at least to 
some extent willing to handle the matter behind the scenes. At the session, 
Finland sided with Britain in sending the examination of the matter to a special 
committee. 
Finland was also interested in the opinions of, for instance, Scandinavian 
countries, trying to enquire if there was a common Nordic policy. This was re-
lated to one potential direction of Finnish foreign policy, the Scandinavian co-
operation. In general, the Finnish attitude in the Council and outside of it was 
cautious and non-committal, in harmony with the currently preferred policy of 
non-alignment and League of Nations co-operation. However, it did not keep 
Finland out of trouble, since Poland was eager to seek signs of a pro-minority 
attitude in the statements of Finnish delegates, which led to minor misunder-
standings between the states in spring 1929. 
As a member of the committee that was entrusted the drafting of the London 
report, Britain was put in the centre of action in spring 1929. Finland, on the 
other hand, was again desperately trying to gather information on the work of 
                                                 
72  TNA FO 371/14123/1294, minute by Cadogan, 14 Feb. 1929. 
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the committee and the attitudes of other governments that were offering their 
observations to the use of the committee. The Finnish foreign secretary Procopé 
then invited a group of members of parliament to prepare a Finnish statement on 
the matter, but the document was sent to the League – purposely and in line 
with Finland’s cautious policy – only after the London report was finished. 
In the Madrid Council session in June 1929, the Council decided on minor 
improvements in the minority procedure. This was the end result of procedural 
debates of 1929. Hjalmar Procopé, the Finnish foreign secretary was relatively 
active at this meeting, while Britain was to some extent sidelined. The reason 
for the British role was the very recent change of government, which meant that 
the new foreign secretary Arthur Henderson was unable to attend. The active 
role of Procopé is harder to explain, but it could perhaps relate to technical and 
legal nature of many details under discussion, in which Procopé was rather 
knowledgeable. 
The discussion on general minority issues died out after the Madrid Council, 
not counting the fact that non-governmental organisations kept the matter in the 
fore in public during the following years. Behind all suggestions for amend-
ments hovered the threat – or possibility – of establishing a permanent minority 
commission under the auspices of the League or even widening minority protec-
tion obligations. These were suggestions that both Britain and Finland opposed.  
In committees of three which examined individual minority petitions, Fin-
land and Britain both did their share, and, in fact, Finland had relatively heavy 
responsibilities. This shows that Finland had a reputation as a conscientious 
Council member. Confirming the hypothesis of this paper, Finland usually 
wanted to follow the lead of the great powers, while Britain was a more active 
policy maker. Finland and Britain often followed similar lines in their policies, 
largely because Finland desired to back the ideas suggested by the most impor-
tant Council members. Sometimes it is hard to find out in the official documents 
what the Finnish policy actually was. In those cases when Finland was clearly 
more active than usual, primarily at the Madrid Council, the personal role of 
foreign secretary Procopé appears to have been important. All things consid-
ered, both Finland and Britain generally managed to sail the middle course 






An Unfortunate Kinship  





The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, it endeavours to show how diplomacy 
and semi-official cultural and propaganda organisations of two nations, Finland 
and Hungary, viewed each other and their interests in the campaign – a common 
cause with Nazi Germany – against the Soviet Union from 1941 to 19451. Sec-
ondly, the article aims at analysing how the realities of the war and the prospect 
of defeat changed all that. The method of study is that of the history of ideas 
and of kinship ideology as applied to eavesdropping on the dialogue of the rep-
resentatives of the two nations2.  
The kinship movement is examined here as a variation of pan-movements 
and its ideology as representing macro-nationalism in its attempts to establish 
ideational links between two nations, Hungary and Finland, which stand rela-
tively far away from each other in Europe.3 This peculiar rapprochement of 
Hungarian and Finnish kinship enthusiasts and sympathizers was a mutual play 
of dualism of Identity (or “We”) and Alterity (or “the Other”) for they, as it 
were, mentally travelled into the spaces of another in order to overcome differ-
ence and encounter familiarity. In comparison to the earlier, primarily cultural 
identification of the late 19th century4, the interwar and wartime contacts and co-
operation enhanced the basic, common identity of them and lifted it onto the 
level political identification. In what follows also this process of valorization, 
i.e. making the “We” valid, giving it surplus-value and devaluing the “Others” 
(Russians, Romanians, Jews), is disentangled, showing that the former acts of 
exclusion were being transformed into actions of inclusion as the common ex-
                                                 
1  The military relations have partly been covered by Antal Pergel, Harag és elfogultság 
nelkül. Magyar–finn katonai és politikai kapcsolatok 1939–1944. Budapest: Püski, 2009. 
2  See Anssi Halmesvirta, Ideology and Argument. Studies in British, Finnish and Hungari-
an Thought.  Helsinki: Gummerus, 2006, 8–9. 
3  Cf. Louis Snyder, Macro-Nationalisms. A History of Pan-Movements, Greenwood Press: 
Westport, 1984. 
4  Anssi Halmesvirta, “Identity in Difference. Antti Jalava’s Hungary of 1875 Revisited”, 
In: Studi Finno–Ugrici 1999–2001, Dipartimento di Studi dell’Europa Orientale, U.N.O., 
Napoli, 2003, 107–134. 
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periences triggered sentiments which invited the advocates kinship to a game of 
“give and take”.5  




Hungary and Finland had recognised each other’s independence in 1920 and 
their diplomatic relations had been officially established in 1922. However, it 
was only in 1924 when chargé d´affaires and kinship promoter Mihály Jungerth 
was moved from Tallinn to Helsinki, that the relations reached a more active 
and regular status, years before the countries opened their respective Embassies, 
in Helsinki in 1928 and in Budapest in 1934. The purpose of Jungerth’s move 
was to boost the development of the so-called kinship relations which had been 
established in the early 1920s. High-level representatives of educational authori-
ties in Hungary, Finland and Estonia had met in Helsinki in 1921 to launch an 
operation of recovery from the traumatic Civil Wars and peace-making proc-
esses.  The leading Hungarian organiser, Aladár Bán of the Turanian Society6, 
described the common sentiment of “resurrection” on the spot: “The Sampo 
[supposedly the mythical source of power in culture for the Finno-Ugric na-
tions] has been freed from the realm of darkness”7. Mourning was now over and 
the youth from the three kinship countries were to be given opportunities to 
learn from each others’ cultures through exchange relations. Now that Finland 
and Estonia were independent states, Hungarians realised that in the North – not 
only in the East or South – there were receptive relatives who understood the 
policy of revision (of the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920) and consolidation ef-
forts of the “bigger brother”. Former PM Pál Teleki had noted it with satisfac-
tion during an expedition to Finland and Lapland in 1924.8  
 
                                                 
5  Anssi Halmesvirta, “Identity versus Alterity Some Analytical Considerations”, The Na-
tional Awakening of Endangered Uralic Peoples, Ed. Holger Fischer, Hamburg University 
Press: Hamburg, 2004, 29–31. 
6  The Turanian Society (Turán Társaság) was established in 1910 to promote cultural, artis-
tic and scientific relations of Hungary with kinship people in Asia and Europe. Its paper 
Turán was started in 1913 and in the 1920s it advocated a wider concept of reunion of 
turanism, now including the Finno–Ugric kinship peoples. In this crusade, the Finns soon 
assumed (some) importance because the interest of Hungarians and Finns appeared more 
intimate than ever before. See László Szendrei, A turanizmus. Attraktor: Máriabesnyő – 
Gödöllö, 2010.  
7  Quoted in Niilo Pesonen, Voi voitettuja. Helsinki: Tammi, 1992, 11.  
8  Anssi Halmesvirta, “Teleki Pál finnországi tanulmányútja 1924”, Történelmi Szemle 2 
(2010) 189–208. 
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In the spirit of reunion of the Finno-Ugric or Turanian nations, kinship en-
thusiasts organised five cultural congresses in the 1920s and 1930s, the last one 
held in Tallinn in 1936. Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs were called 
upon to support such scientific and cultural exchanges, and the Ambassadors, 
particularly Eemil Setälä and Sándor Kiss – the former an advocate of a sepa-
rate institute for Finno-Ugric studies, the latter a member of the Turanian Soci-
ety – helped Minister Kuno von Klebelsberg to execute the plan to strike an of-
ficial agreement of cultural scientific exchange between Hungary and Finland in 
1937. One seemingly insignificant gesture towards the politicisation of such a 
cultural-political rapprochement is that the book titled Justice for Hungary 
(1928) was distributed among select Finns from the Embassy. Among others, 
General C.G. Mannerheim and Risto Ryti read it and were convinced that Hun-
gary had been mistreated in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and that her claims to 
justice by revision were well-justified;  however, they also saw that the League 
of Nations was not really warming up to them. The security policies of Hungary 
and Finland at the turn of the 1930s and 1940s did not succeed in preventing 
them from entanglement in the looming conflict between Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union. The history of power politics had offered them something other 
than a peaceful deepening of bilateral relations as neutral states amid Slavic and 





When trying to put the foreign politics of the two nations into the same context 
of Europe during wartime, one has to bear in mind that Finland had waged its 
Winter War against the Soviet Union in 1939–1940 without substantial help 
from abroad. It may also be mentioned in passing that the 341 Hungarian volun-
teers trained in Finland for winter-time warfare did not quite reach the Karelian 
front in time before the war ended in mid-March. Instead, Finland received 
many gestures of sympathy and international recognition for its resilient de-
fence. In the opinion of many contemporary Hungarian observers, who had pre-
dicted that the war would be over within a few weeks, the Finns had fought he-
roically – by halting the Soviet invasion they had done nothing less than saved 
Western civilization from the Red Menace and had reached the rank of being 
                                                 
9  István Papp had hoped that the Western powers would realize that Slavic imperialism 
could be dammed in the North only by the Finns who should gain Karelia to ensure defensi-
ble border against it. See his Finnország, Budapest:  Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1938, 32–33. 
This was in keeping with the ideology of ‘Greater Finland’ promoted by the Academic Kare-
lia Society in Finland but not in line with the neutrality policy of the Government.  
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among best nations in the world.10 The Finns were the moral victors of the war, 
as they had defended not only their own honour, but also the honour of such 
small nations – Hungary, of course, included – that “were fit to survive and ful-
fill their missions”.11 
This sudden and intimate association between the Finns and their newfound 
relatives was to characterise the rhetoric of the informal relations between the 
two nations throughout World War II, and it was usually phrased in particularly 
affirmative and amplified language during the “Eastern campaign” against the 
Soviet Union in 1941–1945. Occasionally, particularly in 1941–1942 when the 
Red Army appeared to be on the verge of defeat, the diplomatic corps also 
adopted this unifying mode of speech and joined the kinship chorus rejoicing in 
the triumphal messages from the front. Finns and Hungarians, thought to be 
connected linguistically and culturally, embarked on a road of expansion with 
their own specific goals – their leaders stood ready to seize the rare opportunity 
of the historical moment.  It had been complained that normally such small na-
tions did not have a say in great power politics but now they believed that Nazi 
Germany would allow them to have their fair share.  
Finnish and Hungarian motives to join Hitler's Barbarossa differed. To sim-
plify somewhat, one can say that the Finnish army initially aimed at regaining 
the territories in Karelia it had lost in the Winter War, and it had made plans of 
coordination with the Wehrmacht as early as in winter 1941. When Hitler 
launched the attack in late June, he called on Finns to fight as im Bund with the 
Germans, a notion the Finns firmly rejected as they emphasized their separate-
ness from the Axis, albeit not very convincingly. For her part, Hungary had al-
ready become an ally of Germany when it had joined Hitler’s onslaught against 
Yugoslavia. PM Teleki, well-informed of Finnish affairs, tried to keep Hungary 
out of the war but failed and eventually committed suicide. Hitler offered Hun-
gary, one after another, the territories she had had to cede in Trianon. For the 
services Germany did for Hungary, the Hungarians had to pay dearly in the end. 
Mária Ormos puts all the blame on incompetent and unwise PMs, but it is un-
clear what else they could have done. Certainly, the alternative to become yet 
another German-enslaved country did not entice them.12 
 
                                                 
10  For the Hungarian volunteers and public reactions, see Antal Ruprecht, Magyar önkén-
tések a téli háborúban, Budapest: Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum, 2003; Halmesvirta, 
“Teleki”, 118–132. 
11  Quoted in Tamás Mathé, Suomi, Budapest: Corvineum kiadás, 1940, 55. 
12  See Mária Ormos, Magyarország a két világhárobú korában 1914–1945, Debrecen: Csok-
onai Kiadó, 1998, ch. 6; Sándor Szakály, Volt-e alternativa? Magyarország a második 
világháborúban, Budapest: Ister, 2000, especially 136. 
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What matters here is that suddenly the Finns and the Hungarians found 
themselves fighting, so to say, on the same side and having the same rough ride. 
To Aarne Wuorimaa, the Finnish Ambassador in Budapest, the reasons why 
Hungary had joined the attack – without any territorial claims that the Finns had 
– appeared to be ideological and honourable as such. He had attended an eve-
ning party organized by the Turán Társaság on 15 March 1941, and had realized 
that the Hungarian hosts described the foreign policy of both countries as “con-
clusive”, implying that both Finns and Hungarians yearned for “justice”; they 
thought that it was high time they claimed it, even by force.13 In view of the 
geopolitical idea of “natural borders”, it was only right that Hungary took back 
all it had lost in 1920 in the same way as the Finns reclaimed Karelia, the Fin-
nish “Erdely”, as Hungarians occasionally identified it.14 It was also in March 
that the Hungarian Foreign Ministry found out that the Finns knew of the Bar-
barossa plan, and the information strengthened the confidence also of those ac-
tive in the respective kinship societies.  For instance, Sándor Kulai, working as 
a press attaché in the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki, explained that an attack 
against Yugoslavia had been justified because Yugoslavia was an artificial, not 
“historical state”, and was thus doomed to disintegration.15 War-time optimism 
was running high: now Finns and Hungarians had been given the chance to 
show their strength. It made kinship activists think big: ambitious visions of root-
ing out Bolshevism and of the final division of Russian lands between the Ger-
mans and the Finno-Ugric nations seemed realizable.  Moreover, it was envisaged 
that both Finns and Hungarians were now fighting their final “war of freedom” 
and that the ideas of common origin and kinship were about to reach the level of 
kinship-love. The Finns and Hungarians were no longer only brothers-in-blood 
but brothers- or -friends in-arms (bajtárs, fegyverbarát).16 Here the valorization of 
common identity reached a culmination point as the political identification super-
seded the cultural one, leaving it to the kinship “workers” proper.   
When the news of victories in the East reached home, joy burst out. Finns 
congratulated Hungarians on taking part in occupying Kiev and on establishing 
a regime of order in Ukraine.17 For his part, Hungarian Ambassador in Helsinki, 
Mr István Szabó, reported back that hungarophile Finns believed that the Soviet 
                                                 
13  Unkarin kansallispäivän ohjelmistoa, 15.III.1941, Suomen heimotyöseuran julkaisuja 
[Publications of the Finnish Kinship Society] 1 (1941) 6. 
14  Vilma Mányoky, ”Karjala a Finn Erdely”, Turán III (1940), 99–100. 
15  Sándor Kulai, ”Etelä-Unkarin vähemmistöjen kohtalo Jugoslavian vallan aikana”, It-
senäinen Suomi 5 (1941), 57–61. 
16  Väinö Musikka, ”Heimotyön merkitys”, Heimotyö IV (1940–1941), 82–85. 
17  A. Sovijärvi, ’Silmäys Unkarin armeijan saavutuksiin Itärintaman  taisteluissa’ (manu-
script of a lecture, 1941), C9, 1, 2, IV, Unkarin ystäväin kerho, KA [The Club of Friends 
of Hungary; National Archives of Finland]. 
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Union would soon collapse and open for them the opportunity to defend their 
kinship people (Ingrians, Karelians, etc.) there and expand the Finnish Lebens-
raum, in keeping with the extreme right-wing ideology of Greater Finland. In-
as-much as Hungary had for ages been a buffer against the East in the south, 
Finland was becoming a defensive wall in the North.18  The Finnish Ambassa-
dor in Budapest was not so polite: he dared to remind the Hungarian Foreign 
Secretary of the fact that in Ruthenia and Transylvania there lived majority na-
tionalities who had equal rights to cultivate their nationality with the Hungari-
ans and that the dream of St. Stephen’s realm was rather old-fashioned in mod-
ern times. The Secretary was upset and explained to Wuorimaa that Hungarian 
expansion was not “imperialism” but rather an act of reinstating “historical jus-
tice”. This was also his excuse for the ban on the selling of foodstuff and alco-
hol by the Jews in Ruthenia.19  
In early July of 1941 President Ryti sent a cordial note to Horthy in which he 
stated that Hungary and Finland fought “for truth and European civilisation”.20 
Wuorimaa and PM László Bárdossy discussed the situation in September 1941 
and reached the conclusion – or rather the prediction – that “Russia” (they did 
not use the term “Soviet Union”) the “beast of Bolshevism”, shall soon be 
slain.21  It was cited in German sources that German military experts considered 
Bolshevism already dead and that only some “cleansing” was remained to be 
done, as the Red Army was running out of soldiers and Leningrad and Moscow 
were about to be occupied and destroyed.22 Ambassador Szabó noted that the 
same “consciousness of victory” which filled German minds, had penetrated the 
minds of the Finns, too, not least the mind of Witting, the Foreign Secretary.23 It 
was evident that the connecting ideology between Finns and Hungarians was 
the hatred of Bolshevism, on which the Hungarians had given a lesson to fas-
cists and Germans earlier in 1919. In late August 1941 one Finnish clergyman 
witnessed in Budapest how the crusade in the East had elevated the Hungarians 
spiritually; their festivities on St. Stephen’s Day were more “pious” than usual – 
the mission dating from the Middle Ages to protect the West from the Eastern 
menace was carried on by the modern Hungarians.24  
                                                 
18  Szabó to Budapest, 19 July 1941, report no. 50, MOL (Magyar Országos Levéltár) [The 
National Archives of Hungary] K 63, 12/1. 
19  Aarne Wuorimaa, Muistojeni Unkari, Helsinki: Otava, 1948, 17. 
20  Szabó to Budapest, 6 July 1941, report no. 46, MOL K 63-4938/941-12/7. 
21  Wuorimaa to Helsinki, 20 September 1941, report no. 42, 72/389, 5C 27, UMA [The Ar-
chives of Finnish Foreign Ministry].  
22  ’Politicus’, ”Bolshevismin luhistumishetki”, Itsenäinen Suomi 10 (1941), 35–37. 
23  Szabó to Budapest, 7 December 1941, report no. 106, MOL K 63-7532/941, 12/2. 
24  Uusi Suomi, 21 August 1941. Cf. Bertalan Korompay’s comment in Suomalainen Suomi 
8–9 (1941) 22–24.  
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High Hopes 
 
When it turned out in late autumn that the Red Army could hold its ground, all 
hopes were invested in the following summer, of 1942, when the “final blow” 
was to be delivered. One Finnish foreign policy expert emphasized to his Hun-
garian colleague that the lesson learned from the fate of Napoleon’s great army 
was of no significance in these calculations, so predetermined the outcome 
was.25 On the more unofficial front, all sorts of triumphal festivities were being 
organized to celebrate military success. The atmosphere was at its peak during a 
festive dinner in the Old Student Union House in Helsinki on 15 of October 
1941, the day of kinship – president and other personalities of the political and 
cultural elite as well as Hungarian honorary guests from the embassy and uni-
versity were in attendance. A sublime flush of victory caught the speakers and 
they congratulated each other with numerous toasts. The Finnish-Hungarian 
feeling of brotherhood reached a higher level of consciousness – Finns did not 
feel that the Hungarians were foreign – on the contrary, they were now of the 
same family of “race” and mentally closer to the Finns than even the Finnish-
Swedish in Finland.   
Among others, V.A. Koskenniemi, the celebrated poet and leading germano-
phile intellectual in Finland, whose aggressively patriotic poems were being 
translated into Hungarian, demanded during the dinner that Finns should con-
quer all Karelia as it “was the blood and flesh” of Finland. It would inaugurate a 
renaissance to all Finno-Ugric peoples. He was proud of the Finns who had 
stopped the expansion of “barbarism” there, and rejoiced that the Karelians, 
who had been enslaved by “inferior races”, had been freed. Bringing the Hun-
garians into the picture and in keeping with this Christian, messianistic national-
ism, Koskenniemi continued by saying that the common crusade in the East 
bound Finns and Hungarians together not only with stripes of kinship but with 
common Christian values in “defence” against the arch-enemy of all Finno-
Ugrians.26 To one Hungarian listener this was “staggering” (megrázó), hitting 
straight to the heart. Another guest, Mr Bertalan Korompay from the Embassy, 
reminded the Finns in his speech of how the Hungarians had been on the “verge 
of death” after the Trianon, but revision had saved them.  He promised that the 
Hungarians would follow the principles of St. Stephen and let the nationalities 
falling under their aegis live. Now that the Finns appeared on the banks of 
White Sea and the Hungarians drove the Russians far to the East, all other na-
tionalities in Russia had a bright future ahead. He concluded by attributing this 
to Hungarian “determination” and “divine providence”. As customary in such 
                                                 
25 Itsenäinen Suomi  11–12 (1941), 1–2. 
26  Szabó to Budapest, 27 November 1941, MOL K 63-7731/941, 12/7. 
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messianic rhetoric, he neglected to mention the political constellations that had 
brought the momentary success about.27 More toasting followed and the next 
evening the party continued at the Hungarian Embassy.  
In Hungary the kinship-day was organised by the Turanian Society on the 15 
November. Its President, Jenő Cholnoky, refrained from talking politics in his 
opening speech but was in a triumphal mood regardless.  He was delighted that 
Germany and Japan – Singapore had just surrendered – had “helped” also the 
Finno-Ugric and Turanian nations to gain victories. In this way, he pointed out 
they earned their place in the chain of civilisation.28 His speech was followed by 
an uplifting cultural programme: the audience sang the Finnish national anthem, 
Maamme; Bakay Lajos recited the poem by Larin-Kyösti titled The Magyars; 
and Elemér Virányi from the Hungarian-Finnish Society recited the song for 
Finno-Ugric nations to which Béla Vikár, the translator of the Kalevala, had 
written the lyrics. More singing and speaking followed, which seemed to prove 
that Hungarians loved the Finns more than the Finns loved the Hungarians.29 
One sign of this was also that a few streets in Kolozsvár (Cluj) had been re-
named in Finnish: now there were the streets of Kalevala, Helsinki and Karjala, 
for instance.  Virányi also read a telegram arriving from the Finnish-Hungarian 
Society, Helsinki. Its high-flown message was that at the moment Hungary and 
Finland were in an exceptional, world-historical situation, for they could to-
gether leave their mark by taking part in “decisive events”. Prospects were 
really promising as Bolshevism was about to be erased from the earth. The 
warmest feeling was that the Finns and Hungarians were now “real allies” and 
that the long-standing kinship relations had gained also power political dimen-
sion.30 Eagerly the members of the Társaság and the Finnish guests waited for 
the fall of Moscow so that the reconstruction work in Russia could be started. 
The occasion ended with the remark that Hitler’s Mein Kampf was second on 
the best-sellers’ list in Hungary.  
One concrete result of the rapprochement of the various Finnish and Hungar-
ian kinship societies was that they signed an agreement of cooperation in late 
November of 1941. Hungary was represented on the highest diplomatic level, as 
Szabó initiated the entire enterprise and gave it his blessing. On the Finnish 
side, Väinö Heiskanen from the Ministry of Education signed the agreement. 
The cooperation plans included e.g. publication of a leaflet containing up-to-
                                                 
27  Speeches are quoted from: Néprokonsági nap visszhangja a finn sajtóban. Szabó to Buda-
pest 30 November 1941, MOL K 89-1942, Copy: 1387/1942; Cf. Heimokansa 2 (joulu-
tammikuu) (1941–1942), 11. 
28  Jenő Cholnoky, “A turáni társaság és világháború”, Turán (1942) 3–5. 
29  The records of the Turán Társaság, quoted in Heimokansa 2 (joulu-tammikuu 1941–
1942), 11–12; Turán (1942), 43–46. 
30  Artturi Kannisto, “Újévi üdvözlet Finnországról”, Turán (1942), 21. 
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date information from both countries. The Hungarian partner was soon able to 
compile the first academic Hungarian-Finnish dictionary and publish a compre-
hensive guide to Hungary for the Finns, Unkarin kirja, edited by Väinö Mu-
sikka and Sándor Kulai. Viljo Tervonen, lecturer of Finnish at the Eötvös Col-
legium, was allotted 6000 Fmk to collect sources for a history of Hungarian-
Finnish kinship relations, and a committee was called to draft plans to write a 
history of Finland for Hungarian readers. Ambassador Szabó intervened in these 
operations and demanded that the contents of the publications not take a particu-
lar stance in hot political questions, as it was, in his opinion, very difficult to 
find “an objective” point of view. Nevertheless, he listed what the editors 
should include in the leaflet regarding Hungary: revision, sport, patriotic asso-
ciations (Turán Társaság, Turul etc.) and defence of the family. Upon closer in-
spection of the final list, we can find timely political subjects as well, for exam-
ple, the relations of Hungarians with the Croats and Serbs and many other 
themes related to the conditions of Hungarians in neighboring countries.31  
During the years 1941–1942, the Hungarian Embassy in Helsinki was very 
active in controlling and sorting out what information or propaganda material 
from Finland was to be disseminated in Hungary and vice versa to promote the 
common cause. One representative example of this work may serve to this suf-
fice here: Rudolf Molnár, working in the Embassy as a cultural attaché, was told 
to collect materials for a book titled Suomalaisten taisteluhenki and to edit the 
special Hungary -issue of the journal Suomen Sotilas. The latter was published 
in 1941 and, to put it short, was diametrically opposed to Romanian propaganda 
in Finland.  For instance, Horthy and Mannerheim were shown as the main na-
tional heroes – however, this notwithstanding, the Hungarian Embassy could 
not prevent the publication of another special issue of Suomen Sotilas in which 
Marshal Antonescu accused Hungarians of not participating in the war with full 
strength. To this, Kulai retorted that the Romanians – a lesser ally in the war 
than the Finns in his mind – could not be taken into account when the so- called 
“New Europe” was born out of the war.32 It remained quite unclear to Kulai 
what this “Europe” would look like, as its formation depended on where the 
Germans would draw its boundaries.  
The Finnish Embassy in Budapest tried its best to match Hungarian produc-
tion: a history of the Winter War and a history of the Finnish Civil War of 1918 
were translated into Hungarian. They sold quite well in bookshops in Budapest 
and Debrecen.  
                                                 
31  Jegyzőkönyv finn–magyar vegyesbizottság üléséről, 29 March 1942, K 89-1942-36-3-
1407 (439); Szabó to Budapest, 8 September 1941, report no. 659, MOL K 89, 619/1941. 
32  ’S.K’ [Sándor Kulai], ”Unkarin aluelisäykset viimeisten neljän vuoden aikana”, Suomen 
sotilas 17 (1941), 553; ”Unkarin ja Suomen aseveljeys”, Suomen Sotilas 17 (1941), 496–498. 
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The peak year of kinship relations was 1942. As the new cultural attaché of 
the Hungarian Embassy, Sándor Mikola had it, the Hungarians were no longer 
“alone” in the world in the way they had been throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
and he surmised that a new Empire of the Finno-Ugric and Turanian nations 
might just emerge from the defeated Russia. Ambassador Szabó was happy that 
this kind of propaganda had been received by the Finns with enthusiasm, and 
added that President Ryti regularly took part in the propaganda displays ar-
ranged by the Embassy. All doubts about possible retreat from the front had, for 
the time being, been put aside, although it was suspected that the Romanians 
might change sides. In any case, the Hungarians would remain “faithful and re-
liable” until the very end, he assured.33 
For the Finns’ part, they became worried because the Hungarians were not 
able to export sugar, beans, peas and morphine to Finland – the Germans con-
sumed them all.34 They were obviously concerned about  the increasing German 
pressure on Hungary, and Ambassador Wuorimaa was losing confidence in the 
Hungarian Foreign Office, as he continued talks with the Romanians, who pro-
tested Hungarian “imperialism” in Transylvania. He had evidently abandoned 
the cause of kinship policy. When he had travelled to Szeged to pick up the 
honorary doctorate granted to Mannerheim, he had given interviews in which he 
was no longer as sure about the victory in the Eastern front as his Hungarian 
hosts. Although he had been satisfied with the fact that the theatre of war was 
still deep in Russia, he was concerned about the United States’ joining the war. 
He could only hope that both Finns and Hungarians could stand the war till the 
end and possibly gain new, more satisfactory borders in the ensuing peace 
treaty.35 Wuorimaa also noted Hungarian jealousy provoked during Hitler’s visit 
to Mannerheim’s birthday party, due to Hitler’s insinuation that the Finns had 
better fighting morale and were better mobilized for the war than the Hungari-
ans. The Hungarian Embassy realized that this insult could not be compensated 
for by any Mannerheim-parties in Hungary or by Géza Képes’s translation of 
the book Mannerheim Syvärillä 36. In view of this, the Foreign Ministry sent 
notes to Helsinki instructing that in propaganda materials the Embassy should 
be prepared to refute all negative comments about Hungary. Simultaneously, the 
Head of the Ministry’s Press Department stated that writings about Finland in 
                                                 
33  Szabó to Budapest, 30 November 1942, Néprokonsági nap visszhangja a finn sajtóban, K 
89-1942, Copy: 1387 (1942); Szabó to Budapest, 30th of September 1942, report no. 95, 
MOL K 637154/942, 12/7. 
34  Szabó to Budapest, 7 May and 8 July 1942, reports no. 96 (9335) and 8 (3087), MOL K 
63, 12/7. 
35  Aarne Wuorimaa, “A közös vér parancsa”, Északi rokonaink, 5 (1942, január), 1. 
36  Wuorimaa to Helsinki, 20 June 1942, report no. 38, 54/382; Wuorimaa to Helsinki, 11 
June 1942, report no. 36, 51/381, 5C 27, UMA. 
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Hungary had been “cleaned” so that they were always “positive” in tone and the 
information contained therein was cross-checked in advance.37 Papers were cen-
sored in order to maintain the morale of the civil population, and Szabó also 
personally replied to the letters from Finns and thanked them if they had written 
nice things about Hungary. To one Mr Jukonen from Keuruu (Central Finland) 
he sent issues of Új Magyarság implying that they contained the “latest infor-
mation” about Hungary. Often he also expressed his disappointment when the 
Finnish newspapers did not write extensively about the kinship-days and he 
criticized the Finnish-Swedish Hufvudstadsbladet in particular for failing to 
mention them at all. However, he was delighted that some leading Finnish poli-
ticians and cultural personalities were sincerely interested in Hungary and in 
kinship work. One of them was Edvin Linkomies, the Vice-Speaker of the Fin-
nish Parliament and PM in 1943–1994. He visited Hungary in January 1943 and 
had talks with Horthy. Szabó had also realized that the Finns liked Hungarian 
movies and plays which were regularly shown in Helsinki. The Embassy ac-
quired them from Hungary and took the trouble to distribute them to cinemas in 
the countryside. This complemented nicely the domestic production of enter-
taining romantic and comedy movies.38  
The Finnish Embassy in Budapest kept a close watch on Hungarian civil mo-
rale and in the summer of 1942 it reported that the counter-attacks of the Red 
Army had caused uncertainty among the inhabitants of Budapest, some of 
whom did not see the point of continuing the wasteful war. Most, however, re-
mained confident: the economic situation seemed quite good, unemployment 
was low, the export of agricultural products was booming, oil had been found, 
Hungary had gained a lot of territory, and there was enough food and its prices 
were tolerable. In fact, Hungary appeared in 1942 to be more ready to fight in 
the ongoing total war than in 1941. Irrespective of how dependent Hungary was 
becoming on Germany, the Finns saw how the earlier “depressed” Hungary was 
to be replaced by a “happy” Hungary in the future.39  
As the information and propaganda flow between Hungary and Finland 
reached record levels in 1942, so the identification of the Finns in Hungary with 
Hungarians reached its culmination point. The German (pseudo-) science of 
race had permeated Hungarian physical anthropology and far-reaching racial 
surveys were conducted, for instance, at the Catholic Pázmány Péter University 
in Budapest. Its researchers had measured 3,000 persons anthropometrically and 
28 % of them had been found to represent the so-called “eastern Baltic race”, a 
                                                 
37  Paikert Géza to Weöres Gyula, 15 January 1942, 34.116/1942, MOL K 89, 1942–1944. 
38  Szabó’s note from the meeting of the board of the Finnish–Hungarian Society. Quoted in 
Dezső Gaskó, Finn–magyar kapcsolatok I, Budapest: Pécsi Egyetem Kiadó, 1943, 96. 
39  T.H. Heikkilä, ”Nouseva maa”, Suomalainen Suomi (1942), 139–140; Lauri Kettunen, 
”Nouseva maa”. Suomalainen Suomi (1942). 141–144. 
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newly-invented racial type to denote common characteristics of the Baltic 
Finno-Ugric peoples which erased all the formerly detected differences between 
the “We” and the “Other”.  It was this very type to which both Hungarians and 
Finns were now found to belong, an identification which may have embarrassed 
many a Hungarian who were more commonly associated with more Southern 
racial types. Hungarians and Finns were both described as 160-168 cm tall, 
“sturdy, sinewy and broad-skulled” – a sign of intelligence.40 The Levente -
youth group41 that visited Finland in October–November of 1942 had purposely 
been selected among this type by measuring their “character, intelligence, skills 
and suitability to the military service”. The inevitable conclusion of such meas-
urements was that both Hungarians and Finns were not much inferior to the Ar-
yan race, which the Germans – as Herrenvolk – represented. General Alajos 
Beldy, who led the group in Finland, explained to his hosts that Hungarians and 
Finns had a common “heritage of blood” which called upon them to carry out 
their guarding mission with the “Aryans”. This “heritage” carried the military 
virtues which were manifested in Mannerheim and Horthy. Beldy proposed to 
the Finnish scout leaders that the Levente youngsters and Finnish scouts take 
part in the international youth camps organized by the Hitler Jugend to show to 
the Germans their abilities and prepare for “hegemony in the future”. To Wuori-
maa, Beldy at one meeting confirmed that in Hungary as well the haunting Jew-
ish question was soon coming to the “final solution”.42 With Beldy many a kin-
ship enthusiast promoted the idea of racial purity in Hungary, and it was sup-
ported by some of their Finnish colleagues as the up-to-date national ideal43.  
Of all the visionaries in the kinship movement in Hungary, the most mega-
lomaniacal was Virányi whose book Finnugor népek élettere (1942) depicted a 
great empire for the Finno-Ugric race in East Europe and Russia where their 
former “Totenraum” was to be transformed after the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion into a formidable Lebensraum. In the North, what Peter the Great had built 
the Finns tore down; and in the South, Hungarians re-conquered what they had 
lost 25 years earlier. From the union of “North” and “South” there would 
emerge a Finno-Ugric Volga-Ural state with over 20 million people, which was 
destined to become a part of the “New Europe” under construction by the Ger-
                                                 
40  Heimokansa 6 (lokakuu, 1942) 31. 
41  Levente (est. 1921) was a paramilitary organization in the interwar and wartime period 
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42  Wuorimaa to Helsinki, 12 November 1942, report no. 73, 100/388; Wuorimaa to Helsinki, 
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mans.44 Virányi’s dream was one extreme version of the much-awaited “resur-
rection” (feltámadás) of the Hungarians, now intertwined with the “resurrec-
tion” of all Finno-Ugric peoples, a process of reunion on its way as the Finns 
annexed Karelia to Finland and the Estonians were “freed” from Soviet rule by 
the Germans.  
Apart from the delusions of grandeur, the kinship societies of the three coun-
tries took to intensifying their cooperation, from exchange of scientists, scholars 
and artists, to visits of civil, party and professional delegations, and kinship ex-
hibitions to correspondence of thousands of school children. One timely scien-
tific joint project was undertaken to study the racial characteristics of 430 Mari 
war prisoners and conduct linguistic interviews with them. It was also decided 
that of all the Russian war prisoners, all those who looked Finno-Ugric should 
be shifted and anthropologically determined to racially belong to that type.45 
Ambitious projects of this kind were soon dropped, as the situation on the front 
deteriorated, and a tone of wary suspicion leaved its mark on the kinship publi-
cations which avoided telling the public what was really going on. The kinship 





The war was becoming increasingly unpopular in Hungary. In Finland the pub-
lic mood remained more hopeful: as one Embassy attaché correctly reported, 
there was no “hysteria” and the Finns had good morale and kept their front. 
Some Finns with whom he had discussed the situation did not think that an Al-
lied victory would be very “unpleasant”, the problem being that Finns could not 
quite yet turn their backs on the Germans.46 Meanwhile, in early 1943, the Hun-
garian representatives in Helsinki were preoccupied with counter-propaganda 
against the Romanians who had established a Finnish-Romanian Society 
through which they reported that the Hungarians were bad soldiers, a useless 
link in the Axis and that they discriminated against Transylvanian Romanians. 
As a counter-measure the Hungarians took to establishing Finnish-Hungarian 
societies in the countryside, and one of them was set up in Jyväskylä where the 
high school students became a major target. The Finnish kinship organizations 
                                                 
44  Elemér Virányi, Finnugor népek élettere, Budapest: Stádium sajtóvállalat, 1942, 74, 83, 
194–195, 198–199. 
45  See Tenho Pimiä, Tähtäin idässä. Suomalaisten sukukansojen tutkimus toisessa maail-
mansodassa, Jyväskylä Studies in Humanities 124, Jyväskylä University, 2009, 213–214;  
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46  Kuhl to Budapest, 5 December 1942, report no. 124, K 63-9335/942-12/7, MOL. 
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also reacted and soon informed the Hungarian Embassy that the Romanians 
could no longer do harm, as the Finnish-Romanian societies had been infiltrated 
by hungarophiles and disbanded. It was emphasized that the Finns knew that the 
Romanian stories about the Hungarians were “nonsense” (badarság) and, in any 
case, only very few Finns could understand French.47  
In early 1943 the Finnish government secretly sought ways to get out of the 
war. When it was learned that they had to surrender, in May 1943 Edwin Lin-
komies – at that point the PM – declared that the Finns would not acquiesce, but 
rather decide for themselves when peace should be made. Finland continued its 
separate war. For Hungary, inextricably bound to the Axis, it was impossible. 
After the catastrophe of the 2nd Hungarian Army at Don River, Hungarian 
troops were called home. When Wuorimaa met PM Miklós Kállay in late 
March, Kállay surmised that the Germans could not beat the Soviets and admit-
ted that Hungary should not have taken part in the crusade in the East. The only 
thing Finland could do, he concluded, was go on fighting.48 Wuorimaa noticed 
that Hungarians still believed that they could defend their homeland – they just 
had to try to save what they could on the Carpathian front.49  
Linkomies had visited Hungary in mid-January as a guest of the Hungarian-
Finnish Society. In his talk to Hungarian dignitaries he did not mention Ger-
many at all but stressed that it was a “European duty” of Hungarians and Finns 
to fight for “survival” and “parliamentarism” in face of Bolshevism, to which 
Kállay responded by saying that Hungarians and Finns were of the same “race” 
and thus their fates were bound together. Strangely to Wuorimaa’s ears, Kállay 
made of “Swedish capitalism” yet another enemy of the Finns, along with 
“Slavic imperialism and proletarian penetration”.  For his part, Minister Jenő 
Szinyei Merse argued against Linkomies, stressing that now Hungarians waged 
a war of defence to which Linkomies politely retorted that Finns had also re-
joiced when Hungarian revision had succeeded.  Minister Paikert told Linko-
mies that he admired Finland because it was not contaminated by “Byzantism” 
or Balkan corruption but instead played “fair game” – Hungarians should be 
proud to have such relatives.50 Linkomies’s discussion with Horthy was more 
serious: they agreed that Germany would lose the war although it would take a 
long time. According to Wuorimaa, the atmosphere in the meeting was not very 
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encouraging; it was evident that both Hungary and Finland were in a forced 
situation. Moreover, if the Soviets were to win the war, civilisation, humanism 
and Christian values would be destroyed. They admitted that it was “a hard ne-
cessity” to continue to fight51. The import of Linkomies’s visit was meagre, 
mere sympathy and polite gestures, and it reflects the situation of the two small 
countries in a war that was a matter of great powers and soon to be lost. All that 
remained was to try to accommodate the inevitable.  
In spite of growing pessimism, kinship work (done by thousands of activists 
in both countries) was continued but festive occasions became rare and focus 
was laid on exchanging actual information and on disseminating it to wider so-
ciety, the working class included. The plan to write histories of both countries 
was completed. From the Finnish side, Jalmari Jaakkola’s Finnország története 
(1943) was heavily criticized in Hungary, as its ideological implications pointed 
towards distinct “Otherness”, namely Scandinavianism, not towards the eastern 
origins of the Finno-Ugric peoples, the mystified pan-ideology, dear to 
Turanists and Finno-Ugrists. It also failed to represent Finnish history as a story 
of suffering, a tale familiar to Hungarians. A lot more congenial to Hungarian 
readers was Lauri Kettunen’s Finn évszázadok (1943), which did not shy away 
from presenting past heroism and imagined greatness of the Finns between the 
West and East. It exaggerated the policy of Greater Finland as if it had been the 
official policy of the Finnish Government. Unfortunately, numerous factual er-
rors in the book were not corrected before its publication (500 copies). 
Both Embassies realised in 1943 that demand for popular cultural programs 
was on the increase. People were tired of war and needed to be entertained. For 
example, Bánk Bán was shown in Helsinki and a few Finnish plays were staged 
in Budapest. Hella Wuolijoki’s Niskavuoren naiset and Niskavuoren leipä mis-
fired for they were not really comedies. In one unfortunate performance in 
which Horthy and his wife were present, the play was in Swedish language, 
much to the annoyance of Wuorimaa and other Finns.52 Another channel used in 
kinship cultural propaganda was radio broadcasts; from Finland Hungarians 
could hear not only daily news but Kalevala citations, Sibelius’s masterpieces 
and folk music. The serenity of these programmes vanished, as in the autumn of 
1943 the seriousness of the war situation was sounded also in kinship messages. 
Some militarists demanded better discipline in the army, and in contrast cler-
gymen urged people to turn from violence and rioting to “holy, spiritual reflec-
tions” so that the “mental reconstruction” could begin even in wartime. They 
were afraid of ensuing spiritual emptiness and depression, and of the Red sol-
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diers, although some others still demanded “the right to live” in the “New 
Europe” that was to be born out of the war, irrespective of the shape it would 
take or under whose rule it would fall53..  Censorship prevented the publication 
of defeatist or desperate writings, and the kinship work turned inwards, to tak-
ing care of the “lost souls”, the barely surviving youth of the nation.  
Many a politician and advocate of kinship ideology realized in spring 1944 
that the historically unique moment for Hungarians and Finns was definitely 
lost. István Csekey, who had in 1941 predicted the downfall of Slavic imperial-
ism, now saw that Finno-Ugric nations had to face suffering and hardships 
again. The “defensive wall” of the West was endangered also in Finland – the 
situation was becoming critical. Horthy hoped in late summer that the Germans 
who had occupied Hungary on the 16 March would leave Hungary in the same 
way as they had, according to his mistaken information, left Finland. He be-
lieved that Hungary might then avoid occupation by the Red Army. What came 
to kinship efforts, Finnish language courses were more popular than ever; in 
Budapest, Professor Miklós Zsirai taught 120 students and Lecturer Viljo Ter-
vonen more than 300. Historian János Hankiss concluded that this was “real 
kinship love”, apolitical and practical. There were some diehards, like Iván 
Nagy, the President of the Hungarian-Finnish Society, who believed that the 
Soviets would still lose and Finno-Ugric nations had a bright future ahead.54 In 
Finland, Lecturer Jenő Fazekas and the Embassy’s clerk Kulai continued their 
travelling lecture series and radio broadcasts. Included were such themes as 
“Viborg, the last bastion against the East” and “Thousand Years of Hungarian 
Realm”55. The leading Finnish kinship paper hoped that Western Allied Forces 
would stop the Red Army from conquering all of Europe. If that would not help, 
the only rescue plan was to be carried out by the “heavenly forces”.56 In autumn 
all means of such propaganda were exhausted and silenced, the Hungarian Am-
bassador appointed in June, Mr Marosy, left Finland in September and the Fin-
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Epilogue 
 
In his postscript to the war, Count István Bethlen – a highly-respected ex-PM 
and anglophile foreign policy observer – condemned the Hungarian leaders of 
causing the unfortunate disaster to their country, although for him, the main vil-
lain was Hitler. On the other hand, in his opinion, the Finns had in the end been 
saved from Soviet occupation by Hitler’s guns. Finns had been more cautious 
than Hungarians in avoiding an alliance with the Germans, although their posi-
tion had been more precarious before the war than that of the Hungarians. Finns 
also had had a real casus belli whereas the Hungarians had not had. They should 
have defended themselves independently, tried to do the same as the Finns had 
bravely done.57 Likewise, to Sándor Márai, who had written articles about the 
Winter War to the Pesti Hirlap, the Finns had been wiser: they had “cleared 
their matters” and got out of the war in high time, while the Hungarians had be-
come both “accomplice” and “victim” with the Germans58.  The Hungarians had 
evidently brought the misfortune onto themselves by their own decisions.  
These indictments may also be interpreted as pointing to those who had 
aligned themselves with the powers that had led the Finns and Hungarians to the 
war. Kinship policies and the work of the pressure groups in kinship societies in 
both countries had contributed to the war-mongering, but as they were not in 
important decision-making positions, they can be regarded as rearguard actors 
playing auxiliary, though noisy, roles. Neither could their political ideologies – 
Turanism or Finno-Ugrianism as versions of macro-nationalism – compete with 
the great ideologies of the time. Although some of them were experts in this or 
that national discipline or foreign policy, they were not great political theorists 
or philosophers. At times they leaned towards authoritarianism or detested de-
mocratic politics of parties and cabinets. In Hungary, some kinship people were 
members of the Foreign Policy Society, giving opinions and advice, but in 
Finland they had exerted far less influence on foreign politics because it was 
firmly in the hands of the Government. Nevertheless, the kinship ideologists 
managed to identify the Hungarians with the Finns and vice versa taking it to 
the extremes of biological, “racial” familiarity and relatedness. Doing this, they 
were eager to toy with the prevalent theories of race, making out of them a basis 
of intimate power-political identification in a joint crusading venture in the East 
with the Nazi Germany. The valorization of common identity came close to per-
fection.  
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During the war, the kinship policy had many sympathizers in high politics, 
but the diplomats and military experts, who coordinated the exchange of secret 
information between Hungary and Finland, rarely utilized the channels of kin-
ship networks. It had had more propaganda influence on the wider audience, 
particularly in 1941–1942 when it seemed that the illusions they had cherished 
for so long were about to come true, and it did not take very long for the Hun-
garian propaganda in Finland to be rekindled: it was János Kádár’s comrade 
Ferenc Münnich (posted in Moscow) who monitored the establishment of a new 
Finnish-Hungarian society in 1950 in Helsinki. Its kinship ideology was perme-
ated with a message that was quite antagonist to the anticommunist one preva-
lent in the war years and before. Again, the Hungarian-Finnish identification 










British Ideas on the Post  





This paper has twofold aims; first to give an analyse of semi- or non-official 
(Winston Churchill’s views) British foreign policy ideas and intentions towards 
post WWII Europe and Hungary; and then to focus on a concrete case study 
through the activity and reports of Alvary Frederick Gascoigne (a British diplo-
mat in Hungary after the Second World War /1945–1946/).  
Histories abound about Winston Churchill’s political career after the Second 
World War1 and post- British foreign policy, and the list of such bibliographical 
items is continuously expanding.2 I prefer to seek an answer to what standpoint 
Churchill represented as regards post-1945 Europe, and how he attempted to con-
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vert it into the official stream of British foreign policy. Therefore, I will provide 
an overview of British foreign policy only when it radically differed from Chur-
chill’s position, which happened on several occasions. With this, following an 
analysis of his address evaluating the immediate post-war situation, as well as the 
Fulton speech, I will discuss Churchill’s vision of United States of Europe.  
Aside from using published and unpublished archival sources, it is necessary 
to analyze in detail some fundamental documents related to Churchill’s post-1945 
activities (“iron curtain telegram,” Fulton Address, Zurich Address, documents 
related to the United States of Europe), because Hungarian studies of history, so 
far, have not dealt with them in a substantive manner.  
The Europe that Churchill knew has ceased to exist. The author’s aim is to 
present this controversial man’s views about Europe, which themselves were con-
troversial in their day. Nevertheless, without his predictions, concepts and visions 
of united Europe, today’s European Union would not exist. 
In case of Gascoigne’s diplomatic reports3 I clarify how the British tried to in-
fluence the fate of a small nation living in the shadow of a Soviet Union. From 
1936 until 1938 Gascoigne was Chargé d’ Affaires in Budapest, from 1945 until 
1946 British Political Representative in Hungary with the rank of Minister. So, he 
became a witness of the last decade of pre war Hungary and an observer of the first 
steps of sovietization of Hungarians. Between 20, March 1945 and 16, May 1946 
as Political Representative in Hungary with the rank of Minister, Gascoigne has 
sent 86 telegrams from Hungary to the British Foreign Office (28 of them were 
sent to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary of the Conservative government and 
9 of them immediately to the Premier, Winston Churchill). According to his 
diplomatic duties he has informed the following Labour government led by C. C. 
Attlee quite honestly, but based on his reports it became obvious that he was much 
more familiar with the conservative values of W. S. Churchill’s government. 
 
Churchill and the Post WWII Europe 
 
Churchill’s ambivalent attitude regarding communism and the Soviet Union 
evolved during the years of the Second World War. Prior to 1939, he represented 
an uncompromising anticommunism (a characteristic feature until his death, that 
even his sharpest critics admit), which somewhat softened during the war years 
                                                 
3  For Gascoigne’s reports see: Eva Haraszti-Taylor, ’Dear Joe’. Sir Alvary Frederick Gascoigne, 
G. B. E. (1893–1970): A Brtish Diplomat in Hungary after the Second World War. A Collection 
of Documents from the British Foreign Office, Nottingham, 2005.  For Gascoigne’s activity in 
Hungary see: Róbert Barta, Brit követjelentések és a magyar belpolitika: 1945–1946 [British 
Diplomatic Reports and the Hungarian Home Policy: 1945–1946] In: Tiltott történelmünk 
1945–1947 [Our Forbidden History 1945–1947], Ed. János Horváth. Budapest, 2006.  77–87. 
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for practical reasons due to a necessary cooperation with the Soviet Union. How-
ever, he remained suspicious of Soviet foreign policy, throughout the war. In Oc-
tober 1939 in a radio speech, he compared Soviet foreign policy to a mystery 
which is “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”4 Although this state-
ment was obviously inspired by the shock felt over the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact 
and the rapid fall of Poland, still it provided the bottomline upon which British 
foreign policy laid judgements about the Soviet Union’s power politics. Churchill 
sensed acutely the dangers implied in the Yalta order, which the words of his 
telegram of May 14, 1945 to Lord Halifax commenting on the Soviet declaration 
of war against Japan aptly illustrate. He was convinced that the cost of the Soviet 
declaration of war against Japan could be very high: the upper hand for the Sovi-
ets in Central Europe and in the Balkans.5  
He took a similar position regarding Hungary, when, in a private conversation 
two weeks later, he emphasized that:’…The position of the Magyars has been 
maintained over many centuries and many misfortunes, and must ever be re-
garded as a precious European entity. Its submergence in the Russian flood could 
not fail to be either the source of future conflicts or the scene of national oblitera-
tion horrifying to every generous heart...’6  
He contrasted the threat of communism and communist activity in Europe with 
the traditional values of the Christian world, but he never denied that communists 
are very practical and purposeful people. Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie 
King noted in his diary that Churchill compared communists to Jesuits denying Je-
sus’s principles, who would be willing to do anything to reach their aim and were 
to no extent naïve daydreamers. Since they were extremely pragmatic in their 
aims, that was the only way to manage them.7  The fact that the Soviet Union’s 
spread in Europe was relentless seriously worried Churchill. Such a fear indeed 
motivated the “iron curtain” telegram, which he sent to President Truman on May 
12, 1945. Although the expression “iron curtain” originated much earlier,8 the 
                                                 
4  Op. cit. Ed. Robert Rhodes James, Winston Churchill. His Complete Speeches 1897–1963, 
VI. 1935–1942, New York, 1974, 6161. Quoted in: Viktor Mauer, “Harold MacMillan and 
the Deadline Crisis over Berlin 1958–59,” Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 9. No. 1. 
1998, 54–85. 
5  Churchill Papers, 20/219. Quoted in: Gilbert, op. cit.  14. 
6  Churchill Papers, M/529,/5. PM. personal minute. Quoted in: Gilbert, op. cit. 24–27. 
7  W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, The macKenzie King Record, vol. 3. 1945–46, Toronto, 
1970. 83–87. Quoted in: Gilbert, op. cit. 160–162. 
8  Historical studies claim that the phrase “iron curtain” was first used by Russian emigrant phi-
losopher Vasilij Rozanov in his 1918 book Apocalypse of Our Time, which discussed Russian 
development (“With a rumble and a roar, an iron curtain is descending on Russian History.”) 
Two years later, in a book about her travels in Soviet-Russia (Through Bolshevik Russia), 
Ethel Snowden also mentions it (“... a country ... being behind an iron curtain.”) The expres-
sion also appears in a speech by Goebbels, Nazi minister of propaganda, delivered on February 
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telegram is more than a mere analysis of the situation.  He found it very urgent to 
make a lasting agreement with the Russians, before everybody got too comforta-
bly settled in the occupied zones. Churchill’s “iron curtain” telegram was moti-
vated by a double fear. At all costs, he wanted to prevent an American withdrawal 
of troops from the continent when the war ended- this had been his primary aim 
in Yalta too − and, because he did not trust the Russians, he wanted to come to 
terms with them from a position of power.  
The new first secretary to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan’s 
long telegram, cabled in spring 1946, already regarded the expansive Russian for-
eign policy as a crossbreed between Marxist hegemony and an old czarist politics 
of conquest. Thus, when Chruchill delivered his speech at Westminster College, 
Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, he underscored an already chrystallizing 
American policy of containment. The speech did not contain surprising new ele-
ments, but its tone was unusually frank. It featured all of the major points of 
Churchill’s future foreign policy. Soviet occupation did not ensure democratic 
development in Eastern and Central Europe, with special regard to Poland and 
those German regions under Soviet control. Dictatorships and police states were 
forming everywhere with the help of the Soviets and local communists, which 
fundamentally threatened peace in Europe and divided the continent.  
In this situation, the most important task the English-speaking democracies 
needed to do was to cooperate closely in matters of economic, political and mili-
tary, as well as pursue common action under UN auspices. The West needed to 
negotiate from the position of power: it must rearm and not allow any of the 
Western occupied German areas to fall into Soviet hands. Nevertheless, Moscow 
and surrounding satellite states must not be rejected from a coming reorganization 
of Europe; they must be negotiated with. Churchill was optimistic for the future 
because, when English-speaking peoples join efforts it must be for world peace 
and such an alliance would inevitably be invincible. Of course, in this unity he 
relegated a triple role to Great Britain: to be the focal point of the Western Euro-
                                                                                                                       
25, 1945 (“... ein eisenes Vorhang.”), as well as in a radio speech by Graf Schwerin von Kro-
sigk, German minister of foreign affairs, delivered on May 2, 1945 (“... In the East the iron cur-
tain behind which, unseen by the eyes of the world, the work of destruction goes on, is moving 
steadily forward.”) Krosigk’s speech was published in details in The Times, 3 May, 1945.  
 The term was also used by Allen W. Dulles in a position paper he presented to the Council 
on Foreign Relations in September 1945. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for which 
Dulles had worked, had just been disbanded. Dulles came to New York to give the Council 
his assessment of the immediate post-war European situation. In relation to this, he stated 
that with regard to the Soviet Union’s activities in Eastern Europe it was “as if an iron cur-
tain has fallen.” This position paper was not published at the time, and remained in the 
Council’s archive. Later on, it was eventually published in the Fall 2005 edition of the 
Council’s journal Foreign Affairs, as part of its commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary 
of the conclusion of World War Two.  
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pean democracies, the British Commonwealth, and the special American-British 
relationship. Hence, the western world, together with the British Empire, was face 
a charming future, as long as Churchill’s recommendations were considered and 
followed.  
Churchill’s Fulton Address was not received with unanimous enthusiasm. 
Truman’s administration distanced itself from the principles advertised in Fulton, 
although they had received Kennan’s “long telegram” a week earlier and it reori-
ented American foreign policy in the exact direction that Churchill proposed. The 
British Labour government, naturally, did not take a speech by a conservative 
politician in opposition to be part of its official foreign political considerations, 
and foreign policy documents testify that the British could not do much against 
the sovietization of Central and Eastern Europe-at least, not in the field of eco-
nomics. A final note of the summative document assessing the situation in East-
ern Europe between 1945−46 stated that British commercial and economic inter-
ests in the region were negligible, but that existing ones needed to be protected.9  
Thus, the leading economic and political personalities in the least “sovietized” 
countries needed to be approached and dealt with, primarily through cooperation 
within international organizations. It would be an oversimplification to claim that 
British foreign policy “wrote off” the region: for instance, they continued to fol-
low Hungarian domestic affairs attentively, but they did not have, nor could have, 
any influence over the proceedings.10  
 Summing up we can argue that Churchill’s Fulton Address cannot be consid-
ered as the opening of the cold war. Neither the phrase “iron curtain” nor his 
evaluation of the contemporary European scene were original. The Fulton speech 
was in keeping with Churchill’s style, but he was in opposition and his statements 
did not reflect the views of Mr. Attlee’s Labour government. As for the United 
States, its foreign policy was already moving toward containment prior to the Ful-
ton speech. In the language of sport: undoubtedly, the Soviet Union hit the high 
ball offered by Churchill, and using all mechanisms of the machinery of propa-
ganda, they named the former wartime ally a warmonger. By this time, Soviet 
foreign policy was also inclined toward an unavoidable confrontation with the 
West. The same thing happened here was what happened several times during 
Churchill’s career: he analysed the situation with brilliant sensitivity, he predicted 
future and, without him being involved, the events proved him right.  
Because Churchill had in all his life been convinced that big events only 
waited for him to direct them and that he held extraordinary skills in strategic 
                                                 
 9  Eds.  M. E. Pelly, H. J. Jasamee and K. A. Hamilton, Ass. by G. Benett, FCO Documents on 
British Policy Overseas, Series I. Vol. VI. HMSO, London, 1991. East-Europe 1945–46. 
363–378. (An analysis of Soviet economic policies in the region.) 
10  Loc. cit. 157–158, 199–201, 305–312. 
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thinking, he referred to many of his earlier predictions in and about his relation to 
the Soviet Union. In his telegram to Stalin on April 29, 1945, he called attention 
that the grave differences between the western and the “eastern” world would 
sooner or later tear Europe apart, unless leaders of the antifascist alliance pre-
vented it. Occasionally, however, he turned a critical eye on his own role, al-
though he never denied that making big decisions in an informal way greatly ap-
pealed to him. Turning to his doctor in a confidential moment, he recalled the fa-
mous “percentage agreement” he made with Stalin in October 1944:  
“Read that. We made an arrangement with Stalin in the war about spheres of 
influence, expressed in percentages. Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and so on. Here 
they are in print ... It seems rather cynical, I said to Stalin, to barter away the lives 
of millions of people in this fashion. Perhaps we ought to burn this paper. `Oh, 
no’ said Stalin, `you keep it.’ … You see the people at the top can do these things, 
which others can’t do.”11 
All of the major elements of his foreign policy vision featured in the Fulton 
Address, as we have argued above, unfolded the way he said they would, with the 
possible exception of the United States of Europe. Churchill first used the expres-
sion “United States of Europe” in Brussels on November 16, 1945, in a speech 
given in a joint session of the Belgian Senate and House of Representatives, al-
though he acknowledged that it originated from Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi, the 
founder of pre-war pan-European movement.12  This part of his speech contained 
generalities only and served for rhetorical purposes:’United States of Europe... 
would unify this continent in a manner never known since the fall of the Roman 
Empire, and within which all its peoples may dwell together in prosperity, in jus-
tice and in peace.’13  
In front of the Dutch National Assembly in the Hague he practically repeated 
the Brussels speech; however, he also mentioned the integration of East Europe 
                                                 
11  Moran Diary, August 16, 1953. Moran, op. cit. 481–482. 
12  Graf Kalergi met Churchill four times between 1946–1950. The preface to his book pub-
lished in 1950 (An idea Conquest the World) was written by Churchill. Further important 
works by Kalergi: Pan Europe, Vienna, 1923. Totalitarian State Against Man (1938), 
Europe Must Unite (1940). Although Churchill acknowledges Kalergi’s achievements, but 
did not agree with the pan-European movement being so sharply anti-Russian: “...I think it 
would be a pity for me to join an organization which had such a markedly anti-Russian bent, 
but I was not aware that this was Count C. K.’s conception.” Letter to Duncan Sandys, June 
29, 1946. Op. cit. Churchill papers, 2/23. Quoted in Gilbert, op. cit. 243. More about Ka-
lergi’s activity in detail: Emma Kövics, Az európai egység kérdése és Németország 1889–
1933 [The Question of European Unity and Germany 1889–1933], Budapest, 1992. 
13  Speech of 16, November 1945, Brussels. In. Churchill Papers 5/2. 
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and the Soviet Union, and he envisioned these under United Nations’ control.14  
After such antecedents came his famous Zurich address, where he expatiated on 
his full concept of the United States of Europe. In his lecture delivered at the Uni-
versity of Zurich, on September 19, 1946, he attempted to connect a European 
image of the future with the democratic and federalist system of Switzerland, 
which was an obvious gesture towards his audience. The Zurich address touched 
upon a timely issue: nuclear weapons. He found it encouraging that this new 
weapon formed a protective shield over the Western world (because the USA en-
joyed a nuclear monopoly then), but pointed out in no uncertain terms that this 
situation was bound to change and, if used for aggression, the atomic bomb would 
lead to a world catastrophe. Everybody took the hint that the speech did not men-
tion explicitely: an effective security system must be developed before the Soviet 
Union came into possession of a similar piece of arms. Churchill was, neverthe-
less, wary of excluding the Soviet Union and other Eastern European peoples 
from United Europe. When, as a first step, he proposed the foundation of a Coun-
cil of Europe, he mentioned that in the creation of united Europe, France and 
Germany must act as leaders, but Great Britain, peoples of the British Common-
wealth, possibly the USA and hopefully the Soviet Union must also participate.  
Media responses to Churchill’s Zurich address were very mixed, most of them 
highlighted the surprise element of the speech: Franco−German reconciliation. 
French pouting is quite understandable after considering a report sent by Chur-
chill’s in-confidence son-in-law, Duncan Sandys about his visit to De Gaulle. The 
initiative came from Churchill, who, in a letter dated November 26, 1946, asked 
De Gaulle’s opinion about Franco−German reconciliation as proposed in the Zu-
rich address. Sandys delivered the letter in person and he reported in writing to his 
father-in-law about the French politician’s answers during their conversation: “He 
said (De Gaulle) that the reference in Mr. Churchill’s Zurich speech to a France-
German partnership had been badly received in France. Germany, as a state, no 
longer existed. All Frenchmen were violently opposed to recreating any kind of 
unified, centralized Reich, and were gravely suspicious of the policy of the 
American and British Governments. Unless steps were taken to prevent a resusci-
tation of German power, there was the danger that a United Europe would be-
come nothing else than an enlarged Germany.”15   
More realistic responses emphasized Churchill’s consideration of the interests 
of the Soviet Union. Russians refused it unanimously, the French took it grudg-
ingly, and British reactions were also contradictory. Even Churchill acknowl-
                                                 
14  “... I see no reason why, under the guardianship of the World organization, there should not 
ultimately arise the United States of Europe, both those of the East and those of the West...” 
Speech of 9 May 1996, The Hague. In. Churchill Papers 5/5. 
15  Churchill Papers 2/20. 
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edged that his Zurich address contributed largely to the Labour Government’s not 
supporting the British delegation travelling to a session of the Congress of Europe 
held in the Hague between May 7−10, 1948, because it was led by him.16  The 
idea of the United States of Europe in his Zurich address was partly naïve – be-
cause it really did not address the continent’s division. An article in the liberal 
Manchester Guardian reflected the most realistic British opinion: “Europe is at 
present divided into two parts by the quarrel between the Soviet world and the 
Western world. If this division persists the best we can hope for is a closer union 
of the nations in the western half, which Russia would certainly consider a hostile 
“block”. True unity can to be achieved only by agreement with the Soviet group, 
which will not be favourably impressed by any speech of Mr. Churchill’s.”17  
 
Gascoigne in Hungary 
 
The representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Alvary Frederic Gascoigne,18 ar-
rived in Debrecen on 23 February 1945, (he had spent only 50 days in the city) 
and described the Hungarian home policy events19 and characteristic of leading 
Hungarian politicians of the time. In a report to his intimate friend and colleague 
(Orme Sargent)20 Gascoigne gave a long analyses on his staying in Debrecen, 
Russian intentions, and foreseen  future events: ’…The Leftists in the National 
Assembly, i.e. the Communists, the Social Democrats and the National Peasants, 
may wish to take over power and rid themselves of the ’coalition’ government, 
                                                 
16  Churchill as chairman of the British United Europe Committee led the delegation, and only 
two Labour Party politicians supported travelling (Gordon Lang, Hugh Delargy). Gordon 
Lang of the Labour Party, who participated in Churchill’s United Europe movement, got to-
tally isolated within Labour because of his article published in London Cavalcade on 10, 
May 1947 in which he ensured the Conservative politician of his support. 
17  Manchester Guardian, 20, September 1946. “East and West.” 
18  Gascoigne was educated at Eton and after his war service entered the Foreign Office in 
1919. He was a Third Secretary in 1921, a Second Secretary in 1925, a First Secretary in 
1933 and a Counsellor in 1941. From 1936 until 1938, he was Chargé d’Affaires in Buda-
pest, from 1939 until 1944 Consul-General for the Tangier Zone (North-Africa). From 1945 
until 1946, he was a British Political Representative in Hungary with the rank of Minister, 
and from 1946 until 1951 British Representative in Japan with the rank of Ambassador. Two 
years before his retirement he was appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to Moscow (1951–
1953). More on his life see: Haraszti-Taylor, op. cit. xiv-xv. 
19  For the Hungarian history of the time, see: Jörg K. Hoensch, A History of Modern Hungary 
1867–1986, London, 1989. 161–187. László Kontler, Millenium in Central Europe. A His-
tory of Hungary, Budapest, 1999. 387–407. Ignác Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, Budapest, 1999. 217–264. 
20  In 1945 Sir Orme Sargent was Deputy Secretary of the Foreign Office responsible for East-
ern-and Central Europe. From 1946, he became Deputy of the Foreign Secretary. 
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but it seems to me possible that, before doing so, they will wait until the present 
regime is well and properly floundering in the mud of land reform, so that they 
shall not bear the weight of responsibility for its results. Of course, behind the 
scenes, there are the Russians. Everyone else is a marionette, pulled this way and 
that by the Russian strings; but it may be that the Russians would not welcome a 
government in Hungary in which was composed entirely of radically ’leftist’ ele-
ments. The latter might get out of hand and be inconvenient to Moscow in more 
ways than one.’21 Gascoigne found the Hungarian Prime Minister of the time22 as 
a pessimistic politician without experience and stamina. General Dálnoki Miklós 
Béla gave him to understand that he was having problems with the Cabinet be-
cause of the cruel offensive policy of the leftist, pro-soviet cabinet members. The 
Premier admitted that the economic situation in Hungary would be serious in the 
near future which was due to the failure of the harvest and the confusing policy of 
the Russians based on forced urgency of sudden land reform.23 Although there 
was a fear in the Foreign Office according to Gascoigne’s preference for the pre-
war Hugarian regime, he made obvious that his main tasks were to inform the 
Foreign Office on Hungarian home policy issues and keep contact with Hungar-
ian political leaders and decision makers of various political parties. After the 
British Labour Party’s electoral victory in the summer of 1945 Gascoigne sent 29 
telegramms to the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. In these he 
gave detailed information on his meetings with various Hungarian party leaders 
and tried to estimate the outcome of the forthcoming Hungarian election. He em-
hasized many times that there were no significant differences between the Hun-
garian social democratic party leaders and the communist ones. He believed that 
Árpád Szakasics24 the head of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party was a real 
communist.25 This short but basically true statement of him was based on the fact 
that Szakasics appeared as mediator to set up a meeting between Gascoigne and 
                                                 
21  Gascoigne to Sargent, 10 April 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 71. 
22  Dálnoki Miklós Béla (1890–1948) army officer, Hungarian military attaché in Berlin (1933–
36), general and leader of the Governor’s military office (from 1941). In December 1944, he 
was appointed as a Premier of Hungarian Provisional Government. He was resigned after 
the general election of November 1945. 
23  Gascoigne to Bevin, 21 August, 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. xvii 
24  Árpád Szakasits (1888–1965) journalist, social democratic politician, leader of the Hungar-
ian Social Democratic Party from 1939. As a pro-communist he became the president of 
Hungary after the communist takeover (1948–1949). 
25  In this case Gascoigne referred to the speech of Árpád Szakasics on a Social Democratic 
Party Congress (18, August 1945) which was-by his opinion- so similar to another speech on 
that ocassion given by the communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi. Gascoigne to Bevin, 21 Au-
gust 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 172–173.  
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the communist leader Mátyás Rákosi.26 Probably because of his attitude he re-
mained a „foreign observer” keeping equal distance from political parties of the 
time. His reports based on very sharp and sensitive analyses, Gascoigne was really 
open minded and always ready to meet anyone from the Hungarian political life 
included the communist party leader Mátyás Rákosi: ’…M. Szakasits…ask me 
whether I would receive M. Rakosi (Mattias), the Communist leader. I said that if 
M. Rakosi wish to see me, I should of course be delighted to welcome him here, as 
I would the leaders of any of the Hungarian political parties. I thought it well, 
however to stress that the initiative must be theirs and that my attitude towards the 
five existing political parties was merely that of an ’interested observer’.27  In a 
former telegramm the British diplomat described Rákosi as very talented person, a 
strong man of the Russians and the future leader of Hungary.28 The background of 
this meeting went back to the first parliamentary speech of Ernest Bevin (20 Au-
gust, 1945) in which the new British Foreign Secretary described Hungary-
together with Bulgaria and Roumania- as non-democratic country. Gascoigne 
thought that Rákosi tried to assure the British not to worry about the fate of Hun-
garian democracy because the only problem he said, was the weakness and incom-
petency of Hungarian government of the time. By the opinion of the communist 
leader there were no political terror in Hungary, the inroduction of exeptional gov-
ernmental measures was necessity in order to stop the black market and secure the 
food supply of the cities. Rákosi expressed that the Hungarian political secret po-
lice was a body of amateurs, they missed the target and were unable to realize the 
existence of hundreds of „reactionary, anti-democratic” groups needed to be arrest. 
He informed Gascoigne on the forthcoming free election and estimated equal re-
sults between the three dominant parties (smallholders, social democrats, commu-
nists). Rákosi made clear that introduction of Soviet-type system in Hungary was 
out of question and the coalition governmental system would exist at least for five 
years (until the end of the country’s resurrection).29  
The issue of forthcoming election became a key element of the Hungarian 
home policy from the summer of 1945, so it is no wonder that Gascoigne made 
permanent reports on that ocassion. The leaders of Hungarian Smallholders Party 
                                                 
26  Mátyás Rákosi (1892–1971) civil servant, communist politician, leader of the Hungarian 
Communist Party (1945–1956). He became a dictator and emblematic figure of Hungarian 
communist regime from 1948 until 1956. 
27  Gascoigne to Bevin, 4 August, 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 152. 
28  ’…It seems possible therefore that M. Rákosi will play a prominent role in future Hungarian 
politics and that the power and influence of the Kremlin may possibly make itself felt through 
the medium of this individual…’Gascoigne to Eden, 28 May 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 4. 
29  The importance of the meeting was indicated by the fact that Gascoigne has sent a long tele-
gramm (three pages) on that to London and it was circulated-with attached minute of Orme 
Sargent- to other British embassies (Beograd, Bucharest, Sofia, Caserta, Moscow, Prague, 
Washington). Gascoigne to Bevin, 22, August 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 178–181. 
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(especially Zoltán Tildy and Ferenc Nagy)30 called the British mission many times 
to achieve more active steps of London against the Soviets. They emhasized their 
sure electoral victory but Gascoigne was more cautious about that. He thought 
that only the Hungarian communists had enough money and Soviet support to 
manage successful electoral campaign.31 By the reports of Gascoigne it is crucial 
to stress that there was an idea well before the elections between the Hungarian 
political parties to establish a coalition government (and it was obviously against 
the values of all types of classical democratic procedures).32 After these starred 
preliminaries the correct management of the elections was pleasant surprise for 
the British, especially when they noticed that the Soviet Red Army was ordered to 
stay in their barracks during the election day. The first analyses on the election’s 
outcome was given by Béla Zsedényi33 to the British. He stated that although 
most of the Hungarians voted against the communists, the economic situation was 
so serious in the country that the smallholders dominated coalition government 
would give many concessions to the communists. He believed that this election 
was much more a kind of plebscite against communism than a real election. 
Zsedényi stated that the leadership of smallholders were under permanent pres-
sure coming from the leftists and the Russians and this would steer the small-
holders to a position of never-ending concessions. This would case not just a total 
collapse of the smallholders but a sudden communist takeover. Gascoigne agreed 
with this opinion and emhasized that the smallholders accepted the idea of the 
coalition govenment just because they wanted to shift the responsibility of mak-
ing serious economic decisions on to other parties.34  
According to his duty, Gascoigne has sent two telegramms on the electoral re-
sults35 and the structure of the new government. He emphasized that Hungarian 
                                                 
30  Zoltán Tildy (1889–1961) pastor of the Hungarian Reformed Church, smallholders politi-
cian, Premier and President of Hungary (1945–1948). Ferenc Nagy (1903–1979) farmer, 
smallholders politician, Premier of Hungary (1946–1947). In June 1947 he was deposed by 
the communists  and forced to go to U.S. exile.  
31  Gascoigne to W. G. Hayter, 5, November 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 216. 
32  ’…It was further suggested that the coalition government which it had been decided by the 
party leaders would in any case be formed as a result of of the General election, should be 
made up before the election were held. After some ten days of crises…it was decided that a 
new coalition government should be formed after the elections, and not before them…’ Gas-
coigne to Bevin, 5, November 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 220–222. 
33  Béla Zsedényi (1894–1955) lawyer, jurist, moderate right-wing politician, between Decem-
ber 1944 and December 1945 President of the Provisional National Assembly.  
34  Gascoigne to Bevin, 10, November 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 225–229. 
35  The election were held on 4, November 1945 and the smallholdres could gain all the seats of 
the sixteen electoral districts collecting 57% of the total votes. The social democrats scored 
17, 4%, the communists 17% and the rest of the votes went to smaller parties. See also: L. 
Kontler, Millenium, 396. 
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political parties were not fully satisfied with the results and the communists 
would probably start very dynamic parliamentary and governmental acivity to 
balance their electoral failure. Further on, there were signs that that the commu-
nists were tried to gain the key positions of executive power. Gascoigne also had 
firm views about the Russians, whom he found difficult. He found Voroshilov 
(’the peasant Marshall’, as he called him) a pleasant person, but shrewd and busi-
nesslike. Quoting Gascoigne: ’The Russians as a whole are always pleasant and 
polite when we meet them, but they have not yet, at any rate, seen fit to give us 
that measure of assistance which we have a right to to expect from them.’36 
In his last telegramm before his leaving for Japan Gascoigne informed the 
Foreign Office on the forthcoming visit of the Mayor of Budapest to London and 
the arriving and welcoming of Count Mihály Károlyi37 in Budapest. He noticed 
that although Károlyi was received as a great statesman but after estimating the 
situation the Count realized his hopeless position in a Soviet and communist con-
trolled Hungarian home policy. He was so depressed and disillusioned when he 
expressed his opinion that there was not much chance to strenghten a western-
type democracy and political culture in Hungary.38 Gascoigne thought that the 
Russians were not versed in the art of co-operation and were filled with suspicion 
and distrust of the British.39 In that respect Gascoigne was right, and his des-
patches about Hungarian personalities and politics also reflect the above views. 
Even if Gascoigne was sent to Hungary because not much could be done for Brit-
ain in his situation, and though he was criticized by A. C. Macartney,40 a Profes-
                                                 
36  Gascoigne to Sargent, 10, April 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 69. 
37  Count Mihály Károlyi (1875–1955) liberal Hungarian aristocrat and landowner, between 
October 1918 and March 1919 he was a Premier and President of Hungary. From July 1919 
until May 1946 he lived in England and then in France (between 1949 and 1955).  
38  ’… Count Károlyi told me that he was suffering from great sorrow, disillusion and disgust; 
sorrow because of the ruince of a once beautiful capital, disillusion because of the weakness 
which was obviously being displayed by those in power towards the Communists, disgust 
because of the wholesale inmorality and graft which permeated all strata of the population, 
both official and otherwise…Count Károlyi said that he would not be staying in Hungary for 
very long. He did not desire to have anything to do with the internal politics of the coun-
try…’ Gascoigne to Bevin, 16, May 1946. Haraszty-Taylor, op. cit. 236–238. 
39  In his Westminster speech of 20 August, 1945, the newly appointed British Foreign Secre-
tary, Ernest Bevin listed those Eastern-and Central European countries (included Hungary) 
in the Russian zone of occupation in which there was no chance for democracy. The speech 
resulted significant outcry in Hungarian home policy and among the Russians staying on 
Hungarian soil. 
40  As a historian and chief adviser of the Foreign Office (from 1937) Carlile Aylmer Mac-
artney became an expert of the Hungarian question (due to his first book: Hungary and Her 
Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919–1937. London, New York, 
Toronto, 1937.) In this he could accept a limited revision of Hungarian borders based on 
ethnic aspects. His second book (October Fifteenth. A History of Modern Hungary 1929–
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sor, historian and leading Hungarian expert at the Foreign Office Research De-
partment, Gascoigne was very dilligent, seemingly enjoyed his popularity, mixed 
easily with every shade of the political and social life in Hungary.  
As his Majesty’s Ambassador to Moscow (the last position of his diplomatic 
career) he improved his inability to understand the high politics. In a telegramm 
dated 9, January, 1952 Gascoigne sent a long analyses on Soviet foreign policy in 
Asia making a consequence that the Soviet presence in Korea is like a spring-
board to sovietize Japan. In Moscow he disliked that strange atmosphere, suffered 
from the lack of real public life and finally this old-fashioned diplomat with tradi-




Churchill’s activity strenghtened a Western European movement for unity and 
helped secure the Marshall Plan. His United Europe Movement organized in 
Great Britain imagined unity with London in the center, which Churchill may 
have been the only one to support. Nonetheless, he could not deny that the British 
Empire was still at the center of his political consciousness. The policies he fol-
lowed especially during his second premiership (1951–1955) followed classic 
19th-century traditions of British diplomacy (pragmatism, a sense of compromise, 
national interests emphasized).  He radically opposed a policy of appeasement if 
rooted in weakness, but he was also convinced that the West must negotiate with 
Moscow from a position of power.  
He was an anticommunist to the bone, but he would not convert the cold war 
into an election campaign. Although he always denied doing it, in fact he wished 
to act as mediator between world powers. He accepted the division of Europe 
(and Germany) as a temporary condition, but he would render a Finland-type so-
lution (independence, with friendship with the Soviet Union) for Eastern Euro-
pean Soviet satellite states. Because he believed in Western democratic values, he 
considered that the kind of government the Soviet Union had was part of their 
domestic affairs. Yet he condemned dictatorship and tyranny. His aim was to 
stem the spread of communism – even if on his own, so for him the policy of 
easement was more a form of containment than its opposite. He wanted to main-
tain a strong Western alliance system even when cold war tensions would release.  
                                                                                                                       
1945. Vols. 1–2. Edinburgh, 1956.) is an objective and well balanced survey of the Horthy-
regime, in this sense a fundamental historical work of that period of Hungarian history. He 
openly clarified his critical standpoint on Gascoigne: ’…he loses no opportunity…of creat-
ing the simultaneous impression that we do not want to have any influence in Hungary, and 
could not have if we would.’ Minute by A. Macartney to Mr Addis, Southern Department, 
Foreign Office, 29, August, 1945. Haraszti-Taylor, op. cit. xviii. 
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He may have been the first leader in the West to realize that rigid anticommunist 
propaganda and an unreasonably strong opposition against the Soviet Union 
would only solidify it as a police state. Since the Americans never formally ac-
cepted Europe’s division, Churchill could not get Stalin to repeat the percentage 
distributions of political influence as he had in October 1944.  
As a British diplomat in Hungary Gascoigne could represent a very weak and 
limited British influence in the region (because of the general weakness of the 
post WWII British Empire). The British were unable to renew their old super 
power presence in Europe (included Central and Eastern Europe) and could not 
avoid the upper hand of Moscow in those countries which were occupied by the 
Red Army. Quoting J. M. Addis (Southern Department, Foreign Office) minute 
(15, August, 1945) to Gascoigne’s report: ’I fear that the revised arrangements for 
British and American participation in the Controll Comission will make no differ-
ence to Hungary’s plight. No change seeems possible until the Russian troops 
withdraw. And even after that, Hungary will remained tied to the Soviet Union 
economically. British influence in Hungary has no chance against Soviet influ-
ence; and those elements in Hungary who look to the West for support for their 
conception of democracy, will look in vain. It seems clear that for many years to 
come Hungary will be a satellite of the Soviet, in which the Communist influence 
will predominate.’41 Gascoigne tried to give an objective picture on Hungary (he 
had 86 diplomatic reports sent to the Foreign Office) although he was keen on the 
non-communist parties and the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church as well (Jó-
zsef Grősz42 the Archbishop of Kalocsa was his political intimate).43 But this old 
fashioned British gentleman could not represent the interests of a weak and disil-
lusioned British Empire in a country where the Soviet Red Army had an upper 
hand. When Gascoigne clarified his personal standpoints in his reports he has 
followed the special Churchillian argumentation; generally we support the pro-
Western political parties in Hungary but practically we are not more than 
curious but desinterested observers. In spite of this limited British involvement, 
Gascoigne’s subtle analyses give us a chance to clarify more delicate focus on the 
diplomatic history of that period. 
                                                 
41  Minute of J. M. Addis to Gascoinge’s report to Churchill, 23, July 1945. Haraszty-Taylor, 
op. cit. 138. 
42  József Grősz (1887–1961) priest of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church and Archbishop 
of Kalocsa (1943–1951). In 1951 he was arrested by the communists and released in the 
days of  the  revolution of 1956.  
43  Gascoigne was a mediator between the Archbishop and the Holy See. Grősz informed the 
Vatican on the land reform, home policy issues and activities of the Russians in Hungary. 




Soviet Cultural Operations and Small Nations  





Soviet presence was felt all around the world for much of the 20th century. In 
the field of international politics, this was especially difficult for many smaller 
countries bordering the Soviet Union in the West, ranging from Finland to Ro-
mania. Before the Second World War the attitude of most European govern-
ments towards the Soviet Union was hostile, and cooperation was mostly non-
existent, limited to sporadic diplomatic connections. On the grass-roots level, 
however, the situation was more ambiguous already in the 1920s and 1930s: for 
some, the first socialist state provided a vision of a glorious future, while for 
many others the vision was scary, filled with pain and wrongdoing. Few were 
left indifferent. But even among Western supporters of the Soviet system there 
were little connections with the Soviet Union itself. Before WWII, the Soviets 
had suppressed most foreign cultural connections. All the more drastic, then, 
was the change that took place after WWII and in particular after Stalin’s death 
in 1953, when the Soviet presence in the international arena became manifold. 
Soviet artists rushed to foreign concert halls and musical competitions, and So-
viet works of art filled exhibition halls and museums. A country that had kept 
its borders closed, fiercely blocking foreign influences, suddenly started to in-
teract with the surrounding world, even with capitalist countries. Consequently, 
Soviet cultural presence grew considerably in the Soviet orbit, but also in 
neighboring countries such as Finland. 
This paper is based on two interlinked projects conducted at the University 
of Jyväskylä. The first is my personal project examining the Soviet project of 
cultural diplomacy in the post-Stalinist period, based primarily on archival re-
search conducted in Moscow and Tallinn and aiming at creating the framework 
for a detailed study about Soviet cultural influence. The other project concen-
trates on Finnish cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries. Finland’s cultural connections with socialist countries were un-
matched in any other capitalist country, but as such, have never been studied in 
depth. Both projects aim at producing new knowledge about the objectives, im-
pact and extent of cultural exchanges and cultural influencing in the post-WWII 
Europe until the collapse of the communist camp. This paper will focus mostly 
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on describing the framework for Soviet cultural diplomacy, and makes connec-
tions to Finland briefly only in the very end. Without a proper study about the 
objectives and conduct of Soviet foreign cultural operations, it is very hard to 
understand the consequences and dynamics of Finnish-Soviet cultural relations. 
While there are existing studies of the Cold War era cultural operations con-
ducted by the the United States, Soviet foreign cultural operations have never 
been subjected to extensive scrutiny. Soviet foreign affairs have typically been 
examined in terms of international relations, mainly political or military. Cul-
ture and arts have mostly been omitted from such studies. And yet, from 1953 
onwards, cultural exchanges played an enormous role in Soviet international 
strategy. The Soviet leaders gave pride of place to sending out Soviet cultural 
artifacts and artists to disseminate information about the Soviet Union and its 
achievements. In the immediate postwar years, these actions were mostly con-
ducted in the Soviet-occupied zones ranging from Germany to Bulgaria, but af-
ter 1953 the Soviet Union already sought bilateral agreements on cultural ex-
change even with Western countries. As a result, the Soviet presence in the 
West, and also in the third world, expanded significantly. Members of the So-
viet cultural elite were believed to be perfect cultural ambassadors, people who 
could convey Soviet messages of peaceful coexistence and the good will of the 
Soviet Union better than Soviet politicians ever could. Therefore, it was Soviet 
artists who spearheaded the exchanges, although these quickly expanded from 
leading artists and few privileged apparatchiks to include broader segments of 
Soviet society in the form of tourism and a wide variety of friendship activities. 
Eventually, cultural exchanges developed into a very lively exchange be-
tween the Soviet Union and the West. Soon socialist countries in East-Central 
Europe were allowed to build connections to the West, too, with similar aims: 
presenting the Soviet system and socialism around the world. Indeed, the major 
expansion and actual creation of Soviet cultural diplomacy was based on the as-
sumed appeal of the Soviet system. The Soviet leaders believed that anti-Soviet 
attitudes in the West stemmed from Western propaganda and misunderstandings 
and were convinced that through the exchanges and dissemination of correct in-
formation, the Soviet system would find increasing support and those hostile to 
the Soviet Union would be marginalized. The price the Soviets paid was natu-
rally a flow of Western influences into the Soviet Union and to East-Central 
Europe in particular. Through exchange programs, scientists, scholars and art-
ists, and in some cases even ordinary people were able to establish foreign ties 
on an unprecedented scale. This resulted in Soviet and East-Central European 
people being exposed to Western influences in ways unimaginable during the 
Stalin era. For the Soviet leaders, however, the international presence of the 
USSR and the embellishment of its public image were the top priorities. In the 
fierce ideological competition with the USA, the Soviets felt they could win 
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over foreign populations by proving their superiority in the cultural arena. How-
ever, what was for the Soviet leaders a battle for hearts and minds was for many 
individuals primarily a chance to go abroad and pursue their personal ends. 
Thus, while on the governmental level there was certainly a political dimension 
to the cultural exchanges between East and West, for individuals the signifi-
cance was often rather different. 
The aim here, then, is to explain the logic of Soviet cultural diplomacy, not 
primarily as a political phenomenon, but as a cultural and social occurrence that 
greatly influenced transnational relations. I have personally conducted several 
sub-projects dealing with Soviet foreign cultural operations and examined vari-
ous manifestations of Soviet cultural diplomacy in order to construct the 
framework in which the East-West exchanges took place. Rather than interpret-
ing them merely as inter-state affairs, I have attempted to get closer to the 
ground. Many Soviet and East-Central European artists took part in these ex-
changes, and their contact with the West gave them access to international 
trends. On the other hand, in some cases Soviet and East-Central European art 
made important contributions to the international scene, especially in film, lit-
erature, music and dance.  
The study of Soviet cultural diplomacy also helps us understand the begin-
nings of the downfall of communist rule. As the Soviet Union started to open up 
to the outside world, the ideological corrosion and alienation of the people from 
Soviet and Communist ideals slowly began. Soviet leaders believed that by 
openly challenging the West, and by learning from it, they could modernize the 
country and catch up with the USA. Cultural exchanges, however, resulted in 
growing exposure to Western ideals and consumerism, something the Soviet 
system could not, or was not ready to, face. Process went along the same tracks 
in East Central European countries, although separately in each country. The 
process in the Soviet Union has been explained by Alexei Yurchak in his book 
Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More. Like Yurchak, many scholars 
have referred to the role of Western cultural influence in this process, but few 
have examined how Soviet policies contributed to it. While in the West the in-
fluence of Soviet art, media and music or their exposure to Western influences 
have been subjected to examination, my purpose is to deconstruct the frame-
work in which these processes were made possible. During the Stalin era, such 
influences were inconceivable. And while the Brezhnev era aimed at suppress-
ing some of them, these attempts were half-hearted compared to those of the 
1930s. Foreign connections were never completely extinguished after 1953, 




Deconstructing Soviet Cultural Diplomacy 
 
During the late Stalin years the Soviet Union used programs of cultural ex-
change to influence Soviet-occupied countries trying to help them in adapting to 
the Soviet system as well as removing general anti-Soviet feelings. Leading So-
viet artists, cooperation in the field of radio, exchange of exhibitions and printed 
materials were used by the Soviet Union in an attempt to appeal to people’s 
feelings.1 During the Stalin era, however, especially western influences were 
repelled and kept outside Soviet borders. Thus, exchange was partial, and Soviet 
authorities closely controlled what was allowed to enter the Soviet Union. Yet, 
experiences from this work were exploited in the international scene after Sta-
lin’s death in 1953. Suddenly, Soviets were making bilateral agreements even 
with capitalist countries, aiming at large scale cultural exchange with them. De-
spite this drastic change, however, research on Soviet foreign policy, and Soviet 
operations in the Cold War, bypass almost completely the role played by cul-
tural exchanges and cultural influencing.2 
Few books examine cultural Cold War taking the Soviet side into account. 
Among them is David Caute’s The Dancer Defects (2003).3 Since Caute, few 
scholars have tackled the issue.4 Other publications on cultural Cold War practi-
cally represent the Western point of view exclusively. In Cold War studies, cul-
ture has been a rising theme and it is already generally acknowledged that for 
the US, American mass culture was one of its greatest assets.5 But culture still is 
overshadowed by traditional diplomacy, high-level politics and military opera-
tions in the Cold War studies. Cultural influencing has not found its way to the 
                                                            
1  Problems regarding early cultural exchanges are discussed for example in Gyorgy Peteri 
(ed), Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of 
State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe, Trondheim, 2006. 
2  Aleksander Fursenko & Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an 
American Adversary, New York, W.W.Norton, 2006; Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Em-
pire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill, University 
of North Carolina Press, 2007; Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October 
Revolution to the Fall of the Wall, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2011. Though 
aforementioned are very good publications on Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, 
they pay practically no attention whatsoever on culture.  
3  David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold 
War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
4  Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union built the Media Empire 
That Lost the Cultural Cold War, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2011; Anne Gorsuch, 
All This is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
5  Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–
1961, London, Macmillan Press, 1996. 
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mainstream even in cases in which its connections with high-level political 
making are obvious.6 
One reason for non-existing literature about Soviet cultural diplomacy is 
conceptual. The concept is American, created in the late 1940s to describe an 
area of foreign politics that quickly developed into an important field in US for-
eign operations. Cultural diplomacy consists of actions that are aimed at appeal-
ing and influencing the people in target countries. For the US, this meant ques-
tioning the authority of Communist Parties through a number of cultural opera-
tions: student exchange, tourism, international radio broadcasting, and by gen-
erally introducing consumerist culture and modern lifestyle. American tradition 
aims at distinguishing cultural diplomacy from propaganda and transnational re-
lations, as there has existed an extensive civic society outside the government 
that has been active in foreign operations. In the Soviet case, there was no such 
thing as a civic society, at least, not in the first post-WWII decades. While 
friendship societies were for the West part of civic society, for the Soviet Union 
they constituted an integral part of the administration and were strictly con-
trolled by the government. The Communist Party subjected their actions to close 
scrutiny and their objectives were directly tied to Soviet foreign policy. The tra-
ditional definition of cultural diplomacy thus works poorly in the Soviet case, 
although this has also been attempted.7  
Soviet foreign cultural operations need to be examined either separately, or 
as part of larger foreign political objectives. As the field was exceptionally ex-
tensive in the Soviet case, here I will concentrate on the Khrushchev era, when 
Soviet cultural diplomacy and many of its operations were still formulating and 
                                                            
6  General books on Cold War typically bypass culture either completely, or with few sen-
tences. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, New York, Penguin Press, 
2005 e.g. does mention peaceful coexistence as a concept, but does not look how it mani-
fested itself. Among few works that do discuss the topic, primarily from the American 
point of view, see: Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural 
Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Post-War Europe, New York, Free Press, 1989; 
Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the 
United States in Austria after the Second World War, Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994; Hixson, Parting the Curtain; Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the 
Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, London, Granta Books, 1999; Caute, Dancer 
Defects; Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain, 
University Park, Penn State Press, 2003; Victor Rosenberg, Soviet-American Relations, 
1953–1960: Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange During the Eisenhower Presidency, Jeffer-
son, McFarland & Co, 2005; Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “Culture and the Cold War in 
Europe”, In: The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. I, Eds. Melvyn Leffler & Odd 
Arne Westad, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 398–419. 
7  Nigel Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy”, Diplomatic History 27 
(2003) 193–214. 
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were rather fresh. Later, many of these forms stabilized as part of the normal 
Soviet conduct, and changed very little from the way they were formulated in 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
It is illustrative that, when the United States suggested a program of cultural 
exchanges to the Soviet Union in 1949, it was immediately countered. There 
was no willingness for bilateral agreements on exchanges in the Stalinist Soviet 
Union. Cultural exchange with the capitalist countries became topical after the 
Geneva Convention (1955).8 Temporarily slowed by the events in Hungary in 
1956, many agreements with capitalist governments were signed in 1957-1958, 
among them with the United States. They were important as they made large 
scale exchange of people and cultural artifacts possible. Indeed, after signing of 
agreements, what started as exchanges of top artists and troupes, expanded with 
student and professional exchange, and even tourism. Agreements were general 
by nature, so that western governments could not control their side of agree-
ments very strictly.9 This made it possible for the Soviets to contact directly e.g. 
art business for producing Soviet art and artists to western concert arenas with-
out western governments’ interference. 
Perhaps the single most important early manifestation of the agreement be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States were national exhibitions in the 
summer of 1959: the Soviet exhibition in New York and the American exhibi-
tion in Moscow. The US exhibition has received a lot of attention in research.10 
Its Soviet counterpart, however, has remained outside research so far,11 although 
the Communist Party followed very closely both exhibitions.12 Generally, the 
                                                            
 8  Unites States Department of State, “Cultural Relations Between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Efforts to Establish Cultural-Scientific Exchange Blocked by the U.S.S.R.”, 
Stanford University: Hoover library collections, 1949. Apparently, the memo was drafted 
to point out that the Soviet Union had prevented agreement from being reached. Yet, ideas 
of the United States about free change of ideas and people were impossible for Stalin.  
 9  Zhukov’s memorandum about bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and West-
ern Europe and the United States, 28.11.1961, Russian State Archives of Recent History 
[hereafter RGANI] f. 5, op. 30, d. 370, ll. 74–76. 
10  Marilyn S. Kushner, “Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 
1959: Domestic Politics and Cultural Diplomacy”, Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (2002) 
6–26; Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 169–180; Richmond, Raising Curtain, 14–20; 
Rosenberg, East-West, 131–132. 
11  Susan Reid’s innovative article deserves to be mentioned as an important exception: 
“Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition 
in Moscow, 1959”, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9 (2008) 855–
904. Here Reid examines reactions of individual Soviet citizens to American exhibition. 
12  Zhukov’s memoranda to Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party about American 
exhibition in Moscow, 9.1–27.7.1959, RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 291. Party leadership was 
closely following how the exhibition proceeded, the reactions of citizens and the way in 
which exhibition appealed to people. 
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lack of attention for the Soviet side in these agreements causes significant dis-
tortion as the Soviet Union and Khrushchev were essentially initiators in these 
agreements, and the agreements therefore had close links to Khrushchev’s pol-
icy of peaceful coexistence.13 
The basic reasoning for the Soviets to engage in cultural agreements that even-
tually increased the Western influence in the Soviet-controlled area can be found 
in the postwar situation. Foreign policy had become increasingly dependent on 
popular opinion, and, for the Soviet Union, appealing to people was therefore an 
important chance to have a direct impact on foreign policy of Western govern-
ments. Thus, Soviet leaders aimed at using what they considered as a crucial 
weakness of democratic systems. This was practically spelled out by the central 
figure of US foreign policy under the presidency of Eisenhower, John Foster Dul-
les, when he said about Geneva Convention that it was not desired by the United 
States, but that people’s expectations forced the US to negotiations.14 Soviet for-
eign policy after Stalin’s death aimed at lessening fears towards the Soviet Union, 
and supporting peace movements in the West. Therefore, the Soviet engaged in 
measures directed especially at the middle classes in the West.15 Although Soviet 
authorities hardly believed in turning Western populations into Communists in 
large scale, it was equally important to decrease anti-Soviet attitudes and raise 
positive attitudes about the Soviet Union.16 Against this background, the Soviet 
Union skillfully combined international propaganda, exchange of arts and culture, 
public diplomacy and other measures into part of its foreign policy. While some 
of the measures existed before Stalin’s death, the scale had been considerably 
smaller, and actions poorly controlled before mid-1950s. 
The change can be easily seen in the field of classical music, which was con-
sidered to be of higher standard in the Soviet Union than anywhere else in the 
world. Yet, before the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union was very selective, only 
participating in international competitions sending out the best and most-trusted 
musicians to win these competitions. Apart from such competitions, there had 
been only very occasional appearances of Soviet artists in the western concert 
arenas prior to 1955.17 After that, the change was drastic. Instead of individual 
                                                            
13  Relationship between peaceful coexistence with the agreement on cultural exchanges with 
the US has been examined by Rósa Magnusdóttir,”Be careful in America, Premier Khru-
shchev!” Soviet perceptions of peaceful coexistence with the United States, Cahiers du 
Monde Russe 47 (2006) 109–130. 
14  National Security Committee’s (NRC) Memorandum 256, 28.7.1955. Foreign relations of 
the United States, 1955–57, 5:534, Washington: State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs. 
15  Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 102, 104. 
16  Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 104. 
17  Report about cultural affairs with the United States, 19.4.1972, RGANI f. 5, op. 64, d. 
126, ll. 20–24. 
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competitors, whole opera houses and orchestras started making American and 
European-wide tours that lasted months. The political dimension of such tours 
was obvious and it was a logical continuum in increasing Soviet presence in the 
international arena in general. For instance, simultaneously, the primary Soviet 
foreign radio broadcasting operation Radio Moscow expanded its volume by 
15% per year.18 
Perhaps even more illustrative was the administrational change that took 
place. In 1957 Soviet Foreign Ministry that had been shaped by the long rule of 
Viatcheslav Molotov lost important parts of its power to a new State Committee 
of Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (GKKS). This new committee assumed 
planning and coordination responsibilities over a number of forms of cultural 
influencing, bilateral agreements with foreign countries included, as well for-
eign radio programming, publicity campaigns, foreign ties of cultural institu-
tions, exchange of people and so forth. This organ in essence created the Soviet 
cultural diplomacy. For ten years it exercised power over a number of Soviet 
ministries, until in 1967 it was terminated and its power returned to ministries. 
Like another State Committee, KGB, GKKS was more significant than its for-
mal status would seem to be.19 
One of the core aims of this committee was to replace “Western falsifica-
tion” with facts about the Soviet Union. Generally, it is important to underline 
that GKKS was created to control the Soviet public image more effectively and 
control cultural influencing around the world. Its actions were less aggressive, 
often putting lessening of Western influence in target countries in the first place 
and increasing of Soviet influence only to the secondary position. In the West, 
this typically meant encouraging non-dependence on the United States. Fur-
thermore, the emphasis was less on the superiority of the Soviet system, while 
inter-cultural solidarity was brought to the fore. This was especially important 
for many smaller countries, although in practice Soviets often placed their cul-
ture in the first place. Even so, reciprocity was underlined in bilateral agree-
ments and gradually became a core element in cultural exchanges.20 
                                                            
18  United States Information Agency, “Advance Release: for Monday papers, 1.2.1960”, 
Stanford University: Hoover library collections, 1960. Soviet foreign broadcasts reached 
975 hours per week when Voice of America broadcasted 609 hours per week. About So-
viet foreign broadcasts more in detail, see Simo Mikkonen, “To control the world’s in-
formation flows – Soviet Cold War broadcasting”, In: Airy Curtains in the European 
Ether: Broadcasting and the Cold War, Eds. Andreas Fickers & Alexander Badenoch & 
Christian Heinrich-Frank, Baden-Baden, Nomos, forthcoming in 2012.  
19  Zhukov’s memorandum to Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, 16.7.1959, 
RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 304, ll. 78–84. 
20  Frederick Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in 
Soviet Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 11.  
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The power of GKKS is also manifested in the fact that the chairman of the 
Committee, Yuri Zhukov, personally took care of negotiations with foreign 
governments. Thus, even if the first Soviet-American agreement on cultural ex-
changes is often called as Lacy-Zarubin act since Ambassador Georgi Zarubin 
signed the agreement, it was Zhukov who took care of the negotiations.21 Zhu-
kov was the former deputy editor-in-chief of Pravda, as well as its foreign cor-
respondent, for example to Paris.22 He was, thus, no alien to foreign or public 
diplomacy. What is perhaps even more important is that he openly admired US 
foreign public and cultural diplomacy and the way they were coordinated. He 
urged that this was something Soviet organs should learn.23 
 
 
Forms of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy 
 
One of early forms of Soviet cultural diplomacy that survived from the Stalin 
era were radio broadcasting and the distribution of a magazine presenting life in 
the Soviet Union in a number of foreign languages. Broadcasts consisted typi-
cally of programs that were translated into various languages and then broadcast 
to their target countries. The magazine was similarly general, mostly with trans-
lated contents. With the general activation of Soviet cultural diplomacy in the 
mid-1950s, these materials were updated and better adapted to local circum-
stances and with more local materials. With many countries, the distribution of 
a Soviet magazine required reciprocal publishing of a magazine in the Soviet 
Union, like the magazine called Amerika in the US case. While the Communist 
Party allowed such publications, they also gave strict orders about how to pre-
vent distribution of these magazines and to downplay their influence in the So-
viet Union.24 This is illustrative of different forces in the Soviet administration: 
hardliners especially within KGB were constantly worried about foreign influ-
ences, while GKKS was filled with people whose primary focus was to further 
Soviet presence in the world and to work for the Soviet image. Thus, when after 
the Geneve convention Molotov, who was still the Soviet Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, was against extending foreign contacts, his removal in 1956 made it 
                                                            
21  Zhukov’s memorandum to Pospelov about the meeting with George Allen, 2.1.1958, 
RGANI f. 5, op. 33, d. 72, l. 1. 
22  Zhukov was displaced as the chair of the Committee in 1962 after which he served in less 
important post, like as the vice head of the Soviet Peace Committee until 1982. 
23  Zhukov’s memorandum to Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party about the 
US propaganda service, 20.1.1958, RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 270, ll. 6–25. 
24  About restructuring VOKS, Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party, 5.9.1957, RGANI f. 89, per. 55, d. 21, ll. 3–5. The same document can be 
found in: RGANI f. 89, per. 46, d. 28, ll. 1–3. 
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possible to use embassies and assets of the Foreign Ministry for widening for-
eign cultural projects.25 Especially after events in Hungary, the peaceful nature 
of Soviet foreign policy was being underlined.26 
Bilateral cultural agreements with a number of foreign countries were typi-
cally similar by content, with little variation. They outlined principles for recip-
rocal exchange of delegations and materials. Often this meant exchange of ex-
hibitions, media contents, musical recordings, but also increased movement of 
people in the form of delegations, artists, and often also tourists. For Soviet au-
thorities, the foremost field of exchanges was music and dance, which can be seen 
in the strong presence of concert artists and troupes in the first wave of exchanges. 
Also, recordings were heavily distributed in the West following agreements. Along 
with classics, works by leading Soviet composers such as Shostakovich, Ka-
balevsky, Prokofiev and Khachaturian were prominently featured.27 Along with 
music, media was considered highly important. By the summer 1961, radio and 
television programs were exchanged already with 55 countries altogether. Ex-
change was naturally most intense with the socialist countries that had their own 
cooperation organ in OIRT, but documentaries and recordings of major events, as 
well as some art films were exchanged with Western countries, too.28 
The Soviet aim in these exchanges was to equal Russian and Soviet high cul-
ture with the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union in people’s minds. As-
sociation between communism and scientific development as well as good and 
equal life in general were to be strengthened as a result. Positive and cultural 
connotations, thus, were used for foreign political purposes. Even if détente was 
the stated purpose, the aim of proving their superiority remained as guiding 
principle.29 Exchange programs did not constitute of occasional representatives, 
but of a selected elite of their fields. Cultural exchange seems to stand out as a 
mixture of measures aimed at mutual understanding that emphasized peaceful 
coexistence, and cultural influencing more clearly representing the cultural Cold 
War. In any case, after the Khrushchev era, cultural diplomacy became part of 
the normal arsenal of Soviet foreign policy. 
Another activity that had in some form existed in the Stalin era, but then be-
came softer and was substantially expanded was that of friendship societies. 
                                                            
25  Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 108, 113. 
26  Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 176. 
27  Memorandum by Zhukov and Chesnokov about agreement on cultural exchanges with the 
US, 6.5.1958, RGANI f. 5, op. 33, d. 72, ll. 71–85.  
28 Radio and television committee’s report about the resolution of the Central Committee of 
the Soviet Communist Party on 29.1.1960 and development after the resolution, spring 
1961, State Archives of the Russian Federation [hereafter GARF] f. 6903, op. 1, d. 675. 
29  Memorandum by Zhukov and Chesnokov about agreement on cultural exchanges with the 
US, 6.5.1958, RGANI f. 5, op. 33, d. 72, ll. 71–85. 
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While during the Stalin era they were primarily communist-controlled organiza-
tions, doing mostly Soviet-bidding, since the mid-1950s they started to become 
more clearly cultural organizations, although they still had their ties to Soviet 
foreign policy. While friendship societies had been controlled by VOKS, in 
1957 it was terminated and replaced by SSOD, the Union of Soviet Friendship 
Societies, which expanded the field and aimed at more active cooperation with 
the foreign friendship organizations. With SSOD, reciprocity increased notably. 
SSOD was, for example, very active in sending and receiving all kinds of dele-
gations between the Soviet Union and foreign countries. Under SSOD, there 
were professional sections which nurtured ties to their foreign counterparts, 
aiming at furthering knowledge about the Soviet Union through direct ties at the 
grass-root level. 30  Yet, while biggest friendship societies, like the Finnish-
Soviet society, were independent, many others, like the US-Soviet friendship 
society were funded by the Soviet Union and were only seemingly independ-
ent.31 The division of labor between GKKS and SSOD was in practice clear. 
SSOD was a visible organization that was in touch with foreign friendship so-
cieties on a daily basis. GKKS, in turn, was powerful a State Committee that 
planned and coordinated actions in the higher levels of administration. 
The friendship societies’ publicly-expressed purpose was to have friendly 
ties and to nurture mutual understanding with target countries. Simultaneously, 
societies were supposed to make the Soviet Union and its people better known 
and correct false perceptions. The rejection of the ideas conveyed by the West-
ern media was among central purposes.32 Societies were supposed to arouse 
sympathy for the Soviet Union and present the Soviet Union as the pillar of the 
international community. The aim was to find partners from abroad who would 
spread the Soviet message better than the Soviet Union itself could. Back home, 
friendship societies were expected to familiarize Soviet people with the life, cul-
ture and language in the target countries, manifesting the duality of the Khru-
shchev era politics. SSOD seemed to offer for moderate people in the Soviet 
administration a chance to expand foreign contacts, while for the hardliners 
SSOD provided another channel to spread propaganda abroad.33 
                                                            
30  About restructuring VOKS, Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party, 5.9.1957, RGANI f. 89, per. 55, d. 21, ll. 1–3.  
31  Zhukov to Central Committee, December 1958; Report of Kazakov and Romanov, 
24.2.1959, RGANI f. 5, op. 33, d. 76, ll. 48–53. 
32  Report by section’s active regarding meetings with foreign delegations related to cultural 
relations, summer 1958, GARF f. 9576, op. 16, d. 24. ll. 164–166. 
33  About restructuring VOKS, Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party, 5.9.1957, RGANI f. 89, per. 55, d. 21, l. 1–4. Suslov received the draft about 
establishment of SSOD on 15 August, and secretariat made its decision on 5 September 
1957.  
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The softening Soviet approach to foreign propaganda, and foreign cultural 
ties in general, did not mean that Soviet authorities abandoned their aims of in-
fluencing foreign populations or the ideological competition with the United 
States. In practice, it was tactics rather than strategy that went through signifi-
cant changes. Origins of these changes are hard to come by. One source for the 
change can be found from the Soviet intelligentsia members whom Khrushchev 
had sent around the world to report to Khrushchev about their experiences. One 
such trip was made by Boris Polevoy, the author of Story about a True Man, 
who wrote a lengthy letter to Khrushchev in May 1958 advising him in several 
issues related to Soviet cultural diplomacy. His letter is made significant by the 
fact that several of his ideas were put into action in the following years, suggest-
ing that Khrushchev decided to follow his advice. Polevoy was convinced about 
the success of peaceful coexistence.34 He considered that Soviet propaganda 
paid too little attention to average people and their issues. There should be more 
about medical and social security issues, about education and science. There 
should be less about communism as such, since this alienated many people and 
made it hard for the message to go through. Furthermore, Polevoy considered 
that, as outright anti-Soviet attitude had been diminishing in Western media, 
Soviet media ought to do the same in order to be more plausible.35  
Although Polevoy’s suggestions started to be carried through, the problems 
were plenty. Editors who were used to rigid bureaucracy could not easily pro-
duce new kind of media items. Suggestions for new, more popular programs 
were titled: “How [the Soviet Communist Party] accelerates progress towards 
Communism”, or “What does the 7-year plan give to Soviet citizens” or “What 
is the core content of the restructuring of Soviet elementary education?”36 On 
the other hand, radio started a major restructuring which resulted in improved 
news coverage, reporting from the spot, and generally was remodeled towards 
the Western model.37 New brochures to be distributed abroad in exhibitions, 
with Soviet magazines, through friendship societies and in connection with fes-
tivals were to be produced. Leading Soviet writers and editors were employed 
ranging from Mikhail Solokhov, Leonid Leonov and Konstantin Fedin to Niko-
lay Tikhonov. They were assigned to go around the Soviet Union collecting ex-
                                                            
34  About the letter of Polevoy to Khrushchev, 12.5-26.12.1958, RGANI f. 89, per. 46, d. 13, 
ll. 8–12. 
35  About the letter of Polevoy to Khrushchev, 12.5-26.12.1958, RGANI f. 89, per. 46, d. 13, 
ll. 12–14. 
36  About the letter of Polevoy to Khrushchev, 12.5-26.12.1958, RGANI f. 89, per. 46, d. 13, 
ll. 5–6. 
37  Memorandum to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party regarding devel-
oping of radio broadcasts to domestic and foreign audiences, 12.12.1959, RGANI f. 11, 
op. 1, d. 457, ll. 27–41. 
SOVIET CULTURAL OPERATIONS AND SMALL NATIONS 251 
periences about the 7-year plan, peaceful coexistence and the role communism 
played in the improving of people’s lives. These pieces of experience were to be 
the base for new brochures about the Soviet Union.38 
In order to maximize the impact of cultural exchanges, Soviet presence in 
Western media was also to be increased. Western journalists and writers were to 
be tempted to quote Soviet leaders’ speeches. For this end, speeches of Soviet 
leaders were to be translated to English and French and distributed through dif-
ferent channels, ranging from embassies to friendship societies and Radio Mos-
cow.39 More information about tourist trips to the Soviet Union was also to be 
spread.40 Polevoy’s suggestion about arranging grants for foreign writers and 
editors to visit the Soviet Union if their work was believed to support political 
ends was also taken to heart.41 The Soviet objective, thus, seems to have been to 
find as powerful local actors to further the Soviet foreign political agenda, in-
stead of merely producing and executing their own contents. 
Many of the methods related with Soviet cultural influencing would be seen 
in the West as normal transnational relations, however, as the Communist Party 
controlled Soviet Union foreign ties, they were always political by nature. Thus, 
while foreign radio broadcasting was on both sides seen as political activity, 
concert tours were in the West part of the market-based activity, whereas for the 
Soviet Union they were part of the cultural front of foreign policy. Indeed, the 
mobility of artists was central for the Soviet Union; reports by the Soviet Minis-
try of Culture to the Central Committee of the Party point this out clearly. In the 
first half of 1960, the Soviet Ministry of Culture invited 663 artists from 31 
countries to perform in the Soviet Union. During the same period, 2,905 Soviet 
artists performed in 53 countries. The destinations of more than half of these 
trips were capitalist countries.42 Naturally, these figures do not include trips 
made through friendship societies, or other organizations. The Ministry of Cul-
ture also sent typically the same artists to foreign tours over and over again. As 
bilateral agreements were accomplished there were typically one or more tours 
by leading dance companies, like Moiseyev’s National Dance Company, Be-
riozka group, Georgian or Ukrainian National Dance Companies, Bolshoi Bal-
let, and naturally Red Army Song and Dance group. All of the aforementioned 
                                                            
38  About the letter of Polevoy to Khrushchev, 12.5-26.12.1958, RGANI f. 89, per. 46, d. 13, l. 2. 
39  About the letter of Polevoy to Khrushchev, 12.5-26.12.1958, RGANI f. 89, per. 46, d. 13, 
ll. 2–3. 
40  About the letter of Polevoy to Khrushchev, 12.5-26.12.1958, RGANI f. 89, per. 46, d. 13, l. 3. 
41  Memoranda to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party about foreign cul-
tural relations, summer 1959, RGANI f. 5, op. 36, d. 92, ll. 20–22. 
42  Report by the Ministry of Culture about foreign business traveling, August 1960, RGANI 
f. 5, op. 36, d. 125, ll. 134–136. 
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presented core elements for Soviet propaganda: friendship between different na-
tions and national traditions in the Soviet Union.43 
Reasons for choosing only top artists were clearly political. The Soviet au-
thorities wanted to prove the superiority of the Soviet system. In 1959, the Cen-
tral Committee of the Party listed all international prizes won by Soviet musi-
cians since 1936. There were 149 artists who had won 41 first, 22 second and 
19 third prizes. Also, there had been six international festivals in which 162 So-
viet musicians had won 75 golden, 67 silver and 20 bronze medals. For the 
Party, this was a clear sign of the highest level of Soviet musical culture.44 And 
yet, the Party was not all satisfied with the training of top talents, but wanted 
more.45 Furthermore, another important core principle for cultural exchanges 
was being neglected: pieces they played consisted too much of Western classics 
while there should have been more Russian and Soviet compositions. For the 
Party, these artists were messengers of Soviet culture, therefore, music that was 
essentially Soviet ought to have featured more prominently.46 
Tourism was also present when there was talk of cultural exchange. Foreign 
tourism with capitalist countries started in the mid-1950s, both to and from the 
Soviet Union. While at first ordinary citizens were rarities among tourists, their 
share increased later on.47 In practice, Soviet foreign tourism consisted of group 
trips with strict programs, which typically had a group leader, a “nanny”, hired 
by KGB to look after the group. Such trips were used for establishing foreign 
ties of all kinds, as well as exploited for introducing Soviet culture. This could 
either be distribution of Soviet publications or, like in one case, the continuous 
concert activity by professional musicians in what was officially a tourist trip.48 
While friendship societies did not have the biggest tourist quotas, they are quite 
representative of early foreign tourist trips. They were supposed to further Party 
                                                            
43  Number of outgoing artists from the Soviet Union was constantly four times greater than 
that of incoming foreign artists in the latter half of the 1950s. 
44  Decision of the Ideological Commission ”regarding definiciencies in training of Soviet 
musicians to international competitions,” 1.10.1959, RGANI f. 11, op. 1, d. 49, l. 19. See 
also an earlier related memorandum, 17.6.1959, RGANI f. 5, op. 30, d. 102, ll. 67–69. 
45  Report by the Ministry of Culture about the results of the international Tchaikovsky violin 
competition, 22.4.1958, RGANI f. 5, op. 36, d. 71, ll. 17–27. 
46 Memorandum by Cultural section of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist 
Party about deficiencies in training Soviet musicians to international competitions, 
17.6.1956, RGANI f. 5, op. 36, d. 102, l. 69. 
47  Memorandum about foreign tourism to the Soviet Union, spring 1954, RGANI f.5, op. 30, 
d. 70, ll. 110–112. 
48  Report by the Italian section of SSOD about trip to Italy, May 1960, GARF f. 9576, op. 
16, d. 12, ll. 21–24. Vera Dulova and Alexander Baturin, who worked at Bolshoi of Mos-
cow, participated in the Italian roundtrip and gave concerts practically in every town they 
visited. 
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objectives through fresh ties between target countries and the Soviet Union. 
Those selected to such trips had to be loyal, have correct political views and in 
addition listen before the trip instructions on how to behave abroad. There was 
constant cooperation with Inturist, the Soviet tourist organization, for fulfilling 
political objectives of trips. Soviet tourists were also encouraged to meet people 
with similar professions, but also their countrymen, representatives of same na-





While the early stages of Soviet cultural diplomacy did not last long and relaxa-
tions of the early Khrushchev era soon turned sour, many forms of cultural ex-
change and bilateral agreement themselves were kept alive. Thus, foreign influ-
ences kept flowing to the Soviet Union, which likely was very important not 
only for the corrosion of the Soviet system, but also for individuals living in the 
Soviet Union. There is certainly a dire need to produce more research especially 
about the impact of cultural exchanges on individuals on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain. 
In the late 1950s, the significance of direct propaganda was downplayed by 
the Soviet Union and there was more strain on indirect operations. The Soviet 
administration showed appetite for an American style cultural diplomacy. Even 
if some of these tendencies were real, aiming at détente, they were occupied by 
direct propaganda and aspirations of hardliners during the Brezhnev era. Yet, 
this period of ten years is very important as then foreign connections increased 
drastically, in practice bringing the Soviet Union to the international arena in 
large scale, but also enabling the flow of Western influences to the Soviet orbit. 
What this framework of cultural exchanges made possible was to open new 
worlds for individuals. While they counted as political action for the Commu-
nist Party, individuals who participated in them, either as artists, tourists, or 
perhaps receiving foreign visitors did not typically consider their work as politi-
cal. Instead of seeing themselves as representatives of the Soviet Union, it might 
have been much more important for them to establish professional contacts, or 
to find consumer goods unavailable in the Soviet Union. Or in the case of a Fin-
nish tourist to Leningrad or Tallinn, instead of testifying superiority of the So-
viet system in cultural events, this tourist might rather have suffered from se-
vere hangover caused by cheap alcohol. 
                                                            
49  About tourist trips of SSOD to foreign countries, Secretariat of the Central Committee of 
the Soviet Communist Party, 20.5.1961, RGANI f. 89, per. 55 d. 8, ll. 1–2, 5–6. 
SIMO MIKKONEN 254
For a small country such as Finland, cultural exchanges made it possible to 
receive top artists of international level in scale unimaginable without the Cold 
War. Finland, lying on the northern edge of Europe, was far away from Central 
European or British top arenas. But Finnish neutrality and connections both to 
the East and the West made Finland a special case, inducing top artists from 
both capitalist and Communist worlds. Especially during the immediate postwar 
years, the Soviets attempted more actively to change people’s perceptions about 
the Soviet Union, but as this work in Finland hardly reached larger segments of 
population, softer methods were taken into use towards the 1950s. This is espe-
cially well manifested in the changing face of the Finnish-Soviet friendship so-
ciety, which dropped politics almost completely from its agenda. Views about 
the Soviet Union also started to change and the society became a genuine mass 
organization, with others besides Communists joining in from the late 1950s 
onwards in growing numbers. This was made possible by the cultural work 
conducted by the society, as well as large scale tourism, in which the society 
was involved. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the Soviet Union used cultural exchanges to 
its political aims, and attempted at furthering its agenda especially forcefully in 
smaller countries that were neighboring the Soviet Union. Towards Finland, ex-
change was surely dominated by the Soviet culture, but tourism from the Soviet 
Union to Finland grew continuously, and in other fields, too, exchange was, if 
not equal, then at least it worked both ways. Finland did not fall victim to Soviet 
cultural pressure, but in most cases, benefited from cultural exchange. For 
many, the Soviet Union provided the first touch to internationalism already at 
elementary school, either in the form of visiting delegations from abroad, or as 
visits to friendship schools abroad. Thus, while the Soviet Union managed to 
lure people to act in ways that benefited the Soviet Union, to participate in 
friendship societies and programs, to visit the Soviet Union and so forth, most 
participated out of their own motivation and did not feel they represented or 
served the Soviet Union. Although several Western citizens have been accused 
of working for the Soviet Union, actually quite few did so. More often they had 
their own reasons to act in ways they did, even while the Soviet Union per-
ceived this was for their benefit. Working for the Soviet Union was thus much 
rarer than conspiracy theories would suggest. In the Finnish case, more often 
individuals and Finnish societies and organizations benefited from cultural ex-
changes with the Soviet Union and therefore engaged in cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. Their motivation was very seldom their belief in the superiority 
of the Soviet system, or its adaption to Finland. 
László Pallai 
 
Alternativen gegen den deutschen  
wirtschaftlichen Einbruch im Ostmitteleuropa  




Seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts spielte Ost- und Mitteleuropa in der deut-
schen Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Machtpolitik eine wichtige Rolle.1 Hier han-
delt es sich um eine Region, die von den Politikern, Ökonomisten, Schriftstel-
lern und Künstlern in Anbetracht des Inhalts und der geographischen Grenzen 
mit vielen Bezeichnungen und Namen apostrophiert worden war. In dem letzten 
Jahrhundert konnte man sich mit solchen Benennungen, wie Ostmitteleuropa, 
Mitteleuropa, Zwischeneuropa, Donauraum usw. begegnen. Diese Termini ha-
ben ihre eigene Geschichte. Unter diesen Begriffen ist das „Mitteleuropa” eine 
abwechlungsreiche Bahn verlaufen. Mitteleuropa war im Laufe des ersten Welt-
krieges das offizielle Kriegsziel, im NS-Zeitalter war es wegen seiner rassischen 
Nebenbedeutung kompromittiert; dieser Begriff wurde in den 1980er Jahren 
wieder geboren frei von dem negativen Inhalt. Der Spielraum der deutschen 
Außenpolitik war in den 1920er Jahren durchaus eng. Die Weltwirtschaftskrise 
aber eröffnete neue Möglichkeiten. Die Wirtschaftskrise tauchte in der mittel- 
und osteuropäischen Region früh auf, in Form der Agrarkrise. Derzeit war 
Deutschland der grösste Agrarimporteur Europas. Diese Tatsache garantierte 
bedeutende politische Aktivität und Möglichkeit für die deutsche Politik und 
Aspirationen in der Region. Der vorliegende Aufsatz versucht diejenigen An-
strengungen zusammenzufassen, die das Ziel hatte, um das deutsche wirtschaft-
liche Invasion in Ostmitteleuropa und ihre schweren politischen Konsequenzen 
zu verhindern.  
                                                 
1  Die ausführlichste Zusammenfassung über Deutschlands Mitteleuropa-Pläne seit dem An-
fang des 19. Jahrhunderts siehe bei: Henry Cord Meyer: Mitteleuropa in German Thought 
and Actoin 1815–1945. Den Haag, 1955. Die sorgfältige Zusammenfassung der deutschen 
Mitteleuropa-Pläne der Zwischenkriegszeit von: Jürgen Elvert: Mitteleuropa! Deutsche 
Pläne zur europäischen Neuordnung (1918–1945). Stuttgart, 1999. Aus der jüngsten 
Fachliteratur die folgenden sind wichtig zu erwähnen: Friedrich Lenz: Deutsche Mitteleu-
ropapläne 1815–1945. Eine Studie zum modernen Imperialismus und zur Formation der 
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden-Amöneburg. 2008., Hermann Graml: Berhard von 





Die Weltwirtschaftskrise bedeutete einen Wendepunkt sowohl in den politi-
schen, wirtschaflitchen und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Zwischenkriegs-
zeit, als auch in den Integrationsbestrebungen, die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 
eine neue Blütezeit hatten.2  Solche ökonomische und politische Umlagerungen 
erfolgten sich, die das Spielraum der Integrationsgedanken im Vergleich zu den 
Zwanzigerjahren im beträchtlichen Maße vermehrten.3  
Angesichts der Integrationspläne ist es keine Überraschung, dass um die 
Wende der 1930er Jahren solche Vorstellungen in einer grossen Zahl entstan-
den. Viele formulierten das Gedanke der Annäherung als Alternative, eine Tech-
nik der Krisenbehandlung. Zur Verwirklichung der Einheitsbestrebungen trat eine 
Chance in einem Zeitpunkt auf, als die existierende wirtschaftlich-politische 
Einrichtung durchaus schwank wurde, und man formulierte die Möglichkeit und 
Notwendigkeit der Schöpfung einer neuen Struktur. Diese Beobachtung ist be-
sonders gültig für die Jahren der Krise. Darauf weist das Gedanke des Artikels 
verfasst 1933 von dem früheren Ministerpräsidenten und Äußenminister Frank-
reichs – Pierre-Étienne Flandin – hin, nämlich: „Es wäre eine grosse Irrtum zu 
glauben, dass die heutige Lage Mitteleuropas für eine lange Zeit aufrechterhal-
ten werden kann”.4  
Ein neues Element war die Dominanz der Vorstellungen wirtschaftlichen In-
halts. Das kann mit dem Wesen der Krise erklärt werden. Ein anderer neuer As-
pekt ist das, dass die Integrationsgedanken auch der Politik und der politischen 
Öffentlichkeit annäherten. Diese Gedanken erschienen früher nur in Form als 
Eigeninitiativen. Viele Politiker der ehemaligen Siegermächte identifizierten 
sich mit dem Gedanken der Integration. (Aristide Briand, André Tardieu, Eduard 
Beneš, Juliu Maniu usw.) Diese Umstände sicherten der Politiker der Einheits-
bestrebungen ein grösseres Handlungsspielraum. Zahlreiche Politiker, ökonomi-
sche Experten formulierten wieder die Notwendigkeit der wirtschaftlichen An-
näherung der Nachfolgerstaaten, zur Situation abpassend, die durch die Krise 
entstanden worden war. In der instabile gewordenen Situation entstanden meh-
rere Vorstellungen und Pläne, die sich nach der Verhinderung des deutschen 
                                                 
2  Zu den Ursachen und Wirkungen der Weltwirtschaftskrise siehe: Kindleberger, Charles 
P.: Die Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929–1939. München, 1984., Cipolla, Carlo M. (Hrsg.): 
Europäische Wirtschaftsgeschichte. 5. kötet. Die europäische Volkswirtschaften im zwan-
zigsten Jahrhundert. Stuttgart–New York, 1980., Graml, Hermann: Europa zwischen den 
Kriegen. München, 1969., Hillgruber, Andreas: Die Zerstörung Europas. Beiträge zur 
Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945. Frankfurt am Main–Berlin, 1989. Kaser, M. C. – 
Radice, E. A. (Ed.): The Ecomomic History of Eastern Europe 1919–1975. Volume II. 
Interwar policy, the War and Reconstruction. Oxford, 1986. 
3  Über die Vorgänge in dem Wirtschaftsleben der 1920er Jahre: Aldrocft, Derek H.: Die 
zwanziger Jahre. Von Versailles zur Wall Street 1919–1929. München, 1978.  
4  Berend, Iván T.: Válságos évtizedek. (Krisenhafte Jahrzehnte) Budapest, 1987. 408. 
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wirtschaftlichen Eindringens in die Region bestrebten. Die Folgen der deut-
schen wirtschaftlichen Revision war klar. 
Während der Krise die Einheitsbestrebungen erschienen in recht unter-
schiedlichen Formen. Ihr gemeinsames Merkmal ist die Suche nach der Lösung 
der Wirtschaftskrise. Die Integrationsvorstellungen, die die Krise behandelten, 
tauchten in den folgenden Ebenen auf.  
l: die Suche nach dem Ausgang in dem Rahmen des Weltwirtschaftssystems.  
2: Lösungen auf der europäischen Ebene.  
3: Regionale Einheitsbestrebungen.  
4: Bilaterale Übereinkunfte.  
5: Grossmächtige Regelung. 
Die neuen Bedingungen der Integrationsbestrebungen wird durch die Tatsa-
che charakterisiert, dass durch Aristide Briand erstmals die Idee der europäi-
schen Einheit erstmals von einer Grossmacht offiziel unterstützt wurde.5 Am 5. 
September 1929 brachte er in Den Haag, an der 10. Tagung des Völkerbundes 
die Idee der Vereinigten Staaten Europas vor. Als die französische Regierung 
teilte ihr Memorandum den europäischen Mächte am 17. Mai 1930 mit, wurde 
diese Initiative ein offizielles politisches Programm; die Antwort sollte bis zum 
15. Juli zurückgekommen werden. Die Veröffentlichung der Paneuropa-Idee 
von Briand war nicht ohne Voraussetzung, denn er war eine bekannte Figur der 
Paneuropa-Bewegung in seinem Heimatland. Er war auch der erste unter den 
Politikern, die das Program der Verwirklichung der europäischen Einheit in ei-
ner offiziellen Form verfasste. Am Anfang des Planes dominierten die wirt-
schaftlichen Überlegungen, das heißt, er hatte die Ansicht um die europäischen 
Länder in einer Zollunion zu vereinen. Die Verkündigung des Plans von Briand 
waren nicht nur durch die Wirtschaftsproblemen der Krise begründet, sondern 
diejenige Anerkennung europäischer Politiker und wirtschaftlichen Fachleute, 
dass die ökonomischen Prozesse in der Richtung der Entstehung der immer 
grösseren wirtschaftlichen Systeme irreversibel fortschritten. Der politische In-
halt des Briand-Plans wurde aber immer eindeutlicher. Die Bestätigung des eu-
ropäischen Status quo unter dem französischen Einfluß wurde von mehreren 
Regierungen abgelehnt. In dem Moment der Erschütterung der Versöhnungspo-
litik versuchte die französische Regierung, dass gleich vor der allgemeinen De-
batte über die revisionischen Einforderungen, Deutschland in ein europäisches 
System zu integrieren. Der Plan war zugleich eine Krisenstrategie auch, die als 
                                                 
5  Über den Plan Briands siehe Barraclaugh, Geoffry: Die Einheit Europas als Gedanke und 
Tat. Göttingen, 1964., Brugmans, Henri: L'Idée Européenne 1920–1970. Bruges, 1970., 
Nelböck, Friedrich: Kleine Beiträge zum Kampf um Völkerbund, Paneuropa, Mittel-
europa. Brünn–Prag–Leizig–Wien, 1930., Pegg, Carl H. (Ed.): Evolution of the European 




Alternative gegen die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Angriffe Deutschlands 
nach Österreich und Südost-Europa diente.   
Es gaben viele, die das Gedanke der Integration unterstützten, aber sie sahen 
es stufenweise, nach der Realisierung des regionalen Zusammenschlusses zu 
verwirklichen. Sie übten an den Entwurf von Briand eine scharfe Kritik. Sie be-
trachteten die Schaffung von Paneuropa als eine wirtschaftliche Notwendigkeit, 
aber es wäre möglich nur in dem Verlauf der Vereinigung der kleineren Einhei-
ten, wie z. B. das neue Mitteleuropa. Die Aktion Briands in dem Völkerbund, 
mit der er den politischen Bund der europäischen Staaten in den Vordergrund 
stellte, schädigte mehr, als es der wirtschaftlichen Näherung der europäischen 
Länder beitrug. Die Zollunion als Endziel kann niemals außer Acht genommen 
werden, aber wir müssen damit klar sein, dass ihre Verwirklichung ohne Statio-
nen nicht möglich sein kann. Es wäre also unrichtig, die Kooperation der histo-
risch, geographisch und wirtschaftlich zusammenhängenden Gebiete in der 
Schwebe halten oder verschieben bis zur Entstehung eines gesamteuropäischen 
Wirtschaftsbundes oder zu dem zollpolitischen Waffenstillstand. Die Konzepti-
on der europäischen Einheit in einer offiziellen Form erwies sich also kurzlebig. 
In bescheidener Maße beförderten sie die Entstehung jenes politischen Umstan-
des, in dem die mittel- und südosteuropäischen Einheitspläne mit grosser Inten-
sität sich entfalten konnten. Später wurden die regionale und bilaterale Vorstel-
lungen dominant, als ein Weg aus der Krise. Das Zurückdringen der Idee Pan-
europas wurde nicht nur durch die neue außenpolitische Richtlinie der Gross-
mächte geprägt, sondern durch den Personenwechsel. Der Tod Gustav Strese-
manns in 1929 und die Sturz Briands in 1932 bedeutete die Politik der Gross-
mächte auch.  
Die Krise tauchte in den Nachfolgestaaten vor allem als Absatzproblem auf. 
Die Lösung der Überproduktion bedeutete die grösste Herausforderung. Die in-
ternationalen Konferenzen und Integrationspläne hatten die Ansicht um diese 
Frage zu ordnen. Die verschiedenen Vorschläge untersuchten die Verlagerungs-
möglichkeiten, die Verminderung der Zölle und die Verfahren der Produktions-
regelungen. Die folgende Tabelle zeigt die Veränderung der Menge des Ex-
portweizens in der Krisenzeit. Der Weizen und andere Getreidesorten gehörten 
zu den wichtigsten Exportartikeln der Region.  
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Die Menge des Exportweizens, in Millionen q6 
Land 1928–29 1929–30 1930–31 1931–32 1932–33 1933–34 
Sechs Agrarländer 
in dem Donauraum     9   15   14   23     3   15 
USA   98 111 106 130 107   62 
Kanada 140   84 109   91 128   96 
Der übrige Waizen-
überschuss der Welt  391 306 378 377 358 297 
Waizenimport  
Europas 179 140 168 167 120 102 
 
In der Tabelle kann man klar und eindeutig sehen, dass die Menge des Export-
wiezens der Staaten des Donauraumes grosse Schwingung zeigt, und sein Vo-
lumen war im Vergleich mit der europäischen Weizenausfuhr unbedeutend. Es 
war der Grund jener Vorstellung, dass die Weizenkrise im Donauraum auch in 
europäischen Rahmen gelöst werden kann, wenn die traditionellen Importeure 
gegen die transatlantischen Gebiete die Agrarstaaten Mittel- und Osteuropas 
bevorzugen. Das Preferenzsystem erschien als die beste Möglichkeit der prakti-
schen Verwirklichung dieser Vorstellung.  
Nach der Sturz des Briand-Plans wurde die wirtschaftliche Konsolidation der 
Region eine ständige Frage der internationalen Konferenzen und Tagungen. In 
der Genfer Konferenz für Zollwesen im Jahre 1930 schlugen die Franzosen die 
Begrenzung der Meistbegünstigkeit und die Einführung des Preferenzsystem für 
die Agrarstaaten vor.7 Die Vereinigten Staaten, England und andere westliche 
Mächte versteiften sich noch für die vollständige Freiheit des Handels. Das be-
vorstehende Fiasko der Konferenz wurde dadurch offensichtlich, dass unter den 
Gesandten der sechsundzwanzig Staaten nur acht über Stimmberechtigung ver-
fügte.  Seitens der Franzosen war Loucher der Anreger, der auch der geistige 
Vater der Weltwirtschaftskonferenz von 1927 gewesen war.  
Die Lösung der Marktprobleme suchend tauchte die Idee des Preferenz-
systems auf, mit dem sich auch die Gemeinschaft der ungarischen Ökonomen 
abgab. Mehrere Möglichkeiten standen zu ihrer Anwendung offen. Die Figuren 
                                                 
6  Elekes, Dezső: A dunavölgyi kérdőjel. A dunakörnyéki Közép-Európa gazdasági problé-
mája. (Das Fragezeichen in dem Donauraum. Das Wirtschaftsproblem Mitteleuropas) Bu-
dapest, 1934. 90. 
7  Über die Konferenz berichtet: Zelovich, László: Az 1930. évi genfi vámfegyverszüneti 
konferencia. (Die Genfer Konferenz über den Zollwaffenstillstand von 1930) In: Magyar 
Szemle (Ungarische Rundschau), November 1930. 225–233., Ders: A legnagyobb ked-
vezmény kérdése és az 1930. évi genfi vámkonferencia. (Die Frage der Meistbegünstigkeit 
und die Genfer Zollkonferenz von 1930) In: Közgazdasági szemle (Ökonomische 




des Wirtschaftslebens arbeiteten mehrere Vorstellungen zur wirtschaftlichen 
Kooperation der Donaustaaten heraus und befürworteten die sg. „protektionnele 
Präferenz”. In diesem System verringern sich die Zölle inwärts nicht, sondern 
vergrößern sich auswärts. Großbritannien verwendete diese Lösung nach 1932, 
als sie steigerte die Agrarzölle auswärts deswegen, um Vergünstigungen ihren 
Dominien zu bieten. Wegen der schon hohen Zölle bedeutete diese Lösung kei-
ne Linderung. Eine andere Lösung war die „zollunionartige Präferenz”, die an-
nuliert die Zollmauer inwärts vollständig, und vertritt eine einheitliche Handels-
politik auswärts. Die Meinungen über die Beziehung zwischen Präferenz und 
Freihandel waren durchaus unterschiedlich.  Einige hatten die Absicht, dass die 
Präferenz das Mittel des Protekzionismus ist, und so ist der liberalen Auffas-
sung der Handelsfreiheit gegenseitig. Andere waren aber der Meinung, dass die 
Präferenz nicht die Leugnung der Handelsfreiheit wäre, sondern es ist ihre Fort-
entwicklung. Richard Riedl, der einstige Botschafter Österreichs in Berlin und 
viele anderen äußerten sich, dass in der Mitte der Zollkämpfe und kommerziel-
len Beschränkungen die alte Interpretation der Handelsfreiheit ihre Aktualität 
verloren hatte. 
Zwei Gedankensysteme tauchten im Zusammenhang mit der Lösung des 
Marktproblems auf. Das eine ist der Versuch der Schaffung der Agrarblöcke, 
und das andere ist die Vereinbarung der Industrie- und Agrarstaaten miteinan-
der. Die Krisenjahren schöpften die praktischen Rahmen der wirtschaftlichen 
Zusammenarbeit der mitteleuropäischen Agrarländer. Die Agrarkonferenzen der 
Nachfolgestaaten zwischen 1930 und 1932 galten als eine neue Erscheinung in 
dem Prozess der Integrationsbestrebungen.8  
 Während der 1920er konnte man die mehrseitigen Verhandlungen der Staa-
ten der Region nicht veranstalten. Im Rahmen der Mitteleuropäische Wirt-
schaftstagung (weiter MWT) war eine Konferenz für Schifffahrtswesen in Bu-
dapest im Mai 1929 die erste inoffizielle Veranstaltung, wo alle Nachfolgestaa-
ten vertraten sich selbst.9 
Die Veranstaltung der mitteleuropäischen Agrarkonferenzen inspirierten die 
grösste Hoffnung der Zusammenarbeit und des deutschen wirtschaftlichen Ein-
dringens. Die westlichen Mächte konnten aber keine Impulse geben, die irgend-
eine Ergebnisse gehabt hätten, obwohl in der Organisation der Agrarkonferen-
                                                 
8  Über diese Konferenzen zusammenfassend siehe: Elekes: A dunavölgyi kérdőjel, a. a. O.., 
Riedl, Richard: Statistische Grundlagen innereuropäischer Handelspolitik. Berlin–Gru-
newald, 1933., Ders.: Két világgazdasági konferencia között. (Zwischen zwei weltwirt-
schaftlichen Konferenzen) In: Külügyi Szemle (Außenpolitische Rundschau) 1933/2. 
104–116. 
9  Der Bericht über die Konferenz: Hantos, Elemér: Mitteleuropäische Wasserstraßenpolitik. 
Wien, 1929. 
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zen sowohl der Völkerbund als auch der Römische Internationale Landwirt-
schaftliche Anstalt teilgenommen hatte.  
Viele Politiker und Agrarfachleute grüssten den Gedanken der Agrarkonfe-
renzen. Sie gingen daraus, dass die bisherigen isolierten Versuche zur Lösung des 
Absatzproblems der Landwirtschaft – wie z. B. das Boletta-System in Ungarn 
und in anderen mitteleuropäischen Ländern – nur geringe Ergebnisse hatten.  
Die erste Konferenz fand im August 1930 mit der Teilnahme von Ungarn, 
Jugoslawien und Rumänien in Bukarest statt.10 Sie schlugen die Gestaltung ei-
nes preferenzialen Zollsystems gegen das überseeischen Getreide. Sie unter-
stützten die Schöpfung kartellartiger Vereinbarungen, wie Elemér Hantos, im 
Gebiet der Landwirtschaft auch. Sie meinten die Aufhebung der konkurrenzbe-
schränkenden Verbote und tiermedizinische Regulierungen notwendig. Die Ver-
teidigung gegen die Preisschwankung wurde mit der Entstehung eines internati-
onalen Lagerungssystems möglich gesehen.  
Die nächste Konferenz wurde in Sinaia um die Wende von Juli und August 
mit der Teilnahme von Jugoslawien und Rumänien veranstaltet. Der Gedanke 
der hier vorgeschlagene Zollunion löste die Bangigkeit seitens der anderen Ag-
rarstaaten aus, weil sie darin eine mögliche Form einer späteren wirtschaftlichen 
Kleinentente entdeckt hätten. Die bedeutsamste Agrarkonferenz fand im August 
1930 in Warschau statt, wo – außer Österreich – sowohl die fünf Donauländer, 
als auch Bulgarien, Estland und Lettland sich selbst repräsentierten. Die hier 
ausgearbeiteten Vorschläge waren die folgenden: die Aufhebung der Export-
prämien, die Errichtung eines internationalen Exportanstaltes, Abschluss multi-
laterale Handelsverträge, die Schaffung des Gleichgewichtes in dem Außenhan-
del, die Regelmäßigkeit der Agrarländer zur Verwirklichung der gemeinsamen 
Interessenvertretung. Die nächste Veranstaltung erfolgte in Belgrad, im Septem-
ber 1930. Unter den Teilnehmern befand sich Polen auch. Man formulierte hier 
die Gedanken einer gemeinsamen Exportstrategie und die Aufrichtung eines in-
ternationalen Büros. In der Konferenz von Sofia im Dezember 1931 erschienen 
die Gesandten und Fachleute Polens und Estlands neben die der Donauländer. 
Der wichtigste Betreff der Tagung war die finanzielle Frage infolge der zwi-
schenzeitlichen Kreditkrise. Die Agrarländer betrachteten die Schuldenverwal-
tung, die durch die Errichtung einer international landwirtschafltichen Kredit-
bank durchführbar sein kann.  
In der Krisenzeit verschärfte sich die mitteleuropäische Aktivität Italiens 
auch.11 Mit seinen Empfehlungen hätte es die Absicht seinen Einfluß in dem 
Donauraum zu erhöhen. Es mangelten sich aber an die notwendigen wirtschaft-
                                                 
10  Elekes: A dunavölgyi kérdőjel, a. a. O. 130. 
11  Frey, András: Olaszország külpolitikája az Abesszin viszályig. (Außenpolitik Italiens bis 




lichen Mittel. Ignazio Brocchi entwickelte den Entwurf, der später nach ihm ge-
nannt worden ist, der potentiellen Preferenzen in sich verbarg. Mit der Amplifi-
kation des Planes auf Österreich wollte man die Näherung dessen an Deutsch-
land verhindern. Das System wurde 1932 vollständig, aber es erwies sich für die 
Behandlung des Marktproblems unzulänglich. Die steigernde italienische Er-
kundigung wurde dadurch bezeugt, dass unter der Mitwirkung des Internationa-
len Landwirtschaftlichen Anstalts in Rom eine überstaatliche Getreidetagung 
veranstaltet wurde, wohin 46 Länder ihre Delegaten geschickt hatte. Seit 1927 
konnte man erstmals eine solche Wirtschaftskonferenz unter einem Dach brin-
gen, wo auch die transatlantischen Agrarexporteure dabei waren. Wesentliche 
Entscheidungen aber nicht gefällt sind, weil die überseeischen Gebiete protes-
tierten gegen das Preferenzsystem für die europäischen Staaten, das auch vom 
Frankreich nicht eindeutig unterstützt worden war. Die Delegaten stimmten nur 
in der Frage der Errichtung einer landwirtschafltichen Hypothekenbank unter 
der Ägide des Völkerbundes miteinander überein. Das Problem der Lagerung 
des agrarwirtschaftlichen Überschusses tauchte in anderen Tagungen auf. In 
London sammelten sich die agrarausführenden Staaten im Mai 1931 zusammen. 
Interessanterweise fand man unter diesen Ländern die Sowjetunion auch. Wäh-
rend der Krisenperiode wurde die Verhältnis der Sowjetunion mit den übrigen 
Agrarländern wegen der Dumping-Klage sehr angespannt.12 Die Teilnehmer 
hatten die Meinung, dass die Krise mit der Einschränkung der Produktion, der 
Steigerung des Verbrauchs und der Festsetzung des Exportkontingents behan-
delt werden kann. Nach einem Monate später trafen sich die Teilnehmer eines 
landwirtschaftlichen Kongresses in Prag. Die hier entworfenen Vorschläge 
klangen mit den bisherigen Empflehlungen zusammen. Sie brachten einen An-
trag zu der Milderung der Importzölle, der Einrichtung eines preferenzialen 
Zollsystems und der Organisation eines zentralen Beschaffungsanstaltes ein.  
Die Konferenzen konnten aber keine wesentlichen Veränderungen erzielen. 
Der Verwirklichung der aufgetauchten Empfehlungen mangelten sich an die 
Unterstützung der Großmächte, denn sie wollten in der traditionellen Prinzipien 
des internationalen Handels zugunsten des preferenzialen Systems nicht lassen. 
Ein wichtiger Aspekt war das auch, dass die Vorschläge, die von den Groß-
mächten später verfasst worden sind, stützen sich auf die Empfehlungen der 
früheren Tagungen in einem beträchtlichen Maße. Es wurde auch ersichtlich, 
dass die wirtschaftliche Zukunft des Donauraumes nicht durch Agrarkonferen-
                                                 
12  Zur Konflikt der mitteleuropäischen Agrarstaaten mit der Sowjetunion siehe: Kövér, 
György: A Szovjetunió és Közép-Kelet-Európa. Gazdasági érintkezés a két világháború 
között. (Die Sowjetunion und Ostmitteleuropa. Wirtschaftliche Kontakte in der Zwischen-
kriegszeit) In: Történelmi Szemle (Historische Rundschau), 1986/3–4. 481–489., Kiss, 
Dezső: Az orosz dumping. (Das russische Dumping) In: (Außenpolitische Rundschau) 
1931/3. 306–319. 
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zen und anderen Tagungen bestimmt werden kann, sondern das Folgen des 
Wettbewerbs der Großmächte miteinander.  
Dieser großmächtige Wetteifer um die wirtschaftliche Organisation des Do-
nauraumes entfaltete sich fürwahr, als Deutschland trat hervor.13 Stresemann 
führte eine Politik innerhalb der Rahmen des Friedenssystems von Versailles 
um den möglichts grösste Handlungsspielraum für Deutschland zu schaffen. 
Heinrich Brüning versuchte dieses politische System zu verändern und die Be-
wegungsmöglichkeiten zu benützen, die einst von Stresemnann geschaffen wor-
den waren. Die neue Richtlinie der deutsche Außenpolitik wurde durch die Per-
sonenwechsel bezeugt. Kanzel Brüning, Außenminister Julius Curtius und 
Bernhard Bülow, Staatssekretär der äußeren Angelegenheiten vetraten diejeni-
gen deutschen außenpolitischen Ideen, die die von der Rückgewinnung der alten 
ost-mitteleuropäischen wirtschaftlichen Positionen die Möglichkeit der Revision 
erhofften. Bülow fasste im August 1930 diese Möglichkeit folgendermaßen zu-
sammen: „Besser als in den übrigen Teilen Europas, die Sachen in Südost-
Europa sind bildsam und beweglich. Die deutsche Außenpolitik muss lostreten, 
weil die künftige Chancen Deutschlands befinden sich dort.”14 Diese Verände-
rung der deutschen Außenpolitik war in den Debatten innerhalb der MWT 
greifbar.15 Früher zeigte Deutschland eine viel kleinere Aktivität trotz seiner 
wirtschaftlichen Möglichkeiten. Jetzt veränderte es sich auch. Nach dem Besuch 
des deutschen Außenministers zu Wien im Februar 1931 kündigten die beiden 
Regierungen an, dass sie eine solche Vereinbarung abgeschlossen hatten, die die 
Zollunion zwischen den beiden Ländern ermöglichte.16 Der Plan der deutsch–
                                                 
13  Über die deutsche „Mitteleuropa”-Pläne und die deutsche Politik im Mitteleuropa siehe: 
Brechtefeld, Jörg: Mitteleuropa and German Politics. 1848 to the Present. New York, 
1996., Droz, Jacques: Évolution historique de l'Idée "Mitteleuropa". Paris, 1960. Elvert, 
Jürgen: Mitteleuropa! Deutsche Pläne zur europäischen Neuordnung. Stuttgart, 1999., 
Groß, Hermann: Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Südosteuropas für das Deutsche Reich. 
Stuttgart–Berlin, 1938., Meyer, Henry Cord: Mitteleuropa in Germain Thought and Ac-
tion 1815–1945. The Hague. 1955., Schöllgen, Richard: Die Macht in der Mitte. Sationen 
deutscher Außenpolitik von Friedrich dem Großen bis zum Gegenwart. München, 1992. 
14  Romsics, Ignác: Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében. (Unser Ort und Schicksal im 
Donauraum) Budapest, 1996. 195.  
15  Über diesen Vorgang vgl. Szevera, Walter: Die Mitteleuropadebatte in der 30-er und 80-
er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts in Österreich: ökonomische, politische, kulturelle Aspekte 
einer konservativen Diskussion. Dipl. Arbeit. Wien, 1991. 26. 
16  Über das Projekt der deutsch–österreichischen Zollunion siehe: Gratz, Gusztáv: A német–
osztrák vámunió kérdéséhez. Magyarország Középeurópai Intézete Közlemények 2. (Zur 
Frage der deutsch–österreichischen Zollunion. Mitteilungen des Ungarischen Mitteleuro-
pa-Instituts) Budapest, 1931.; Ders.: A német–osztrák vámunió terve. (Der Plan der deutsch–
österreichischen Zollunion) In: Külügyi Szemle (Außenpolitische Rundschau), 1931/3. 
277–288., Ormos, Mária: Franciaország és a keleti biztonság 1931–1936. (Frankreich 




österreichischen Zollunion löste eine grosse Befürchtung europaweit aus. Trotz 
des Kommuniques beider Regierungen, die den wirtschaftlichen Charakterzug 
des Planes betonte, die europäische Öffentlichkeit sah das Vorbild des An-
schlusses in der deutsch–österreichischen wirtschaftlichen Einigung. Der Ent-
schluß von Den Haag erklärte die geplante Zollunion sowohl mit dem Friedens-
vertrag von Saint-Germain, als auch mit dem Genfer Protokoll von 1922 entge-
gengesetzt. Wegen der französischen Intervention ist der Plan der deutsch–
österreichischen Zollunion durchgefallen, aber auch die Franzosen konnten sich 
dafür nicht erfreuen. Sie waren auch unfähig, das Absatzproblem zu lösen, so-
gar die Kreditkrise im ganzen Mittel- und Südost-Europa vertiefte die Wirt-
schaftskrise weiter.  
Die französische Außenpolitik stand vor einer grossen Herausforderung, 
weil die verneinende Antwort auf das deutsche Projekt Paris darauf bemüßigte, 
um eine neue Konzeption zu entwerfen. Die Wiedererscheinung der Frage der 
Gutmachung ermäßigte aber die außenpolitische Aktivität Deutschlands für eine 
kurze Zeit. Die Deutschen hatten die Absicht zu abwarten. Auf der Tagung der 
deutschen Kommission der MWT sagta man am 19. Mai 1932: „Die deutsche 
Politik muss ein Langzeitprogramm herausarbeiten. Für die offizielle Politik 
bedeutet es vor allem zu warten. Wir haben nur eine Chance, wenn Frankreich 
kann die Länder nicht finanzieren, und sie müssen sich Deutschland wenden, 
um ihre Produktionsüberschüsse zu lagern.”17  
Vor den Franzosen traten die Tschechen mit einer Integrationsvorstellung 
auf. Der Gedanke der deutsch–österreichischen Zollunion befürchtete die 
Tschechoslowakei auch. In dieser Situation kam Eduard Beneš mit dem Plan ei-
nes Zollverbündnisses zwischen der Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn und Öster-
reich.18 Der Plan war von vornherein zum Misslingen verurteilt. Einerseits ent-
faltete Beneš seine Vorstellungen nicht eindeutig, und die westlichen Mächte 
dachten auch nicht so, dass die Lagerung des landwirtschaftlichen Überschusses 
in einer solchen Konstruktion möglich gewesen wäre. Es mangelte sich aber an 
die politische Gewogenheit auch. Das tschechslowakisch–ungarische Verhältnis 
war traditionell belastet, und diese Beziehung wurde nach dem Zollkrieg von 
1930 noch schlimmer. Die österreichische und ungarische Regierungen betrach-
teten den Entwurf von Beneš als eine wirtschaftliche Halblösung und hatten 
Angst auch vor den eventuellen politischen Folgen. Unter den entworfenen Plä-
nen schien den Plan von Brocchi sich zu verwirklichen, als die ungarische Re-
gierung bestätigte den Pakt mit den Italienern am 20. Februar 1932.  
                                                 
17  Ránki, György: Gazdaság és külpolitika. A nagyhatalmak harca a délkelet-európai gaz-
dasági hegemóniáért (1919–1939). (Wirtschaft und Außenpolitik. Der Kampf der Groß-
mächte um die südosteuropäische Wirtschaftshegemonie 1919–1939) Budapest, 1981. 172.  
18  Der Bericht von Beneš über die Pläne: Beneš, Edward: Das Problem Mitteleuropas und 
die Lösung des österreichischen Frage. Prag, 1934. 
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Die Krise spornte auch England zur Aktivität. England war der bedeutendes-
te Kapitalexporteur der Region, trotzdem war es an der Lösung der wirtschaftli-
chen Schwierigkeiten der Nachfolgestaaten nicht besonders regsam. Am 17. Ja-
nuar 1932 warf die englische Regierung offiziell den Gedanken den Zollbund 
der sechs Donauländer auf. Der sechste Staat wäre Bulgarien gewesen. Die eng-
lische Außenpolitik bestrebte sich mit der Schaffung der wirtschaftlichen Ein-
heit nicht nur die deustchen Ambitionen zu kompensieren, sondern England hat-
te traditionell auch eine Affinität für die Kooperation der mitteleuropäischen 
Länder. Die Engländer hatten sich aber wegen der französischen, italienischen 
und tschechischen Gegenrede zurückzuziehen.  
1932 eine neue Regierung gelang zur Herrschaft in Frankreich, und das be-
deutete eine Wende in der Außenpolitik auch. André Tardieu wollte energische 
Schritte für die Verhinderung der östlichen Ambitionen Deutschlands machen. 
Er kündigte am 2. März 1932 in dem Abgeordnetenhaus seinen Plan an, der drei 
Tage später an den betroffenen Regierungen offiziell weitergesendet worden 
war.19 Tardieu empfahl im Interesse der Aufhebung des Marktproblems die Er-
richtung des preferenzialen Zollsystems der fünf Donauländer. Die Idee selbst 
war nicht neu, aber die Tatsache, dass sie seitens Frankreichs verfasst worden 
war, bedeutete eine grössere Öffentlichkeit. Die italienische und deutsche Au-
ßenpolitik erkannte die Bedeutung dieses neuen Plans auch, und sie hatten eine 
Angst vor dem Misslingen ihrer mitteleuropäischen Ambitionen. Nach einem 
zeitgenössischen Aufsatzes der französische Plan „ist nicht nur eine Antwort auf 
die Wirtschaftskrise, aber seine echte Absicht ist die Verhinderung eines neuen 
deutschen Dranges nach Osten.”20 Die Außenpolitik beider Länder wurde noch 
aktiver in den Nachfolgestaaten. Solange Deutschland versuchte den Tardieu-
Plan mit seiner früheren Empfehlung für die Preferenz zu blockieren, dann Ita-
lien beschleunigte die Verwirklichung des Brocchi-Planes. Das Schicksal des 
Planes entschied sich in London. Die englische Regierung rief eine Tagung zur 
Behandlung der Einzelheiten zusammen. Der Vorschlag fiel schnell wegen der 
italienischen und deutschen Einwände durch. Das abgedrosselte Verhalten der 
Engländer trug auch dem Durchfall des Plans bei.  
Nach dem Fiasko des Tardieu-Planes waren die Franzosen nicht mehr in der 
Lage um das Schicksal der Region in den weiteren wesentlich zu gestalten. Die 
                                                 
19  Über den Plan siehe: Diószegi, László: Gazdasági egységesítési tervek a Duna-medencé-
ben az 1929–1933-as világgazdasági válság időszakában. (Die Pläne zur wirtschaftlichen 
Vereinigung im Donauram im Zeitalter der Weltwirtschaftskrise von 1929–1933) In: Bán, 
András – Diószegi, László – Márer, Pál – Pritz, Pál – Romsics, Ignác: Integrációs tervek 
Közép- és Kelet-Európában a 19–20. században. (Integrationspläne im Ostmitteleuropa 
im 20. Jahrhundert) Budapest, 1997. 85–99. 
20  Romsics, Gergely: A Foreign Affairs és Magyarország 1922–1939. (Die Foreign Affairs 




Aktivität Frankreichs dadurch bestimmt, dass zwischen 1930 und 1932 die Wir-
kung der Krise daheim noch nicht greifbar war, und die wirtschaftliche, bezie-
hungsweise finanzielle Lage Frankreichs schien stabil zu sein. Die Krise entfal-
tete sich seit 1932 schrittweise, die die außenpolitischen Möglichkeiten Frank-
reichs bedeutsam beschränkte. Italien und Deutschland blieben nur in dem 
Wettbewerb für Mittel- und Osteuropa.    
Bevor dieser Wetteifer in seine letzte Phase getreten wäre, die Grossmächte 
hatten einen unkräftigen Versuch um den deutsche Versuch zu verhüten. Im Som-
mer von 1932 fanden zahlreiche Tagungen statt, die die Marktprobleme der Ag-
rarstaaten einrichten wollten. Inzwischen erschienen neue Tendenzen in den in-
ternationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. Die Tagung von Ottawa in Juli und Au-
gust 1932 ordnete nicht nur das Beziehungssystem von Grossbritannien und 
seine Dominien, sondern formulierte neue Prinzipien in dem internationalen Han-
deln auch. England war gezwungen zu bekennen, dass das Prinzip der Meistbe-
günstigung nicht mehr aufrechtzuerhalten. Die Einrichtung der preferenzialen 
Systeme ist wieder ein Tagesordnungspunkt geworden. Die Konferenz von 
Warschau im August 1932 bereitete nicht nur die Tagung in Stresa vor, sondern 
sie schlug die Gesamtbehandlung des Marktproblems und der Verschuldung. 
Die polnische Initiative hatte den Vorsatz, dass die verschuldeten Agrarstaaten 
bis zu der Maß ihrer Schulden Kontingente in der Agrarausfuhr erhielten.  
Noch in der Tagung von Lausanne im Jahre 1932 tauchte der Gedanke auf, 
dass man um der ökonomischen Reorganisation der mitteleuropäischen Region 
willen eine internationale Tagung zusammenrufen musste, mit der Teilnahme 
aller betroffenen Staaten. Die Konferenz wurde im September 1932 in Stresa 
(Italien) veranstaltet. Die Anwesenheit der fünfzehn Staaten und die Tagesord-
nung der Fragen erweckten in den Agrarstaaten grosse Hoffnungen. Die Unzahl 
der Zusagen und die Verwirklichung klangen aber wieder nicht zusammen. Un-
ter den Vorschlägen tauchte die Einrichtung eines einheitlichen Währungsfonds 
und die Schaffung der Subvention für die Agrarstaaten empor.  
Die Wankung der ost-mitteleuropäische Stabilität bezeugte die Krise der 
Kleinentente auch. Die organisatorischen und konzeptionalischen Defekte der 
Kleinentente kamen immer mehr hervor. Mit dem Organisationspakt von 1933 
konnte man sie umformen, doch mangelten sich an die außenwirtschaftlichen 
Bedingungen zur Verwirklichung der ökonimischen Kleinentente.  
Im Juni und Juli 1933 wurde in London wieder eine Weltwirtschaftskonfe-
renz veranstaltet.21 Sie hatte das Vorhaben um die Eintracht der Produktion und 
des Verbrauchs zu regulieren. Diese Regulation schien mit den folgenden Me-
                                                 
21  Den Bericht über die Konferenz siehe: Eckhardt, Tibor: A londoni világgazdasági konfe-
rencia mérlege. (Die Bilanz der Weltwirtschaftskonferenz in London) In: Külügyi Szemle 
(Außenpolitische Rundschau), 1933/4. 321–330. 
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thoden zu verwirklichen: die Reduktion der Ackerfläche, die Vermeidung der 
weiteren Überproduktion, die Bestimmung der Exportquoten. Sie betrachteten 
die Anwendung einer verbrauchsteigernden Propaganda für notwendig, weil 
sich der Getreidekonsum in den westlichen Ländern mit 20–25 Prozent unter 20 
Jahren verringerte. Die überseeischen Gebiete auch zogen sich daneben eine 
Selbstbegrenzung in der Maß der europäischen Getreideausfuhr unter.    
Das Hinziehen der Lösung des Marktproblems bedeutete eine immer grösse-
re Schwierigkeit in dem Finanzwesen auch. Der freie Devisenverkehr ist aufge-
hoben worden. Um das Problem zu überbrücken schlug dr. Wilhelm Reisch, der 
Präsident der österreichischen Notenbank in 1931 in einer Prager Tagung den 
Gedanke des Systems des Zahlungsausgleichs vor. Damit wurde der multilatera-
le Handelsverkehr in immer grösserer Maße bilateral. 1932 schloss Deutschland 
einen Clearingvertrag mit den Donauländern. 1938 erfolgte sich das 80–85 Pro-
zent des internationale Außenhandels aufgrund dieser Clearingverträge.  
In der Lage, als Frankreich und England schon, und Deutschland noch nicht 
konnte in das Leben der Länder des Donauraumes eingreifen, Italien versuchte 
ein neues Bündnissystem zu gestalten. Mussolini sah die Rolle der Donauländer 
in der italienischen Außenpolitik folgendermaßen: „Die pangermanische Lö-
sung der Donaufrage wäre für uns so unannehmbar, wie eine panslawische Lö-
sung. Das Donaubecken ist unser Hinterland. Wenn wir darauf absagen, wir 
werden eine gewichtslose Halbinsel am Rande Europas. Damit kann man mein 
Interesse in der Richtung Österreichs und Ungarns erklären.”22 Die Pläne und 
die Möglichkeiten Italien klangen aber wieder nicht mit einander zusammen. Es 
konnte das Marktproblem nicht lösen, weil seine Begabtheiten in dem Außen-
handel dies nicht ermöglichten. Hitlers Machtantritt bedeutete eine sofortige 
Wende in der Donaupolitik Deutschlands nicht. Das Denken über die ost-
mitteleuropäische Region modifizierte sich in 1934 weder in seinem Inhalt, 
noch in seinem persönlichen Bedingungen. Deutschland hatte kein Interesse an 
der raschen Lösung der wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten der Agrarstaaten. Es 
öffnete seine Märkte nur schrittweise. Mit dem Neuen Plan in September 1934 
begann die Verwirklichung der Expansion Deutschlands donauwärts.23 Staats-
sekretär Poose fasste das Wesen dieser Politik zusammen: „Als der planmäßige 
Ausbau des inneren deutschen Wirtschaftsraumes war die wichtigste Aufgabe 
der nationalsozialistische Staatsregierung, jetzt ist die Zeit angekommen, dass 
                                                 
22  Réti, György: Gömbös és a római hármas egyezmény, 1934. (Gömbös und der Drei-
mächtepakt in Rom, 1934) In: Történelmi Szemle (Historische Rundschau), 1994/1–2. 
135. 
23  Über diesen Vorgang vgl.: Broszat, Martin: Deutschland – Ungarn – Rumänien. In:  
Manfred Funke (Hrsg.): Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialen zur Außenpolitik 




wir die Einfügung der deutschen Wirtschaft in der organisch entstehenden 
’Grossraumwirtschaft’ als unsere wichtigste Obliegenheit zu betrachten.”24  
Die Nachfolgestaaten konnten weder auf einander noch auf die Grossmächte 
gegen das deutsche Eindringen stützen. Ein ungarischer ökonomischer Expert, 
József Csetényi schrieb über diese Situation wie es folgt: „Italien kann irgend 
etwas machen, Frankreich und England können mit den Mitteln der Diplomatie 
bemühen: in dem Donauraum marschiert Deutschland nach seinem Ziel, solan-
ge die Zersplitterung der Donauregion dauert, und die einzelnen Länder um 
Deutschlands Gunst wetteifern, wann, in welcher Maße und mit welchen Preise 
können sie in das deutsche Markt eingeführt werden.”25  
Der Plan von Milan Hodža in 1936 war der letzte Versuch dafür, dass die 
Staaten der Region gegen das deutsche Eindringen ökonomisch zu auftreten. Es 
mangelte sich sowohl an wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen als auch die Unterstüt-
zung der Grossmächte. Die Kleinstaatigkeit trat in die Phase des Niederganges. 
Nach 1934 gab es keine Alternative für die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit der 
Donauländer ohne Deutschland.  
In dieser aussichtslosen Lage schrieb ein ökonomischer Fachmann die fol-
genden: „Es ist möglich, dass diese Verwirklichung des Donaugedanken noch 
lange auf sich warten lässt, und man braucht noch mehr Not und Leid, um die 
Machtfaktoren sich dem Donaugedanken anzunehmen; die Tatsache wird nicht 
verändert, dass nur das einheitliche Donaubecken ist der Ramen, in dem die ge-
schichtliche Berufung der ungarischen Nation, ihre staatsorganisatorische Kraft 
und kulturelle Entwicklung zur Geltung gebracht werden kann. Diese Entfal-
tung an der Donau ist nicht nur eine ungarische Angelegenheit in dem engen 
Sinne, sondern ein europäisches Problem, ihre Verwirklichung ist der Beruf des 
Ungarntums.”26  
Diese Lösung aber scheiterte sich. Parallel mit der Erfolglosigkeit der Integ-
rationsbestrebungen wurden die westlichen Mächte aus der Region verdrängt, 
und man konnte das Eindringen Deutschlands nicht mehr aufhalten.  
                                                 
24  Berend, Iván – Ránki, György: Közép-Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19–20. század-
ban. (Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung Mittel- und Osteuropas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert) 
Budapest, 1976. 381. 
25  Csetényi, József: Új Trianon felé? (Auf dem Wege eines neuen Trianons?) Budapest, o. J. 
70. 
26  Hantos, Elemér: A dunai tengely. (Die Donauachse) In: Duna Népe (Das Volk der 
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